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Abstract 
 
Deliberative Democracy as Reflexive Social Inquiry 
 
By 
 
Quinlan Bernhard Bowman 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
 
University of California, Berkeley 
 
Professor Mark Bevir, Chair 
 
 
 
Two overarching questions motivate this dissertation: How might the participants to a nominally 
democratic process themselves craft decision-making processes that are “inclusive,” or, that best 
approximate the ideal of treating them and those, if any, they represent as “free and equal”? And 
what role, if any, might a normative theory of the democratic process play in their diverse efforts 
to do so?  
 
To address these questions, the dissertation juxtaposes selected aspects of the literature on 
“deliberative democracy” with ideas drawn from pragmatist approaches to ethics and social 
inquiry. Broadly speaking, pragmatists theorize by explicitly drawing on the resources provided 
to us by our actual practices, and by making reference to the consequences that they have for 
actual lives. The dissertation deploys pragmatist ideas to develop a normative theory of the 
democratic process, intended as a contribution to a public philosophy for contemporary 
democratic governance. In developing the theory, the dissertation illustrates how engaged, 
situated agents might invoke that theory in their diverse efforts to craft processes for collective 
decision-making that actually treat the citizens of the respective demos, or the members of the 
respective association, as “free and equal.” 
 
In brief, the theory developed in this dissertation is a “deliberative” conception because, like 
other such conceptions, it stresses that democracy’s participants ought to try to justify their 
expressed policy preferences to one another. Yet, for a number of reasons, it is also distinct from 
other deliberative conceptions. For instance, it is distinctive in the stress it places on inquiry of 
various kinds. Indeed, the theory developed here suggests that, ideally speaking, democracy itself 
ought to be conducted as a form of collective social inquiry, one in which participants inquire 
into the procedures, virtues, and cultural practices that, in some particular context, are most apt 
to treat citizens or members in a way that is consistent with the values that arguably justify the 
adoption of a democratic process in the first place. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
This dissertation, Deliberative Democracy as Reflexive Social Inquiry, juxtaposes 
selected aspects of the literature on “deliberative democracy” with ideas drawn from pragmatist 
approaches to ethics and social inquiry. Broadly speaking, pragmatists theorize by explicitly 
drawing on the resources provided to us by our actual practices, and by making reference to the 
consequences they have for actual lives. 1  Here, I deploy pragmatist ideas to develop a 
“normative theory of the democratic process,” meant as a contribution to a public philosophy for 
contemporary democratic governance. The theory, I suggest, can help democracy’s participants 
to reason about how to create “inclusive” democratic processes in a variety of associations and at 
a variety of geographic scales. The theory is basically a “deliberative” one; yet, my pragmatist 
orientation makes me critical of certain depictions of deliberative democracy.  
Two overarching questions motivate the discussion: How might the participants to a 
(nominally) democratic process themselves craft decision-making processes that are “inclusive,” 
or, that best approximate the ideal of treating them and those (if any) they (ought to) represent as 
“free and equal”? And what role, if any, might a normative theory of the democratic process play 
in their efforts to do so? To address these questions, I develop my own normative theory of the 
democratic process, illustrating how engaged, situated agents might invoke that theory in their 
diverse efforts to craft processes for collective decision-making that treat the citizens of the 
respective demos or the members of the respective association as free and equal. 
 
I. Problematic Aspects of the Literature, Suggested Resolutions 
 
To clarify the intellectual context for the project, let me outline three problematic aspects 
of relevant literatures on dialogue, deliberation, and inclusion. Along the way, I’ll briefly 
indicate how I address these problems.  
 
1.1 No Broad Agreement on What Makes a Process “Democratic,” Even at the “Ideal” Level 
 
To begin with, note that a very broad range of democrats, including so-called 
“aggregative democrats” and so-called “deliberative democrats,” apparently agree that 
democracy is a moral or ethical ideal.2 Briefly, the reason that I say this is that, at least tacitly, a 
broad range of democrats endorse some ideal of “free and equal personhood,” and, in 
consequence, some ideal of “free and equal citizenship or membership” too.3 And the notion that, 
                                                            
1 Bacon (2012: 1). 
2 On the aggregative side, some (e.g. Cohen [2009: 224]) would place Dahl (1989), for instance. On the deliberative 
side, we clearly find Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 2004), Cohen (2009), and Habermas (1996); all of these 
authors explicitly contrast the normative theory that they develop (or co-develop in the case of Gutmann and 
Thompson) with so-called “aggregative” conceptions of democracy. For brief characterizations of these two 
“models” of democracy,” see, for instance, Chappell (2012: 98-103) and Young (2000: 18-26). 
3 The notion of free and equal personhood is commonly invoked in moral and political philosophy generally, and is 
typically the basis for justifications for equal citizenship. Indeed, as George Sher (2015: 16) has recently 
commented, “One of the rare points of agreement among most…moral and political philosophers is that all persons 
have equal moral standing. To accept this claim is not to deny that there are innumerable moral reasons for treating 
different persons differently, but it is to maintain that the principles that give rise to these reasons are somehow 
rooted in the assumption that the interests of all persons are equally important, and that each is by his nature owed 
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at least in some forms of “collective decision-making” (e.g., “binding,” collective decision-
making), persons ought to be treated as “free and equal” surely is a “moral or ethical ideal.” 
Despite such agreement, however, such democrats often do not agree on what an inclusive, 
democratic process would even ideally look like. Indeed, “deliberative democracy,” for instance, 
has often been characterized as an ideal that stands in sharp contrast to “aggregative 
democracy,” even though, as I say, so-called “deliberative democrats” and so-called “aggregative 
democrats” apparently endorse some ideal of “free and equal personhood,” hence some ideal of 
“free and equal citizenship or membership” too.4  
Nevertheless, it is possible, I believe, to articulate a normative theory of the democratic 
process that is broadly persuasive to such democrats, based on the “values” of treating persons as 
“free” and as “equal” that they already endorse (or, at the very minimum, have good reason to 
endorse, given their other commitments – particularly their stated commitment to democracy 
itself).5 In short, my suggestion is that if democracy is conceived of as a moral or ethical ideal, 
there are good reasons to develop a normative theory of the democratic process that is explicitly 
deliberative, that is, which asks participants to seek out justifications for their expressed policy 
preferences. And, I suggest, it is plausible to claim that a broad range of democrats who do 
conceive of democracy as a moral or ethical ideal might endorse such a theory.  
Now, as I’ve already intimated, the approach I take to developing my normative theory of 
the democratic process is a broadly pragmatic one. And again, pragmatists theorize by explicitly 
drawing on the resources provided by our actual practices, and by making reference to the 
consequences they have for actual lives. On John Dewey’s account, this entails that, in 
developing a moral theory, we should begin with moral experience itself.6 Following this 
injunction, I reason through those moments in “moral experience” in which I believe that we are 
most likely to think and to feel that we are being treated as “free and equal” in joint or collective 
decision-making. Here, my suggestion is that if we reason carefully about our “shared 
understandings”7 of what it actually means to “treat persons as ‘free and equal’ in joint or 
collective decision-making,” there are, at a certain level of generality, plausible grounds for 
broad agreement on what a “democratic process” should at least ideally look like.8 And this is 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
an equal measure of concern and respect.” The topic of equal consideration of interests, and of equal concern and 
respect for persons, is one that we consider throughout the dissertation, but especially in chapter 5. 
4 Gutmann and Thompson (2004). 
5 For relevant discussion, see Dahl (1989), especially chapters 6-9. 
6 For discussion, see Pappas (2008), especially Parts I and II. See also chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
7 For relevant discussion, see Walzer (1983).	  
8 As this formulation suggests, my approach to developing a normative theory of the democratic process is one that 
sees such “theory development,” as I will say throughout, as an “anthropological-interpretive” enterprise. As I 
mentioned, I take inspiration from pragmatist approaches to ethics and social inquiry in developing my conception 
of such an enterprise, drawing particularly on the ideas of John Dewey. Michelle Moody-Adams has recently 
articulated an approach to moral philosophy/theory that, in relevant respects, is well aligned with the approach that I 
adopt here and that bears significant affinities with John Dewey’s approach, as she herself occasionally notes. 
“Genuine moral inquiry,” Moody-Adams (1997: 169-70) writes, “is a species of self-reflection, and philosophical 
theorizing about morality must start from the pre-theoretical moral consciousness of those capable of being 
addressed by the theory. But self-reflection that qualifies as moral inquiry first requires a careful articulation of the 
self-conception under scrutiny. And this articulation is an exercise in interpretation…. The pre-theoretical 
deliverances from which philosophical interpretation begins are accessible to the philosopher only by reflection on 
linguistic and non-linguistic behavior; moral philosophers must presume that it is possible to isolate and identify 
some portion of this behavior that may reveal the structure of moral experience. In this regard, then, moral 
philosophy always presupposes a kind of interpretive ethnography – although it usually involves fieldwork in 
familiar places…. [N]ot only does this conception of moral philosophy as an interpretive enterprise allow a robust 
 3 
true both in terms of the opportunities that participants should ideally have and in terms of the 
responsibilities that they should ideally assume.  
So, again, I reason through those moments in “moral experience” in which I believe that 
we are most likely to think and to feel that we are being treated as “free and equal” in joint or 
collective decision-making. That is, I begin with certain paradigmatic moments of “free and 
equal treatment,” reasoning through why I believe that we regard them as such. More 
specifically, I take certain joint decisions among genuine friends as paradigmatic of moral 
experiences in which we do think this way, and reason through why I think we do so. Very 
briefly, my suggestion is that we do so because they represent joint or collective decisions that 
give equal consideration to, and that show equal concern and respect for, the good or interests 
of each of the participants. Again, exploring (what I take to be) our “shared understandings” of 
such decisions, I derive an account of: first, the (equal and adequate) opportunities that 
participants ought ideally to be granted (and to grant one another) in a democratic process; and 
second, the principal responsibilities that they ought ideally to assume in it. Thinking through 
these opportunities and responsibilities, it becomes clear, I suggest, that the theory I develop is 
well described as a “deliberative” one. For, among other reasons, it asks participants to justify 
their expressed policy preferences. Hence, my approach promises to generate greater support for 
a deliberative conception of democracy, bringing a broader range of democrats, including more 
“aggregative democrats,” into the “deliberative” fold (at least at the level of political ideals; 
abstract reasoning, as I will stress throughout, can never, by itself, adjudicate disagreements 
about how to pursue particular democratic norms and values in particular contexts). And it does 
so by beginning from a number of premises associated with the pragmatic philosophy of John 
Dewey, including, as I mentioned, the idea that we ought to develop our moral theories out of 
anthropological-interpretive inquiry into moral experience itself. 
 
1.2 A Lack of Reasoning about Procedures, Virtues, and Cultural Practices in Conjunction 
 
A second problematic aspect of the literature concerns the fact that in normative 
democratic theory, there is sometimes a tendency to focus either on ideal procedures/procedural 
criteria, or on civic virtues, or on cultural practices that would arguably facilitate the creation of 
more “inclusive” democratic processes. And this tendency is sometimes evident in the literature 
on deliberative democracy in particular: indeed, deliberative theorists have sometimes focused 
either on ideal deliberative procedures/procedural criteria, or on deliberative/civic virtues, or on 
cultural practices that would arguably facilitate the creation of more “inclusive” deliberative-
democratic processes.9 However, informed reflection on paradigmatic moments of “free and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
defense of the integrity of normative moral theories as theories, but also it supports a reasonable (if cautious) 
optimism about the importance of such theories – and of philosophical moral inquiry generally – in everyday moral 
argument.” Moody-Adams (1997: 170-72) contrasts her approach to the thought of those (e.g. Daniels [1980: 21]) 
who reject “as ‘erroneous’ any suggestion that there is an important link between the methods of philosophical 
moral inquiry and the methods of interpretive inquiry,” and she likens it to “Dewey’s conception of moral 
philosophy as a contribution to the collective scrutiny of the culture from which it emerges, rather than the principal 
authoritative source of decisions about how, and whether, a moral conception is justified (Dewey 1994, 1-8). This 
Deweyan conception is an implicit rejection of the self-conception of much moral philosophy (in Daniels’s account, 
as in many others) on which moral philosophers simply hand down the ‘results’ of their inquiries to the non-
philosophical public.”	  
9 At a minimum, this tendency can be seen in individual, discrete discussions (e.g. in a single article, chapter, or 
even book) on democratic theory, as when an author discusses a “procedure” that might create a more inclusive 
deliberative-democratic process but, in that same discrete discussion, does not say much or anything about virtues 
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equal treatment” in joint or collective decision-making reveals, I suggest, that, to create such 
processes, it is generally the case that: (a) certain procedures are needed and participants need to 
(at least tacitly) invoke certain procedural criteria to reason about such procedures in an 
intelligent fashion; (b) participants need to evince certain deliberative/civic virtues in order for 
the democratic process in question to function as those procedural criteria suggest it should; and 
(c) certain cultural practices are needed to make those procedures effective and to cultivate those 
virtues.10 Correspondingly, it reveals that the participants to such decision-making typically 
recognize the need to reason about procedures, virtues, and cultural practices “in conjunction,” 
and, indeed, that they do sometimes so reason. This reasoning is important, I suggest, for it helps 
to provide a better depiction of what, in whatever context democracy’s participants do (have to) 
act, an inclusive deliberative-democratic process would ideally look like. And, by implication, it 
can help them to improve their ability to craft actual decision-making processes that are 
(reasonably) “democratically inclusive.” (Or at least it can help them to craft decision-making 
processes that are more “democratically inclusive” than the respective processes were ex ante.) 
Again, when we appeal to paradigmatic moments of free and equal treatment in joint or 
collective decision-making, we can easily appreciate this, I think. So far as I am aware, however, 
no deliberative theorist has yet articulated a normative theory with the stated aim of helping 
democracy’s participants to reason about procedures, virtues, and cultural practices “in 
conjunction” – as I’ve just indicated that informed reflection on paradigmatic moments of “free 
and equal treatment” suggests they should. Indeed, in a variety of ways, discussions of 
procedures, virtues, and cultural practices have proceeded in relative isolation from one another. 
To illustrate, consider three brief examples.  
Take first Habermas’s presentation of his own “normative model of democracy,” which 
he describes as a “procedural” conception of democracy. Here we have a case of a democratic 
theorist presenting an insightful discussion of an ideal procedure, but without at the same time 
explicitly discussing its relation to and dependence on virtues and cultural practices. Indeed, at 
least in the presentation offered in “Three Normative Models of Democracy,”11 Habermas 
intimates that, in contrast to “the republican view” of democratic politics, his own normative 
democratic theory is not “dependent upon the virtues of citizens devoted to the public weal.”12 In 
point of fact, as I describe at length in chapter 1, Habermas, oddly enough, adopts certain 
locutions in “Three Normative Models of Democracy” that can reasonably be construed as 
suggesting that his model is not dependent on the “virtues” of citizens at all. (An odd suggestion, 
I know. But see the discussion in section 1.2 of chapter 1 for a detailed explanation of these 
claims.) This way of effectively distancing himself from any attempt explicitly to elaborate the 
virtues that might assist democracy’s participants in realizing (something akin to) his 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and cultural practices. The point here is not that the author in question only ever gives attention to one of the three 
topics in question – that he always ignores the other two topics. He might, indeed, discuss these topics elsewhere. 
Rather, the point is that, in presenting his normative democratic theory, the three topics in question are not 
presented and reasoned about “in conjunction”– a fact that, I believe, weakens the theory’s potential contribution to 
improving actual democratic practice. Below I provide some brief examples.  
10 This claim is developed throughout the dissertation, but especially in chapter 4. Note that by “cultural practices” I 
shall loosely mean practices that draw from the broader culture in which a (nominally) democratic process takes 
place, ones that, if they were somehow incorporated into that process, would arguably: assist the participants in 
assuming (or dispose them to assume) the responsibilities that our procedural criteria suggest they should ideally 
assume; promote the effective granting of the opportunities that our procedural criteria suggest they should have; 
and consequently promote the exhibition of certain relevant virtues.  
11 Habermas (1994). 
12 Ibid. 3-4. 
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“procedural” conception of democracy leads to a lack of attention being paid to the cultural 
practices that arguably might promote the cultivation of such virtues. Likewise, it leads us away 
from the question: How might such cultural practices be incorporated into the procedures (the 
“various forms for deliberation” and “fair bargaining processes”13) that he describes as laying the 
basis for democratic legitimacy in his model?  
Take next Gutmann and Thompson’s discussion (in Democracy and Disagreement) of 
the deliberative/civic virtues that the authors would like democracy’s participants ideally to 
exhibit. Here we have a case of two democratic theorists presenting an insightful discussion of 
relevant virtues, but without at the same time explicitly discussing their relation to an ideal 
procedure (or to a set of ideal procedural criteria) and without at the same time discussing their 
relation to and dependence on cultural practices. For instance, Gutmann and Thompson discuss 
the virtue of “civic integrity,” which they think that deliberators should exhibit in order to show 
one another “mutual respect.”14 The authors unpack this virtue in terms of three more specific 
dispositions: the disposition to show “consistency in speech,” the disposition to show 
“consistency between speech and action,” and the disposition to show “integrity of principle.”15 
The authors plausibly argue, I think, that by exhibiting these specific dispositions in the face of 
moral disagreement, the participants to a moral dialogue and deliberation thereby show respect 
for their interlocutors. Yet, the authors do not indicate what, if any, role specific cultural 
practices might actually play in cultivating these virtues. (In the broader culture in which any 
given democratic process might take place, surely there are practices for, say, testing the extent 
to which individuals – for instance, legislators – show “integrity of principle.” Very broadly, one 
common way of doing so is to test what a legislator says in public about his “moral values” 
against what his public record indicates about those values. We often do this, for instance, by 
comparing his campaign and other public speeches to his actual voting record.) Likewise, they 
do not indicate how, if at all, such practices might be incorporated into this or that particular 
procedure or aspect of the democratic process (for instance, how cultural practices of the kind 
just mentioned might be incorporated into actual public-opinion formation processes or agenda-
setting process). Nor do they indicate what, if any, relationship the virtue in question has to a 
particular set of ideal procedural criteria.16  
Take finally Iris Young’s discussion of “inclusive political communication” in Inclusion 
and Democracy.17 Young discusses various ways in which democracy’s participants can use 
greeting, rhetoric, and narratives/storytelling for the purpose of creating more inclusive forms of 
political communication. As I employ the term (see note 7 above), the practice of offering 
greetings, the practice of employing rhetoric in speech, and the practice of offering 
narratives/storytelling may each be described as a “cultural practice.” Now, here we have a case 
of a democratic theorist presenting an insightful discussion of cultural practices that, in some 
cases at least, could arguably promote more inclusive deliberative-democratic engagements, but 
without saying much about (ideal) procedures/procedural criteria and while only providing a 
                                                            
13 Ibid.	  
14 Gutmann and Thompson (1996: 81).  
15 Ibid. 81-83. 
16 In speaking of “ideal procedures” and “ideal procedural criteria,” I have in mind, for instance, the “ideal 
deliberative procedure” offered by Cohen (2009) and the “criteria for a democratic process” offered by Dahl (1989). 
(Note that Dahl [1989: 108] himself describes the criteria as articulating “ideal standards” for a democratic process.) 
I discuss these authors’ respective normative democratic theories in chapter 1 and, in the case of Dahl, again in 
chapter 5.  
17 Young (2000: chapter 2). 
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limited discussion of the relationship between the cultural practices that she discusses and 
specific virtues that she thinks participants ought ideally to exhibit. As this formulation suggests, 
the specific variant of the tendency in question is subtler in this example. Yet, it is still 
identifiable.  
Consider, for instance, Young’s discussion of the cultural practice of offering 
narratives/storytelling. “Some internal exclusions18 occur because participants in a political 
public do not have sufficiently shared understandings to fashion a set of arguments with shared 
premises, or appeals to shared experiences and values.”19 Where this is the case, “arguments 
alone will do little to allow public voice for those excluded from the discourse. Another mode of 
expression, narrative, serves important functions in democratic communication, to foster 
understanding among members of a polity with very different experience or assumptions about 
what is important.”20 Young goes on to say that narratives/storytelling can help democracy’s 
participants to understand the “experience of others” and to counter “pre-understandings.”21 
“While it sometimes happens,” she says, “that people know they are ignorant about the lives of 
others in the polity, perhaps more often people come to a situation of political discussion with a 
stock of empty generalities, false assumptions, or incomplete and biased pictures of the needs, 
aspirations, and histories of others with whom or about whom they communicate.”22 Young’s 
presentation suggests that she thinks that, ideally speaking, participants ought to try to 
understand others’ experiences and that they ought to try to counter “pre-understandings” that 
preclude them from doing so. However, this implied claim is not given a clear formulation in 
terms of how it relates to an ideal procedure or a set of ideal procedural criteria. For instance, she 
does not explicitly say that she endorses a specific set of ideal procedural criteria that specify 
(among other things) certain responsibilities that participants ought ideally to assume. Were she 
to do so, we might be able easily to make sense of the implied claim that, ideally speaking, 
participants ought to try to understand others’ experiences and ought to try to counter “pre-
understandings” that preclude them from doing so. If, for instance, she defended a specific ideal 
procedural criterion that said, “participants should assume responsibility for seeking out mutually 
acceptable and generally accessible reasons for their expressed preferences” (as I later do23), we 
could easily explain the implied claim. We might then say, for instance, that in order to seek out 
reasons for one’s expressed policy preferences that could be regarded as “mutually acceptable,” 
one has also to assume responsibility for trying to understand other participants’ experiences 
(and how they bear on whether the “reasons” in question could be regarded as “mutually 
acceptable”). Unless one does so, one simply can’t seek out “mutually acceptable reasons.” 
Furthermore, in order to understand other participants’ experiences, one sometimes does have to 
                                                            
18 On the notion of “internal exclusion,” Young (2000: 55) writes: “Having obtained a presence in the public, 
citizens sometimes find that those still more powerful in the process exercise, often unconsciously, a new form of 
exclusion: others ignore or dismiss or patronize their statements and expressions. Though formally included in a 
forum or process, people may find that their claims are not taken seriously and may believe that they are not treated 
with equal respect. The dominant mood may find their ideas or modes of expression silly or simple, and not worthy 
of consideration. They may find that their experiences as relevant to the issues under discussion are so different from 
others’ in the public that their views are discounted. I call these familiar experiences internal exclusion, because 
they concern ways that people lack effective opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have 
access to fora and procedures of decision-making.” 
19 Ibid. 71. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 73. 
22 Ibid. 74.	  
23 See chapter 5. 
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counter the “pre-understandings” that preclude such understanding. Hence, Young could then 
present the responsibilities in question as straightforward entailments of an explicit ideal 
procedural criterion.  
Of course, Young does give some indication of the “model” of democratic decision-
making that she regards as “legitimate,”24 and this model helps to explain why she thinks that 
participants ought to try to understand others’ experiences and why she thinks that they ought to 
try to counter whatever “pre-understandings” preclude them from doing so. Hence, at the 
beginning of the chapter in question (chapter 2), Young does refer us back to the previous 
chapter, pointing out that she there “endorsed a normative ideal of democracy as a process of 
communication among citizens and public officials, where they make proposals and criticize one 
another, and aim to persuade one another of the best solution to collective problems.”25 Here she 
says that “participants in the processes of communication must be reasonable in the sense of 
willing to be accountable to others. The process must be open in the sense of public and 
accessible for it to count as normatively legitimate.”26 “Most importantly,” she continues, 
“democratic norms mandate inclusion as a criterion of the political legitimacy of outcomes. 
Democracy entails political equality, that all members of the polity are included equally in the 
decision-making process and have an equal opportunity to influence the outcome.”27 This type of 
inclusion “increases the chances that those who make proposals will transform their positions 
from an initial self-regarding stance to a more objective appeal to justice, because they must 
listen to others with differing positions to whom they are also answerable.”28  
Notice, however, that these formulations do not lead to a clear defense of the 
responsibilities in question in the same way that I just suggested that a direct appeal to an ideal 
procedural criterion could. Indeed, with Young’s presentation, many questions immediately 
arise, in part because the discussion of the “model” is not clearly integrated with the discussion 
of the responsibilities in question. Here, for instance, one might reasonably ask: “How, if at all, 
does having an ‘equal opportunity to influence the outcome’ relate to these responsibilities? 
Perhaps this means that they have equal agenda-setting rights, equal rights to voice in the 
process, and equal voting rights. But how, if at all, do these ‘rights’ relate to the responsibilities 
in question?” Furthermore, one might reasonably ask: “Why ‘must [participants] listen to others 
with differing positions to whom they are also answerable,’ as Young says?” Perhaps one might 
think: “Yes, participants should have an ‘equal opportunity to influence the outcome’; but this 
does not mean that I have to ‘listen to them,’ hence try to understand their ‘experiences.’ It just 
means that they have equal agenda-setting rights, equal rights to voice in the process, and equal 
voting rights.” Here, I am not suggesting that Young is likely to lack reasonable answers to these 
questions. Again, I am merely pointing out that Young’s presentation does not lead to a clear 
defense of the responsibilities in question in the same way that I suggested that a direct appeal to 
an ideal procedural criterion could. For again, with Young’s presentation, the discussion of the 
“model” of legitimacy that she endorses is not clearly integrated with the discussion of the 
responsibilities that she thinks participants should ideally assume. Consequently, the discussion 
of the relevance of the practice of offering narratives/storytelling that she discusses in connection 
                                                            
24 Ibid. 52.	  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid.	  
27 Ibid. 52. 
28 Ibid. 52.	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with those responsibilities is less clear than it otherwise might have been, had she presented that 
practice as directly promoting this or that ideal procedural criterion. 
Finally, a similar point may be made about the topic of virtues. Young implies that 
participants should assume certain virtues, but she does not clearly state that they should do so in 
the discussion in question.29 This, I think, is lamentable, in part because virtue-terms help us to 
communicate what is, or what would be, involved in the assumption of such responsibilities as 
Young implies that participants should assume, such as the ones discussed above: the 
responsibility for trying to understand other participants’ experiences and for trying to counter 
“pre-understandings” that preclude them from doing so. For instance, if person A wants to 
communicate to person B how she thinks that person B might actually come to understand her 
particular experiences and grievances, she is likely to want to appeal to virtue-terms; she is likely 
to want to say things like, “If you were only a bit more patient in listening to me, you’d probably 
see where I’m coming from”; “Be a little more charitable in your interpretation of my motives; 
not everyone is completely self-interested”; “Just try to be more open-minded; it will help you to 
see my perspective.” Correspondingly, without making any reference to virtue-terms, it typically 
would become harder for individuals to discuss the means by which they think others might 
assume such responsibilities as are in question. Hence, for these and other reasons, it seems to 
me lamentable that Young does not explicitly discuss the virtues that the cultural practice of 
offering narratives/storytelling might help to cultivate. 
So, here we have three examples that illustrate the intellectual tendency previously 
indicated: that in which a deliberative theorist focuses either on ideal deliberative 
procedures/procedural criteria, or on deliberative/civic virtues, or on cultural practices that 
would arguably facilitate the creation of more “inclusive” deliberative-democratic processes. 
Yet, again, informed reflection on paradigmatic moments of “free and equal treatment” in joint 
or collective decision-making reveals, I believe, that, to create such processes, it is generally the 
case that: (a) certain procedures are needed and participants need (at least tacitly) to invoke 
certain procedural criteria to reason intelligently about such procedures; (b) participants need to 
evince certain deliberative/civic virtues in order for the democratic process in question to 
function as those procedural criteria suggest it should; and (c) certain cultural practices are 
needed to make those procedures effective and to cultivate those virtues. If so, it would seem that 
participants should ideally reason about procedures, virtues, and cultural practices “in 
conjunction” – an observation that immediately suggests the thought that a normative theory of 
the democratic process might help them to do so. 
Accordingly, the perspective I develop is that the democratic process ought to be 
conceived of as a form of collective social inquiry, in which participants inquire into the 
procedures, virtues, and cultural practices that, in some particular context, are most apt to 
promote the formulation and realization of their own democratic aims and that are most liable to 
treat citizens or members as free and equal. John Dewey took the view that democracy ought to 
be a form of collective social inquiry, but said little about what this might mean in practice.30 As 
                                                            
29 Indeed, the word “virtue” only appears in two sentences (two consecutive sentences, in fact) in the chapter in 
question. And when it does so, the term is not used to refer to individual behaviors, dispositions, or character traits at 
all. “Standards of political communication,” Young (2000: 80; my emphasis) writes, “should be thought of as 
virtues…rather than as conditions of entry into public deliberation. Arguments, greetings, stories, and rhetoric all 
have their virtues.” But what about the participants who do assume the responsibilities that she implies they should? 
Aren’t they to be praised for exhibiting certain virtues? 
30 Dewey (1927).  
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we have already seen, Dewey also enjoined us to develop moral theories by beginning with 
“moral experience itself,” but said little about what this might mean in the case of normative 
democratic theory in particular. Here, I take up and develop these two Deweyan injunctions, 
arguing that a normative theory of the democratic process can function as a “tool” for practical 
reasoning, one that could “guide” the collective social inquiry mentioned above. That is, I argue 
that a normative theory of the democratic process could “guide” collective inquiry into the 
procedures, virtues, and cultural practices that are most apt to promote the formulation and 
realization of participants’ own democratic aims and that are most liable to treat citizens or 
members as free and equal. And again, reflection on certain paradigmatic moral experiences can 
help us to see why participants ought ideally to engage in such inquiry in the first place. More 
specifically, I suggest that when we reflect on those joint or collective decisions (say, among 
friends) in which we typically do think that we are being treated as “free and equal,” we notice 
that we typically do recognize the need to inquire, and that we sometimes do inquire, into 
procedures, virtues, and cultural practices (in my sense). Correspondingly, I suggest that, in order 
for the participants to a democratic process to treat one other (and those, if any, they [ought to] 
represent) as “free and equal,” they too should do so. In this way, I develop an understanding of 
“inclusive” democratic decision-making which underscores the crucial importance of 
participants themselves engaging in collective reasoning about procedures, virtues, and cultural 
practices, and not just about the rules, laws, and/or policies that are to be enacted through a 
“democratic process.” This way of approaching democratic inclusion offers a more robust, and 
so attractive, conception of democratic self-governance. Or so that will be my suggestion. 
 
1.3 Problems Related to the Lingering Legacy of the Fact/Value Dichotomy 
 
A third problematic aspect of the literature relates to the fact that in reasoning about 
democratic dialogue, deliberation, and inclusion, theorists have tended to focus on the moment of 
decision-making itself (and perhaps the immediate process leading up to it). Hence, they have 
asked such questions as: Who is present? Who do they “represent,” and who ought they to 
represent? What kinds of “reasons” or “considerations” are exchanged in the deliberative forum 
(Are they inclusive? Do they address participants as moral equals? Are they, or could they be, 
mutually justifiable?). Obviously, such questions are important for any discussion of democratic 
dialogue, deliberation and inclusion. However, by adopting this focus when we develop a 
normative theory of the democratic process and when we reason about how best to treat citizens 
or members as “free and equal” in practice, we run the risk of reproducing a certain problem that 
Iris Murdoch once identified with a good deal of modern moral philosophy generally.  
To describe that problem in terms that are specific to our own purposes, we might say the 
following. To draw the “right,” or even just an “intelligent” or “morally sensitive,” conclusion 
about how to act in some particular case, one obviously needs to have an “adequate” description 
of one’s situation. And typically, the process of arriving at such a description has been regarded 
as “theoretical reasoning” rather than “practical reasoning,” where the former has been 
construed as “reasoning about the facts” while the latter has been construed as “reasoning about 
one’s values.”31 Hence, theoretical and practical forms of reasoning have been sharply separated, 
with reasoning about the facts therefore being sharply separated from reasoning about one’s 
values. Correspondingly, much social inquiry, at least where it has aimed to be “scientific,” has 
                                                            
31 For discussion, see Millgram (2005: 17-18). 
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sought to be “value-free” and/or “value-neutral,”32 and has taken its task to be the provision of 
information that is merely “factual,” which can in turn lead to “rational” (moral/ethical) decision-
making. Hence, the view has been that when we reason properly, we only make “value 
judgments” in the moment or process of decision-making itself (in the moment or process of 
deciding how to act in response to our circumstances); if we are “rational,” we do not do so 
when coming up with the descriptions with which we then make “rational” decisions. Thus, 
much modern moral philosophy has focused on the moment of decision-making itself, and has 
assumed that “value-judgments” are properly made only after we have an “adequate” description 
of our situation at hand.33 (This last sentence captures the “problem” that Murdoch once 
identified with much modern moral philosophy generally; see above.) 
But this focus is, I think, detrimental to moral/ethical reasoning, and misrepresents how it 
actually functions. To indicate why, I begin with two of Murdoch’s arguments, but develop my 
own defense of them, primarily making reference to arguments from the pragmatist tradition. 
The two arguments are: first, that one cannot sharply distinguish between “facts” and “values”; 
and second, that much of the “hard work” involved in moral/ethical reasoning actually occurs in 
the process of coming up with an “adequate” description of one’s situation, a process that 
precedes “decision-making” (as this is typically depicted: as reasoning about how to act in 
response to one’s circumstances and in light of one’s values) and that itself involves “value 
judgments.”34 (Hence the problem with moral philosophy focusing on the moment of decision-
making itself and sharply separating “theoretical reasoning” from “practical reasoning” [hence 
reasoning about “the facts” from reasoning about “one’s values”].)  
To defend these arguments, I develop (what I regard as) the pragmatic viewpoint that all 
inquiry is “value-guided” and “value-laden.” (The idea that our social inquiries in particular are 
“value-laden” is a familiar, though not uncontroversial, one in the contemporary social 
sciences.35 As far as I am aware, however, “value-guided” is a term of art, and I will therefore 
need to describe what I mean by it.36) Having done so, I then move on to discuss various reasons 
for thinking that, in light of the inevitable “value-guidedness” and “value-ladenness” of all of our 
inquiries, anything that is said (and not said) in some particular inquiry could have “moral or 
ethical significance and implications.” Furthermore, I discuss various reasons for thinking that 
those engaged in a deliberative process of mutual justification should try to understand that 
significance/those implications. On the whole, the literature on deliberative democracy has not 
been adequately attentive to this point. Indeed, by focusing on the moment of decision-making 
itself and by not explicitly disavowing the fact/value dichotomy,37 deliberative democrats and 
                                                            
32 For discussion, see, for instance, Kincaid et al. (2007), Proctor (1991), Putnam (2002), Putnam and Walsh (2012), 
Sayer (2011), and Taylor (1985). 
33 The astute observer will immediately observe at least one major problem with this view. The idea of having an 
“adequate” description of the situation at hand is itself a “value judgment.” And even on the view I’m describing 
here, the judgment that one has such a description is made before we reason about how to act in light of the situation 
at hand. Yet, at the same time, if we reason properly/rationally, on that view, “value judgments” are only to occur 
when we decide or reason about how to act in light of (our description of) our situation. For discussion, see chapter 
6.  
34 Murdoch (1999); for discussion, see Millgram (2005, chapter 5). 
35 For discussion, see, for instance, Kincaid et al. (2007), Proctor (1991), Putnam (2002), Putnam and Walsh (2012), 
Sayer (2011), and Taylor (1985). 
36 I do so in chapter 6. There, I’ll also explain various senses in which our inquiries may be “value-laden” too.	  
37 Notice that my point here is not that deliberative democrats argue for the fact/value dichotomy. My point is rather 
that, in deliberative-democratic theory, it seems to me that insufficient attention has gone to explicitly disavowing 
the fact/value dichotomy (and so to thinking through the implications of our doing so, for how we should conceive 
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others arguably run the risk of reproducing the problematic view of moral/ethical reasoning just 
discussed. That is, if we do not give due attention to the descriptive-evaluative processes that 
inevitably precede decision-making and that inevitably exercise great influence over it, we 
arguably run this risk of reproducing this problematic view. By contrast, I put these processes at 
the center of my normative theory of the democratic process, making the politics of knowledge 
production central to it.   
How, though, do I do so?  
Above, I indicated that, on the theory that I develop, the democratic process ought ideally 
to be conducted as a form of “collective social inquiry.” But the fuller argument that I develop is 
an extended version of that claim. It reads like this: Ideally speaking, the democratic process is 
best conceived of as a form of “collective social inquiry,” but one that, more specifically, is 
conducted as a “reflexive social practice”: as a practice in which participants recognize the 
potential need to inquire, and, as appropriate, actually do inquire, into the (potential or actual) 
moral or ethical significance and implications of whatever is said (and not said) in whatever 
inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, that process.38 Briefly, I arrive at this view as 
follows.  
As just indicated, there is a traditional view of “rational” moral or ethical reasoning that 
views it as a process that consists in two clearly distinct and separable “moments”: a “value-free” 
and/or “value-neutral” one, where we first figure out what our situation is; and (as we might put 
it) a “value-guided” and “value-laden” one, where we then decide how we would should (like to) 
act in light of that situation. But the problem with this view is that all inquiry is apparently 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
of “expertise,” “social science,” “knowledge production,” and the like, within and through deliberative-democratic 
processes), which raises the concern that, given that the fact/value dichotomy remains something of a “cultural 
institution,” deliberative democrats might (wittingly or unwittingly) contribute to the reproduction of that dichotomy 
in our thinking. On the loose sense in which I use the term “cultural institution,” consider the following remarks by 
Hilary Putnam, which serve also to indicate the relevance of challenging this dichotomy in our own discussion of 
everyday moral dialogue and deliberation and our own discussion of democratic theory and practice. “Understood in 
a sufficiently wide sense,” Putnam (1990: 127-28) remarks, “the topic of fact and value is a topic which is of 
concern to everyone. In this respect, it differs sharply from many philosophical questions. Most educated men and 
women do not feel it obligatory to have an opinion on the question whether there really is a real world or only 
appears to be one, for example. Questions in philosophy of language, epistemology, and even in metaphysics may 
appear to be questions which, however interesting, are somewhat optional from the point of view of most people’s 
lives. But the question of fact and value is a forced choice question. Any reflective person has to have a real opinion 
upon it (which may or may not be the same as their notional opinion). If the question of fact and value is a forced 
choice question for reflective people, one particular answer to that question, the answer that fact and value are 
totally disjoint realms, that the dichotomy ‘statement of fact or value judgment’ is an absolute one, has assumed the 
status of a cultural institution…. By calling the dichotomy a cultural institution, I mean to suggest that it is an 
unfortunate fact that the received answer will go on being the received answer for quite some time regardless of 
what philosophers may say about it, and regardless of whether or not the answer is right. Even if I could convince 
you that the fact-value dichotomy is without rational basis, that it is a rationally indefensible dichotomy, or even if 
some better philosopher than I could show this by an absolutely conclusive argument (of course there are no such in 
philosophy), still the next time you went out onto the street, or to a cocktail party, or had a discussion at some 
deliberative body of which you happen to be a member, you would find someone saying to you, ‘Is that supposed to 
be a statement of fact or a value judgment?’ The view that there is no fact of the matter as to whether or not things 
are good or bad or better or worse, etc. has, in a sense, become instutionalized.” I agree with Putnam’s assessment, 
and I think that democrats – including deliberative democrats – ought to take up the challenge of showing why the 
fact/value dichotomy is a “rationally indefensible dichotomy.” Here, I hope to contribute to that challenge, but make 
no claim to have fully met it. 
38 For an explanation of why I say “the (potential or actual) moral or ethical significance and implications of 
whatever is said (and not said)” in those inquiries, see chapter 5, note 83. 
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“value-guided” and “value-laden,” and so there apparently is no form of inquiry that is “value-
free” and/or “value-neutral.” From this it follows, I submit, that anything we say in any of our 
inquiries could have “moral or ethical significance and implications.” Hence, insofar as it is 
“rational,” the democratic process will not be divided into two stages (as the traditional view 
would have it), one in which participants “gather the facts” about relevant circumstances (where 
this process is viewed as one of collecting and/or producing observational, descriptive, 
explanatory, and predictive information, data, and/or knowledge about the facts of those 
circumstances and where this is viewed as not involving “value judgments”) and one in which 
they subsequently decide together – through some form of collective decision-making – what 
(individual or collective) “ends” or “values” they would like to realize, and how they would like 
to do so, given those circumstances. Rather, insofar as it is “rational,” I suggest, the democratic 
process will be conducted as a “reflexive social practice”: again, as a practice in which 
participants recognize the potential need to inquire, and, as appropriate, actually do inquire, into 
the (potential or actual) moral or ethical significance and implications of whatever is said (and 
not said) in whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, that process. This is not 
only because the aforementioned traditional view of moral or ethical reasoning fails on its own 
terms (as I try to indicate it does); it is also because the normative theory of the democratic 
process that I develop in chapter 5 suggests its own view of “rationality” that is relevant here.39 
                                                            
39 It is well to recall that “moral” or “ethical” discourse has sometimes been characterized as “arational” or perhaps 
even “irrational,” since, in modernist thinking at least, values have often been seen as “beyond the scope of reason,” 
in Andrew Sayer’s (2011: 3) phrase. However, I agree with Sayer (and with John Dewey, for that matter) that 
“values [are] within reason” (Sayer 2011: chapter 2). Furthermore, I agree with Hanna Pitkin’s assessment that 
“moral discourse” has its own kind of “rationality.” Pitkin (1972: 152-154; my emphasis) writes: “Those 
positivistically inclined…will doubt that moral discourse can have a logic or a rationality at all, since it seems to 
them ‘normative’ and resting ultimately on personal preference or taste or feeling, beyond the reach of reason…. 
Against this view, [Freidrich] Waismann and [Stanley] Cavell and [Michael] Oakeshott argue that moral discourse 
has its own standards of rationality; it does not lack logic, but its logic is of a different kind and structure than the 
logic of science. Oakeshott maintains, at least with respect to conduct, that each kind of human activity has an 
‘idiom’ of its own, with its own distinctive rationality. Rationality is not one single thing, the same in all areas of 
thought, but has its own distinct embodiments in various realms of human life. It consists essentially of faithfulness 
to the particular idiom in which one happens to be operating…. In science or mathematics, the rationality of an 
argument depends upon its leading from premises all parties accept, in steps that all can follow, to an agreement 
upon a conclusion which all must accept. And, of course, “all must accept” does not mean that no human creature 
could conceivably refuse or fail to accept the conclusion. It means, rather, that anyone who fails to accept the 
conclusion is regarded as either incompetent in that mode of reasoning, or irrational…. But the criteria of rationality 
in scientific agreement need not be taken as the only ones in the world, as equally defining rationality in esthetics or 
morals or politics…. The point of moral argument [or more discourse in general, I would add] is not agreement on a 
conclusion, but successful clarification of two people’s positions vis-à-vis each other. [And, mutatis mutandis, we 
could say the same thing about “the point” of moral argument where there are various interlocutors.] Its function is 
to make the positions of the various protagonists clear – to themselves and to the others. Moral discourse is about 
what was done, how it is to be assessed, what position each is taking toward it and thereby toward each other, and 
hence what each is like and what their future relations will be like. The hope, of course, is for reconciliation, but the 
test of validity in moral discourse will not be reconciliation but truthful revelation of self. ‘The direct point’ of moral 
discourse, Cavell says, ‘is to determine the positions we are assuming or are able or willing to assume responsibility 
for.’ Consequently, again, ‘what makes moral argument [or discourse] rational is not the assumption that we can 
always come to agreement about what ought to be done on the basis of rational methods. Its rationality lies in 
following the methods which lead to a knowledge of our position, of where we stand.’”  
Following Pitkin’s depiction of moral argument/discourse, one way of explaining my interest in critiquing 
the fact/value dichotomy can be put this way: If all inquiry is, as I say, “value-guided” and “value-laden,” and yet 
we think that (in Putnam’s phrase) “fact and value are totally disjoint realms,” we will therefore miss the various 
ways in which “values” are “involved in” our inquiries, hence the various in which values (including, in some cases, 
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According to that theory, participants to the democratic process ought ideally to seek out 
mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons for their expressed policy preferences. And 
this entails that they try to understand “relevant social situations and activities from relevant 
persons’ perspectives,” which in turn entails that they try to understand “the (potential or actual) 
moral or ethical significance and implications” of what participants say (and do not say) in 
relation to those situations and activities. (This, I suggest, is an aim that the idea of “value-
free/neutral” social [-scientific] inquiry can undermine.) Hence, a reflexive social practice can 
help the participants to the democratic process to assume certain of the responsibilities that the 
normative theory of the democratic process that I develop suggests they should ideally assume.  
In other words, if our aim is to engage in an inclusive, self-reflective moral dialogue and 
deliberation (as my normative theory of the democratic process suggests it should be), we 
should, therefore, seek to understand “the (potential or actual) moral or ethical significance and 
implications” of whatever is said during that process, based on whatever “knowledge,” 
“information,” or “data” it is (implicitly or explicitly) based on.  
 
II. A Summary of the Reconstructive Argument 
 
Now, taking the positive or reconstructive aspects of the above arguments together, we 
can then see the reasonableness of a certain conception of democracy, which I refer to as 
“Deliberative Democracy as Reflexive Social Inquiry.” Let me now reiterate the main 
reconstructive aspects of the above three arguments (from Sections 1.1 through 1.3) and then 
indicate how this is so. 
To begin with, there are, as I previously indicated, two overarching questions behind the 
entire the discussion: How might the participants to a (nominally) democratic process 
themselves craft decision-making processes that are “inclusive,” or, that best approximate the 
ideal of treating them and those (if any) they (ought to) represent as “free and equal”? And what 
role, if any, might a “normative theory of the democratic process” play in their efforts to do so? 
To address these questions, I develop my own normative theory of the democratic process and 
illustrate how engaged, situated agents might invoke that theory in their diverse efforts to craft 
processes for collective decision-making that treat the citizens of the respective demos or the 
members of the respective association as “free and equal.” I do so by developing three main 
reconstructive arguments. 
First, it is possible, I believe, to articulate a normative theory of the democratic process 
that is broadly acceptable to all democrats who view democracy as a “moral or ethical ideal,” 
based on some notion of “free and equal personhood,” and so some notion of “free and equal 
citizenship or membership” too. More specifically, I claim that if we reason carefully about our 
“shared understandings” of what, in practice, it actually means to “treat persons as ‘free and 
equal’ in joint or collective decision-making,” it is possible to generate broad agreement on what 
a “democratic process” should at least ideally look like. This is true both in terms of the 
opportunities that participants ought ideally to be granted (and that they ought ideally to grant 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
moral or ethical values) are conveyed by our inquiries too. And this can undermine the kind of “truthful revelation of 
self” that Pitkin speaks of here. Accordingly, it can undermine the aim of engaging in a genuine, self-reflective 
moral-ethical dialogue and deliberation, which the normative theory of the democratic process developed in chapter 
5 suggests that participants should ideally do. In that sense, a philosophy of social inquiry that denies the “value-
guidedness” and “value-ladenness” of all of our social inquiries might be considered a source of “irrationality” in 
relation to a deliberative-democratic process (if, indeed, it is plausible to claim that all of those inquiries are “value-
guided” and “value-laden.”) 
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one another) and in terms of the responsibilities that they should ideally assume. And when we 
articulate these opportunities and responsibilities, the theory that emerges is well described as a 
“deliberative” one. For, among other things, it asks participants to justify their expressed policy 
preferences. 
Second, I argue that the democratic process ought to be conceived of as a form of 
collective social inquiry, in which participants inquire into the procedures, virtues, and cultural 
practices that are most apt to promote the formulation and realization of their own democratic 
aims and are most liable to treat them (and those, if any, they [ought to] represent) as free and 
equal. To do so, I take up and develop two Deweyan suggestions: first, that democracy ought to 
be a form of collective social inquiry; and second, that, in developing a moral theory, we should 
begin with “moral experience itself.” Following these suggestions, I note that when we reflect on 
those joint or collective decisions (say, among genuine friends) in which we are most likely to 
think and to feel that we are being treated as “free and equal,” we notice that we do recognize the 
need to inquire into, and that, as appropriate, we actually do inquire into, the procedures, virtues, 
and cultural practices that would arguably promote the ability of “the process” in question to 
give equal consideration to, and to show equal concern and respect for, the good or interests of 
each of the participants. So, by analogy, I suggest that in order for democracy’s participants to 
treat one another (and those, if any, they [ought to] represent) as “free and equal,” they too 
should recognize the need to conduct such inquiry and, as appropriate, they too should actually 
do so. 
Finally, I argue that the participants to a democratic process should be aware that 
anything that is said (and not said) in whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context 
of, that process could have “moral or ethical significance and implications.” Historically, much 
social inquiry, at least where it has aimed to be “scientific,” has sought to be “value-free” and/or 
“value-neutral.” On a certain traditional view, such inquiry that has been thought to lay the basis 
for “rational” decision-making. By contrast, the pragmatist starting point is that all inquiry is, in 
my terminology, “value-guided” and “value-laden.” If so, this implies, I suggest, that anything 
that is said (and not said) in any particular inquiry could have “moral or ethical significance and 
implications.” And those engaged in a deliberative process of mutual justification should try to 
understand that significance/those implications. So, “rational” decision-making has a different 
meaning here. 
So, when we take these three reconstructive arguments together, we can then see the 
reasonableness of a conception of democracy which regards it as a process in which, ideally 
speaking, the free and equal citizens of the respective demos or the free and equal members of 
the pertinent association: enter into a moral-ethical dialogue and deliberation with one another; 
view that dialogue and deliberation as a process of inclusive, collective social inquiry; and 
conduct that inquiry as what I call a “reflexive social practice.” Hence the title of this 
dissertation: Deliberative Democracy as Reflexive Social Inquiry. 
 
III. Organization of the Dissertation 
 
 In section 1.2 above, I suggested that one problematic aspect of relevant literatures is that 
there is sometimes a tendency to focus either on (ideal) procedures/procedural criteria, or on 
civic virtues, or on cultural practices that would arguably facilitate a more “inclusive” 
democratic process. And, I noted, this tendency is sometimes apparent in the literature on 
deliberative democracy in particular: indeed, deliberative theorists have sometimes focused 
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either on ideal deliberative procedures/procedural criteria, or on deliberative/civic virtues, or on 
cultural practices that would arguably facilitate a more “inclusive” deliberative-democratic 
processes. Thus, in a variety of ways, discussions of procedures, virtues, and cultural practices 
have proceeded in relative isolation from one another.  
In chapter 1, I discuss one variant of the tendency in question at length: the tendency to 
focus on (ideal) procedures/procedural criteria without at the same time explicitly discussing 
deliberative/civic virtues and cultural practices. In my view, this is the most widespread and 
important variant of the tendency in question. This is because most normative democratic 
theories are, I think, broadly “liberal” in character (certainly this is the case with the literature on 
deliberative democracy), and, as we’ll see below, the various kinds of “proceduralism” that 
often characterize liberal-democratic theories can lead to precisely this tendency. In chapter 1, I 
therefore discuss selected aspects of three author’s works – Robert Dahl, Jürgen Habermas, and 
Joshua Cohen – indicating how the tendency in question is on display in each of their respective 
normative democratic theories, each of which the author describes as being a “deliberative” 
conception of democracy. (Cohen and Habermas are conventionally recognized as theorists of 
deliberative democracy, but Dahl is not. Yet, in a reply to a comment that Cohen makes in a 
symposium on Dahl’s Democracy and Its Critics [where Dahl presents the normative democratic 
theory in question], Dahl does describe his own theory as articulating a “deliberative” conception 
of democracy.40) The main reason that I discuss these authors’ theories is because it is important 
to recognize how the prominence of a certain kind of “liberal proceduralism” in normative 
democratic theory helps to explain why democratic theorists have often failed to recognize (or at 
least not explicitly discussed) how their own respective (ideal) procedures/procedural criteria 
could assist democracy’s participants in reasoning about procedures, virtues, and cultural 
practices in conjunction. Thus, in chapter 1, I critically engage with selected aspects of each of 
these author’s works in an effort to set the background for my own normative theory of the 
democratic process. A major conclusion that emerges from the discussion is that in these 
author’s respective theories, the “proper” function of normative democratic theory in democratic 
practice is either unclear or is presented in a way that is less desirable than it otherwise might 
be. (Or both.)   
 This discussion sets the background for the reconstructive arguments that I pursue in the 
rest of the dissertation, where, as I have said, I am concerned with (a) how the participants to a 
(nominally) democratic process themselves might craft decision-making processes that best 
approximate the ideal of treating them and those (if any) they (ought to) represent as “free and 
equal” and with (b) what role, if any, a normative theory of the democratic process might play in 
their efforts to do so.  
In chapter 2, the point of departure is an observation offered at the end of chapter 1, 
again, that, in the authors’ works that concerned us in that chapter, the “proper” function of 
normative democratic theory in democratic practice is either unclear or presented in a way that is 
less desirable than it otherwise might be (or both). One reason for this, I note, is that normative 
democratic theory, like other forms of moral or ethical theory, is sometimes conducted without 
making clear reference to empirical inquiry. As suggested in chapter 1, there are various 
lamentable consequences. One is that it is not clear what the theory’s relationship to existing 
democratic norms and values is; it is not clear where the norms and values articulated by the 
                                                            
40 See Dahl (1991). Here, I won’t develop a position on the extent to which Dahl’s theory is fairly described as a 
“deliberative” conception. I’ll just say that I believe that it has elements of a “deliberative” conception as well as 
elements of an “aggregative” conception, but, for that matter, so do most normative democratic theories. 
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theory come from in the first place – what relation, if any, they have to lived experience. 
Correspondingly, it is not clear how, if at all, the participants to any actual democratic process 
might relate such theory to their own norms, values, and practices. Another consequence is that it 
is not clear what role, if any, normative democratic theory might play in “guiding” empirical 
inquiries into how best to instantiate the norms and values developed in the theory. 
Correspondingly, it is not clear how the participants to some democratic process might use the 
theory to improve that process. Therefore, in chapter 2, I begin to offer a strategy for “re-
engaging” so-called “normative” democratic theory and so-called “empirical” democratic theory. 
Briefly, the strategy looks like this. As the classical pragmatists sought to teach us, all reasoning 
is, in some sense, “practical,” which obviously implies that whatever reasoning is involved in 
“normative democratic theory” is so too. Correspondingly, I argue that normative democratic 
theory is a form of “practical reasoning,” and so, like any form of practical reasoning, inevitably 
“involves” empirical inquiry (in an extended sense of “involvement” that I specify.41) Indeed, 
because normative democratic theory just is a form of practical reasoning and because practical 
reasoning inevitably does involve empirical inquiry, it follows that normative democratic theory 
just is an “empirical enterprise.”42 Hence, when we reason about what we think a democratic 
process should ideally look like – that is, when we engage in “normative democratic theory” – 
we should avoid any sharp distinction between “normative” and “empirical” forms of reasoning, 
just as we should avoid any such distinction between “theoretical” and “practical” forms of 
reasoning.  
Now, if chapter 2 indicates why it is the case that normative democratic theory just is an 
empirical enterprise, chapter 3 tries to give greater clarity to the character of that empirical 
enterprise. Briefly stated, the central claim in chapter 2 is that when we actually carry out certain 
tasks that are indispensable to any “reasonable”43 conception of normative democratic theory, we 
are then engaged in a form of “practical reasoning,” one that inevitably “involves” empirical 
inquiry. So, chapter 3, “Practical Reasoning is About a Unique Context,” aims to give further 
clarity to the character of the “practical reasoning” that is involved in that empirical enterprise. In 
doing so, we arrive at an extended version of “the central claim” from chapter 2, just mentioned, 
which looks like this: When we actually carry out certain tasks that are indispensable to any 
“reasonable” conception of normative democratic theory, we are then engaged in a situated form 
of practical reasoning, one that inevitably “involves” empirical inquiry; and this reasoning is 
always about a unique context, one in which our norms and values may come into conflict and in 
which those norms and values always need “contextual interpretation ‘in their application.’” 
Having clarified the nature of the practical reasoning that is inevitably involved in any 
“reasonable” conception of normative democratic theory, we then, in chapter 4 (“Normative 
Democratic Theory as a Tool for Practical Reasoning”) go on to clarify the “proper” function of 
                                                            41	  A	  person’s reasoning can be said to “involve” empirical inquiry, I say, if it is the case that her ability to reason 
about something is tied to, in some way depends on, her own or others’ empirical inquiries. 	  
42 To the empirically minded, this may seem entirely obvious. If so, it is well to recall, as I will again suggest we 
should in chapter 2, that, as Alasdair MacIntrye has observed, “moral philosophy [of which normative democratic 
theory is one variety] is often written as though the history of the subject were only of secondary and incidental 
importance. This attitude seems to be the outcome of a belief that moral concepts can be examined and understood 
apart from their history [a belief, I would add, that seems to suggest that we need not engage in empirical inquiries 
into the origins and formation of our democratic norms and values]. Some philosophers have even written as if 
moral concepts were a timeless, limited, unchanging, determinate species of concept, necessarily having the same 
features throughout their history, so that there is a part of language waiting to be philosophically investigated which 
deserves the title “the language of morals” (with a definite article and a singular noun)” (MacIntyre 1998: 1). 
43 See chapter 2, section II, for an explanation of what I mean by this term. 
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normative democratic theory in this “practical reasoning.” As suggested by the title, chapter 3 
therefore describes how normative democratic theory might function as a “tool” for practical 
reasoning, one that can assist democracy’s participants in carrying out two principal tasks. First, 
it can help them to clarify what their own democratic norms and values are. And second, it can 
help them to conduct empirical inquiries that clarify how they might better uphold those norms 
and realize those values.  
To develop these ideas, Part I of chapter 4 discusses John Dewey’s “empirical-
instrumentalist” approach to moral theory, juxtaposing it with two more familiar approaches. 
Briefly, the “generalist” approach is to articulate moral principles that are purportedly universal 
in scope and that purportedly “tell us” how we are to act in cases of a particular kind. The 
“particularist” approach, by contrast, rejects the idea of moral principles altogether or, at a 
minimum, holds that, in moral deliberation, there need be no attempt to bring such principles to 
bear on particular situations. Sound moral judgment is non-codifiable, and can only be found as 
one decides particular cases. The chapter then suggests that normative democratic theory is a 
kind of moral theory, and that a Dewey-inspired approach to it is more appropriate than either a 
generalist or a particularist one. Dewey’s approach recognizes the need for moral principles that 
are broad in scope. It also recognizes, however, that sound moral judgment responds to the 
exigencies of particular situations and is, therefore, non-codifiable. Hence, a Dewey-inspired 
approach to normative democratic theory is sensitive to the need for such theory to balance a 
kind of generalism with a kind of particularism. Section II then illustrates the logic of how 
normative democratic theory, construed in this way, can assist democracy’s participants in 
carrying out the two principal tasks mentioned above: first, clarifying what their own democratic 
norms and values are; and second, helping them to conduct empirical inquiries that illuminate 
how they might best uphold those norms and realize those values.  
After developing this Dewey-inspired approach to normative democratic theory in 
chapter 4, I then, in chapter 5 (“Toward a Normative Theory of the Democratic Process”) 
develop my own normative democratic theory, or as I prefer to call it, my own “normative theory 
of the democratic process.” To do so, I critically engage with Dahl’s “theory of the democratic 
process,” which, as noted, I also discuss in chapter 1.44 Briefly, the reason that I develop my own 
theory through an engagement with Dahl’s theory is that, among the normative democratic 
theories that I am aware of, Dahl’s conception of the “proper” character and function of a 
normative theory of the democratic process is closest to the way in which I think we should 
conceive of it. And, quite often at least, the best way to make theoretical progress in some area is 
to differentiate one’s own theory from whatever theory is, in relevant respects at least, the theory 
that is “closest” to one’s own theory. This helps to make it clear how one’s own theory offers an 
improvement on what is “the best theory” on offer. 
Dahl’s theory is based on two major premises. First, if we regard persons as somehow 
being “intrinsically equal,” it follows that the process by which a political association governs 
itself ought to give “equal consideration” to the good or interests of each of its members. Second, 
if we presume that the adult members of an association are “autonomous” – that they are the best 
judges, promoters, and defenders of their own good or interests – we should assume that they are 
adequately qualified to participate in that process. Based on these premises, Dahl offers four 
“criteria for a democratic process.” These are meant as descriptions of the ideal, defining features 
of a process for “binding,”45 collective decision-making that treats persons as intrinsically equal 
                                                            
44 Dahl (1989: chapter 8). 
45 On the sense in which Dahl uses the term “binding,” collective decision-making, see chapter 5, note 3. 
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and autonomous. Dahl’s criteria specify the equal and adequate opportunities for participation 
that members should ideally have in such a process. The criteria, he says, are “standards – ideal 
standards, if you like – against which procedures proposed ought to be evaluated in any 
association to which the assumptions [“justifying a democratic political order” may be said to] 
apply,” those assumptions being that persons are regarded as intrinsically equal and as 
autonomous.46 More specifically, the criteria, he says, ought to be used for assessing how well 
alternative procedures furnish citizens with the equal and adequate opportunities that the criteria 
articulate. 
In chapter 5, I suggest that, in qualified form, we should endorse Dahl’s two premises, 
but reconsider the implications of our doing so. First off, I agree with Dahl that adult persons 
should be regarded as “intrinsically equal” (in Dahl’s terminology), and I agree that the 
“binding,” collective decision-making processes of an association should treat their members as 
such.47 However, I propose an amendment to Dahl’s first premise. Again, Dahl says that if we 
regard persons as somehow being “intrinsically equal,” it follows that the process by which a 
political association governs itself ought to give “equal consideration” to the good or interests of 
each of its citizens/members. By contrast, I offer reasons for preferring to say that if we regard 
persons as somehow being “intrinsically equal,” it follows that the process by which a political 
association governs itself ought to give “equal consideration to, and show equal concern and 
respect for, the good or interests of all relevant persons.”48 The second premise I do not amend: 
if we presume that the adult members of an association are “autonomous” – again, that they are 
the best judges, promoters, and defenders of their own good or interests – we should indeed 
assume that they are adequately qualified to participate in that process.  
Turning to the criteria themselves, I agree with Dahl that we should think of the criteria 
for a democratic process as “ideal standards” (though I choose to use the terminology “ideal 
procedural criteria” instead.) However, I disagree with Dahl on two major substantive issues 
with respect to the criteria. Here is where I can indicate why I say that Dahl’s conception of the 
proper character and function of a normative theory of the democratic process is closest to my 
own conception, but why I also say that my own theory offers an improvement on his theory. 
First, I agree with Dahl that the ideal procedural criteria should specify the equal and 
adequate opportunities that participants should have. This is the very broad sense in which I 
agree with Dahl’s depiction of the proper character of a normative theory of the democratic 
process. However, I disagree with him in that I maintain that they should also specify the 
responsibilities that they should ideally assume. That is, I argue that the ideal procedural criteria 
should specify not only the equal and adequate opportunities that the process should ideally grant 
citizens or the members of an association (and that participants ought to grant each other); they 
                                                            
46 Dahl (1989: 108-109). 	  
47 Since the arguments in this dissertation are aimed at self-styled democrats, and since genuine democrats (almost?) 
invariably endorse some idea of “intrinsic quality” or “moral equality,” I don’t spend time arguing for the two 
claims expressed in this sentence. For the purposes of this dissertation, I just take them as background assumptions, 
focusing on various conclusions that seem to me to follow from them. 
48 By “relevant persons” I shall mean “all those persons whose good or interests may reasonably be expected to be 
(somehow) importantly affected by the ‘binding,’ collective decision-making process in question.” Included here 
are: (a) the participants themselves; (b) those, if any, they “represent” (in the electoral sense); and (c) those they 
“ought to represent” (i.e., “anyone whose good or interests may reasonably be expected to be [somehow] 
importantly affected by the ‘binding,’ collective decision-making process in question,” but who does not herself 
participate in the process and does not herself have “representation” in it [in the electoral sense].) See section 3.1.2 
of chapter 5. Note that, in this dissertation, I make no attempt to defend a particular interpretation of the phrase 
“(somehow) importantly affected” by a decision. 
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should also specify the responsibilities that they should ideally assume in relation to one another 
(and, indeed, those, if any, they [ought to] represent). As indicated in section 1.2 above, I follow 
the Deweyan injunction to develop my moral theory (that is, my normative theory of the 
democratic process) by starting with “moral experience itself.” And anthropological-interpretive 
inquiry into relevant aspects of moral experience (that is, into paradigmatic moments of “free 
and equal treatment” in joint or collective decision-making) reveals, I suggest, that persons who 
view each other as intrinsically equal and autonomous recognize that they owe each other 
justifications for their expressed policy preferences. Therefore, the ideal procedural criteria 
should not just articulate certain (equal and adequate) opportunities but also a number of 
responsibilities related to such justification. In this way, we are led from Dahl’s own premises to 
a deliberative conception of the democratic process.  
This, I submit, is an important outcome. As indicated in section 1.1 above, a broad range 
of democrats, including so-called “aggregative democrats” and so-called “deliberative 
democrats,” agree that democracy is a “moral or ethical ideal.” For again, it seems that all such 
democrats (at least tacitly) endorse some ideal of “free and equal personhood,” and, in 
consequence, some ideal of “free and equal citizenship or membership” too. Nevertheless, such 
democrats currently arrive at very different conclusions about what an inclusive, democratic 
process should look like. (“Deliberative democracy,” for instance, is sometimes understood to 
stand in sharp contrast to “aggregative democracy.”) If, however, I am able to derive a 
deliberative conception of democracy from the values that “aggregative democrats” and 
“deliberative democrats” both apparently endorse (that is, the values of treating citizens or 
members as “free” and as “equal”), my theory promises to bring more “aggregative democrats” 
into the “deliberative” fold, creating broader agreement on what a democratic process should at 
least ideally look like. 
Second, I agree with Dahl that the ideal procedural criteria ought to be used for assessing 
how well alternative procedures furnish citizens or the members of an association with the equal 
and adequate opportunities that the criteria articulate. This is the very broad sense in which I 
agree with Dahl’s depiction of the proper function of a normative theory of the democratic 
process. However, I disagree with Dahl in that I maintain that the participants to a democratic 
process ought to use the ideal procedural criteria as a “tool” for practical reasoning, one that can 
“guide” participants’ inquiries into the procedures, virtues, and cultural practices that, in the 
particular context in which they do (have to) act, are most apt to promote the effective granting 
of the equal and adequate opportunities that are specified by those criteria and that are most apt 
to promote the effective assumption of the responsibilities that are specified (or entailed) by 
them. Dahl, for his part, only discusses the potential role of the criteria in assessing how well 
alternative procedures furnish citizens or the members of an association with the equal and 
adequate opportunities that his criteria articulate.  
Here again, I suggest, we can see the benefit of my Dewey-inspired philosophic method – 
that is, we can see the benefit of engaging in anthropological-interpretive inquiry into moral 
experience itself. For such inquiry helps us to see why participants ought ideally to engage in 
such inquiry in the first place. That is, when we reflect on those joint or collective decisions (say, 
among friends) in which we are most likely to think and to feel that we are being treated as moral 
equals, we notice that we do recognize the potential need to inquire, and that, as appropriate, we 
actually do inquire, into “procedures,” “virtues,” and “cultural practices” in this way. And, 
reasoning analogically, we can then appreciate that, in order to treat each other (and those, if any, 
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they [ought to] represent) as free and equal, the participants to a democratic process should do 
so too. 
Next, in chapter 6 (“Why the Democratic Process Ought to Be Conducted as a Reflexive 
Social Practice”), I return to the idea that, ideally speaking, the “democratic process” ought to be 
conceived of as a form of “collective social inquiry,” but now add a qualification to that claim. 
The revised and extended claim is that, ideally speaking, the democratic process is best 
conceived of as a form of “collective social inquiry,” but one that, more specifically, is 
conducted as a “reflexive social practice”: as a practice in which participants recognize the 
potential need to inquire, and, as appropriate, actually do inquire, into the (potential or actual) 
moral or ethical significance and implications of whatever is said (and not said) in whatever 
inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, that process.  
To summarize very quickly, the main motivation for this argument goes like this. As 
indicated in section 1.3 above, there is a traditional view of “rational” moral or ethical reasoning 
that views it as a process that consists in two clearly distinct and separable “moments”: a “value-
free” and/or “value-neutral” one, where we first figure out what our situation is; and (as we 
might put it) a “value-guided” and “value-laden” one, where we then decide how we would 
should (like to) act in light of that situation. Chapter 6 indicates that the problem with this view 
is that all inquiry is apparently “value-guided” and “value-laden,” and so there apparently is no 
form of inquiry that is “value-free” and/or “value-neutral.” From this it follows, I suggest, that 
anything we say (and do not say) in any of our inquiries could have “moral or ethical 
significance and implications.” Hence, insofar as it is “rational,” our reasoning in the democratic 
process will not be divided into two “moments,” with the first one being “value-free” and/or 
“value-neutral” (when we figure out what our situation is) and the second one being “value-
guided” and “value-laden” (when we figure out how to act in light of that situation). (Recall the 
discussion in section 1.3 above.) Rather, insofar as it is “rational,” I suggest, the democratic 
process will be conducted as a “reflexive social practice”: again, as a practice in which 
participants recognize the potential need to inquire, and, as appropriate, actually do inquire, into 
the (potential or actual) moral or ethical significance and implications of whatever is said (and 
not said) in whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, that process. According 
to the normative theory of the democratic process developed in chapter 5, participants to the 
democratic process ought ideally to seek out mutually acceptable and generally accessible 
reasons for their expressed policy preferences. And this entails that they try to understand 
relevant social situations and activities from relevant persons’ perspectives, which in turn entails 
that they try to understand the moral or ethical significance and implications of what is said (and 
not said) by participants in relation to those situations and activities. Hence, a reflexive social 
practice can help the participants to a democratic process to assume certain of the responsibilities 
specified (or entailed) by the ideal procedural criteria developed in chapter 5.  
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Chapter 1  
 
 
Problems In/With Normative Democratic Theory 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the Introduction, I suggested that one problematic aspect of the literature on normative 
democratic theory is that there is sometimes a tendency to focus either on (ideal) procedures/ 
procedural criteria, or on civic virtues, or on cultural practices that would arguably facilitate a 
more inclusive democratic process. And, I noted, this tendency is sometimes apparent, for 
instance, in the literature on deliberative democracy, which particularly concerns us here: 
deliberative theorists have sometimes focused either on (ideal) deliberative 
procedures/procedural criteria, or on deliberative/civic virtues, or on cultural practices that 
would arguably facilitate the creation of more inclusive deliberative-democratic processes. Thus, 
in a variety of ways, I suggested, discussions of procedures, virtues, and cultural practices have 
proceeded in relative isolation from one another. And yet, informed reflection on paradigmatic 
moments of “free and equal treatment” in joint or collective decision-making reveals, I believe, 
that, in those moments, participants recognize that there is often a need to inquire into the 
procedures, virtues, and cultural practices that are most apt to promote the aim of treating 
participants as free and equal in such decision-making. Likewise, it reveals that, in those 
moments, participants often do inquire into such procedures, virtues, and cultural practices. Of 
course, I have not yet argued for these claims about “paradigmatic moments of ‘free and equal 
treatment,’” and in due course I shall need to do so. (I take them up in Chapter 4 and return to 
them at various points in subsequent chapters.) Nevertheless, if there is something to these 
claims, the fact that discussions of procedures, virtues, and cultural practices have sometimes 
“proceeded in relative isolation from one another” should concern us here. For the suspicion 
arises that whenever this tendency is apparent, the theory in question will be less useful to 
democratic practice than it otherwise might be. Whenever attractive democratic practices 
arguably reveal one thing, while normative democratic theories (seem to) suggest another, we 
then have at least a prima facie “case for concern” that something is missing in the respective 
theories. 
In this chapter, I’d like therefore to consider one variant of the tendency in question: the 
tendency to focus on (ideal) procedures/procedural criteria without at the same time explicitly 
discussing deliberative/civic virtues and cultural practices. As mentioned in the Introduction, the 
reason we’ll give more attention to this particular variant of the tendency in question is that it is 
the most widespread and so important of the three variants mentioned there. As noted, this, I 
believe, is because most normative democratic theories are broadly “liberal” in character 
(certainly this is the case with the literature on deliberative democracy), and, as we’ll see below, 
the various kinds of “proceduralism” that often characterize liberal theories can lead precisely 
to this tendency. So, in this chapter I take up selected aspects of three author’s works (Robert 
Dahl, Jürgen Habermas, and Joshua Cohen), indicating how the tendency in question is on 
display in each of their respective normative democratic theories, each of which the author 
describes as offering a “deliberative” conception of democracy.1  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As mentioned in the Introduction, Cohen and Habermas are conventionally recognized as theorists of deliberative 
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Briefly, the motivation behind this discussion may be characterized as follows. Like the 
three normative theories reviewed in this chapter, the normative democratic theory that I later 
develop in this dissertation is based on a commitment to treating the citizens or members of a 
political association as “free and equal” in collective decision-making. In that broad sense, all of 
these theories – including my own theory – are “liberal” theories. Furthermore, like the three 
normative theories reviewed in this chapter, the normative democratic theory that I later develop 
also maintains that our normative democratic theories should help us to reason about the 
procedures that would treat the citizens or members of a political association as free and equal. 
Yet, as indicated in the Introduction and as we’ll see in later chapters, I maintain that normative 
democratic theory ought to help us to reason about procedures, virtues, and cultural practices 
“in conjunction,” while each of the three normative theories discussed in this chapter is 
presented as just helping us to reason about procedures (or “procedures” and “institutions”). 
Accordingly, it is useful to investigate how the three normative theories in question arrive at this 
latter orientation – to see whether there might not be something mistaken in the former 
orientation. As the reader surely imagines, however, I obviously conclude that the former 
orientation – my own orientation – is preferable. And the critical investigation of the three 
normative theories in question will help to indicate how I arrive at this conclusion.  
 
I. Three Varieties of Liberal Proceduralism 
 
 So, we turn now to the three varieties of liberal proceduralism mentioned above: Robert 
Dahl’s “theory of the democratic process,” Jürgen Habermas’s “normative model of democracy” 
(his “proceduralist conception” or “discourse-theoretic interpretation” of “deliberative politics”), 
and Joshua Cohen’s “ideal deliberative procedure.” 
 
1.1 Problems with Dahl’s Variety of Proceduralism 
 
We first consider Dahl’s variety of proceduralism.2 In Democracy and Its Critics, Dahl 
offers a “theory of the democratic process” that articulates “criteria for a democratic process.”3 
The criteria, Dahl writes, are “standards – ideal standards, if you like – against which procedures 
proposed ought to be evaluated in any association to which the assumptions [“justifying a 
democratic political order” may be said to] apply.”4 These criteria, he continues, “specify that 
citizens...ought to have equal and adequate opportunities to act in certain ways.”5 In these brief 
passages, we can already see two closely related features of Dahl’s proceduralism that are 
important for our purposes.  
The first concerns his claim that the “criteria for a democratic process” are standards 
whose value resides specifically in their usefulness in judging alternative “procedures.” Now, 
Dahl does not explicitly deny that his criteria might be useful for other purposes: for instance, for 
the purpose that I have already suggested they might profitably be used for, that is, helping 
democracy’s participants to reason about procedures, virtues, and cultural practices in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See chapter 5 for additional comments on Dahl’s variety of proceduralism. . 
3 Dahl (1989: chapter 8). 
4 Ibid. 108-9. These assumptions refer to, or are derived from, what Dahl calls the “Idea of Intrinsic Equality” and 
the “Presumption of Personal Autonomy.” See pp. 107-108. Also, on the former, see Dahl (1989: chapter 6) and, on 
the latter, Dahl (1989: chapter 7). See also my discussion of these assumptions in chapter 5. 
5 Ibid.114. 
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conjunction. But there is some reason to suspect that he would at least be hesitant about using it 
for that purpose. For, in formulating his criteria, Dahl is clearly after a kind of “minimalism”: he 
is trying to articulate standards for a “fair” form of collective decision-making, one that respects 
citizens’ personal and moral autonomy, their freedom to be self-determining.6 In other words, he 
is after criteria for a “fair” collective decision-making process for a pluralistic society. And talk 
of “virtues” (at least in the normative theory itself) might be thought to run against his desired 
minimalism. 
This, I think, becomes particularly evident when we look at the second feature of Dahl’s 
proceduralism that is evident in the above passages: namely, the fact that Dahl’s criteria are 
understood as properly articulating – and as only articulating – the “equal and adequate 
opportunities” for participation that citizens ought ideally to have in a democratic process.7 In 
explaining why he chooses to conceive of the criteria in this way, Dahl recognizes that someone 
might object that the criteria for a democratic process ought to specify “duties as well as 
opportunities – [for instance, the] duties of the citizen to participate, to vote, to become 
informed, and the duty of the demos to determine how the agenda is to be decided.”8 In response 
to this possible objection, however, he says the following: “While I believe that the democratic 
process does imply duties like these, they are moral duties. They take their place among an array 
of obligations, rights, and opportunities that would confront citizens in a democratic order.”9 
Hence, Dahl feels that he “cannot say that it would always be wrong for a citizen to choose not to 
fulfill the political obligations implied by the criteria of the democratic process.”10  
Accordingly, Dahl’s theory contents itself with: an articulation of the “equal and 
adequate opportunities” that citizens ought to be granted; a recognition that his theory does, 
however, seem to imply certain “duties”; and a further stipulation that it is best to leave it to 
citizens themselves to weigh those duties against the other obligations, rights, and opportunities 
that they (would) confront in a democratic political order, since doing so ensures that “citizens 
have the freedom to choose how they will fulfill their political obligations,” which is more 
consistent with the values of personal and moral autonomy and with the freedom of self-
determination.11 Consequently, to respect the value of pluralism, we might say, the criteria 
themselves, on his view, are not to say anything explicit about “duties” (or, it seems, 
“responsibilities” or other cognate terms).  
Now, I have a number of criticisms about this way of conceiving of the “proper” 
character and function of a normative theory of the democratic process.12 But, focusing on the 
two features of Dahl’s “proceduralism” that I’ve already underlined, I just want to observe 
something of critical importance that results from that proceduralism.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid. 108, 115. 
7 We consider Dahl’s “criteria for a democratic process” at length in chapter 5. But to get a sense of what those 
“criteria” look like, how they specify various “equal and adequate opportunities,” consider the following criterion, 
which Dahl (1989: 109) calls the criterion of “effective participation”: “Throughout the process of making binding 
decisions, citizens ought to have an adequate opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their preferences 
as to the final outcome. They must have adequate and equal opportunities for placing questions on the agenda and 
for expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.” 
8 Ibid. 115. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid.	  
11 Ibid. 
12 These are considered at length in chapter 5. The discussion in chapter 4 also suggests a number of disagreements 
with Dahl’s way conceiving of the “proper” character and function of a normative theory of the democratic process. 
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In light of what has already been said, we can fairly say that, at a minimum, Dahl’s way 
of conceiving of the “proper” character and function of his normative democratic theory does not 
explicitly encourage us to use the criteria it articulates as a framework for reasoning about 
procedures, virtues, and cultural practices in conjunction, as I’ve suggested (but not yet argued 
that) we should use a normative democratic theory to do.13 Still more critically, however, it is 
arguably also fair to say that, in so far as we follow him in this respect, Dahl’s way of conceiving 
of the criteria leads us to give inadequate attention to the responsibilities that are arguably 
necessary for the granting of the “equal and adequate opportunities” that those criteria specify. 
As we’ve seen, his view is that the criteria are just to specify (ideal) opportunities; are to be used 
to evaluate alternative procedures in light of how well – to what extent – they grant those 
opportunities; and are not themselves explicitly to specify any duties (or presumably any cognate 
terms, like “responsibilities”; indeed, as he articulates them, they don’t explicitly specify any 
such cognate terms). So, what results is that Dahl’s normative theory of the democratic process 
exhibits the tendency identified at the outset: the tendency to focus on (ideal) 
procedures/procedural criteria without at the same time explicitly discussing deliberative/civic 
virtues and cultural practices. 
Let’s look closely at how this is so. In Dahl’s theory, the focus is just on opportunities, 
and on the role that the criteria can play in helping us to adjudicate between “procedures” that 
are more and less able to afford citizens those opportunities. Correspondingly, there is no explicit 
claim (to the effect) that the criteria should (or even could) be used to help democracy’s 
participants to reason about the responsibilities that participants might be asked ideally to 
assume. Furthermore, the main reason to discuss deliberative/civic virtues in the first place is 
precisely to help us to see how democracy’s participants indeed might best assume such 
responsibilities. (Or it is surely one of the main reasons for which authors have historically 
discussed such virtues). So, an inattention to deliberative/civic virtues arguably results from the 
lack of attention to responsibilities here. 
 Of course, one might not immediately see why there is any reason for thinking that 
citizens (or those who choose to participate in the democratic process, either as representatives or 
otherwise) have any “responsibilities” at all. Hence, one might not immediately see why indeed 
we should give any attention to responsibilities here. For, at least at first blush, it might appear 
that for a democratic process to be a “fair” collective decision-making process for a pluralistic 
society, it need only “grant certain ‘opportunities’” to those who choose to participate. (And, 
indeed, it is not unreasonable, I think, to read Dahl as sometimes speaking – if not actually 
thinking – this way). And so, again, it might not appear that there is a need to speak of 
“responsibilities” here.  
The conclusion is clearly mistaken, however. In order for a “democratic process” to treat 
persons in a particular way, it should be evident that the participants themselves must do so. Any 
time a “process” is, in actuality, a human activity, it obviously follows that (certain of) the 
participants to that activity have to assume certain responsibilities in order for the guiding aims 
of that process to be effectively promoted or realized (or in order for its ostensible “guiding 
aims” to be effectively promoted or realized). For a “process,” of course, cannot literally do 
anything; but people can. Thus, when we speak of the “democratic process” as “doing” 
something, like “granting an ‘opportunity,’” we have to remember that this is an elliptical, 
shorthand way of talking about a specific kind of activity, which, like any activity, can be 
performed more and less adroitly depending on the responsibilities that relevant persons assume 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Recall my brief comments in the Introduction. 
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(or fail to assume) and depending on the virtues (and vices) that those persons exhibit there. 
Indeed, we have to remember that “the process” cannot “function” at all – much less be said “to 
grant equal and adequate opportunities ‘to act in certain ways’” – unless certain individuals 
assume certain responsibilities. Accordingly, we have to remember that in reasoning about how 
best to realize, or to promote, the aim of granting a participant “the opportunity to act in a certain 
way,” we ought to concern ourselves with the responsibilities that other participants would have 
to fulfill in order for “the process” to do so. Likewise, we ought to concern ourselves with the 
virtues that would arguably assist them in assuming (or that would arguably dispose them to 
assume) those responsibilities. So, there clearly is a need to speak of responsibilities here.  
Furthermore, it appears plausible that insofar as there is a lack of attention to the 
responsibilities that participants should ideally assume, there likely will be a lack of attention to 
the virtues they should exhibit. For notice that when we reason about deliberative/civic virtues, it 
often just is because we think that participants ought to assume certain responsibilities, either in 
relation to one another or in relation to those (if any) they (ought to) represent. (Or both.) For 
instance, when Gutmann and Thompson suggest that legislators should ideally evince the virtue 
of “civic integrity,” it is because they want to encourage them to assume responsibility for 
justifying their expressed policy preferences – to the other participants, to their electoral 
constituents, and even to their “moral constituents” (those who are affected, or are likely to be 
affected, by the decision[s] in question, but who neither participate in the decision-making nor 
have someone to represent them in it).14 Of course, we often reason about virtues in order to 
specify how “the process” might grant certain opportunities to participants, too. For instance, if 
we suggest that participants should ideally be “open-minded” (as Gutmann and Thompson also 
say), it is surely in part because we want other participants to have the opportunity “to convince 
others of their positions,” “to be heard,” “to say their piece,” “to express their viewpoints,” “to 
have a voice in the process,” and so on.15 Notice, however, that this is just an indirect way of 
saying that we are reasoning about the “responsibilities” that participants should assume. For 
again, to say that a human activity should “grant certain opportunities” just is to say that “certain 
persons should assume certain responsibilities.” Hence, if we forego a discussion of 
responsibilities, we are likely to be less inclined (and able) to engage in a (productive) discussion 
of deliberative/civic virtues. Indeed, if we are not careful, we arguably might not even see the 
point of our doing so.  
What, though, of the “cultural practices” that I have referred to? Well, parallel remarks 
can be made here too. That is, it appears plausible that insofar as there is a lack of attention to the 
responsibilities that participants should ideally assume, there will likely be a lack of attention to 
the cultural practices that could conceivably help to create a social climate in which participants 
are more likely to assume the responsibilities that our ideal procedural criteria state or imply that 
they should.16 For notice that when we reason about the importance of certain “cultural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Gutmann and Thompson (1996: 81-81). Gutmann and Thompson do not explicitly formulate the idea of “moral 
constituents” in this way, but I think it is implied by their presentation. We return to this idea in chapter 5. 
15 Hence, in speaking of “the simple virtue of open-mindedness,” Gutmann and Thompson (1996: 83) write: 
“Cultivating this disposition maintains the possibility that citizens can be convinced of the moral merits of their 
adversaries’ position. Open-minded citizens try to break personal and institutional habits that would discourage them 
from accepting an opposing position at some time in the future, or at least from modifying their position at some 
time in that direction.”	  
16 Let me reiterate what I mean by “cultural practices”: loosely, practices that draw from the broader culture in 
which a (nominally) democratic process takes place, ones that, if they were somehow incorporated into that process, 
would arguably: assist the participants in assuming (or dispose them to assume) the responsibilities that our 
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practices” in the context of a democratic process, it often just is because we are concerned with 
participants assuming certain responsibilities. For instance, if we say (or imply) that the cultural 
practice of “greeting” one another can help to create a more “inclusive” process (as, for instance, 
Iris Young does), we are typically concerned with participants assuming the responsibility for 
treating one another with equal concern, respect, and/or consideration.17 Of course, we often 
reason about cultural practices in order to specify how the process might grant certain 
opportunities to participants, too. For instance, if we suggest (as again Young does) that the 
cultural practice of employing “rhetoric” in public deliberations and dialogues can sometimes 
help to bring much needed attention to unacknowledged or under-acknowledged grievances, we 
are often concerned with the process giving participants the opportunity to place issues on the 
agenda for discussion.18 Again, however, notice that this is just an indirect way of saying that we 
are reasoning about “responsibilities” here. For again, to say that a human activity should “grant 
certain opportunities” just is to say that “certain persons should assume certain responsibilities.” 
Hence, if we forgo a discussion of responsibilities, we are, again, likely to be less inclined (and 
able) to engage in a (productive) discussion of cultural practices (in the above sense). And again, 
if we are not careful, we might not even see the point of our doing so. 
 
1.2 Problems with Habermas’s Variety of Proceduralism 
 
We turn now to Habermas’s variety of proceduralism. Here, too, the tendency in question 
can be identified: the tendency to focus on (ideal) procedures/procedural criteria without at the 
same time explicitly discussing deliberative/civic virtues and cultural practices. And, as with 
Dahl, this tendency is evident in at least some of Habermas’s writings in that, in discussing his 
own normative democratic theory, he too focuses on a “procedure,” and in such a way that an 
explicit acknowledgement of the relevance and importance of reasoning about deliberative/civic 
virtues and cultural practices falls away.  
Consider, for instance, Habermas’s article, “Three Normative Models of Democracy.” 
Here, Habermas criticizes two “received views of democratic politics.”19 These he refers to as, 
first, “the ‘liberal’ or Lockean view” and, second, the “the republican view,” and he describes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
procedural criteria suggest they should ideally assume; promote the effective granting of the opportunities that our 
procedural criteria suggest they should have; and consequently promote the exhibition of certain relevant virtues. 
17 Hence Young (2000: 57) writes: “It is not uncommon to hear a complaint from individuals or groups who have 
tried to make claims and arguments in a political discussion that they have been ignored, or worse, spoken about by 
others as though they were not there, deprecated, stereotyped, or otherwise insulted. No rules or formalities can 
ensure that people will treat others in the political public with respect, and really listen to their claims. I suggest, 
however, that situations of political communication, in which participants explicitly acknowledge the other 
participants, are more substantively inclusive than those that do not. What I call greeting, or public 
acknowledgement, is thus a specific communicative gesture with important and not sufficiently noticed functions for 
democratic practice.”  
18 Hence Young (2000: 64-67) writes: “Explicit reflection on the function of rhetoric in political 
communication…reveals several uniquely positive contributions rhetoric can and sometimes does make to 
democracy…. Rhetorical moves often help to get an issue on the agenda for deliberation. Gutmann and Thompson 
make this point through the example of Carol Mosley Braun’s impassioned rhetoric when the US Senate was about 
to renew the patent on the Confederate flag insignia, without any debate. They suggest that without her emotional 
rhetoric the Senate would not have taken the issue seriously, and that therefore her extreme and even disruptive 
speech contributed positively to a deliberative process by motivating officials to discuss an important issue.”  	  
19 Habermas (1994: 1). 
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them as having certain “opposite features.”20 Having characterized these two “established 
models,”21 he then goes on to “introduce a new proceduralist conception by way of a critique of 
the ‘ethical overload’ of the republican view.”22 Under the section heading “Proceduralist vs. 
Communitarian Views of Politics,” Habermas writes:   
 
The republican model as compared to the liberal one has the advantage that it preserves 
the original meaning of democracy in terms of the institutionalization of a public use of 
reason jointly exercised by autonomous citizens. This model accounts for those 
communicative conditions that confer legitimating force on political opinion- and will-
formation. These are precisely the conditions under which the political process can be 
presumed to generate reasonable results. A contest for power, if represented according to 
the liberal model of market competition, is determined by the rational choice of optimal 
strategies. Given an indissoluble pluralism of pre-political values and interests that are 
best aggregated with equal weight in the political process, politics loses all reference to 
the normative core of a public use of reason. The republican trust in the force of political 
discourses stands in contrast to the liberal skepticism about reason. Such discourses are 
meant to allow one to discuss value orientations and interpretations of needs and wants, 
and then to change these in an insightful way…. But contemporary republicans tend to 
give this public communication a communitarian reading. It is precisely this move 
towards an ethical constriction of political discourse that I call into question. Politics 
may not be assimilated to a hermeneutical process of self-explication of a shared form of 
life or collective identity. Political questions may not be reduced to the type of ethical 
questions where we, as members of a community, ask who we are and who we would like 
to be. In its communitarian interpretation the republican model is too idealistic even 
within the limits of a purely normative analysis. On this reading, the democratic process 
is dependent upon the virtues of citizens devoted to the public weal. This expectation of 
virtue already led Rousseau to split the citizen oriented to the common good from the 
private man, who cannot be ethically overburdened. [My emphasis; the other emphases 
are in the original.] The unanimity of the political legislature was supposed to be secured 
in advance by a substantive ethical consensus. In contrast, a discourse-theoretic 
interpretation insists on the fact that democratic will-formation draws its legitimating 
force not from a previous convergence of settled ethical convictions but from both the 
communicative presuppositions that allow the better arguments to come into play in 
various forms of deliberation and from the procedures that secure fair bargaining 
processes. Discourse theory breaks with a purely ethical conception of civic autonomy.23  
 
Now, there are many aspects of this passage that I find obscure or puzzling. Putting all 
but one of these aside, however, just consider the claim I’ve italicized: “On this reading [i.e., on 
what Habermas takes to be the communitarian interpretation of the republican model of 
democracy], the democratic process is dependent upon the virtues of citizens devoted to the 
public weal. This expectation of virtue already led Rousseau to split the citizen oriented to the 
common good from the private man, who cannot be ethically overburdened.” For a variety of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid.	  	  
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid.	  
23 Ibid. 3-4. 
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reasons this claim is curious, but I want to highlight just one reason for saying so: Taken in 
context, it seems (tacitly) to suggest that Habermas believes that his own “proceduralist” 
conception of the democratic process is not “dependent upon the virtues of citizens devoted to 
the public weal” – even, perhaps, that it is not dependent upon (the cultivation of) citizen 
“virtues” at all.   
To see this, recall three facts. First, Habermas says that his aim is to “introduce a new 
proceduralist conception [of the democratic process, or of democracy, or of deliberative politics 
– Habermas uses each of these, and other similar, phrases] by way of a critique of the “‘ethical 
overload’ of the republican view.” Second, the passage just cited comes, as noted, under the 
section heading, “Proceduralist vs. Communitarian Views of Politics,” suggesting that he wants 
to draw a firm line (to highlight a firm opposition) between, on the one hand, his own conception 
of deliberative politics (of the democratic process, of democracy…) and, on the other hand, the 
“communitarians’” view. Otherwise, why would he employ the heading, “Proceduralist vs. 
Communitarian Views of Politics?” Third, the sentence “On this reading [i.e., on what Habermas 
takes to be the communitarian interpretation of “the republican model” of democracy], the 
democratic process is dependent upon the virtues of citizens devoted to the public weal” is 
immediately followed by the sentence: “This expectation of virtue already led Rousseau to split 
the citizen oriented to the common good from the private man, who cannot be ethically 
overburdened.” So, taking these three observations together, it is reasonable, I think, to read 
Habermas as here implying that his “proceduralist” conception of the democratic process is not 
“dependent upon the virtues of citizens devoted to the public weal.” And, what is more, it is 
reasonable to say that this passage reads as though Habermas wishes to defend a conception of 
the democratic process that isn’t “dependent upon the virtues of citizens devoted to the public 
weal,” and precisely because he thinks that a conception of the democratic process that is so 
amounts to a conception that does “ethically overload” or “overburden” citizens. (Or perhaps the 
claim is that, where implemented, such a conception leads to a situation in which they are 
“ethically overloaded” or “overburdened”?) But these (implied) claims are mistaken or, at the 
very minimum, misleading. That is, it seems to me mistaken, or at least misleading, to imply: 
first, that, in some meaningful sense, his “proceduralist” conception of the democratic process is 
not “dependent upon the virtues of citizens devoted to the public weal”; and second, that a 
conception of the democratic process that is so “dependent” amounts to a conception that 
“ethically overloads” or “overburdens” citizens, and should therefore be rejected.  
Here, though, I want to focus on the first of these claims. For if the first claim fails, so 
does the second. Briefly, this is because if Habermas’s own conception is, in some meaningful 
sense, “dependent upon the virtues of citizens devoted to the public weal,” as my response to the 
first claim will suggest it is, then it makes no sense to reject some other conception because that 
conception is “dependent upon the virtues of citizens devoted to the public weal.” 
So, consider the first claim. To begin with, it seems that the proper, even adequate or 
minimal, functioning of any democratic process, however conceived, just will be, in some 
measure, “dependent upon the virtues of citizens devoted to the public weal.” “Devotion to the 
public weal” need not, of course, take the form that Rousseau thought it should. But how could 
any democratic process “function” – much less function well – if no citizen were “devoted to the 
public weal”? To my mind, it is extremely difficult to understand how such a process could 
function at all, much less function well, if no citizen were “devoted to the public weal.” Again, 
any time a human process or procedure is to grant citizens (or members), or certain citizens (or 
members), certain opportunities – e.g., opportunities for participation, as in any “democratic 
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process,” however conceived – certain citizens (or members) have to assume certain 
responsibilities. And any time someone “assumes certain responsibilities,” she may be said to 
“exhibit some ‘virtue’” (or, what is more likely the case, some “cluster of virtues”). Accordingly, 
I think it should be admitted that the proper, even adequate or minimal, functioning of any 
conception of the democratic process just will be, in some measure, “dependent upon the virtues 
of [at least some] citizens [or members] [who are at least partly] devoted to the public weal.”  
But, if there is any reader who is unsure about this conclusion, surely she will admit that 
the proper, even adequate or minimal, functioning of Habermas’s own “procedural” conception 
would be so “dependent,” at least when we give some content to the phrase “dependent upon the 
virtues of citizens devoted to the public weal.”  
Recall that, in the above passage, Habermas holds that a “discourse-theoretic 
interpretation [of the democratic process] insists on the fact that democratic will-formation draws 
its legitimating force not from a previous convergence of settled ethical convictions but from 
both the communicative presuppositions that allow the better arguments to come into play in 
various forms of deliberation and from the procedures that secure fair bargaining processes.”24 
Surely, however, these “various forms of deliberation” depend, for their actual functioning, on 
(at least certain) participants exhibiting certain “virtues.” For again, “deliberation” can only 
happen if (at least certain) participants assume certain responsibilities, and any time they do so 
we can say that they “exhibit certain ‘virtues.’” Likewise, we can also say that unless (at least 
certain) participants do assume certain responsibilities – hence do evince exhibit certain virtues – 
the “various forms of deliberation” that Habermas refers to here won’t function as he intends 
them to function; indeed, won’t “function” at all. 
Of course, one might reply here that these virtues needn’t be the virtues of a citizen who 
is “devoted to the public weal.” Hence, in reply to all of what has been said so far, one might be 
willing to concede that the proper, even adequate or minimal, functioning of any conception of 
the democratic process just will be, in some measure, dependent on the virtues of (at least some) 
citizens. Yet, one still might want to object to the claim that the actual functioning of any such 
conception just will be “dependent upon the virtues of [at least some] citizens [or members] 
[who are at least partly] devoted to the public weal.” For one might reason as follows.  
Perhaps the only virtues that are pertinent here are such virtues as have not been 
traditionally associated with “devotion to the public weal,” or which, in any case, wouldn’t 
reasonably be described as virtues that are associated with such devotion. For instance, it may 
indeed be the case that in order for any democratic process to function, including (one that 
resembles) Habermas’s conception, most citizens, most of the time, have to be willing to press 
their demands through the democratic process itself, rather than through, say, acts or threats of 
violence. Presumably, no “democratic process” can function properly (or perhaps even at all) 
where, say, most citizens press their demands through acts of, or (plausible) threats of, violence. 
Yet, to assume such a “negative responsibility” (a responsibility that consists in a citizen or 
citizen-participant not engaging in certain forms of conduct) does not, by itself, necessarily 
amount to the exhibition of any such “virtue” as has traditionally been associated with “devotion 
to the public weal,” or which, in any case, would reasonably be described as a virtue that is 
associated with such devotion. For instance, the assumption of such a responsibility might flow 
from a simple indifference to “the common good,” or to “the democratic process,” not from any 
“devotion” to it. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid. 4. 
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There is, however, a serious issue with this line of reasoning. To begin with, let us grant 
that not all of the “virtues” that are, or that would be, necessary for the proper, or adequate or 
minimal, functioning of some particular conception of a democratic process will be such virtues 
as traditionally have been associated with “devotion to the public weal,” or which could 
reasonably be described as virtues that are associated with such a devotion. However, on 
reflection, it seems clear that some of those virtues will be reasonably described in some such 
way. To keep focus, however, let me just make the point in relation to Habermas’s conception.  
As we have seen, Habermas holds that “the discourse-theoretic interpretation” of the 
democratic process insists that “democratic will-formation draws its legitimating force…from 
the communicative presuppositions that allow the better arguments to come into play in various 
forms of deliberation and from procedures that secure fair bargaining processes.”25 Surely, 
however, these “various forms of deliberation” and these “procedures that secure fair bargaining 
processes” are, or would be, dependent for their actual functioning on the assumption of certain 
“positive responsibilities” on the part of (at least certain) citizens and/or citizen-participants. (By 
a “positive responsibility,” I mean here, roughly, a responsibility that consists in someone 
intentionally engaging in certain forms of conduct that allow the democratic process in question 
to function as intended by the conception in question. More on this below.)  By appreciating this, 
we can see how at least some of the virtues necessary for the proper, or adequate or minimal, 
functioning of Habermas’s conception of a democratic process will be such virtues as 
traditionally have been associated with “devotion to the public weal,” or which could reasonably 
be described as virtues that are associated with such devotion.  
For brevity, just consider Habermas’s reference to the “various forms of deliberation” 
that partly lay the basis for the “legitimating force” of “democratic will-formation,” putting that 
reference in the context of Habermas’s fuller articulation of the “discourse-theoretic 
interpretation” of the democratic process that is offered in Between Facts and Norms (German 
edition, 1992), which slightly predates the article we have been referencing and is presumably 
the “discourse-theoretic interpretation” that he refers to in that article (from 1994). Here, the 
central task is arguably to provide a normative account of legitimate law under modern 
conditions. Modern law is fundamentally concerned with the definition, protection, and 
reconciliation of individual freedoms in their various organizational and institutional contexts. 
To be legitimate, modern law must secure the private autonomy of those individuals who are 
subject to it. However, legal guarantees of private autonomy presuppose an established legal 
code and a legally defined equal-citizenship status that articulates the basic, actionable rights that 
secure a space for the exercise of such private autonomy. And such rights are expressions of 
freedom only if the citizens can understand themselves as the authors of the laws that interpret 
their rights; or, as Bohman and Rehg write of Habermas’s view, “only if the laws that protect 
private autonomy also issue from citizens’ exercise of public autonomy as lawmakers acting 
through elected representatives.”26 Consequently, the legal rights that define private autonomy 
must themselves include rights of political participation. Habermas understands the relation 
between private and public autonomy as one in which each presupposes the other: each is “co-
original” or “equiprimoridal,” since, to a considerable extent, each can be realized only if the 
other is so. Thus, the exercise of public autonomy presupposes citizen-participants who 
understand themselves as privately autonomous, while private autonomy presupposes that they 
can shape their individual freedoms through the exercise of their public autonomy.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid. 4. 
26 Bohman and Rehg (2014). 
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Now, an abstract account of these rights to private autonomy and political participation is 
generated via reflection on the nature of discursive legitimation (as articulated in the D-
Principle27) in contexts shaped by the functional demands for law.28 The system of rights then 
constitutes a minimum set of normative institutional conditions for any legitimate political order, 
that is, the normative framework for constitutional democracies. It is within these frameworks 
that political institutions, such as legislatures, must operate. What is still more important for our 
purposes, however, Habermas’s conception of public autonomy entails that “the legitimacy of 
ordinary legislation must ultimately be traceable to robust processes of public discourse that 
influence formal decision-making in legislative bodies.” 29  This idea is summarized in 
Habermas’s democratic principle of legitimacy: “only those statutes may claim legitimacy that 
can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been 
legally constituted.”30 Of course, “decisions about laws typically involve a combination of 
validity claims: not only truth claims about the likely consequences of different legal options, but 
also claims about their moral rightness (or justice), claims about the authenticity of different 
options in light of the polity's shared values and history, and pragmatic claims about which 
option is feasible or more efficient.”31 Hence, for Habermas, “legitimate laws must pass the 
different types of discursive tests that come with each of these validity claims.”32 As Bohman 
and Rehg note, “this strong orientation toward cognitive validity qualifies Habermas's version of 
deliberative democracy as an ‘epistemic’ theory,” putting it “in a rather puzzling position.”33  
 
On the one hand, it represents a specification of the discourse principle for a particular 
kind of discourse (legal-political discourse). This make it analogous to the moral 
principle (U), which specifies (D) for moral discourse.34 As a specific principle of 
reasonable discourse, the democratic principle seems to have the character of an 
idealizing presupposition insofar as it presumes the possibility of consensual 
decisionmaking in politics. For Habermas, reasonable political discourse must at least 
begin with the supposition that legal questions admit in principle of single right answers 
…or at least a set of discursively valid answers on which a fair compromise, acceptable 
to all parties, is possible.35 
 
One the other hand, however,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See note 34 below. 
28 Ibid.	  
29 Ibid. 
30 Habermas (1996: 110). 
31 Bohman and Rehg (2014). 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 As Bohman and Rehg write (2014), “Habermas summarizes his idealized conception of practical discourse in the 
‘discourse principle’ (D), which we might state as follows: A rule of action or choice is justified, and thus valid, 
only if all those affected by the rule or choice could accept it in a reasonable discourse. Although he first understood 
(D) as a principle of moral discourse, he now positions it as an overarching principle of impartial justification that 
holds for all types of practical discourse... As such, it simply summarizes his argumentation theory for any question 
involving the various ‘employments of practical reason’… (D) thus applies not only to moral rightness and ethical 
authenticity, but also to the justification of technical-pragmatic claims about the choice of effective means for 
achieving a given end. Each type of practical discourse then involves a further specification of (D) for the content at 
issue.” 
35 Ibid.	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the democratic principle lies at a different level from principles like (U), as Habermas 
himself emphasizes.... The latter specify (D) for this or that single type of practical 
discourse, in view of internal cognitive demands on justification, whereas the former 
pulls together all the forms of practical discourse and sets forth conditions on their 
external institutionalization. From this perspective, the democratic principle acts as a 
bridge that links the cognitive aspects of political discourse (as a combination of the 
different types of idealized discourse) with the demands of institutional realization in 
complex societies. As such, the democratic principle should refer not to consensus, but 
rather to something like a warranted presumption of reasonableness. In fact, in a number 
of places Habermas describes democratic legitimacy in just such terms, which we might 
paraphrase as follows: citizens may regard their laws as legitimate insofar as the 
democratic process, as it is institutionally organized and conducted, warrants the 
presumption that outcomes are reasonable products of a sufficiently inclusive deliberative 
process of opinion- and will-formation... The presumption of reasonable outcomes thus 
rests not so much on the individual capacities of citizens to act like the participants of 
ideal discourse, but rather on the aggregate reasonableness of a “subjectless 
communication” that emerges as the collective result of discursive structures—the formal 
and informal modes of organizing discussion… This means that democracy is 
“decentered,” no longer fully under control of its own conditions and no longer based on 
a congruent subject of self-legislating discourse.36 
 
However, regardless of whether we emphasize the first of the above interpretations of the 
democratic principle or the second of them, the same point can be made: Habermas’s “epistemic 
proceduralism” (Habermas’s own term), and the “various forms of deliberation” associated with 
its implementation, would surely be dependent on the assumption of certain “positive 
responsibilities” on the part of (at least certain) citizens and/or citizen-participants. With the first 
conception, we saw, reasonable political discourse must at least begin with the supposition that 
legal questions admit of discursively valid answers on which a fair compromise, acceptable to all 
parties, is possible, while on the second conception, reasonable outcomes rest primarily on the 
aggregate reasonableness of a “subjectless communication” that emerges as the collective result 
of the formal and informal modes of organizing discussion in a society. But in both cases, the 
discursive communication and deliberation referred to would surely be dependent on the 
assumption of certain “positive responsibilities” on the part of (at least certain) citizens, citizen-
participants, and/or their elected representatives.  
How so? Well, as a matter of definition, anything that can reasonably be described as a 
genuine “deliberation,” or as a “sufficiently inclusive deliberative process of opinion- and will-
formation,” inevitably involves the participants assuming such responsibilities, and not just 
“negative responsibilities.” For when parties to a discussion actually do engage in anything like 
genuine “deliberation,” they just do “assume certain ‘positive responsibilities’” in relation to one 
another: for instance, as ordinary experience indicates, they assume responsibility for listening to 
one another and for trying to understand each other’s perspectives on relevant social situations 
and activities.37 Where they do not do so, we simply aren’t willing to say that they are 
“deliberating.” What is more, when they do so deliberate, we may therefore say that they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Ibid. 
37 This is a theme we take up in later chapters, especially chapter 5. 
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“exhibit certain ‘virtues’”: like being (in some degree) “patient,” “understanding,” and/or 
“sympathetic.” Likewise, if they don’t show some such virtues, we simply aren’t willing to say 
(or to imply) that they are assuming certain “positive responsibilities” in relation to one another, 
hence are not then willing to say (or to imply) that they are engaged in genuine “deliberation” 
(however precisely we would define that term). For these reasons, we may conclude that the 
“deliberations” that are part of Habermas’s procedural conception are dependent, for their actual 
functioning, on the virtues of citizens, citizen-participants, and/or their elected representatives. 
What is more, some of these virtues are, or would be, such virtues as traditionally have been 
associated with “devotion to the public weal,” or which could reasonably be described as virtues 
that are associated with such devotion – even if they are not primarily the result of it. As 
suggested, a genuine attempt to “understand someone else’s point of view,” for instance, is part 
of what we mean by any kind of moral, ethical, or even practical “deliberation.” Such an attempt 
(by some number of participants) is part of what we mean when we say that someone engaged in 
a “deliberation” with someone else, and, at least where the deliberation concerns the justifiability 
of this law or that law, the attempt in question just will entail that they “exhibit some virtue” (like 
“patience” [in, say, trying to understand what other participants’ concerns are] or “generosity” 
[in, say, assuming – without having any way of proving – that participants are largely or at least 
partly sincere in what they are saying]) in making that attempt. Likewise, we are warranted in 
saying that unless they do exhibit some such virtues, the “various forms of deliberation” that 
Habermas refers to simply won’t reasonably be described as such, simply won’t function as he 
intends them to function. Perhaps, indeed, they won’t even function at all. Furthermore, such 
virtues can reasonably be described as virtues that are associated with a concern for the good of 
others, and, when that concern is manifest in relation to a broader public, as it is meant to be in 
such “deliberations,” they can reasonably be described as virtues that are associated with a 
concern for “the common good.” And again, this is true even if the primary motivation for which 
particular agents show those virtues doesn’t reside in a commitment to “the common good” or 
“the public weal.”  
So, it is reasonable, I think, to conclude that Habermas’s (implied) claim that his 
“proceduralist” conception of the democratic process is not “dependent upon the virtues of 
citizens devoted to the public weal” is either just mistaken or at best misleading. And this is 
especially so when we recall that, for Habermas, the “discursive opinion- and will-formation” 
that is said to lay the basis for legitimate law under modern conditions emerges via the interplay 
of three major discursive arenas: “the dispersed communication of citizens in civil society; the 
‘media-based mass communication’ in the political public sphere; and the institutionalized 
discourse of lawmakers.”38 “When these arenas work well together,” Bohman and Rehg note of 
Habermas’s view, “civil society and the public sphere generate a set of considered public 
opinions that then influence the deliberation of lawmakers.”39 Hence, the “legitimating force” of 
“democratic will-formation” does not, as one might initially reply in response to my criticism, 
simply emerge out of the “virtues” of elected representatives who engage in “various forms of 
deliberation”; it emerges out of the virtues of citizens and citizen-participants who engage in 
“various forms of deliberation” as well.  
Thus, at least to function well (and arguably even to function at all), Habermas’s 
normative conception of democracy would also be “dependent upon the virtues of citizens,” and, 
to a considerable degree, “dependent upon the virtues of citizens devoted to the public weal.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Bohman and Rehg (2014). 
39 Ibid.	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Again, surely this appears a reasonable interpretation when we grant: that unless they do exhibit 
some such virtues, the “various forms of deliberation” that Habermas refers to simply won’t 
reasonably be described as such; that some such virtues can reasonably be described as virtues 
that are associated with a concern for the good of others; and that when that concern is manifest 
in relation to a broader public, some such virtues can reasonably be described as virtues that are 
associated with a concern for “the common good” or the “public weal.” And again, this is true 
even if the primary motivation for which particular agents show those virtues doesn’t reside in a 
commitment to “the common good” or the “public weal.” Furthermore, we reinforce this 
conclusion when we notice that any conception of the media “functioning well” in a democratic 
society presupposes that at least some journalists and other media participants and producers 
choose certain areas to investigate that are reasonably construed as somehow being in “the public 
interest,” i.e., as concerning “the common good,” and that they present their findings in ways that 
are broadly accessible to the public. In other words, it seems to presuppose (at least) a 
(professional) devotion to “the common good” or “public weal.”    
Now, taking the above considerations together, it is fair to say that, at least in the 
presentation of Habermas’s normative democratic theory in “Three Normative Models of 
Democracy,” the tendency in question is again on display: the tendency to focus on (ideal) 
procedures/procedural criteria without at the same time explicitly discussing deliberative/civic 
virtues and cultural practices. Hence, as with Dahl’s normative theory, an explicit 
acknowledgement of the relevance and importance – indeed, I would say, indispensability – of 
deliberative/civic virtues, and so certain cultural practices, to the effective instantiation of the 
“procedures” in question does not explicitly feature in the presentation of that theory – or even in 
the discussion (such as it is) of the uses to which it could or should be put. 
 
1.3 Problems with Cohen’s Variety of Proceduralism 
 
We turn now to Joshua Cohen’s normative democratic theory. As we’ll see, the tendency 
in question is here on display too.  
Like Dahl and Habermas, Cohen is concerned with the appropriate way of arriving at 
collective decisions in a pluralistic society – with collective decision-making “under conditions 
of pluralism.”40 Hence, in “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” Cohen presents an “ideal 
deliberative procedure”41 for a “deliberative democracy,”42 which he construes as being a 
“pluralistic association” 43  whose “affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its 
members.”44 To develop the ideal deliberative procedure, Cohen proceeds as follows.  
To begin with, he agrees with John Rawls that “when properly conducted…democratic 
politics involves public deliberation on the common good, requires some form of manifest 
equality among citizens, and shapes the identity and interests of citizens in ways that contribute 
to the formation of a public conception of the good.”45 However, he disagrees with Rawls’s way 
of accounting for “the attractiveness and importance of these three features of the deliberative 
democratic ideal.”46  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Cohen (2009: 26). 
41 Ibid. 16. 
42 Ibid. 16. 
43 Ibid. 22. 
44 Ibid. 16.	  
45 Ibid. 19. 
46 Ibid. 19. 
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Rawls, he says, regards the above three “conditions” as “natural consequences of the 
ideal of fairness.”47 And he offers both a “formal” and an “informal” argument in support of this 
view. Very briefly, the formal argument, Cohen says,  
 
is that parties in the original position would choose the principle of participation with the 
proviso that the political liberties have their fair value. The three conditions are important 
because they must be satisfied if constitutional arrangements are to ensure participation 
rights, guarantee a fair value to those rights, and plausibly produce legislation that 
encourages a fair distribution according to the difference principle.48 
 
With the informal argument, “the suggestion is that, since we accept the intuitive ideal of a fair 
system of cooperation, we should want our political institutions themselves to conform, insofar 
as it is feasible, to the requirement that terms of association be worked out under fair 
conditions.”49 Thus, Cohen quotes Rawls as writing: 
 
Justice as fairness begins with the idea that where common principles are necessary and 
to everyone’s advantage, they are to be worked out from the viewpoint of a suitably 
defined initial situation of equality in which each person is fairly represented. The 
principle of participation transfers this notion from the original position to the 
constitution…[thus] preserv[ing] the equal representation of the original position to the 
degree that is feasible.50 
 
And elsewhere, Rawls writes: “The idea [of the fair value of political liberty] is to incorporate 
into the basic structure of society an effective political procedure which mirrors in that structure 
the fair representation of persons achieved by the original position.”51 Thus, “in this informal 
argument,” Cohen writes, “the original position serves as an abstract model of what fair 
conditions are, and of what we should strive to mirror in our political institutions, rather than as 
an initial-choice situation in which regulative principles for those institutions are selected [as in 
the formal argument].”52  
Again, Cohen thinks that “Rawls is right in wanting to accommodate the three 
conditions” of the deliberative-democratic ideal that were previously mentioned,53 but he finds 
“less plausible that the three conditions are natural consequences of the ideal of fairness,” as the 
“formal” and “informal” arguments summarized above would suggest they are. (To recall, the 
three conditions were expressed as follows: “When properly conducted…democratic politics 
involves public deliberation focused on the common good, requires some form of manifest 
equality among citizens, and shapes the identity and interests of citizens in ways that contribute 
to the formation of a public conception of the common good.”54) More specifically, he suggests 
that if we follow Rawls in “taking the notion of fairness as fundamental” and in “aiming…to 
model political arrangements on the original position, it is not clear why, for example, political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Ibid. 20. 
48 Ibid. 19. 
49 Ibid. 20. 
50 Quoted at Ibid. 19-20. For the original, see Rawls (1971: 221-222). 
51 Ibid. 20. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 20.	  
54 Ibid. 19. 
	   36	  
debate ought to be focused on the common good, or why the manifest equality of citizens is an 
important feature of a democratic association.”55 Indeed, “the pluralist conception of democratic 
politics as a system of bargaining with fair representation for all groups seems [to Cohen] an 
equally good mirror of the ideal of fairness.”56 
 Cohen, of course, recognizes that Rawls has a response to this objection; it is just that he 
finds it unsatisfying. Rawls, he suggests, would recognize that the three conditions  
 
do not follow directly from the ideal of a fair system of cooperation, or from that ideal as 
it is modeled in the original position. Rather, we arrive at them when we consider what is 
required to preserve fair arrangements and to achieve fair outcomes. For example, public 
political debate should be conducted in terms of considerations of the common good 
because we cannot expect outcomes that advance the common good unless people are 
looking for them. Even an ideal pluralist scheme, with equal bargaining power and no 
barriers to entry, cannot reasonably be expected to advance the common good as defined 
by the difference principle.57 
 
Yet, Cohen thinks this response is “too indirect and instrumental and argument for the 
three conditions. Like utilitarian defenses of liberty, it rests,” he thinks, “on a series of highly 
speculative sociological and psychological judgments.”58 By contrast, Cohen proposes “an 
account of the value of [“an association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of 
its members”59] that treats democracy as itself a fundamental political ideal and not simply as a 
derivative ideal that can be explained in terms of the values of fairness or equality of respect.”60 
Moreover, he suggests that “the reason why the three [conditions] are attractive it not [as Rawls 
suggests] that an order with, for example, no explicit deliberation about the common good and 
no manifest equality would be unfair (though of course it might be)”; it is rather that “they 
comprise elements of an independent and expressly political ideal,” the one just mentioned, 
where the focus is “in the first instance on the appropriate conduct of public affairs,” or, on “the 
appropriate ways of arriving at collective decisions.”61  
So, the second main step in Cohen’s argument is to articulate what he calls a “‘formal 
conception’ [or “formal ideal”] of deliberative democracy,” which has just such a focus. What is 
the role of this formal conception or ideal in democratic practice? At this point, it is important to 
note that, in discussing the role of that formal ideal in democratic practice, Cohen adopts the 
same metaphor as Rawls does, but employs it differently. Understanding how precisely he 
employs this metaphor will help us to appreciate the specific character of Cohen’s variety of 
proceduralism, which, again, is our overarching interest here.  
As we earlier saw, Cohen quotes Rawls as stating that “the idea [of the fair value of 
political liberty] is to incorporate into the basic structure of society an effective political 
procedure which mirrors in that structure the fair representation of persons achieved by the 
original position.”62 Cohen adopts the metaphor of “mirroring,” but, as I say, employs it 	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56 Ibid. 20.	  
57 Ibid. 20-21. 
58 Ibid. 21. 
59 Ibid. 16. 
60 Ibid. 16.  
61 Ibid. 21.	  
62 Quoted at Cohen (2009: 20); Cohen’s emphasis. For the original, see Rawls (2005: 330). 
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differently than Rawls. As we’ll see, Cohen first stipulates what the formal ideal itself consists 
in. (He simply states that it has “five main features,” which we’ll summarize below.) He then 
observes that  
 
a [normative] theory of deliberative democracy aims to give substance to this formal 
ideal by characterizing the conditions that should obtain if the social order is to be 
manifestly regulated by deliberative forms of collective choice. I propose to sketch a 
view of this sort by considering an ideal scheme of deliberation, which I shall call the 
“ideal deliberative procedure.” The aim in sketching this procedure is to give an explicit 
statement of the conditions for deliberative decision-making that are suited to the formal 
conception, and thereby to highlight the properties that democratic institutions should 
embody, so far as possible. I should emphasize that the ideal deliberative procedure is 
meant to provide a model for institutions to mirror – in the first instance for the 
institutions in which collective choices are made and social outcomes publicly justified – 
and not to characterize an initial situation in which the terms of association themselves 
are chosen.63 
 
So, to summarize, Cohen develops his normative democratic theory and explains its 
function in democratic practice in this way. The first task is to stipulate a formal conception or 
formal ideal of one’s preferred kind of democracy (in this case, a “‘formal conception’ of 
deliberative democracy”64). The second task is to develop a normative theory (in this case, a 
normative “theory of deliberative democracy”65), which gives substance to the formal ideal by 
characterizing the conditions that should obtain if the social order is to be manifestly regulated 
by forms of collective choice that instantiate that theory (in this case, “deliberative 
institutions”66). In this way, the theory articulates an ideal procedure (in this case, an “ideal 
deliberative procedure”67). And finally, whoever is involved in the designing or crafting of 
institutions for collective decision-making is to look to the ideal procedure (in this case, the ideal 
deliberative procedure) for a model68 that should be mirrored in those institutions (in this case, in 
“deliberative institutions”69).  
Enumerating these steps gives us a broad overview of the variety of “proceduralism” that 
characterizes Cohen’s essay. However, to understand the importance of that proceduralism for 
our own specific purposes, we need to look briefly: at the details of the “formal conception of 
deliberative democracy”70 that Cohen stipulates; at the “ideal deliberative procedure”71 that he 
articulates; at some of the remarks that he makes about how his “characterization of ideal 
deliberation” allows us to say something “more substantive about a deliberative democracy,” in 
particular, about the “implications of a commitment to deliberative decisions for the terms of 
social association”;72 and finally, at some of the remarks he makes about certain “natural 	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67 Ibid. 23. 
68 Ibid. 23 
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objections to the conception” he develops, which serve “to clarify the conception of deliberative 
democracy by sketching the lines along which a response should proceed.”73 
First, then, consider the formal conception of deliberative democracy, which has “five 
main features” (which I’ll abbreviate here).  
 
 D1 A deliberative democracy is an ongoing and independent association, whose  
members expect it to continue into the indefinite future.  
 D2 The members of the association share…a commitment to coordinating their activities   
       within institutions that make deliberation possible and according to norms that they   
       arrive at through their deliberations. For them, free deliberation among equals is the    
       basis of legitimacy. 
 D3 A deliberative democracy is a pluralistic association…. While sharing a commitment  
       to the deliberative resolution of problems of collective choice (D2), they also have   
       divergent aims, and do not think that some particular set of preferences, convictions,    
       or ideals is mandatory. 
 D4 Because the members of a democratic association regard deliberative procedures as  
       the source of legitimacy, it is important to them that the terms of their association          
       not merely be the results of their deliberation but also be manifest to them as such…. 
 D5 The members recognize one another as having deliberative capacities, i.e., the  
       capacities required for entering into a public exchange of reasons and for acting on         
       the results of such public reasoning.74 
 
Now consider the ideal deliberative procedure, the articulation of which constitutes the third 
main step in Cohen’s argument. The ideal deliberative procedure “captures” the “principle” that 
“outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and 
reasoned agreement among equals.”75 In articulating the ideal procedure, “three general aspects 
of deliberation” have to be addressed: “There is a need to decide on an agenda, to propose 
alternative solutions to the problems on the agenda, supporting those solutions with reasons, and 
to conclude by settling on an alternative.”76 Again, abbreviating, the procedure looks like this:  
 
I1  Ideal deliberation is free in that it satisfies two conditions. First, the participants   
     regard themselves as bound only by the results of their deliberation and by the      
     preconditions for that deliberation. Their consideration of proposals is not  
     constrained by the authority of prior norms or requirements. Second, the participants  
     suppose that they can act from the results, taking the fact that a certain decision is    
     arrived at through their deliberation as a sufficient reason for complying with it. 
I2  Deliberation is reasoned in that the parties of it are required to state their reasons for 
advancing proposals, supporting them, or criticizing them. They give reasons with 
the expectation that those reasons (and not, for example, their power) will settle the 
fate of their proposal…. Reasons are offered with the aim of bringing others to 
accept the proposal, given their disparate ends (D3) and their commitment (D2) to 
setting the conditions of their association through free deliberation among equals…  	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I3  In ideal deliberation parties are both formally and substantively equal in that the rules      
regulating the procedure do not single out individuals. Everyone with the deliberative 
capacities has equal standing at each stage of the deliberative process. Each can put 
issues on the agenda, propose solutions, and offer reasons in support of or in 
criticism of proposals. And each has an equal voice in the decision. The participants 
are substantively equal in that the existing distribution of power and resources does 
not shape their chances to contribute to deliberation, nor does that distribution play 
an authoritative role in the deliberation…. 
I4  Finally, ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus – to find      
reasons that are persuasive to all who are committed to acting on the results of a free 
and reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals. Even under ideal conditions there 
is no promise that consensual reasons will be forthcoming. If they are not, then 
deliberation concludes with voting, subject to some form of majority rule….77 
 
The fourth and fifth steps in Cohen’s argument are: to offer some remarks about how “this 
characterization of ideal deliberation” allows us to say something “more substantive about a 
deliberative democracy” (in particular, about the “implications of a commitment to deliberative 
decisions for the terms of social association”);78 and to offer some remarks about certain “natural 
objections” to the conception deliberative democracy that he discusses, which serve to clarify it 
“by sketching the lines along which a response should proceed.”79 The fifth step is just an 
extension of the fourth one; it allows us to “continue to pursue the relationship between the ideal 
procedure and more substantive issues about deliberative democratic association.”80 So, for ease 
of exposition, we’ll consider these last two steps together. As the below discussion indicates, this 
also allows for an easier explication of my own critical remarks on Cohen’s arguments, which 
are interspersed below. 
 Turning, then, to his “more substantive” remarks and the “more substantive issues” they 
concern, Cohen begins with some comments on the “notion of the common good.”81 He suggests 
that “the characterization of an ideal deliberation procedure links the formal notion of 
deliberative democracy with the more substantive ideal of a democratic association in which 
public debate is focused on the common good of the members”:  
 
Since the aim of ideal deliberation is to secure agreement among all who are committed 
to free deliberation among equals, and the conditions of pluralism obtains (D3), the focus 
of deliberation is on ways of advancing the aims of each party to it. While no one is 
indifferent to his/her own good, everyone also seeks to arrive at decisions that are 
acceptable to all who share the commitment to deliberation (D2).82 
 
However, he immediately raises a potential objection: “While public deliberation may be 
organized around appeals to the common good, is there any reason to think that even ideal 
deliberation would not consist in efforts to disguise personal or class advantage?”83 “There are 	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two responses to this question,” he suggests.84 In considering these two responses, I can begin to 
state what I find problematic about Cohen’s approach to articulating his normative democratic 
theory.  
 The first response, Cohen says, is that “in my account of the formal idea of a deliberative 
democracy, I stipulated (D2) that the members of the association are committed to resolving their 
differences through deliberation, and thus to providing reasons that they sincerely expect to be 
persuasive to others who share that commitment.”85 As he notes, however, the objection is 
presumably “best understood as directed against the plausibility of realizing a deliberative 
procedure that conforms to the ideal, and this is not answerable through stipulations.”86  
 This much I find unproblematic. The issue I want to signal arises when he describes his 
second response, which, given the way he seem to offer it as an alternative to the first response, 
we are apparently to understand as (at least largely) consisting in an appeal to a set of factual 
propositions (as opposed to being a primarily “stipulative” response).  
“The second response,” he says, “rests on a claim about the effects of deliberation on the 
motivations of deliberators.”87 More specifically, 
 
A consequence of the reasonableness of the deliberative procedure (I2) together with the 
condition of pluralism (D3) is that the mere fact of having a preference, a conviction, or 
an ideal does not by itself provide a reason in support of a proposal. While I may take my 
preferences as a sufficient reason for advancing a proposal, deliberation under conditions 
of pluralism requires that I find reasons that make the proposal acceptable to others who 
cannot be expected to regard my preferences as sufficient reasons for agreeing. The 
motivational thesis is that the need to advance reasons that persuade others will help to 
shape the motivations that people bring to the deliberative procedure in two ways. First, 
the practice of presenting reasons will contribute to the formation of a commitment to the 
deliberative resolutions of political questions (D2). Given that commitment, the likelihood 
of a sincere representation of preferences and convictions should increase, while the 
likelihood of their strategic misrepresentation declines. Second, it will shape the content 
of preferences and convictions as well. Assuming a commitment to deliberative 
justification, the discovery that I can offer no persuasive reasons on behalf of a proposal 
of mine may transform the preferences that motivate the proposal. Aims that I recognize 
to be inconsistent with the requirements of deliberative agreement may tend to lose their 
force, at least when I expect others to be proceeding in reasonable ways and expect the 
outcome of deliberation to regulate subsequent action.88 
 
Now, I am not concerned to challenge the factual premises contained in this passage; I 
want to leave my considered views on them open here. Instead, I want to bring attention to the 
stipulative aspects of this second response (which, again, is apparently presented as an 
alternative to the first, stipulative response noted above), and to place those aspects of it in 
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relation to some of the remarks Cohen offers about the ideal deliberative procedure providing a 
“model” that “institutions” “should mirror, so far as possible.”89  
To begin with, notice the phrases I have italicized in the above block quote. Each of these 
is stipulative or refers us back to one or more stipulations. Take the first such phrase: “A 
consequence of the reasonableness of the deliberative procedure (I2) together with the condition 
of pluralism (D3)…” There are obviously two stipulations here: first, that “the deliberative 
procedure” is reasonable (I2, recall, says that “deliberation is reasoned in that the parties of it are 
required to state their reasons for advancing proposals, supporting them, or criticizing them. 
They give reasons with the expectation that those reasons [and not, for example, their power] 
will settle the fate of their proposal…); and second, that the condition of pluralism obtains (D3 
stipulates, recall, that “while sharing a commitment to the deliberative resolution of problems of 
collective choice (D2), they also have divergent aims, and do not think that some particular set of 
preferences, convictions, or ideals is mandatory”).  
Now, note how these stipulations (especially the first one) appear to be doing the bulk of 
the work in Cohen’s second response to the objection in question, in his “claim about the effects 
of deliberation on the motivations of deliberators.”90 For instance, as we see further down in the 
block quote, “the motivational thesis is [precisely] that the need to advance reasons that persuade 
others will help to shape the motivations that people bring to the deliberative procedure in two 
ways.” Again, the first of these is that “the practice of presenting reasons will contribute to the 
formation of a commitment to the deliberative resolution of political questions (D2).” But this, it 
seems, is only plausible if there already is a sincere commitment to “the deliberative resolution 
of political questions” on the part of some considerable number of pertinent individuals. If there 
is not, “the motivational thesis” arguably becomes significantly less plausible. Hence why the 
next line reads: “Given that commitment, the likelihood of a sincere representation of preferences 
and convictions should increase, while the likelihood of their strategic misrepresentation 
declines.” In other words, Cohen appears to recognize here that this aspect of the “motivational 
thesis” depends crucially on the prior, proper operation of (something significantly like) the ideal 
deliberative procedure itself. And the same could be said of the second way in which “the need 
to advance reasons that persuade others will help to shape the motivations that people bring to 
the deliberative procedure”: “it will shape the content of preferences and convictions as well.” 
(Again, see the above block quote.) For again, the claim begins with a stipulation: “Assuming a 
commitment to deliberative justification, the discovery that I can offer no persuasive reasons on 
behalf of a proposal of mine may transform the preferences that motivate the proposal.”  
Crucially, however, the objection in question is not, or is not primarily at least, about the 
effects that we can expect to emerge once the procedure is already up and running (for some 
“significant” period of time). Rather, as he himself summarizes it, the objection is presumably 
“best understood as directed against the plausibility of realizing a deliberative procedure that 
conforms to the ideal, and this is not answerable through stipulations.”91 Hence, Cohen’s 
premising of the motivational thesis on a number of clear stipulations, as suggested above, is 
likely to leave the hypothetical objector unsatisfied. 
 To this observation one might initially think it persuasive to respond as follows, however. 
The way to respond more directly to the objector’s concern is to remind her that the ideal 
deliberative procedure is meant as a model for institutions to “mirror,” so far as possible. 	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Hence, the stipulations in question are not mere stipulations, akin to saying: the beliefs and 
commitments referenced just are present. Rather, they are stipulations that certain deliberative 
institutions exist, and given this fact, the motivational thesis then becomes plausible. But this 
response is yet another stipulation: that those institutions do exist, and, moreover at some 
adequate level of functioning. But again, as stated, the objection is precisely concerned with the 
plausibility of this (ever) being so. So a stipulation that it just is so is not likely to be persuasive.  
 Suppose now that we put aside the objection as it was precisely stated, just considering 
the second response on its own terms. Is “the motivational thesis” convincing? Is it convincing to 
say that “the need” to advance reasons that persuade others will help to shape the motivations 
that people bring to the deliberative procedure in the two ways Cohen suggests?  
For brevity, let us just consider the first way: Will “the practice of presenting 
reasons…contribute to the formation of a commitment to the deliberative resolution of political 
questions,” making it so that “the likelihood of a sincere representation of preferences and 
convictions should increase, while the likelihood of their strategic misrepresentation declines”? 
Well, perhaps so, given the commitment to “the deliberative resolution of political questions,” as 
Cohen says. But qua factual premise, the claim only seems to have force if: first, we have a fairly 
clear sense of where that commitment originates, what other broadly held values stand in support 
of it; and second, if we have at least some sense of what “the institutions” look like in which that 
commitment is widely operative. On neither of these points, however, does Cohen’s response 
strike me as particularly persuasive.  
The “formal conception of deliberative democracy”92 is, Cohen says, “rooted in the 
intuitive ideal of a democratic association in which the justification of the terms and conditions 
of association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens.”93 Now, 
this ideal may well be an “intuitive” one for self-described democrats who strongly endorse not 
only the equal moral worth of persons (hence support some form of “equal citizenship”) but who 
also endorse the idea that, as a general matter, individuals ought to be presumed the best judges 
of, and the most reliable and vigilant defenders of, their own good or interests.94 For then, it 
seems to me, we arguably have a reasonable way of responding to the inevitable critic of 
Cohen’s “intuitive ideal,” who very well might retort: “Intuitive for you, perhaps, but not for me! 
Sure, I agree with the ideal of ‘equal citizenship.’” But not all citizens, ‘morally or intrinsically 
equal’ though they may be, are equally capable of engaging in ‘public argument and reasoning’ 
about the ‘terms and conditions’ of their ‘democratic association.’ If they are not, then I have 
trouble appreciating what is ‘intuitive’ about your ideal. Indeed, it seems to me somewhat 
counter-intuitive. In such deeply complicated matters as ‘argument and reasoning’ about ‘the 
terms and conditions’ of a ‘democratic association,’ can’t we treat citizens as equals by having 
the wiser, the more intelligent, and perhaps the more experienced simply give equal 
consideration to the good or interests of each citizen, much in the way that we allow – and think 
we should allow – parents to do so with respect to their children? Why have, for instance, the 
significantly less wise, less intelligent, and less experienced participate, and on the same 
footing?”  
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Now, if we appeal to (something like) what Dahl calls the Idea of Intrinsic Equality and 
the Presumption of Personal Autonomy,95 we then have grounds for making an appeal to fairness 
in justifying or promoting the ideal: it may be “fair” to have, say, parents largely determine what 
decisions are most apt to promote the good or interests of their children, but it is not so when we 
are speaking of adults. For they, we generally presume, are “autonomous”: we presume that, as a 
general matter, they are the best judges of, and the most reliable and vigilant defenders of, their 
own good or interests, not that others are.96 Having this appeal available to us, we would then be 
able to explain why Cohen’s ideal may seem “intuitive” to us: because it broadly comports with 
our actual experiences of those moments when we typically do think and feel that we are being 
treated “fairly” qua persons who are intrinsically equal and who are “autonomous” (in the above 
sense), and who view themselves as such.97  
Yet, Cohen’s account seems to push us away from this response. To begin with, he states 
that “the notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democratic 
association in which the justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through 
public argument and reasoning among equal citizens.”98 But again, the appeal that I am 
suggesting might be more plausible here is explicitly rooted in “the intuitive ideal” (if you like) 
of a democratic association in which the justification in question proceeds through public 
argument and reasoning among equal and autonomous citizens, not just “equal” ones.99 More 
importantly, though, Cohen, as we’ve already noted, explicitly distances himself from an appeal 
to “ideal fairness.” Though his critical comments focus on Rawls’s way of “taking the notion of 
fairness as fundamental,” it seems that Cohen wants to avoid an appeal to (at least ideal) fairness 
altogether. In part at least, this is because “the pluralist conception of democratic politics as a 
system of bargaining with fair representation seems [to him] an equally good mirror of the ideal 
of fairness,” and he apparently does not want to endorse that conception.100 Accordingly, Cohen, 
as we have seen, proposes “an account of the value of [“an association whose affairs are 
governed by the public deliberation of its members”101] that treats democracy as itself a 
fundamental political ideal and not simply as a derivative ideal that can be explained in terms of 
the values of fairness or equality of respect.”102 Consequently, it is, I think, relatively more 
difficult for Cohen to respond to our hypothetical objector here. And, in short, this is why I say 
that Cohen has not offered a clear sense of where the commitment to “the deliberative resolution 
of political questions” precisely comes from, what other broadly held values stand in support of 
it.  
What, though, of the other issue I raised in relation to the plausibility of Cohen’s 
“motivational thesis,” that is, whether or not his discussion offers at least some sense of what 	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“the institutions” in question might look like, were the commitment to “the deliberative 
resolution of political questions” to be widely operative? Here again, I do not find his discussion 
particularly persuasive. As noted, Cohen says that the ideal deliberative procedure is meant as a 
“model” for “institutions” to “mirror,” so far as possible. And, in the essay in question, he is 
obviously (and somewhat understandably) not concerned to detail the relevant institutions 
themselves. But the metaphor of “mirroring” does not strike me as helpful in thinking about the 
plausibility of the motivational thesis, which depends on such details. To assess the claim that 
“the likelihood of a sincere representation of preferences and convictions should increase, while 
the likelihood of their strategic misrepresentation declines” in some institutional setting, we have 
to have some sense of what that setting looks like. And this, presumably, is the role that the ideal 
deliberative procedure is to play. Yet a closer look at the mirroring metaphor renders this 
problematic, I think. 
 To begin with, notice that when, in defending the motivational thesis, Cohen speaks of 
“the need” to advance reasons that persuade others, he is apparently referring us back to I2 and 
D2. (I2: “Deliberation is reasoned in that the parties of it are required to state their reasons for 
advancing proposals, supporting them, or criticizing them. They give reasons with the 
expectation that those reasons (and not, for example, their power) will settle the fate of their 
proposal”; D2: “The members of the association share…a commitment to coordinating their 
activities within institutions that make deliberation possible and according to norms that they 
arrive at through their deliberation.”) That is, in speaking of “the need” to advance reasons that 
persuade others, he is apparently referring us back to these stipulations. Yet he is also doing 
more than that: he is now making a factual claim about what is likely to occur given the presence 
of institutions that are “mirrored” on the ideal deliberative procedure. Hence, he says that “the 
practice of presenting reasons will contribute to the formation of a commitment to the 
deliberative resolution of political questions.”103 And it is precisely at this point that we should 
like to know what the institutions themselves look like (or what that “practice” looks like) – 
beyond the fact that they (it) simply “mirror” (“mirrors”) the ideal deliberative procedure. Or, to 
put the point another way, it is precisely at this point that we should like to know what this 
“mirroring” might consist in and how this bears on the motivational thesis in question. Taken by 
itself, however, the mirroring metaphor is not very helpful in sorting this matter out – nor is the 
fact that Cohen also claims that “the institutions themselves…determine whether there is 
equality, whether deliberation is free and reasoned, whether there is autonomy, and so on.”104  
If I2, for instance, stipulates that “deliberation is reasoned in that the parties of it are 
required to state their reasons for advancing proposals, supporting them, or criticizing them” and 
that participants “give reasons with the expectation that those reasons (and not, for example, their 
power) will settle the fate of their proposal,” we are apparently to understand that the institution 
or institutions in question “mirror” these conditions. But what does it mean to say that an 
institution “mirrors” these two stipulations? With respect to the first stipulation, perhaps it just 
means that deliberation in the institution(s) in question just is “reasoned” in the sense just 
specified. In that case, fair enough. But we would then want to know how this is so, what, if 
anything, it is about “the institution itself” that makes it so. Just saying that it “mirrors” this first 
stipulation does not give us much to work with here. Indeed, it amounts to just saying that 
(behavior within) the institution(s) in question does meet the condition in question. And parallel 
remarks could be made with respect to the second stipulation, that is, that participants “give 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Ibid. 26; my emphasis. 
104 Ibid. 29.	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reasons with the expectation that those reasons (and not, for example, their power) will settle the 
fate of their proposal.”105  
Furthermore, saying that the institution itself, or that the institutions themselves, 
“determine(s)” whether (say) deliberation is “free and reasoned” doesn’t, unfortunately, help us 
evaluate the motivational thesis either. For again, we should like to know how this is so, what it 
is about “the institution” that makes it so. Do the pertinent institutions “determine” whether, or to 
what extent, participants “give reasons with the expectation that those reasons (and not, for 
example, their power) will settle the fate of their proposal”? If so, how? Do the pertinent 
institutions “determine” whether, or to what extent, participants “state their reasons for 
advancing proposals, supporting them, or criticizing them”? If so, how?  
For instance, it might be the case that an institutional format “requires” that participants 
state their reasons. (Recall that the ideal deliberative procedure – specifically, I2 – says: 
“Deliberation is reasoned in that the parties of it are required to state their reasons for advancing 
proposals, supporting them, or criticizing them.” Hence, if actual “deliberative institutions” are 
meant to “mirror” I2, it might be thought that the institutions in question should literally 
“require” participants “to state their reasons for advancing proposals, supporting them, or 
criticizing them.”) If so, do we, indeed, have good reason to expect that “the likelihood of a 
sincere representation of preferences and convictions should increase, while the likelihood of 
their strategic misrepresentation declines” simply in virtue of that (literal, institutional) 
“requirement”? Why should the mere “requirement” to offer those reasons, regardless of one’s 
antecedent motives, lead to the outcome in question? Or, if this kind of reason giving is not 
(literally) “required” in the institution in question, what, if any, “properties” of that institution do 
give us good reason to expect that outcome? Further stipulations, as Cohen himself notes, won’t 
be sufficient to render the motivational thesis plausible on its face. It wouldn’t be compelling just 
to say, for instance, that the features that make the expectation in question plausible are the other 
features of the ideal deliberative procedure that are also “mirrored” in the institution – without 
saying anything about what, in practice, that might mean either. Such a response would simply 
beg the question. 
Now, the immediate objective of these comments has been to point out a number of 
potential problems, ambiguities, confusions that (may plausibly) arise when we speak a certain 
way; I have been using the above discussion of Cohen’s motivational thesis as a way of driving 
this point home. But, for our purposes, there is a broader, more important point that we can now 
appreciate.  
Authors commonly speak of “institutions” and/or “procedures” as “doing” certain things 
(for instance, as “determining” certain outcomes), but without elaborating on the responsibilities 
that certain persons (e.g. the participants to a deliberation) would have to assume in order for 
those outcomes to be effectively realized. (Again, when – if – we speak this way, we have to 
remember that it is a shorthand, elliptical way of talking about a specific activity, which, like any 
activity, can be performed more and less adroitly depending on the responsibilities that relevant 
persons assume [or fail to assume] and depending on the virtues [and vices] that those persons 
exhibit “in,” “through,” or “around” that “activity.”) Consequently, they often do not explicitly 
discuss the virtues that those persons would necessarily exhibit were they to assume those 
responsibilities, and that would arguably assist them in assuming (or that would dispose them to 
assume) those responsibilities in the first place. Correspondingly, they often do not discuss the 
cultural practices that would arguably promote the assumption of those responsibilities, and that 	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would arguably enhance the likelihood that participants to the activities in question do exhibit 
relevant virtues. Where this is so in discussions of (ideal) procedures/procedural criteria, the 
tendency in question arises: the tendency to focus on (ideal) procedures/procedural criteria 
without at the same time explicitly discussing deliberative/civic virtues and cultural practices. 
And, in point of fact, this is the case with Cohen’s essay. 
Two specific features of Cohen’s way of speaking about the role of the ideal deliberative 
procedure in democratic practice lead us to observe this outcome in his essay: first, the fact that, 
as we have seen, he speaks of deliberative institutions functioning properly to the extent that they 
“mirror” the ideal deliberative procedure; and second, the fact that, as we have also seen, he 
speaks of “institutions” as “determining” key outcomes, such as whether or not “deliberation” is 
“free and reasoned.”106 As we saw in our critical discussion of the motivational thesis, the idea 
that an institution might “mirror” certain stipulations that are constitutive of a particular 
“independent and expressly political ideal” is by no means clear. And, I now emphasize,	  this	  is	  perhaps	   particularly so where the stipulations in question refer to beliefs, commitments, 
expectations, and the like – for instance, the “commitment to coordinating activities…within 
institutions that make deliberation possible and according to norms that [participants] arrive at 
through their deliberations.”107 The idea that an institution itself might “mirror” this commitment 
is, taken by itself, ambiguous at best. What is more, speaking as though we simply could 
“mirror” such stipulations as are contained in the ideal deliberative procedure can easily take our 
attention away from the arduous task of judging what responsibilities, in some particular context, 
participants would have to assume in order for “the institutions” to “make deliberation possible.” 
In consequence, it can also take our attention away from the arduous task of specifying what, in 
that particular context, it would precisely mean for them to “assume those responsibilities.” And 
the second feature of Cohen’s way of speaking may also, if we are not careful, contribute to the 
same result: by speaking of “institutions” as themselves “determining” key outcomes, such as 
whether or not “deliberation” is “free and reasoned,” our attention may again be drawn away 
these arduous tasks. 
For instance, genuine “deliberation” about moral or ethical disagreements surely entails, 
on any reasonable interpretation of that term, a sincere attempt on the part of the participants to 
try to understand each other’s perspectives on relevant social situations and activities.108 (This 
includes, notice, the they attempt to understand the others’ perspectives on whatever the others 
regard as “relevant social situations and activities,” not just what they themselves do.109) And, to 
be sure, no “institution” can ensure that participants make such an attempt – that they assume the 
responsibility for doing so. (For instance, an institutional format that “requires” participants to 
“state their reasons for advancing proposals, supporting them, or criticizing them” surely would 
not, by itself, ensure that participants assume that responsibility.) Recognizing this, we are 
naturally led to such questions as: How, then, might a particular “institution,” in this or that 
setting, (help to) cultivate the willingness, disposition, inclination, ability to assume that 
responsibility? And what, in practice, might that even mean? (That trained facilitators employ 
certain well-proven tactics? That certain forms of cultural self-criticism are part of the public-
opinion formation stage that is intentionally built into, and that precedes the decision-making 
stage in, that institution? That some deliberators employ emotional “rhetoric” in the way that Iris 	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108 We return to this theme in later chapters, especially in chapter 5. 
109 This, too, is a theme we return to in later chapters, especially in chapter 5.	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Young suggests they sometimes should, so as, for instance, to motivate others to discuss, and 
thereby hopefully come to a better understanding of, some important issue that would otherwise 
be ignored?110 Or…?) Furthermore, what, in some particular context, might it even mean to 
“assume that responsibility”? In other words, what other, “more specific responsibilities” might 
it entail? (Challenging one’s preconceptions? Interrogating one’s self-understandings? Learning 
to be more charitable?) 
As a general matter, we can say, as I just did, that a sincere attempt to engage in 
“deliberation” about moral or ethical matters entails a sincere attempt on the part of the 
participants to try to understand each other’s perspectives on relevant social situations and 
activities. But we then need to move from a discussion of such a “general responsibility” (one, 
for instance, that is specified or entailed by an ideal procedural criterion, such as the criterion 
that “deliberation is reasoned…Reasons are offered with the aim of bringing others to accept the 
proposal, given their disparate ends (D3) and their commitment (D2) to setting the conditions of 
their association through free deliberation among equals”) to a discussion of further, “more 
specific responsibilities” that are, or, depending on the circumstances, may be, implicated in, or 
partly constitutive of, (our concept of) that “general responsibility.” In this way, we move from a 
more abstract conversation about (the) general responsibilities (that are specified [or entailed] by 
an ideal procedural criterion, for instance) to more specific judgments about what, in this or that 
particular context, “assuming” these “general responsibilities” would actually mean.  
For instance, in the context of a moral or ethical deliberation that involves the 
participation of (say) two principal “cultural groups,” one of which has been the clear historic 
victim of (let us say) marginalization, oppression, violence, and disenfranchisement on the part 
of the other, dominant cultural group, a sincere effort to understand relevant social situations and 
activities from the perspectives of individuals from the former group might well entail that the 
latter group assume responsibility for (say) “unlearning” a great deal of “history.” That is, it 
might well entail that they assume responsibility for (say) interrogating and even rejecting 
“vicious generalizations,” “racial stereotypes,” “deep-seated cultural prejudices,” and so on – 
ones which, if left unexamined or even just unacknowledged, might well prevent (many of) them 
from meaningfully assuming the responsibility for trying to understand relevant social situations 
and activities from the perspectives of the other group’s members – hence from meaningfully 
assuming responsibility for engaging in (say) “reasoned” deliberation aimed at “setting the 
conditions of their association.” 
In any case, however, the overarching points here are two. The first is that to speak of 
some “deliberative institution” as “mirroring” (say) the “requirement” that participants “state 
their reasons for advancing proposals, supporting them, or criticizing them” does not, by itself, 
bring our attention to the specific responsibilities that would make their doing so meaningful, or, 
to the specific responsibilities the assumption of which might plausibility lead to such desired 
outcomes as an increase in the “sincere representation of preferences and convictions” with a 
corresponding decline in the “strategic misrepresentation” of them. And the second point is that 
neither does talk of “institutions” “determining” these or other outcomes bring our attention to 
these responsibilities (again, perhaps especially so where those institutions are said to do so by 
“mirroring” beliefs, convictions, expectations, and so on). Indeed, if we are not careful, such talk 
may even have a bewitching effect, where a particular way of speaking leads us to a particular 
way of thinking, (tacitly) encouraging us to attribute agency to the institutions in which people 
act, rather than to the people themselves.    	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Now, as previously mentioned, there are two further results that are of interest here. The 
first is that, in not giving explicit attention to the responsibilities that are specified or entailed by 
the ideal procedural criteria that a normative democratic theory offers, we consequently give 
inadequate attention to the virtues that participants would necessarily exhibit were they to 
assume those responsibilities, and that would arguably assist them in assuming (or that would 
dispose them to assume) those responsibilities. And the second is that we consequently give 
inadequate attention the cultural practices that could conceivably help to create a social climate 
in which participants are more likely to assume the responsibilities that we think they ideally 
should assume. 
Think again of our last hypothetical, concentrating now on the issue of responsibilities. 
Again, we have here a moral or ethical deliberation that involves the participation of (say) two 
principal “cultural groups,” one of which has been the clear historic victim of (let us say) 
marginalization, oppression, violence, and disenfranchisement on the part of the other, dominant 
cultural group. And here as elsewhere, what we apparently need is: first, to refer to whatever 
ideal procedural criteria we think are worthy of our endorsement; second, to reason about what 
responsibilities are specified or entailed by those criteria; third, to reason about the virtues that 
participants would necessarily exhibit were they to assume those responsibilities, and that would 
arguably assist them in assuming (or dispose them to assume) those responsibilities; and to 
reason about the cultural practices that could conceivably help to create a social climate in which 
participants are more likely to assume the responsibilities that are specified by the criteria and/or 
that we think are entailed by them.  
So, suppose we start with the following ideal criterion, I2 of Cohen’s ideal deliberative 
procedure: “Deliberation is reasoned in that the parties of it are required to state their reasons for 
advancing proposals, supporting them, or criticizing them. They give reasons with the 
expectation that those reasons (and not, for example, their power) will settle the fate of their 
proposal.”111 From there, we might then observe that, on any reasonable definition of a 
“deliberation” (including, of course, a “reasoned deliberation”) about moral or ethical matters, a 
sincere attempt to engage in “deliberation” about moral or ethical matters entails a sincere 
attempt on the part of the participants to try to understand each other’s perspectives on relevant 
social situations and activities.112 Here, recall, there are two main “cultural groups,” one of which 
has been the clear historic victim of marginalization, oppression, violence, and 
disenfranchisement on the part of the other, dominant cultural group. (Call the former group “the 
subordinate group” and the latter group “the dominant group.”) So, we then note that a sincere 
effort on the part of many individuals from the dominant group to understand relevant social 
situations and activities from the perspectives of individuals from the subordinate group might 
well entail that they assume responsibility for “unlearning” a great deal of “history.” That is, it 
might well entail that they assume responsibility for (say) interrogating and even rejecting 
“vicious generalizations,” “racial stereotypes,” “deep-seated cultural prejudices,” and so on. 
These, we could say, are some of the “more specific responsibilities” entailed by the “general 
responsibility” that participants have for trying “to understand each other’s perspectives on 
relevant social situations and activities.”  
Now, we then notice that there are certain virtues that the participants from the dominant 
group would necessarily exhibit were they to assume such responsibilities, and that would 	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arguably assist them in assuming (or dispose them to assume) those responsibilities. (In the rest 
of this chapter and afterwards, I’ll sometimes refer to these virtues as “corollary virtues.”) For 
instance, suppose that, in entering into a genuine dialogue and deliberation with person B from 
the subordinate group, person A from the dominant group comes to realize that the way in which 
she has heretofore narrated some relevant social activity (like protests primarily organized by 
members of the subordinate group against police brutality in their communities) has served to 
reproduce “vicious generalizations” about the “character traits” and “behavioral tendencies” of 
members of the subordinate group. If, indeed, person A does come to this realization through 
conversations with person B in which she does make a sincere effort to understand the social 
activity in question, she just would exhibit some such virtues as “patience” and “open-
mindedness.” That is, if person A really had narrated the protests primarily organized by 
members of the subordinate group in a way that reproduced “vicious generalizations” about the 
“character traits” and “behavioral tendencies” of members of the subordinate group, and really 
did come to this realization by entering into a genuine dialogue and deliberation with person B 
from the subordinate group, she just would exhibit some such virtues as “patience” and “open-
mindedness.” So, we notice, a discussion of virtues is relevant and useful here, for it helps us to 
describe what characterizes the behavior of those who do assume (one or more of) the “more 
specific responsibilities” entailed by some “general responsibility” (e.g. the responsibility for 
trying to understand other participants’ “perspectives on relevant social situations and activities”) 
that is either explicitly specified or entailed by whatever ideal criterion or criteria we start with 
(e.g. I2 of Cohen’s ideal deliberative procedure: “Deliberation is reasoned…). Furthermore, we 
notice that the identification of such virtues helps us to characterize what would be involved in 
the assumption of (say) “the more specific responsibilities” in question, hence also to 
characterize what would be involved in the assumption of the “general responsibility” in 
question. And we notice that without making reference to some such virtues, it becomes harder 
to discuss the means by which participants to a dialogue and deliberation might assume “the 
more specific responsibilities” in question, hence also the “general responsibility” in question.  
For instance, B’s ability to communicate to A that she is somehow failing to assume the 
“general responsibility” in question and that she is somehow failing to assume (at least some of) 
the “more specific responsibilities” in question is partly dependent upon the availability of 
certain virtue-terms. If, say, B is in a moment in which she is trying to get A to see that her way 
of narrating the protests in question does reproduce “vicious generalizations” about the 
“character traits” and “behavioral tendencies” of members of the subordinate group (hence is in a 
moment in which she is trying to get A to “understand her perspective on relevant social 
situations and activities”), an appeal to such virtues as “patience” and “open-mindedness” might 
help her to communicate, for instance, why she thinks that A is failing to assume “the general 
responsibility”/”the more specific responsibilities” in question. (Person A: “I think you’re way 
off base: the protesters are just using this whole thing about ‘police brutality’ as an excuse to act 
disruptively. They’re probably mostly unemployed and so don’t have anything better to do.” 
Person B: “No, I’m pretty sure you’d see where you are wrong – and how offensive that 
statement is – if you would just take the time to hear me out. Please be patient; it takes time. One 
has to be open-minded to unlearn such preconceptions and to see that, whatever one’s intentions 
are, statements like that have a long history behind them and serve to reproduce vicious 
generalizations about people from my community. If you show a bit more patience and open-
mindedness, it shouldn’t be too hard to see my perspective.”) 
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Finally, we are led to the realization that there are practices that draw from the broader 
culture that, if they were somehow incorporated into the process in question, could conceivably 
help to create a social climate in which participants from the dominant group are more likely to 
assume “the general responsibility”/”the more specific responsibilities” in question, and so to 
exhibit certain “corollary virtues” as well. For instance, we might think here about the practice of 
offering “testimony.” Testimonies are used in a variety of settings – for example, in legal 
discussions and courtrooms, in social movement organizations and protest activities – to give 
voice to types of experiences that often go unheard and even unacknowledged.113 Resistance 
movements, for instance, sometimes use them to reveal the oppression of the communities that 
they emerge from, to expose the repression that they suffer at the hands of government agencies 
or others. So, in the present case, we might consider having individuals from the protest activities 
in question and from the communities in which police brutality has (allegedly) occurred provide 
testimonies about their experiences. To be sure, such testimonies are no guarantee that other 
participants will (even try to) assume the “the general responsibility”/”the more specific 
responsibilities” in question. Yet, it is not inconceivable that they might encourage some of them 
to do so. Moreover, there are other potential benefits to the inclusion of such testimonies, as we 
can see, for instance, by appealing to other aspects of whatever ideal procedural criteria we 
might endorse. (I proceed on the assumption that whatever those criteria are, they will 
presumably specify, or entail, that the participants to the process in question ought to have, as 
Dahl puts it, “opportunities to act in certain ways.” I, for one, cannot conceive of anyone wanting 
to develop a normative democratic theory that does not specify such opportunities. Indeed, I 
cannot even make sense of the idea of a “normative democratic theory” that does not do so. 
What would it even consist in? A list of the opportunities that participants should not have? In no 
sense would such a theory be about “democracy.”)  
Suppose, for the moment, that we endorse Cohen’s ideal deliberative procedure, for 
instance. Well, we might then see that I3 is relevant here:  
 
In ideal deliberation parties are both formally and substantively equal in that the rules 
regulating the procedure do not single out individuals. Everyone with the deliberative 
capacities has equal standing at each stage of the deliberative process. Each can put 
issues on the agenda, propose solutions, and offer reasons in support of or in criticism of 
proposals. And each has an equal voice in the decision. The participants are substantively 
equal in that the existing distribution of power and resources does not shape their chances 
to contribute to deliberation, nor does that distribution play an authoritative role in the 
deliberation….114 
 
There are various ways that we can see this, but just consider the idea that “each [participant] 
can…offer reasons in support of or in criticism of proposals.” In thinking about how best to 
approximate this aspect of I3, we might just focus narrowly on what we could call “procedural 
requirements.” This term connotes rules that can be codified and, in principle at least, easily 
followed. For instance, rules can stipulate that each participant has a “right” to “put issues on the 
agenda” for democratic discussion. Clearly, however, no such rules/procedural requirements can 
themselves ensure that participants meaningfully have these opportunities; in some cases, they 
might not even make this outcome plausible. Hence the usefulness of reasoning about, and 	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potentially including, certain cultural practices (such a testimony) that, if they were somehow 
incorporated into the process in question, could conceivably help to create a social climate in 
which it is more likely that participants will meaningfully have such opportunities. For instance, 
it is conceivable that, in some cases, where space is given to testimonies from groups who likely 
will be affected by a potential policy decision (say, about policing in some community), 
testimony about police brutality in that community could help participants to “put issues on the 
agenda” for discussion in a more meaningful way. 
The above considerations underline what is potentially missed (or at least what we are not 
explicitly encouraged to think about) when we speak of some “deliberative institution” as simply 
“mirroring” this or that ideal procedural criterion or as simply “mirroring” an ideal procedure 
taken as a whole. Likewise, they underline what is potentially missed (or at least what we are not 
explicitly encouraged to think about) when we talk of “deliberative institutions” as themselves 
“determining” this or that outcome.  
If, as a consequence of either or both of these ways of speaking (and so perhaps 
thinking), we do not give adequate to attention to “the general responsibilities”/”the more 
specific responsibilities” that are specified or entailed by the ideal procedural criteria that a 
normative democratic theory offers, we may consequently give inadequate attention to such 
corollary virtues as those discussed above. And this is problematic, for, among other reasons, it 
is useful to talk about such virtues precisely to fill out our descriptions of what is involved in 
assuming those responsibilities in the first place; it helps us to communicate to each other what 
precise behaviors are arguably necessary for the effective instantiation of the procedural criteria 
in question. Likewise, if, as a consequence of either or both of these ways of speaking (and so 
perhaps thinking), we do not give adequate attention to “the general responsibilities”/”the more 
specific responsibilities” that are specified or entailed by the ideal procedural criteria that a 
normative democratic theory offers, we may consequently give inadequate attention to the 
cultural practices that might promote the effective assumption of those responsibilities. 
(Likewise, if, for whatever reason, we don’t give adequate attention the opportunities that we 
think participants should have, parallel remarks could be made: we might therefore give 
inadequate attention to the responsibilities, virtues, and cultural practices that are relevant to the 
effective granting of those opportunities.) 
 
Conclusion 
 
Normative democratic theory, including deliberative-democratic theory, is sometimes 
characterized by kind of “proceduralism,” according to which the role of the democratic theorist 
is to articulate an “ideal procedure,” or “ideal procedural criteria,” for (“fair”115) democratic 
decision-making on the part of citizens and/or their representatives. In this chapter we have 
explored the specific kind of proceduralism that, at one point or another, Robert Dahl, Jürgen 
Habermas, and Joshua Cohen has each adopted, paying particular attention to how that author’s 
particular variety of liberal proceduralism leads to the tendency signaled throughout: the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 I put “fair” in parentheses here because, while (for instance) Dahl and Habermas (as we’ve seen) both make 
explicit references to “fairness” in justifying their theories, Cohen’s position is more complicated in this respect. As 
we saw, Cohen (2009: 16) depicts his conception as “an account of the value of [“an association whose affairs are 
governed by the public deliberation of its members”] that treats democracy as itself a fundamental political ideal and 
not simply as a derivative ideal that can be explained in terms of the values of fairness or equality of respect.”  
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tendency to focus on (ideal) procedures/procedural criteria without at the same time explicitly 
discussing deliberative/civic virtues and cultural practices. 
With Dahl’s liberal proceduralism, we saw, the role of a normative democratic theory is 
to offer “criteria for a democratic process,” where these are construed as “standards – ideal 
standards, if you like – against which procedures proposed ought to be evaluated in any 
association to which the assumptions [“justifying a democratic political order” may be said to] 
apply.”116
 
These criteria, we saw, “specify that citizens...ought to have equal and adequate 
opportunities to act in certain ways.”117 “They represent ideas of human possibilities against 
which actualities may be compared.”118 In short, Dahl’s manner of speaking suggests that the 
primary role of normative democratic theory is to help us to engage in practical reasoning about 
how to craft procedures that grant citizens opportunities to act in certain ways.  
Accordingly, there is no (explicit) indication that the criteria might be used for the 
purpose of reasoning about procedures, virtues, and cultural practices in conjunction. (Again, 
while I have provided some indication of why it should serve this function, the argument is 
developed at greater length in subsequent chapters, especially chapter 4.) Dahl does not 
explicitly disavow this idea, but he does disavow the idea that the criteria themselves should 
articulate “duties”; he doesn’t include any mention of “duties” in his ideal procedural criteria, 
nor is there any reference to “responsibilities” or other cognate terms. The main reason for this, it 
seems, is that although he believes that his theory does imply certain “duties,” he believes it best 
to leave it to citizens themselves to weigh those duties against the other obligations, rights, and 
opportunities that they (would) confront in a democratic political order, since doing so ensures 
that “citizens have the freedom to choose how they will fulfill their political obligations,” which 
is more consistent with the values of personal and moral autonomy and with the freedom of self-
determination.119 Consequently, to respect the value of pluralism, he seems to conclude, the 
criteria themselves are not to say anything explicit about “duties” (or, it seems, “responsibilities” 
or other cognate terms). Correspondingly, there is no discussion of the virtues that participants 
would necessarily exhibit were they to assume the responsibilities involved in the granting of the 
opportunities specified by the criteria. Furthermore, he does not explicitly consider the virtues 
that would arguably assist them in assuming (or dispose them to assume) those responsibilities in 
the first place – hence that would also assist participants in granting each other certain 
opportunities in a meaningful way. Correspondingly, he does not discuss any cultural practices 
that would arguably promote the assumption of those responsibilities, and that would arguably 
enhance the likelihood that participants to the activities in question do assume certain 
responsibilities, hence grant certain opportunities and exhibit certain virtues as well.  
 With Habermas’s proceduralism, the same tendency is on display. Like Dahl, Habermas 
is concerned with articulating a “procedural” conception of democracy that respects “the fact of 
pluralism,” to invoke Rawls’s well known phrase; he is concerned not to “ethical[ly] overload” 
or “overburden” the citizens of a polity, as he suggests that at least some “contemporary 
republicans” would (wittingly or unwittingly) have us do, since they preserve the original 
meaning of democracy in terms of the institutionalization of a public use of reason jointly 
exercised by autonomous citizens (this aspect of republicanism Habermas likes), but “give this 
public communication a communitarian reading”: they assimilate politics to a “hermeneutical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Dahl (1989: 108-109). 
117 Ibid. 114. 
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process of self-explication of a shared form of life or collective identity,” and construe “the 
democratic process [as being] dependent upon the virtues of citizens devoted to the public 
weal.”120 “In contrast, a discourse-theoretic interpretation insists on the fact that democratic will-
formation,” in Habermas’s own formulation, “draws its legitimating force not from a previous 
convergence of settled ethical convictions but both from the communicative presuppositions that 
allow the better arguments to come into play in various forms of deliberation and from the 
procedures that secure fair bargaining processes.”121  
Clearly, however, if those “various forms of deliberation”122 are to have any “legitimating 
force,” (some number of) participants to them will have to assume certain (positive and negative) 
responsibilities in relation to one another (and, as the case may be, those they [ought to] 
represent). Pace what Habermas says (in “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” for 
instance), “democratic will-formation draws its legitimating force,” on his own (implied) view, 
not from “the communicative presuppositions that allow the better arguments to come into play 
in various forms of deliberation and from the procedures that secure fair bargaining processes,” 
but rather from the action of individuals who act in accord with those “communicative 
presuppositions” in “various forms of deliberation” (and from the action of individuals who act 
in certain ways within those “fair bargaining processes.”123) And, at a general level, this is but 
another way of saying that “democratic will-formation” has “legitimating force” to the extent 
that the participants to these deliberations and fair bargaining processes assume certain (positive 
and negative) responsibilities in relation to one another (and, as the case may be, those they 
[ought to] represent). From this it follows that, on Habermas’s own conception, the “legitimating 
force” of “democratic will-formation” is “dependent on the virtues citizens,” and, to some extent 
it seems, on citizens who exhibit virtues that have been traditionally associated with “devotion to 
the public weal,” or that could reasonably be described as being associated with such devotion 
(even if the primary motive for their exhibiting those virtues is not such devotion).   
 So, like Dahl, Habermas wishes to respect the value of pluralism, and his particular way 
of trying to do so seems to lead our attention away from the need to engage in reasoning about 
procedures, virtues, and cultural practices in conjunction.  
 Finally, the same may be said of Cohen’s variety of proceduralism. Cohen’s “ideal 
deliberative procedure” is an “independent and expressly political ideal” for a “pluralistic 
association”;124 it is meant as an ideal for an association in which “the members have diverse 
preferences, convictions, and ideals concerning the conduct of their own lives. While sharing a 
commitment to the deliberative resolution of problems of collective choice (D2), they also have 
divergent ends, and do not think that some particular set of preferences, convictions, or ideals is 
mandatory.” 125  As we saw, Cohen first articulates a “formal conception of deliberative 
democracy” and then an “ideal deliberative procedure.”126 The ideal deliberative procedure is 
meant as “a more substantive account of deliberative democracy,” one that “is meant to provide a 
model for institutions to mirror.”127 And, importantly, Cohen speaks of the institutions that do try 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Habermas (1994: 4). 121	  Ibid.	  
122 Parallel remarks could be made about the “fair bargaining processes” Habermas refers to, but our analysis 
focused on the “various forms of deliberation” here referenced. 
123 Though again, we just focused on the “various forms of deliberation” here. 
124 Cohen (2009: 22, 21, 22). 
125 Ibid. 22.	  
126 Ibid.  
127 Ibid. 22, 23. 
	   54	  
to “mirror” the ideal deliberative procedure as themselves “determining” whether we witness 
various outcomes that are meant to be a part of that procedure: for instance, whether or not 
“deliberation” is “reasoned.”  
These ways of speaking we found problematic, however: it is highly ambiguous to say 
that an “institution” “mirrors” stipulations regarding (for instance) beliefs, expectations, and 
convictions, e.g., that parties to deliberation “give reasons with the expectation that those reasons 
(and not, for example, their power) will settle the fate of their proposal”; and it is unclear, even 
misleading, to say that “institutions” themselves can “determine” such outcomes as whether or 
not “deliberation is free and reasoned.”128 Relatedly, the plausibility of such factual claims as 
accompany the discussion of the desirability or justifiability of the ideal deliberative procedure 
suffers as a result of these ways of speaking. We found this to be the case, for instance, with the 
claim that “the practice of presenting reasons will contribute to the formation of a commitment to 
the deliberative resolution of political questions (D2),” which in turn suggests that “the likelihood 
of a sincere representation of preferences and convictions should increase, while the likelihood 
of their strategic manipulation declines.”129 To assess the plausibility of such a claim, what is 
needed is some sense of what the pertinent institutions look like, what specific practices might be 
involved there, beyond the mere fact that they “mirror” the stipulation(s) in question. Or to put 
the point in the way that I would prefer: What is needed is a more specific sense of: the 
opportunities that participants should have in the process in question and of the responsibilities 
that participants should assume; the virtues that they would exhibit in granting those 
opportunities and assuming those responsibilities and that would arguably dispose them to grant 
those opportunities and to assume those responsibilities; and the cultural practices that might be 
incorporated into that process which would arguably promote the granting of those 
responsibilities and the assumption of those responsibilities. But again, talk of institutions 
“mirroring” the ideal procedure and of institutions “determining” relevant outcomes does not, by 
itself, explicitly bring our attention to these opportunities, responsibilities, virtues, and cultural 
practices. Rather, it seems to focuses us on procedures (or on “institutions”) alone. Hence, as 
with Dahl and Habermas too, Cohen’s variety of proceduralism leads to the tendency in 
question: the tendency to focus on (ideal) procedures/procedural criteria without at the same time 
explicitly discussing deliberative/civic virtues and cultural practices. Hence, we again do not see 
an explicit recognition of how his normative theory might function as a framework for reasoning 
about procedures (in which participants [can] grant each other certain opportunities and assume 
certain responsibilities), virtues, and cultural practices in conjunction. And again, attention is 
apparently drawn away from the need to engage in such reasoning in the first place. 
Taking these three liberal proceduralisms together, it is not hard to identify what is 
common to them: they are all after a kind of “minimalism,” one which allows for as much moral-
ethical pluralism as possible, while still retaining a fundamental commitment to collective choice 
through (deliberative-) democratic decision-making. This, in short, is the “liberal core” that they 
share, and it is, I believe, why, in its own way, each of them can be read as being, or at least as 
seeming, wary of any talk of “responsibilities,” “virtues,” or even “cultural practices” – at least 
in the presentation of (the character and function of) the normative democratic theory itself. But, 
I am afraid, each of these liberal proceduralisms is less useful to democratic practice than it 
otherwise might be precisely because of this shared feature. (This, perhaps, was clearest in the 
discussion of Cohen’s theory, but it also came out in the discussion of the other two theories as 	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well.) As indicated, what we apparently need to do when we reason about how actually to craft 
and implement a democratic process is to reason about procedures (and so opportunities and 
responsibilities), virtues, and cultural practices in conjunction. But the tendency to focus on 
(ideal) procedures/procedural criteria without at the same time explicitly discussing 
deliberative/civic virtues and cultural practices does not explicitly encourage us to do so, indeed, 
at times at least, diverts our attention away from the need to do so in the first place. 
 Now, if the preceding critical comments on the tendency in question help to motivate 
how I myself will later describe the “proper” character and function of normative democratic 
theory in democratic practice (briefly, as a “tool” for practical reasoning that can and should help 
democracy’s participants to conduct empirical inquiries into the procedures, virtues, and cultural 
practices that, in some particular context, are most apt to promote the effective granting of the 
equal and adequate opportunities specified in the theory’s ideal procedural criteria and that are 
most apt to promote the effective assumption of the responsibilities that are specified or entailed 
by those criteria), they also help to motivate some preliminary tasks that we will need to take up 
before proceeding to that discussion. So, let me close with some brief comments on these tasks. 
In doing so, hopefully the motivation behind my proposed way of describing the proper character 
and function of normative democratic theory in democratic practice will begin to become clearer. 
If not, it should so as we move through chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
 My closing comments concern the relationship between theory and empirical inquiry. 
When an author develops and presents his normative democratic theory, what, if any, links the 
author sees between his theory, on the one hand, and empirical inquiry, on the other hand, is not 
always clear. Here, I would like to highlight two senses in which this is so, both of which are 
evident in one or more of the three theories reviewed in this chapter. However, I will center my 
comments on Cohen’s theory, in part because it is freshest in our minds. 
Very briefly, the first sense in which this is so is that the theory in question is developed 
or at least presented in such a way that it is not clear how, if at all, the author understands the 
theory to have emerged out of empirical inquiry. One consequence is that it is unclear what the 
author would say about where the democratic norms and values come from in the first place – 
about what relation, if any, they have to existing (democratic) norms, values, and practices. As 
we saw, Cohen, for instance, presents his ideal deliberative procedure as an “independent and 
expressly political ideal” for a “pluralistic association”; 130 it is meant as an ideal for an 
association in which “the members have diverse preferences, convictions, and ideals concerning 
the conduct of their own lives. While sharing a commitment to the deliberative resolution of 
problems of collective choice (D2), they also have divergent ends, and do not think that some 
particular set of preferences, convictions, or ideals is mandatory.”131 This way of framing his 
ideal raises various pressing questions. One is: If some actual association is “pluralistic” in this 
sense, what reason to do we have for expecting that its members would all find the ideal 
“intuitive,” or even that most of its members would? If the ideal were presented, for instance, as 
somehow being an interpretation of certain norms and values that are widely shared in the 
association in question, the claim about intuitiveness would not be so problematic. But since 
Cohen doesn’t frame his ideal as emerging through this kind of “empirical inquiry” (what I 
referred to in the Introduction – and what will later continue to refer to – as “anthropological-
interpretive inquiry”), that claim does indeed seem problematic. Hence, for at least this reason, it 
does seem advisable to clarify where the democratic norms and values come from in the first 	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place – what relation, if any, they have to existing (democratic) norms, values, and practices. 
Doing so, I believe, makes it easier for democracy’s participants to see how the theory might 
help them to improve their (nominally) democratic practices. Where normative democratic 
theory does not have a clear connection to existing (democratic) norms, values, and practices, 
this seems more difficult to imagine. 
Very briefly, the second sense in which the links between a normative democratic theory 
and empirical inquiry may sometimes be unclear concerns the fact that authors sometimes do not 
say anything explicit, or do not say much that is explicit, about how, if at all, their theories might 
relate to future empirical inquiries. Think again of how Cohen’s theory is presented. As we 
discussed at length, the ideal deliberative procedure is meant to provide a “model” for 
deliberative institutions to “mirror,” and these institutions are in turn thought to “determine” 
whether this or that desired outcome is witnessed (e.g., whether “reasoned deliberation” is so). 
Yet this way of framing the character and function of normative democratic theory in democratic 
practice does not give a clear indication of what role, if any, the theory itself might play in actual 
empirical inquiries. If an institution is to “mirror” the ideal deliberative procedure, does this 
mean that we are to take its stipulations as essentially articulating specific rules to be followed? If 
so, perhaps it will seem that the theory essentially has no role to play in actual empirical 
inquiries. Here, the procedure might be thought of as setting down rules to be followed 
regardless of context, obviating the need for “empirical inquiry.” Or suppose someone interprets 
the “mirroring” metaphor quite differently. They are quite sure that the ideal procedure’s 
stipulations are precisely stated and that, normatively speaking, democracy’s participants should 
try to approximate them as much as possible. Yet, on their view, such procedural criteria always 
need to be given a context-specific interpretation, for the criteria are stated at a sufficiently high 
level of abstraction so as to necessitate such interpretation. If so, it will perhaps seem that the 
theory does have a role to play in future empirical inquiries. It might, say, be thought of as 
providing expectations about the conditions in which democracy’s participants might plausibly 
anticipate that certain human “goods” will be realized. And so, at a minimum, it might be 
thought that the theory could serve an important role in orienting inquiries into what, more 
precisely, those “conditions” might consist in in this or that context. In any case, however, the 
point here is that unless an author gives us a clear indication of how, if at all, he envisages his 
theory relating to future empirical inquiries, we are left mostly guessing here. And this, I would 
again add, undermines the potential for the theory to play a productive role in actual democratic 
practice. 
 In short, these brief considerations suggest that, in developing a normative democratic 
theory, it is useful to clarify what, if any, links we think our theory has to empirical inquiry, and 
in two broad senses. First, it is helpful to indicate how, if at all, we think that the theory emerged 
out of empirical inquiry. Among other things, this should also help to clarify what, if any, 
relationship there is between, on the one hand, the norms and values that the theory articulates 
and, on the other hand, the norms and values that may or may not already exist in this or that 
particular community. And second, it is helpful to indicate how, if at all, the theory might relate 
to future empirical inquiries. This should help to clarify what, if any, role the theory might play 
in reshaping actual democratic practices in the future. So, in the next chapter, we’ll begin to take 
up these tasks. 	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Chapter 2  
 
 
Re-engaging Normative and Empirical Democratic Theory, Or, Why “Normative” 
Democratic Theory is “Empirical” All the Way Down 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Sharp divisions continue to separate “normative political theory” from “empirical 
political science.”1 These divisions are evident, for instance, in the historic separation of 
“normative democratic theory” from “empirical democratic theory,” where “normative 
democratic theory” has been construed as something that political theorists and philosophers 
sometimes engage in, while “empirical democratic theory” has been construed as something that 
political (and other social) scientists sometimes engage in.2 These sharp conceptual divisions and 
the divisions of disciplinary labor that express them reflect, inter alia, the legacy of logical 
positivism, which sharply distinguished between “facts” and “values,” hence between 
“empirical” and “normative” forms of theory as well.3 Historically, though, it has been much 
more common for political scientists to argue that their own work is, or could be, “value-free” 
and/or “non-normative” than it has been for political theorists and philosophers to argue (or even 
directly suggest) that their work is, or could be, so to speak, “empirics-free.” Yet, as John 
Dryzek has observed, “normative political theory” has, indeed, “sometimes [been] characterized 
as an evidence-free zone.”4  
In this chapter, I criticize this characterization, critically taking up the proposition that 
“normative democratic theory” (qua one form of “normative political theory”) might be 
characterized as an “evidence-free zone” or as “empirics-free.” More specifically, I do so by 
offering a conceptual strategy for challenging any sharp distinction between “normative” 
democratic theory and “empirical” democratic theory. Very briefly, the strategy goes like this.  
When we actually carry out certain tasks that are indispensable to any “reasonable”5 
conception of “normative democratic theory,” we are then engaged in a form of “practical 
reasoning.” And “practical reasoning” inevitably “involves” empirical inquiry (in an extended 
sense of “involvement”6). From this recognition it follows that normative democratic theory is 
best conceived of as a form of practical reasoning, “involving,” as it always does, one or another 
form of empirical inquiry. This conclusion gives us reason not only to avoid any sharp 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For discussion, see Fung (2007), Gerring (2006), Pitkin (1972), and Shapiro (2007). There are, of course, 
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others, Dryzek (2012), Fung and Wright (2003), and Rosenberg (2007). 
2 Cnudde and Neubauer (1969). 
3 For discussion, see Putnam (2002). The Cnudde and Neubauer (1969) volume offers one example of the influence 
of the logical positivist’s fact/value dichotomy on the field of “empirical democratic theory.” 
4 Dryzek (2007: 237). 
5 In section II, I indicate what I mean by a “reasonable” conception on normative democratic theory. 
6 Here, a person’s reasoning can be said to “involve” empirical inquiry if it is the case that her ability to reason about 
something is tied to, in some way depends on, her own or others’ empirical inquiries. I also use the term 
“influenced” in an extended sense: I say that a person’s reasoning is “influenced” by empirical inquiries if it is the 
case that her ability to reason about something is tied to, in some way depends on, her own or others’ empirical 
inquiries.	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distinction between “normative” and “empirical” forms of theory but also to avoid any such 
distinction between “theoretical” and “practical” forms of reasoning. Indeed, as the classical 
pragmatists sought to teach us, all reasoning is, in some sense, “practical,” which obviously 
implies that the reasoning involved in normative democratic theory is so too. Taking up this 
perspective, the chapter argues for a re-engagement of “normative” and “empirical” democratic 
theory. Indeed, because normative democratic theory just is a form of practical reasoning and 
because practical reasoning inevitably does “involve” empirical inquiry, it follows that normative 
democratic theory just is a form of empirical inquiry.  
This is an important recognition, not just because “normative political theory” has, 
indeed, “sometimes [been] characterized as an evidence-free zone,”7 but also because, as I 
indicated in chapter 1, it is not always clear what links, if any, an author sees between her own 
normative democratic theory and empirical inquiry. To recall, one sense in which I suggested 
this is so is that it is sometimes unclear how, if at all, the author understands the theory to have 
emerged out of empirical inquiry. However, if normative democratic theory just is an empirical 
enterprise, the minimal response to this kind of unclarity is to say: Whatever the details, the fact 
is that the theory in question just did “emerge out of empirical inquiry.” And recognizing this can 
serve to prompt more detailed inquiries into how precisely the theory did (wittingly or 
unwittingly) emerge out of this or that particular form of empirical inquiry. From there, 
interesting insights can emerge about how, for instance, the theory in question does or does not 
relate to the past or present norms and values of this or that particular community; or about how 
the individuals from this or that particular community may or not interpret some relevant concept 
differently; or about how the theory relies on tacit empirical premises that do not take adequate 
account of evidence that contravenes those premises; and so on. 
The rest of this chapter is divided in three sections. To situate my argument, section I 
briefly reviews two recent calls to give practical reasoning its due: the first is for moral 
philosophy/theory to give practical reasoning its due, the second for empirical social science or 
inquiry to do so. Elijah Millgram has recently maintained that moral philosophers have given 
inadequate attention to practical reasoning, and that moral philosophy/theory has suffered as a 
result.8 Likewise, Andrew Sayer has recently maintained that empirical social scientists have 
given inadequate attention to practical reasoning, and that the ability of social scientists to 
appreciate the “evaluative” nature of our being in the world has consequently suffered.9 Here, I 
give support to both of these claims and, moreover, indicate why they are relevant to – indeed, 
reasonable with respect to – the conduct of normative democratic theory. In doing so, however, I 
also indicate why the authors’ respective arguments would be strengthened by the recognition 
that all reasoning, whether in moral philosophy or empirical social science, is a form of 
“practical reasoning.” Both authors ask us, in brief, to “give practical reasoning its due.” Yet, 
neither of them explicitly recognizes that theoretical reasoning just is a form of practical 
reasoning, a recognition that, as I say, would strengthen both of their accounts.  
Section II turns directly to the topic of normative democratic theory, indicating, roughly 
in the way that I’ve already suggested, why normative democratic theory just is a form of 
practical reasoning, and so inevitably does “involve” empirical inquiry. Here I indicate in further 
detail why it is crucial that we not just give more attention to “practical reasoning,” giving such 
reasoning its due, so to speak, but rather that we recognize that normative democratic theory just 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Dryzek (2007: 237). 
8 Millgram (2005). 
9 Sayer (2011).	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is a from of practical reasoning. Recognizing this is crucial because it allows us to see that 
“normative democratic theory” just is a form of empirical inquiry, and so allows us to defend the 
call for “re-engagement” between “normative democratic theory” and “empirical democratic 
theory” in a particular way. That is, it clarifies that the call for “re-engagement” is actually a call 
to recognize that our existing democratic norms, values, and theories inevitably have been 
“empirically generated” and that our future democratic norms, values, and theories inevitably 
will be so. 
Section III then concludes. 
 
1. Two Recent Calls to Give Practical Reasoning Its Due 
 
1.1 Giving Practical Reasoning Its Due in Moral Theory 
 
In Ethics Done Right: Practical Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral Theory, Elijah 
Millgram defends the view that all moral philosophies and normative ethical theories presuppose 
some kind of “theory” (or at least an implicit understanding) of “practical reasoning,” where 
“practical reasoning” is construed as “reasoning directed toward deciding what to do,” or, as he 
also says, “reasoning directed toward decision or action.”10 And yet, “for most of the past, 
philosophers have not been especially self-aware when it came to their [own] opinions about 
practical reasoning. Typically they didn’t notice more than one or two possibilities, and typically 
one of those seemed to them obviously right, and not to need much in the way of sustained 
argument or defense.”11 For diverse reasons, this inattention to practical reasoning has been 
problematic, and Millgram defends a number of claims that are intended to show why greater 
attention to practical reasoning could generate more “successful” moral theories. These include, 
but are not limited to, that “the strong moral theories of the past – the moral theories that have 
passed the test of canonization – have distinctive takes on practical reasoning”; that the “central 
features of those moral theories are consequences of the understandings of practical reasoning 
that underlie them,” and hence that “when you show how moral theories pair off with theories of 
practical reasoning, you gain theoretical insight into the deep structural features of your moral 
theories”; that the “problems in [these] moral theories can often be traced back to problems in the 
underlying theory of practical reasoning”; and that “[strong] theories of practical reasoning are 
[therefore] the engines of strong moral theories.”12  
Now, despite the historic inattention to practical reasoning in moral 
philosophy/normative ethical theory that Millgram point us to, none of these claims should be 
particularly jarring. For, on reflection, “it should not be surprising that a theory [or an implicit 
understanding] of practical reasoning can have consequences for moral philosophy/normative 
ethical theory. Moral reasoning is reasoning about what to do in which specifically moral issues 
are at stake.”13 Indeed, “because moral reasoning [just] is [a form of] practical reasoning, 
practical reasoning stands (or should stand) to moral theory as process to product.” 14 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Millgram (2005: 185, 312).	  
11 Ibid. 2-3. 
12 Ibid. 3-4. 
13 Ibid. 312. 
14 Ibid. Once having read the argument in chapter 4, the reader will appreciate (I think it is fair to predict) how the 
approach to normative democratic theory that I defend in that chapter is an attempt to show precisely how practical 
reasoning should, indeed, stand to normative democratic theory (qua one form or “moral theory”) as “process to 
product.” 
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Nevertheless, practical reasoning has not received its due in moral philosophy/normative ethical 
theory, and moral reasoning has suffered accordingly. So, Millgram suggests that in order to do 
moral philosophy/normative ethical theory well, we ought to try and get clear on what our 
theories (or implicit understandings) of practical reasoning actually are, and, if necessary, to try 
and develop new such theories (understandings). Indeed, he counsels that, in doing moral 
philosophy/normative ethical theory, we give priority to practical reasoning.15  
 
1.2 Giving Practical Reasoning Its Due in Social Science/Inquiry 
 
In Why Things Matter to People: Social Science, Values and Ethical Life, Andrew Sayer 
offers a similar observation about the academic social sciences: here too, there is a long-standing 
tendency for authors to neglect the topic of practical reasoning.16 Sayer’s book is about “social 
science’s difficulties in acknowledging that people’s relation to the world is one of concern.”17 In 
it, he observes that “social science’s favored spectator’s view of action, coupled with its wariness 
of [what social scientists often understand as] normative or evaluative discourse, can easily 
prevent it from understanding what is most important to people.”18 A related consequence is that, 
historically, relatively little attention has been given to practical reasoning:  
 
Insofar as social science is [regarded as] a theoretical enterprise rather than a practical 
one, [social scientists believe they have] less need of knowledge of particulars than do the 
actors who [they study]; [the social scientist] also rarely needs to respond quickly to the 
irreversible flow of events, simply because the researcher is generally a spectator rather 
than a participant. Insofar as social research tends to focus on particular aspects of lives 
rather than whole lives, it is less likely to appreciate the need for practical judgment in 
the sense of [reasoning about the] different ends that give shape to whole lives [and in the 
sense of reasoning about the different means to the realization of those ends]. Where it is 
primarily interested in common, general processes and objects, it tends to regard variation 
and difference as a nuisance, as ‘noise’, to be ignored or reduced by [a] better choice of 
variables. All of these differences between the practice of social science and everyday life 
tend to lead to variants of the scholastic fallacy,19 in which social scientists focus on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This is a suggestion that I directly take up in chapter 4 when discussing my own approach to developing a 
“normative theory of the democratic process.” 
16 See Sayer (2011), especially chapter 3. 
17 Ibid. 1. 
18 Ibid. 6. 
19 “Pierre Bourdieu,” Sayer (2011: 14-15) writes, “has warned us of the dangers of what he terms the ‘scholastic 
fallacy’ – of academics projecting their contemplative, discursive relation to the world onto actors who have a more 
practical relation to the world (Bourdieu, 2000).” This fallacy can be witnessed both in the academic social sciences 
and in academic philosophy. Sayer continues: “This removal from the pressures of practical activity also reflects and 
signals the privileged social position of the academic. Philosophy’s preoccupation with reason and autonomy make 
it particularly liable to ignore or devalue practice, emotion, vulnerability, dependence and embodiment, and to 
marginalize psychological and sociological considerations. Another kind of scholastic fallacy involves the projection 
of social science’s [alleged] suspension of evaluation onto the people it studies so [that] their evaluative relation to 
the world is overlooked. There is also more than a streak of scientism and status-seeking in the valuation of the 
bloodless descriptions of people we find in social science, like the ‘rational actor’ or the ‘subject’, which give the 
author an elevated status precisely because they are unlike those of everyday language. To be sure, we sometimes 
need [or at least arguably benefit from invoking] these abstract concepts, but the linguistic distance [they create] also 
signifies [a] social distance. There is further a kind of macho tendency to view the study of values, emotions and 
	   61	  
those aspects of everyday life that fit best with their own [detached, spectator’s] outlook, 
and therefore [lead social scientists] to devalue or ignore practical reason. Similarly the 
‘management’ scientist’s interest in finding successful general procedures can easily lead 
[him] to miss the value of practical reason and experience in organizational life. 
[However,] [s]uccessful practice depends on [an] ability to deal with variety, as well as 
[with the] common features [of objects and processes], and the former comes [not from 
an ability to follow general procedures but primarily] from experience.20 
 
Accordingly, Sayer suggests that in order to do empirical social science or inquiry21 well, we 
ought to do the same thing that Millgram suggests we do in moral philosophy/theory: again, to 
try and get clear on what our (tacit) theories (understandings) of practical reasoning actually are, 
and, if necessary, to try to develop new ones.22 Otherwise, we are liable to reproduce the 
deficient understandings of values that have characterized much social science – “deficient,” that 
is, both with regard to the place of values in social life in general and within our social-scientific 
research methodologies in particular.23  
 
1.3 The Relevance and Reasonableness of the Two Calls  
 
Now, first consider Millgram’s recommendation, the relevance of which may already be 
clear. In developing a “normative theory of the democratic process,” surely we are engaged, 
then, in “moral philosophy” or “normative ethical theory.” For, on any plausible rendering of 
those terms, normative democratic theory just is a species of moral philosophy or normative 
ethical theory.24 Accordingly, Millgram’s suggestion has a straightforward implication here. It 
implies that we ought to do the same thing in developing a normative theory of the democratic 
process that we ought to do in developing our moral philosophies generally: again, to try and get 
clear on what our theories of practical reasoning actually are, and, if necessary, to develop new 
such theories. The question, therefore, is not whether his suggestion is relevant here; it is 
whether it is reasonable here. Are there, indeed, good reasons to think that in order to do 
normative democratic theory well, we ought to try and get clear on what our theories of practical 
reasoning actually are, and, if necessary, to try to develop new such theories?  
The answer, I believe, is yes. And, very briefly, the reason is that, as I will describe in 
Section II, “normative democratic theory” just is a form of “practical reasoning.” Hence, if we 
are not clear on what our own theories of practical reasoning are, we will not be clear on what we 
ourselves are even doing when we are engaged in “normative democratic theory.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ethics [and hence practical reasoning] as less scientific [and therefore as less prestigious] than the study of power, 
discourse, and social structure.”  
20 Ibid. 85; my emphasis. 
21 For brevity, I’ll just refer to “empirical inquiry” in the rest of Section 1.	  
22 For simplicity, I will hereafter drop the reference to “tacit” theories or understandings of practical reasoning. I will 
also switch from saying “theories” or “understandings” and just refer to “theories.” However, I recognize that, 
below, there are references to “theories” that would be better described as “tacit theories or understandings.” 
23 Ibid. 23.  
24 For our purposes, “moral philosophy” and “normative ethical theory” may be treated as synonymous. However, as 
a matter of convenience, I shall hereafter refer to “moral philosophy” only, dropping the term “normative ethical 
theory.” Up until this point, I’ve used the latter term (instead of just “ethical theory”) to signal that the enterprise we 
are concerned with is, among other things, (at least loosely) a prescriptive one, as opposed to one that understands 
itself as merely offering descriptions and/or explanations of others’ “ethical theories,” or of others’ use of “ethical 
terms” or “vocabularies.” 
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One way to give a preliminary indication of why I say this is as follows. To reason about 
what “norms” to adopt is to engage in a process of reasoning that can be described as reasoning 
that is “directed toward deciding what to do” or “toward decision or action.” And, on Millgram’s 
view, such reasoning just is “practical reasoning.” Hence, if normative democratic theory 
consists in reasoning about (inter alia) what norms to adopt (as it plainly does), it follows that, on 
Millgram’s conception of practical reasoning, normative democratic theory just is a form of 
practical reasoning. What is more, if practical reasoning is reasonably characterized as Millgram 
characterizes it, as I believe it is, then we ourselves should adopt the view that normative 
democratic theory is a form of practical reasoning. And, with this in mind, we can then say why 
Millgram’s recommendation appears reasonable here.  
Again, on the view just indicated: (a) normative democratic theory consists in (inter alia) 
reasoning about what norms to adopt; (b) reasoning about what norms to adopt counts as 
reasoning that is “directed toward deciding what to do” or that is “directed toward decision or 
action,” 25 viz., counts as “practical reasoning”; and, therefore, (c) normative democratic theory 
just is a form of practical reasoning. This clarifies the reasonableness of Millgram’s 
recommendation: again, that in order to do moral philosophy well (and hence, we have added, to 
do normative democratic theory well), we ought to try and get clear on what our theories of 
practical reasoning actually are, and, if necessary, to try to develop new such theories. For, as I 
have just said, when we are engaged in normative democratic theory we just are engaged in 
practical reasoning. Hence, if we are not clear on what our theories of practical reasoning are, 
this suggests that we will not be clear on what we are even doing when we are engaged in 
“normative democratic theory.” And, it would seem, we are therefore less liable to do normative 
democratic theory well.  
What, though, of Sayer’s recommendation, which may not seem relevant here? If our 
concern is to develop a normative democratic theory, how is a discussion of empirical inquiry 
relevant? More specifically, what is the relevance of the suggestion that in order to do empirical 
inquiry well, we ought to try and get clear on what our theories of practical reasoning are, and, if 
necessary, to try and develop new such theories?  
Well, consider the following basic line of reasoning. As I’ve said, normative democratic 
theory just is, on my view, a form of practical reasoning, viz., a form of reasoning that is 
“directed toward action.” In addition, however, notice that practical reasoning in turn inevitably 
involves “empirical inquiry.” For reasoning that is directed toward action is, among other things, 
reasoning that, in some measure, responds to the circumstances in which one finds (or places) 
oneself. And to “respond” to one’s circumstances, one needs to “inquire,” in some measure, into 
what those circumstances are. 26  At a minimum, this clarifies the relevance of Sayer’s 
recommendation here. For if (a) normative democratic theory just is a form of practical 
reasoning and (b) practical reasoning inevitably involves empirical inquiry, then (c) it would 
seem to follow that in order to do normative democratic theory well, we would need to do 
empirical inquiry well. So, in our effort to develop a normative democratic theory, a discussion 
of how to do empirical inquiry well is indeed relevant. 
I should say a bit more, however, to clarify the reasonableness of Sayer’s 
recommendation here. For recall that “practical reasoning” is sometimes described as reasoning 
that is “directed toward decision or action.” (We already saw that Millgram, for instance, 
describes it this way.) And so notice that, at first blush, it might be thought that the kind of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Hereafter I’ll just say, more simply, that practical reasoning is reasoning that is “directed toward action.”    
26 Here, I am speaking of “responses” in the conscious, purposeful sense of the word.  
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reasoning that is involved in empirical inquiry is “theoretical reasoning” (i.e., reasoning that is 
“directed toward belief”) – not “practical reasoning” (reasoning that is “directed toward decision 
or action”).27 Thus, from this perspective at least, Sayer’s recommendation may not seem 
reasonable here.  
One way to see why this is mistaken, however, is to reflect on the activities that are 
inevitably involved in reasoning that is “directed toward belief.” Consider, for instance, such 
reasoning as goes into how to describe some particular situation. Such reasoning is an 
indispensable part of reasoning that is “directed toward belief,” at least where the “beliefs” in 
question have to do with the empirical (hence social) world. Notice, however, that to reason 
about how to describe some situation is always to reason about whether or not, in this or that 
particular context, one is willing to apply some concept (hence verbally employ some word or 
phrase) and about whether or not one thinks it desirable to modify its use (and therefore “the 
content” of that concept and “the meaning” of that word or phrase). And if this does not appear 
to be a form of “practical reasoning,” it is useful to recall that a choice to speak in a certain way 
is always a choice to act in a certain way. Hence, to the extent that one reasons about how to 
speak, one is therefore reasoning about how to act. As such, one is then engaged in practical 
reasoning, for practical reasoning just is reasoning about how to act (that is “directed toward 
action”).  
We can now indicate more clearly the reasonableness of Sayer’s recommendation here. 
Again, if (a) normative democratic theory just is a form of practical reasoning and (b) practical 
reasoning inevitably involves28 empirical inquiry, then (c) it would seem to follow that in order 
to do normative democratic theory well, we need to do empirical inquiry well. But (d) since 
empirical inquiry (e.g. description) inevitably involves practical reasoning, we can also say (with 
Sayer) that in order to do empirical inquiry well (and hence normative democratic theory well), 
we also need to do practical reasoning well.  
Furthermore, taking the above claims together, we can then see why there is an initial 
case for endorsing the claim that normative democratic theory is best conceived of as a form of 
practical reasoning, involving, as it always does, one or another form of empirical inquiry. 
 
1.4 The Principal Shortcoming of the Two Calls to Give Practical Reasoning Its Due 
 
 So far I have suggested that Millgram’s call to give practical reasoning its due is relevant 
and reasonable in the context of our own discussion of normative democratic theory, just as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Indeed, it is conventional to contrast “practical reasoning” with “theoretical reasoning,” as Millgram (2005: 312) 
does: “Practical reasoning is reasoning directed toward decision or action, as contrasted with theoretical reasoning, 
which is directed toward belief.”27 Note also that he describes “theoretical reasoning” (reasoning that is “directed 
toward belief”) as “reasoning about the facts” (2001: 17), while he seems to imply that “practical reasoning” 
(reasoning that is “directed toward decision or action”) is reasoning about “values.” This implied claim can 
reasonably be gleaned from, for instance, from the following passage (Millgram [2001: 17]): “To draw the right 
conclusion about what to do, you normally have to have an adequate description of your situation. Arriving at such a 
description is usually regarded as theoretical rather than practical reasoning: you are reasoning about the facts, 
rather than about the values.” Hence, from the perspective suggested by these passages, it might be thought that the 
kind of reasoning that is involved in empirical inquiry is “theoretical reasoning” (reasoning that is “directed toward 
belief” and that is “about the facts”), not “practical reasoning” (reasoning that is “directed toward decision or action” 
and is about “values”). 
28 In this section, section 1.3, I am not putting the word “involve” in quotes, as I do elsewhere in this chapter. Here, I 
am using the word in an ordinary sense. In the rest of the essay, I will put it in quotes, since I will then be using it 
the technical sense signaled in note 6 above.	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Sayer’s call is so too. However, both of these calls are weaker than they otherwise might be, and 
for precisely the same reason: neither acknowledges that the form of reasoning that they are 
concerned with – moral philosophy in the case of Millgram and empirical inquiry in the case of 
Sayer – just is a form of “practical reasoning.”  
At one point, Millgram, for his part, does come very close to acknowledging this. As we 
saw, he writes that “moral reasoning is reasoning about what to do in which specifically moral 
issues are at stake,”29 and adds that, indeed, “because moral reasoning [just] is [a form of] 
practical reasoning, practical reasoning stands (or should stand) to moral theory as process to 
product.”30 In this formulation, Millgram comes close to stating that moral theory just is a form 
of practical reasoning. However, he does not quite say that it is, and there are good reasons to 
question that he would be willing to do so. Indeed, as is conventional, Millgram contrasts 
“practical reasoning” with “theoretical reasoning”: “Practical reasoning is reasoning directed 
toward decision or action, as contrasted with theoretical reasoning, which is directed toward 
belief.”31 And this formulation seems to suggest that moral theory is not a form of practical 
reasoning (even if moral reasoning is so), for it posits that moral theory is directed at one thing 
(belief), while moral reasoning is directed at another (decision or action).  
What about Sayer? Similarly, Sayer describes “practical reason” as “reasoning about 
what we should do.”32 However, once again, he does not, in the work in question at least, 
explicitly take the position that the reasoning involved in empirical inquiry is itself a form of 
practical reasoning, even though he is much concerned to defend the legitimacy of various forms 
of practical reasoning (beyond the “instrumentalist” version of it according to which reason can 
inform us about what might be “rational” means to our ends but is silent about our ends [or 
values] themselves, since, on some interpretations of “instrumental” practical reasoning at least, 
our ends [values] are interpreted as being merely “arbitrary” or  merely “subjective,” based on 
mere “preferences” or on “cultural conventions” alone).33 
In contrast to these two authors, the view I want to adopt is a pragmatist one, namely, that 
to hold a belief just is to be prepared to act in a certain way.34 Hence, to reason about what to 
believe just is to reason about how (to be prepared) to act in certain ways. Or, in other words, 
“theoretical reasoning” (reasoning that is “directed toward belief”) just is a form of “practical 
reasoning” (reasoning that is “directed toward decision or action”). Once we appreciate this, we 
can then see how Millgram and Sayer’s respective calls to give practical reasoning its due can be 
strengthened. And we can then see how, re-interpreted in this pragmatic fashion, their arguments 
can offer still greater support to our own call for a “re-engagement” between “normative” and 
“empirical” democratic theory than they currently do. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Ibid. 312. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 312. 
32 Sayer (2011: 61). 
33 See Sayer (2011: chapter 2).  
34 Fesmire writes that “classical pragmatism…replaces beliefs-as-intellectual-abstractions with beliefs-as-tendencies 
to act”; hence, “all reasoning is in some sense prudential” (2003: 28). Likewise, Christopher Hookway writes that 
“all of the classic pragmatists identified beliefs and other mental states as habits. According to Peirce, our beliefs 
‘Guide our desires and shape our actions’… The content of a belief is not determined by its intrinsic phenomenal 
character; rather, it is determined by its role in determining our actions” (2013). And, writing on John Dewey in 
particular, Gouinlock (1976: xxxiii) writes that, for Dewey, “to have an idea is to be prepared to act in certain 
ways.”  
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Now, there are a variety of paths by which we might hope to substantiate the pragmatist-
inspired claim that normative democratic theory is a form of practical reasoning. In the next 
section, however, I’d like to adopt the following basic strategy. Let us think through why 
someone might be thoroughly skeptical of the claim that normative democratic theory just is a 
form of practical reasoning, hence inevitably does involve empirical inquiry. We’ll assume that 
our interlocutor begins from the assumption that “normative democratic theory” is precisely that: 
a “normative” enterprise and not, therefore, an “empirical” one. And, correspondingly, we’ll 
assume that she assumes that it is a “theoretical” enterprise and not, therefore, a “practical” one. 
In reviewing the below line of hypothetical questioning, my aim is to offer a brief outline 
of the strongest case for thinking that empirical inquiry is not an indispensable part of 
“normative democratic theory,” properly so called. And by indicating why even that case is so 
implausible, I hope thereby to clarify why normative democratic theory is best conceived of as a 
form of practical reasoning, involving, as it always does, one or another form of empirical 
inquiry. 
 
II. Why “Normative” Democratic Theory is “Empirical” All the Way Down 
 
Now, let us suppose that our interlocutor begins by reasoning as follows. Roughly, aren’t 
the central tasks in “normative democratic theory”: (a) to articulate a conception of what our 
“democratic norms and values” are; (b) to labor through one or another form of justification for 
our wanting to uphold those norms and to realize those values; and (c) to offer some account of 
how we might “weigh” those norms and values in relation to whatever other norms and values 
we might have?35 If so, it isn’t apparent how anything like social (-scientific) inquiry would 
necessarily (have to) enter in here.  
Indeed, when we look still closer, don’t we discover that we can carry out tasks (a)-(c) 
without making any direct appeal to any kind of “empirical inquiry” – to any kind of “social 
science” or “social inquiry” – whatsoever?36 That is, can’t we (a) articulate our democratic 
norms and values (e.g., the value of give “equal consideration to each citizen’s good or interests” 
and the norm of granting citizens “equal voting rights”) by just reasoning about whatever “more 
basic” values we might have (e.g., the desirability of “treating citizens as equals”), showing that 
a commitment to the former values simply “follows from” a (sincere) commitment to the latter? 
If so, this would seem to allow us to carry out task (b) as well: laboring through a justification for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Below I explicitly affirm that these three tasks are, indeed, indispensable to normative democratic theory. Hence, 
in speaking of “‘reasonable’ conceptions of normative democratic theory,” I have in mind, for the purposes of this 
chapter, any conception of normative democratic theory that does recognize the indispensability of these three tasks. 
36 If it strikes the reader as implausible that someone might actually conclude this, note again that, as Dryzek (2007: 
237) writes, “normative political theory is,” indeed, sometimes characterized as being “an evidence-free zone.” 
Dryzek (2007: 237), for his part, regards this characterization as “generally” being unfair. I would go one step 
further, suggesting that this characterization would always be unfair. Here, however, I don’t have the space to 
develop that claim, for I would have to say something first about what “normative political theory” itself is, then 
defend the claim that that form of theory isn’t fairly characterized as “an evidence-free zone.” And to do all of that 
would take me beyond my immediate purposes here. Below, however, it is precisely my aim to defend the claim that 
(any “reasonable” conception of) normative democratic theory (qua one form of “normative political theory”) isn’t 
fairly characterized as “an evidence-free zone,” at least where “evidence-free zone” bears the meaning of an area of 
reasoning or inquiry that does not “involve” or is not “influenced” by some person or persons’ empirical inquiries. 
(On what I mean by the claim that an area of reasoning or inquiry “involves” or is “influenced” by empirical 
inquiries, refer to note 6 above.) The argument does, I believe, apply to the more general category of “normative 
political theory” as well, but again, defending that broader claim is beyond my immediate purposes here. 
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our holding those values. In short, showing that the former values “follow from” the latter ones 
would, then, constitute our “justification” for (at least) those latter values.37 And this would seem 
to suggest that to carry out tasks (a) and (b), we need only reason through our values and (at least 
certain of) the “implications” of our having them.  
Finally, can’t we also (c) offer an account of how we might “weigh” the norms and 
values articulated under (a) against whatever other norms and values we might have, simply 
reasoning through the “relative importance” we would assign to our realizing some value (or 
norm) X over some other value (or norm) Y? For instance, in everyday life don’t we rank the 
“desirability”38 of such things as spending a day in the park with one’s children against the 
“desirability” of writing a bit more of one’s book manuscript?39 Furthermore, isn’t it the case that 
we can fairly represent such moments as instances of “reasoning through the ‘relative 
importance’ we would assign to our realizing some value X over some other value Y”? And, 
what is more to the point, isn’t it the case that we could carrying out these tasks without making 
any “direct appeal” to anything like social science or inquiry? 
Likewise, can’t we do the same in normative democratic theory, the difference being 
only that we’d be “weighing” different norms and values, for instance, that we’d be weighing the 
desirability40 of having some matter subject to “public,” i.e. “democratic,” decision-making 
against (say) the desirability of leaving that matter to “private” decision-making? And, what is 
more to the point, isn’t it then the case that we could accomplish (a)-(c) without making any 
direct appeal to anything like social science or inquiry? Hence, isn’t it the case that we can, 
indeed, carry out “the central tasks” of normative democratic theory without making any direct 
appeal to anything like social science or inquiry?  
Here, I do not want to deny that, indeed, each of these tasks should be central to 
(whatever we might agree to call) “normative democratic theory.” (I do, however, wish to back 
down from the claim that these are “the central tasks” of such theory. Rather, I would just say: 
“these tasks are central, indeed indispensible, to [any ‘reasonable’ conception of] such theory.”) 
Furthermore, I do not want to deny that, at a certain level of abstraction, we can indeed carry out 
tasks (a)-(c) “without making a ‘direct appeal’ to anything like social science or inquiry” – and, 
moreover, that we can indeed do so intelligently.  
For instance, we can, I think, (a) intelligently reason about how to articulate our own 
democratic norms and values without ourselves engaging in (what we would typically call), or 
without “directly appealing to” (what we would typically call others’), social (-scientific) 
inquiries. In a sense, we do this – to take a simple example – whenever we conclude that “to treat 
citizens as ‘equals,’” we ought to grant them (some form of) “equal voting rights.” To reach this 
conclusion, we need not ourselves engage in any laborious inquiry into, for instance, the vast 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This, of course, leaves open the question of how the former values are “justified.” For our purposes, however, let 
us assume that our interlocutor believes that those values (e.g. “treating citizens as equals”) are straightforward 
logical derivations from ideas given by our universal reason, or from laws that are given by God, or from universal 
human feelings. In short, suppose that, to her mind, these values don’t derive from anything like social (-scientific) 
inquiry. In this way, we’ll suppose, our interlocutor would maintain that the values in question are straightforward 
“logical implications” of other “more basic values” or are themselves such values, where these latter values aren’t, 
again, derived from anything like social (-scientific) inquiry.  
38 For present purposes, it is not important whether this “desirability” is construed in terms of pleasure/utility, or 
well-being/flourishing, or the fulfillment of one’s duties (say, to spend time with one’s kids), or whatever. 
39 Again, it is not important here whether this desirability is construed in terms of pleasure, or well-
being/flourishing, or the fulfillment of one’s duties (say, to earn a livelihood for one’s family), or whatever.  
40 As before, how this “desirability” is construed need not concern us here.  
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array of voting systems employed by countries throughout the world – nor, indeed, into any 
voting system at all. Nor need we rely on others to conduct such inquiries. Still further, we need 
not even (consciously or unconsciously) refer to such inquiries. We need only reason from (1) 
the premise that “citizens ought to be treated as ‘equals’” to (2) the conclusion that “‘equal 
citizens’ ought to have ‘equal voting rights.’” And (1), we might say, is a “normative premise” 
(not a “factual premise”), while (2) is what we might call a “normative conclusion” (not a 
“factual conclusion”). (What additional premises might be involved in reaching that conclusion 
need not concern us for the moment; for these might also be described as “normative premises” 
rather than “factual” ones.) Moreover, at a certain level of abstraction, such “normative 
premises” and “normative conclusions” can be defended without making any “direct appeal” to 
“social science or inquiry.”  
Furthermore, we can also (b) labor through one or another form of justification for our 
endorsing those norms and for our holding those values without making any such appeal. As 
suggested, it is possible for us to articulate our democratic norms and values by, for instance, 
reasoning from (1) the “normative premise” that “citizens ought to be treated as ‘equals’” to (2) 
the “normative conclusion” that “such treatment demands that citizens have ‘equal voting 
rights.’” In doing so (i.e., in carrying out task [a]), we would, then, be laboring through a 
“justification” for our endorsing those norms and for our holding those values; we would, then, 
be showing that the latter norm/value “follows from” a (sincere) commitment to the former 
norm/value (i.e., we would be carrying out task [b]). And again, to reach this conclusion, we 
need not ourselves engage in any laborious inquiry into, for instance, the vast array of voting 
systems employed by countries throughout the world – nor, indeed, into any voting system at all. 
Nor need we rely on others to conduct such inquiries. And still further, we need not even 
(consciously or unconsciously) refer to any such inquiries. Hence, we would, then, be able to 
carry out task (b) without making any “direct appeal” to social (-scientific) inquiry.  
Likewise, we can also, in this way, (c) offer some account of how we might “weigh” 
those norms/values in relation to whatever other norms/values we might have. For instance, to 
return to an earlier example, we can, without “directly appealing to” social (-scientific) inquiry, 
intelligently compare (say) the desirability of having some matter subject to “public,” i.e. 
“democratic,” decision-making with (say) the desirability of leaving that matter to “private” 
decision-making.  
Suppose, for instance, that person A is both a self-styled “democrat” and a self-styled 
“libertarian.” Now, suppose that qua democrat, A believes that some choices are, indeed, 
properly regulated by “public” forms of democratic decision-making. Suppose, however, that 
qua libertarian, A also places a very high premium on “individual liberty.” For her, we’ll 
suppose, there are choices that are unequivocally “individual choices,” where these are 
understood as choices that don’t affect any “public”; instead, they affect, and only affect, the 
individuals who themselves make those choices. And to A’s mind, the choice of whom to have 
sexual relations with, in the privacy of one’s own home, is a paradigmatic example of such a 
choice. Believing this, A therefore concludes that the choice of whom to have sexual relations 
with, in the privacy of one’s own home, is not properly regulated by “public” forms of 
democratic decision-making.41 In this way, A arrives at a position in normative democratic 
theory, and, moreover, without herself engaging in any kind of social (-scientific) inquiry, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 For A, it is only properly subject to “private” forms of democratic decision-making. For, on A’s own view, the 
persons who do engage in such relations each have to “freely consent” to doing so. And, in that more restricted 
sense, the decision is ideally “democratic.”  
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without herself directly appealing to (or [consciously or unconsciously] referring to) others’ 
social (scientific-) inquiries.  
However, in affirming that, at a certain level of abstraction, we can, indeed, intelligently 
so reason, I am not affirming that this is all that “normative democratic theory” consists in. Nor 
am I affirming that it is all that it ought to consist in. Indeed, my suggestion is rather different, 
and can be summarized in the following main claims.  
At a certain level of abstraction, (something like) tasks (a)-(c) surely would be part of any 
“reasonable” conception of “normative democratic theory.” Furthermore, at some such level, we 
can, as I’ve just indicated, carry out these tasks without making any “direct appeal” to social (-
scientific) inquiry. However, on any plausible interpretation of the purpose of normative 
democratic theory, the idea is to gain some clarity about what democratic values one reflectively 
wants to realize (and wants others [to want] to realize) and to gain some guidance about what 
democratic norms one reflectively thinks that one ought to uphold (and thinks that others ought 
to [want to] uphold). And the point of gaining such clarity, and of attaining such guidance, is, of 
course, to figure out how best to act in specific cases of decision-making in order to realize those 
values and to uphold those norms. Yet, there is no plausible argument that I can think of to 
support the claim that general statements about such “norms” or “values” would provide 
unambiguous “guidance,” or perfect “clarity,” about how one could exactly do so in particular 
cases. That is, any such norms or values will always demand contextual interpretation “in their 
‘application.’”42  
Hence, to decide how to act, I am suggesting, one has to engage in a context-specific 
deliberation, which partly concerns how those norms and/or values are themselves to be 
interpreted there;43 norms and values cannot simply be “applied.” And this appears to be so even 
if one thinks that there are “universal norms” to be upheld and/or “universal values” that ought to 
be realized. What is more, actual deliberation about what to do in any given context does not, I 
am suggesting, only happen at a level at which we can carry out tasks (a)-(c) “without making 
any direct appeal to something like social science or inquiry”; or at the very least, it does not best 
happen by just operating at such a level. Moreover, as we’ll see below, even when we do 
deliberate without making “direct appeals” to social (-scientific) inquiry, our reasoning still 
“involves” empirical inquiry, in an extended use of that term.44 So, actual deliberation clearly 
“involves” one or another form of empirical inquiry: it involves a process of (more or less 
formal, more or less conscious) inquiry into the circumstances in which we (are) actually (to) 
decide something. In other words, actual deliberation always takes place in a specific, unique 
context, and, in some sense, always concerns how to act in that context and how certain norms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 This is a claim that I develop at some length in chapter 3. 
43 Of course, there are many cases of human action in which we don’t consciously so deliberate, but act rather on the 
basis of our “feel for the game” (Bourdieu, 1998; 2000). But I am concerned with such cases as when we do reason 
about what “norms” to uphold and about what “values” to realize, for we are concerned precisely with our efforts to 
articulate our democratic norms and values. And again, in such cases, I am claiming, we do have to engage in a 
“context-specific” deliberation. Furthermore, in such cases, I am again claiming, it is highly implausible to suggest 
that any such “norms” or “values,” abstractly stated, would provide unambiguous guidance, or perfect clarity, about 
how one should (wish to) act.   
44 Again, I use “involve” in a broad sense, that is, to include the claim that if one’s ability to reason about some 
premise or conclusion is tied to, is in some way dependent upon, one’s own or others’ empirical inquiries, then the 
reasoning in question may be said to “involve” one or another form of empirical inquiry.	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and/or values are to be interpreted there.45 And in that sense, it is always a form of situated 
practical reasoning, “involving,” as it always does, one or another form of empirical inquiry. 
 
2.1 The Analytic Fallacy and How It Can Occlude the “Empirical” Character of “Normative” 
Democratic Theory 
 
Now, to ignore or to overlook that actual deliberation about one’s norms and values 
clearly does “involve” one or another form of empirical inquiry is, I believe, to commit the kind 
“philosophical fallacy”46 that John Dewey repeatedly warned us against. And if we can avoid 
committing this fallacy, we can easily appreciate that when we actually engage in such 
deliberation, it is always a form of situated practical reasoning, “involving,” as it always does, 
one or another form of empirical inquiry. Hence, we can easily appreciate why normative 
democratic theory just is a form of empirical inquiry, and so easily defend our call for “re-
engagement.”  
Recently, Gregory Pappas has brought our attention to the importance of Dewey’s 
critique of “the philosophical fallacy.” “Philosophers,” Pappas writes, “have not only failed to let 
their own inquiries be guided by and returned to context but they have also defended notions of 
thinking as devoid of all context. Hence, Dewey concludes that ‘the most pervasive fallacy of 
philosophic thinking goes back to [the] neglect of context.’ (LW 6:5). This general failure was so 
common in philosophy that he [chose to call] it ‘the philosophical fallacy’ (LW 1:51).”47 “The 
philosophical fallacy,” Pappas continues, “became Dewey’s main tool of criticism in divergent 
areas of philosophy, and he discovered many different ways that philosophers made the same 
fundamental mistake.”48 Unfortunately, however, Dewey “never clearly set forth in a systematic 
way the various formulations and versions of the fallacy.”49  
Here, we need only consider one version of this fallacy, which Pappas aptly calls the 
“analytic fallacy.” “Analysis,” Pappas writes,  
 
is a process where we discriminate some particulars or elements within a context…. 
Philosophers [and, we may add, anyone else who is engaged in “analysis,” in this generic 
sense] commit the analytic fallacy when the results of an analysis are interpreted as 
complete in themselves [, that is, as considered] apart from any context. ‘It is found 
whenever the distinctions or elements that are discriminated are treated as if they were 
final and self-sufficient’ (LW 6:7)…. Though Dewey refers to this fallacy as one of 
analysis, it is not limited in its application to a specific phase of inquiry. The key to this 
fallacy is that the rich and concrete context from which distinctions are abstracted is 
forgotten and the results of inquiry are given a status that they do not and should not 
have.50  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Historically, pragmatist philosophers have often emphasized precisely this feature of deliberation, as they have 
always had a deep appreciation for the radical contingency and uncertainty of lived experience. For instance, John 
Dewey once wrote: “Practical activity [and hence deliberation about how to act] deals with individualized and 
unique situations which are never exactly duplicable and about which, accordingly, no complete assurance is 
possible.” Quoted in Caspary (2000: 19).  
46 Dewey (1981: 51). 
47 Pappas (2008: 26). 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid.  
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How, though, are Dewey’s observations relevant here? They are relevant, I believe, 
because, on a particular understanding of our own interlocutor’s claim, the fallacy is operative 
here, that is, operative in the claim that we can, indeed, carry out normative democratic theory 
“without any direct appeal to social (-scientific) inquiry.”51  
 So, let us return to the line of reasoning that led our interlocutor to make her claim. 
Above, I granted that we can, indeed, carry out tasks (a)-(c) “without any direct appeal to social 
(-scientific) inquiry.” Furthermore, I granted that we can, indeed, do so intelligently.52 However, 
I was quick to point out that this is only so at a certain level of abstraction. And it is this 
qualification that is key to understanding where the analytic fallacy lies. Seeing this, we can 
more easily appreciate why it is the case that “normative democratic theory is best conceived of 
as a form of situated practical reasoning, “involving,”53 as it always does, one or another form of 
empirical inquiry. 
 To see this, we again consider tasks (a)-(c). This time, however, we’ll pay very close 
attention to the level of abstraction at which we are thinking.  
To recall, task (a), roughly stated, is to articulate a conception of what our “democratic 
norms and values” are, while task (b) is to labor through one or another form of justification for 
our endorsing those norms and for our holding those values. Now, I earlier said that an example 
of our carrying out tasks (a) and (b) together is whenever we conclude that in order “to treat 
citizens as ‘equals,’” we ought to grant them (some form of) “equal voting rights.” And I earlier 
said that such a conclusion can, indeed, be reached “without any direct appeal to social (-
scientific) inquiry.” At this point, however, a number of qualifications should be made.  
First, notice that, in characterizing the position that I do affirm, I have been using the 
phrase “without any direct appeal to social (-scientific) inquiry.” Yes, it is true that an individual 
person can arrive at this conclusion without making any such appeal: she need not herself 
conduct such inquiry, and she need not herself even (consciously or unconsciously) refer to any 
such inquiry.  
Nevertheless, there are a number of angles from which we can see that some such person 
will have been “influenced” by some such inquiry, or, what is to say the same thing here, from 
which we can see that their reasoning would “involve” some such inquiry. For surely it is the 
case that the “deduction” in question is, if you like, a “historically and culturally mediated” one, 
that is, one that relies on a variety of (at least tacit) judgments about the circumstances in which 
“equal treatment” is most likely to be realized (or approximated), judgments that must have 
been derived from someone’s (or some people’s) having observed/inquired into such 
circumstances.  
For instance, some might be led to the conclusion in question by reflecting on the history 
of restrictive or exclusionary franchise systems, e.g., those that have excluded women or certain 
races/ethnicities. And in order to be able so to reflect, one needs to have access to information 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 The qualification that the analytic fallacy is only operative on a particular understanding of our interlocutor’s 
claim is important here, for much depends on how we interpret the phrase “without any direct appeal to social (-
scientific) inquiry” in the claim in question. (“We can indeed carry out tasks (a)-(c) ‘without any direct appeal to 
social (-scientific) inquiry.’”) As I indicate below, this claim, at a certain level of abstraction, is defensible. 
However, at another level, I believe that it is not so. 
52 Recall, however, that while our interlocutor characterized these tasks as “the central tasks” in normative 
democratic theory, I stated that I would rather say: “these tasks are central, indeed indispensible, to (any 
‘reasonable’ conception of) such theory.” 
53 Again, see note 6 above for a description of how I’m using “involvement” here. 
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that is at least partly based on someone’s (or some people’s) observations. Or to take another 
example, others might be led to that conclusion by reflecting on their own lived experiences, e.g., 
on experiences they’ve had where some small minority of individuals at their workplace has 
been granted all of the decision-making authority, while the majority has been consigned to the 
passive receipt of “orders from above.” In such a case, one’s own observations would, then, be 
(part of) the basis for one’s conclusion here. Hence, while it is true that an individual person may 
arrive at the conclusion in question without any “direct appeal” to social (-scientific) inquiry, 
again, it seems that she must have been “influenced” by some such inquiry. And it is by 
abstracting away from, if you like, “the observational-informational context” in which she does 
arrive at that conclusion that we can miss this point. When we do so, we may therefore commit 
Dewey’s analytic fallacy. Hence, careful attention to the level at which we do depict the agent’s 
reasoning can help us to avoid this outcome. 
Moreover, our (more or less conscious) reflections on, and observations of, our own or 
others’ lived experiences are (at least partly) responsible for the content that we give to the 
pertinent concepts here:54 “equal treatment” and “equal voting rights” are, indeed, live, evolving, 
adaptable concepts, and our ability “to apply” those concepts is tied to a particular history, just as 
our willingness (or unwillingness) to do so is too.55 To borrow a phrase from Dewey, surely 
these are not concepts that “descend out of the a priori blue.”56 Nor, clearly, would we want to 
say that the conclusion in question is one that “descend[s] as an imperative from a moral Mount 
Sinai.”57 Even if one thinks that there are strong reasons for supposing that some notion of 
“equality” is somehow “built into our ‘moral intuitions’” and that these intuitions are somehow 
“biologically rooted” (and in that sense “universal”), surely it is implausible to claim that the 
content of the concept of “equal treatment” can be so described.58 And surely it is implausible to 
claim that the content of the concept of “equal voting rights” can be too. Rather, what we have 
here are two concepts with histories, so that to be willing and able to apply those concepts in any 
given instance, one has to be a participant in the interpretation of those histories.59 And, what is 
more, to engage in such participation is always to engage in practical reasoning: it is always to 
reason about whether or not, in this or that particular context, one is willing to apply some 
concept (hence verbally employ some word or phrase) and about whether or not one thinks it 
desirable to modify its use (and therefore the content of that concept and the meaning of that 
word or phrase). Furthermore, to engage in such participation is always to engage in empirical 
inquiry: it is always (more or less consciously, more or less formally) to inquire into how some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 If it is unclear why this point bears mention here, it is useful to recall the following observations, offered by 
Alasdair MacIntyre (1998: 1) in A Short History of Ethics: “Moral philosophy is often written as though the history 
of the subject were only of secondary and incidental importance. This attitude seems to be the outcome of a belief 
that moral concepts can be examined and understood apart from their history. Some philosophers have even written 
as if moral concepts were a timeless, limited, unchanging, determinate species of concept, necessarily having the 
same features throughout their history, so that there is a part of language waiting to be philosophically investigated 
which deserves the title “the language of morals” (with a definite article and a singular noun).” 	  
55 If one’s ability to use or apply some concept is tied to a particular history, so must one’s willingness to apply it be 
so too. Unless one understands a concept, one can’t be willing (sincerely, truthfully) to use or apply it. Hence, if 
one’s understanding of a concept is tied to a particular history, one’s willingness to use or apply it is so too.   
56 Dewey (1981: 219). 
57 Ibid.  
58 For discussion of the idea that some moral intuitions are biologically rooted (and in that sense “universal”), see 
Hauser (2006). 
59 Gadamer (2011); Bevir (1999). 
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concept is typically employed, and to reflect upon how one is likely to be understood if one does 
choose to employ it (in this way or that).  
Now, if this does not appear to be a form of “practical reasoning,” it is useful to recall 
that a choice to speak (in a certain way) is always a choice to act (in a certain way); or, more 
simply, to speak is always to act. Hence, to the extent that one reasons about how to speak, one 
is therefore reasoning about how to act. And, as such, one is then engaged in “practical 
reasoning,” for practical reasoning just is, recall, reasoning about how to act (“directed toward 
action”).  
Furthermore, if such practical reasoning does not appear to entail one or another form of 
“empirical inquiry,” it is useful to recall that when we do inquire into how some concept is 
typically used, we do spend time observing how it is used by (those who we [more or less 
consciously or unconsciously] regard as) competent speakers. Obviously, such observation is 
fundamental to any process of language learning, whether we are learning our own native 
language, a foreign tongue, some specialized professional discourse, or whatever.  
Of course, at times such inquiry is conducted imaginatively, as when, for instance, we 
have some sense of the meaning of a word or term, but are not yet confident that it applies in this 
or that particular case, and so choose to ask someone to describe such circumstances as when one 
would typically use that word or phrase. Now, we can, of course, regard this as a form of direct 
observation of its use, for we are, then, observing our interlocutor use the word or term in 
question. But we can also regard it as form or imaginative projection into the circumstances in 
which someone would use it. (Or we can think of it in both of these ways. Indeed, I think that 
these are just two ways of saying the same thing, placing emphasis on different “moments” of 
the process of trying to come to an understanding of an unclear hermeneutic or semantic 
meaning.) Either way, however, our practical reasoning would, then, depend on empirical 
inquiry. For even on the latter description, the person in question is still indirectly depending on 
observation: she is, then, relying on the linguistic knowledge that her interlocutor has gained 
through observation.60 And, as before, it is by abstracting away from the context in which the 
agent does arrive at the conclusion in question that we can miss this point. For instance, it is by 
abstracting away from, if you like, “the socio-linguistic environment” in which these terms are 
invoked, and the historical backdrop against which they were developed, that we can do so. And 
again, when we do so, we may therefore commit Dewey’s analytic fallacy. Hence, attention to 
the “level” at which we do depict the agent’s reasoning can, once again, help us to avoid this 
outcome.  
 What, though, of task (c)? To recall, this third task, roughly stated, is to offer some 
account of how we might “weigh” our “democratic norms and values” in relation to whatever 
other norms and values we might have. Again, there is a sense in which we can intelligently 
weigh the former against the latter. And indeed, at a certain level of abstraction, we surely do 
sometimes weigh (at least some of) our norms and values in this way, and without making any 
“direct appeal to social (-scientific) inquiry.”  
Again, however, actual deliberation about how to act in particular cases does not operate 
only at such a level; or at the very least, it does not best do so. Moreover, even when we do so 
deliberate, our reasoning still “involves” empirical inquiry, in our extended use of that term. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Note, however, that I do not refer here to “knowledge” that I believe her interlocutor has merely developed 
through observation: her own interpretations and inferences will also be implicated, as may others’ instructions, for 
instance. 
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To return to our earlier example, think again of person A, who regards himself as both a 
“democrat” and a “libertarian.” Earlier we arrived at the conclusion that, without directly 
appealing to anything like social (-scientific) inquiry, A can intelligently compare (say) the 
desirability of having some matter subject to “public,” i.e. “democratic,” decision-making with 
(say) the desirability of leaving that matter to “private” decision-making. There, we supposed 
that, qua democrat, A believes that some choices are, indeed, properly regulated by “public” 
forms of democratic decision-making. However, we supposed that, qua libertarian, A also places 
a very high premium on “individual liberty.” For her, we supposed, there are choices that are 
unequivocally “individual choices,” where these are understood as choices that don’t affect any 
“public”; they affect, and only affect, the individuals who themselves make those choices. And, 
to A’s mind, the choice of whom to have sexual relations with, in the privacy of one’s own 
home, is a paradigmatic example of such a choice. Hence, A concludes that that choice is not 
properly regulated by “public” forms of democratic decision-making. And in this way, we said, 
A may arrive at a position in normative democratic theory, and, moreover, without herself 
engaging in any kind of social (-scientific) inquiry, and without directly appealing to (or even 
[consciously or unconsciously] referring to) others’ social (scientific-) inquiries.  
 However, paying close attention to the level of abstraction at which we are depicting A’s 
reasoning here, we can now see how her actual deliberation in some particular case would not 
operate only at such a level; or at a minimum, that it would not best do so. Moreover, even if it 
did so operate, it would still “involve” empirical inquiry, in our extended use of that term. 
Take first the suggestion that, as a matter of fact, A’s deliberation would “involve” 
empirical inquiry. Again, there are a number of angles from which we can see that A’s reasoning 
would “involve” one or another from of empirical inquiry.61 To begin with, recall that A begins 
with two important premises: (1) that there are choices that are unequivocally “individual 
choices,” where these are understood as choices that don’t affect any “public”; they affect, and 
only affect, the individuals who themselves make those choices; and (2) the choice of whom to 
have sexual relations with, in the privacy of one’s own home, is a paradigmatic example of such 
a choice.  
Now, it may or may not be the case that during the period in which A is (consciously or 
unconsciously) weighing the desirability of having the subject matter in question (the choice of 
whom to have sexual relations with, in the privacy of one’s own home) subject to “public,” i.e. 
“democratic,” decision-making against the desirability of leaving that matter to “private” 
decision-making, A then engages in one of one or another form of empirical inquiry. But let us 
suppose that she does not do so. Still, it must be the case that her reasoning would “involve” one 
or another form of empirical inquiry. We can see this by noticing that premises (1) and (2) above 
both presuppose judgments about the consequences of certain (kinds of) human actions. And 
such judgments may only be derived from (someone’s) empirical observations.  
 First, consider premise (1): again, that there are choices that are unequivocally 
“individual choices,” where these are understood as choices that don’t affect any “public,” in the 
above sense. To say (either in general or in any particular case) that a choice affects, and only 
affects, the individuals who themselves make that choice is obviously (in part) an empirical 
claim.62 Yes, it is apparently the case that once we have already developed a concept of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Here again, I use “involve” in a broad sense, that is, to include the claim that if one’s ability to reason about some 
premise or conclusion is tied to, is in some way dependent upon, one’s own or others’ empirical inquiries, then the 
reasoning in question may be said to “involve” one or another form of empirical inquiry. 
62 But it is only “in part” an empirical claim, for it also a theoretical claim. See note 63 below.  
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“individual choice,” we can then reason abstractly about whether this or that specific (kind of) 
choice is such a choice. However, surely it is the case that: first, whatever precise content we do 
ascribe to our concept of “individual choice,” that content is (at least partly) historically derived; 
second, that “historical derivation” is the result of a process in which various individuals make 
choices about whether or not the (kind of) “choice” in question does “affect” individuals other 
than those who make that (kind of) choice; and third, such choices may only be derived from 
(someone’s or some people’s) empirical observations. If indeed there are “innate ideas,” the idea 
of an “individual choice” is surely not one of them.63 If not, we are warranted in saying that 
whatever the precise content we ascribe to our concept of “individual choice,” that content has 
arisen (in part at least) out of a particular history of judgments about the consequences of certain 
(kinds of) human actions, i.e., out of empirical observations. And this would be as true of A’s 
reasoning about the category of “individual choice” as it would be of any other agent’s reasoning 
about that category. Hence, for that reason alone we should conclude that A’s reasoning would 
“involve” one or another form of empirical inquiry, in our extended sense of that term.  
 What, though, of premise (2), that the choice of whom to have sexual relations with, in 
the privacy of one’s own home, is a paradigmatic example of an “individual choice,” in the 
above sense? Mutatis mutandis, the same could be said here too. For neither is it the case that we 
can judge whether some particular (kind of) choice – e.g., the choice of whom to have sexual 
relations with, in the privacy of one’s own home – is a “paradigmatic example” of an “individual 
choice” without (at least indirectly) relying on (someone’s) observations about the consequences 
of certain (kinds of) human actions that are (and are not) described as constituting such a choice.  
 Accordingly, as with tasks (a) and (b), so too with task (c): we are warranted in saying 
that by abstracting away form the context in which the agent does arrive at the conclusion in 
question, we can mistakenly conclude that she may do so without being influenced by her own or 
others’ social (-scientific) inquiries. For instance, it is by abstracting away from the judgments 
about the consequences of certain (kinds of) human actions that led the agent to ascribe whatever 
specific content she does ascribe to the concept of “individual choice” that we may conclude that 
she arrived at the conclusion in question without being influenced by on her own or others’ 
social (-scientific) inquiries; or, it is by abstracting away from the judgments about the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 One reason that I say this is that it seems to me manifestly implausible to claim that there is one “idea of 
‘individual choice,’” one which has such definite criteria of application that, if agents would only reason correctly, 
they could universally agree on those criteria, independent of their particular cultures and respective historical 
backgrounds. Again, to regard something as an individual choice is, in our sense, to regard it as a choice that affects, 
and only affects, the person(s) who make(s) that choice. But, aside from the choices made by an individual on an 
island by himself, very few choices indeed are “individual choices” in our sense. (And even our lone individual can 
make choices that could affect others, and importantly so: for instance, whenever he pollutes the water around his 
island.) For, whenever humans live together, there are very few choices indeed that do not at least have the potential 
to affect others, even if slightly. For instance, if I choose to wear a pink shirt, and you don’t like pink shirts on men, 
then my choice, when you see me, can be said to “affect you” if you feel a distaste in seeing me in that shirt.  
Does this render the idea of an “individual choice” invalid in social settings? Surely it does not. It just goes 
to show that the choice to call something an individual choice, in our sense, is a theory-laden one, since it entails 
that we make (at least tacit) judgments about what (kinds of) effects, anticipated or actual, we (are to) regard as 
“important enough” to (at least implicitly) classify them as “effects” at all. For instance, I might regard the “effect” 
that the color of my shirt has on you as so insignificant that I would be unwilling even to call that an “effect” (even 
if I am willing, in some other context, for some other purpose, to do so); but, by contrast, I might regard the “effect” 
of your burning trash in your backyard as so significant that I would be willing to call that an “effect” – indeed, one 
so important that I would regard that choice as properly subject to public regulation, hence democratic decision-
making.  
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consequences of certain (kinds of) human actions that led her to conclude that the act in question 
is a “paradigmatic example” of an “individual choice” that we may conclude this. And again, 
when we do so, we may therefore commit Dewey’s analytic fallacy. Hence, attention to the 
“level” at which we do depict the agent’s reasoning can, once again, help us to avoid this 
outcome. 
Suppose, however, that despite the above comments, our interlocutor were to claim that 
A can reach her position in normative democratic theory without “being influenced by” her own 
or others’ social (-scientific) inquiries. Suppose, for instance, that she objects to the extended 
sense in which we have used the terms “involve” and “influenced by,” so that, for her, it is still 
sensible to claim that A may arrive at her position “without directly appealing to her own or 
others’ social (-scientific) inquiries” – precisely, for instance, in the way that we originally had 
supposed our interlocutor might reason. Well, hopefully I have already said enough to convince 
the reader that our interlocutor would be clearly mistaken here. Suppose, however, that we were 
to encounter someone who, in spite of the foregoing arguments, still isn’t convinced. In such an 
event, we need not press the point; instead, we could just prescind from our disagreement here. 
For indeed, it is more important to appreciate that actual deliberation best happens through 
“direct appeals to social (-scientific) inquiry” than it is to appreciate that actual deliberation 
simply does “involve” such inquiries. And the reason for this is that once we appreciate that 
actual deliberation best happens in this way, the claim that, as a matter of fact, it does so happen 
is, for our purposes at least, a less important one. After all, our purpose here simply is to 
establish how, in a certain broad sense, actual deliberation does “best happen.” Why else develop 
a normative democratic theory?64 
However, this does not mean that our time has been wasted here – that is, wasted in 
arguing that, at least in our own extended sense of these terms, actual deliberation is inevitably 
“influenced by” social (-scientific) inquiry or, which is to say the same thing here, inevitably 
does “involve” such inquiry. Quite the contrary: the above discussion has placed us in a better 
position to clarify just how such theory does “best proceed through explicit appeals to such 
inquiry.” And it has done so precisely by indicating the various ways in which empirical inquiry 
may be “involved” in normative democratic theory. Hence, if the even-more-stubborn 
interlocutor that we are now imagining at least concedes that empirical inquiry may be involved 
in (any of) these ways, our task now is to indicate how, in carrying out tasks (a)-(c), it is 
(presumptively) best that it is so. (And I see no reasonable grounds for her not conceding this 
point.) 
To do so, take note of the several ways in which the above discussion has suggested that 
empirical inquiry may be involved in one or a number of the three tasks. (I am not myself 
shifting now to the claim that empirical inquiry just may be involved in the tasks in question; I 
am just noting the various ways in which it may be involved. My position is still that it 
inevitably is involved in various ways. But, as mentioned, we are now imagining a dialogue with 
our even-more-stubborn interlocutor, who objects to our use of “involvement” and “influence” 
with respect to empirical inquiry. So, in an effort to avoid a continued confrontation with this 
specific type of interlocutor, we are shifting to an argument about how deliberation is best 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 I put aside the possibility that we might be concerned to develop such a theory merely because it gives us, or 
ought to give us, some kind of pleasure to do so, or merely because we believe it intrinsically good to do so – 
perhaps because, with Plato and Aristotle, we regard the contemplative life as the highest form of living. Here, the 
operative assumption is instead that we will be developing a normative theory of the democratic process in order to 
improve democratic practice. 
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conducted. And, for that purpose, we begin with a list of previously indicated ways in which 
empirical inquiry may be involved.) 
First, in our discussion of tasks (a) and (b) we saw that (tacit) judgments about the 
circumstances in which a certain value is most likely to be (approximately) realized enter into 
the “deductions” we make from our premises to our conclusions in normative democratic theory. 
For instance, we saw that when someone concludes that in order “to treat citizens as ‘equals,’” 
we ought to grant them (some form of) “equal voting rights,” their conclusion is a “historically 
or culturally mediated” one: it relies on a variety of (tacit) judgments about the circumstances in 
which “equal treatment” is likely to be realized, judgments that must have derived from 
someone’s (or some people’s) having observed/inquired into such circumstances. Hence, the 
reasoning in question will have been “influenced by” one or another (kind of) empirical inquiry.  
But again, suppose our interlocutor objects to our use of “influence” here. Again, for the 
reasons already suggested, we might just prescind from the disagreement, instead pressing the 
following point. Such conclusions as those that are in question are (presumptively) best arrived 
at whenever the deliberations that lead to them have involved “direct appeals to empirical 
inquiry.” For such conclusions just are conclusions about the (kinds of) circumstances in which a 
certain value is to be realized. Hence to deny that such judgments are (presumptively) best 
arrived at whenever they involve direct appeals to empirical inquiries is tantamount to claiming 
that judgments about the (kinds of) circumstances in which a value is most likely to be realized 
are (presumptively) best arrived at without relying on any empirical observations about such 
circumstances. Or, more simply, it is (implicitly) to claim that judgments about the 
circumstances in which a value is most likely to be realized can be made without relying on 
anyone’s observations about such circumstances. And that, plainly, is absurd.   
Second, in our discussion of tasks (a) and (b), we also saw that our (more or less) 
conscious reflections on our own or others’ lived experiences are (at least partly) responsible for 
the content that we give to the pertinent concepts here, e.g., the concepts of “equal treatment” 
and “equal voting rights.” Such concepts do not descend from the sky; they are the products of a 
series of historical judgments, judgments about, inter alia, the consequences of certain (kinds of) 
human actions. In short, such concepts have histories; and to be willing and able to apply them 
(or to modify them) in this way or that is to be a participant in the interpretation of those 
histories. Furthermore, to engage in such participation is to engage in practical reasoning: to 
reason about whether or not, in some particular context, one is willing to apply (or to invoke) 
some concept (or to reason about how one should modify its use) just is to reason about how one 
should (want to) act in that context (or in such contexts). Still further, to be able intelligently to 
engage in such reasoning, we need to engage in empirical inquiry: for instance, to observe how 
others use the concept(s) (and hence word[s] and/or phrase[s]) in question. And even where we 
don’t so inquire, our ability to engage in such reasoning is tied to, and therefore, in our extended 
sense, “involves,” someone else’s (or other people’s) doing so.  
But again, suppose our interlocutor objects to our use of “involvement” here. 
Furthermore, suppose that, for whatever reason, she is skeptical of, perhaps even denies, the 
claim that the content we ascribe to pertinent concepts is the product of people’s (more or less 
conscious) reflections on their own or others’ lived experiences, of their own or others’ 
judgments about, inter alia, the consequences of certain (kinds of) human actions. Once again, 
we might just prescind from the disagreement, instead pressing the following point. (Recall that 
we are referring to tasks [a] and [b] here.)  
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Our effort to articulate what our democratic norms and values are and our effort to labor 
through a justification for our holding those norms and endorsing those values are 
(presumptively) best conducted whenever they are the result of, inter alia, direct appeals to 
empirical inquiry. For even if one believes that the concepts in question (for instance, “equal 
treatment”) are “built into our ‘moral intuitions’” and that these intuitions are somehow 
“biologically rooted” (and in that sense “universal”), one should still recognize that such 
concepts, and the norms and/or values that they express, would not provide unambiguous 
“guidance,” or perfect “clarity,” about how one should (wish to) act in all cases of actual 
deliberative decision-making. And the same could be said to anyone who holds any other belief 
that might tempt them to think otherwise: for instance, to those who believe that the concepts in 
question are given by our universal reason, or by God’s law, or are rooted in universal human 
feelings, or whatever. Again, any such concept (norm, value) will always demand contextual 
interpretation “in its ‘application.’”  
True, to a certain degree of specificity, one can, by reasoning at a certain level of 
abstraction, “articulate” what one means by such concepts (norms, values). Additionally, it is 
true that whenever one does so, one can then claim that one is “articulating what one’s 
‘democratic norms and values’ are.” Furthermore, it is true that one can then claim that one is 
doing so “without directly appealing to empirical inquiry.” Equally, it is true that, to some degree 
of specificity, one can, by reasoning at a certain level of abstraction, offer a “justification” for 
one’s holding those norms and values.  
Still, to make these claims is not yet to claim that one is (presumptively) best able to 
engage in the deliberative tasks involved in (a) and (b) without directly appealing to empirical 
inquiry; again, it is only to claim that, at least at a certain level of abstraction, one can do so. To 
make the claim that those tasks are best so realized is to defend a much more ambitious claim, 
indeed, one that entails defending a variety of side-commitments that, to put it mildly, surely lack 
plausibility. To name just one of them: it entails that one defend the claim that, regardless of 
whom one’s interlocutors are, one is (presumptively) best able to “articulate” one’s democratic 
norms and values without inquiring into how one’s interlocutors are themselves likely to interpret 
those norms and values (and whatever concepts, words, and phrases are involved in one’s 
articulation of them). Surely it is the case, however, that to aim sincerely to give a theoretical 
explication of what one’s norms and values are (as we aim to do in task [a]) is also sincerely to 
commit oneself to modifying, however slightly or significantly, the terms in which one does 
explicate those norms and values, as necessary in order to communicate with whomever one’s 
interlocutors are. And we can only do so when we are willing to inquire into how one’s 
interlocutors are themselves likely to interpret those norms and values (and whatever concepts, 
words, and phrases are involved in one’s articulation of them).  
Hence, to claim that we are (presumptively) best able to carry out task (a) without 
directly appealing to empirical inquiry is also (implicitly) to claim that one can (presumptively) 
best judge what one’s interlocutors are likely to think of the norms and values (and concepts, 
words, and phrases) involved there without inquiring into how one’s interlocutors are themselves 
likely to interpret those norms and values (and concepts, words, and phrases). And again, to put 
it mildly, surely that lacks plausibility.  
Finally, we return to our consideration of task (c). To repeat, the task, roughly stated, is to 
offer some account of how we might “weigh” our democratic norms and values in relation to 
whatever other norms and values we might have. Above, we highlighted three ways in which 
empirical inquiry is involved here. First, judgments about the consequences of certain (kinds of) 
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human actions are involved in the formation of relevant conceptual categories, for instance, ones 
that we invoke in making judgments about the proper scope of “public,” and hence “democratic,” 
decision-making, such as the category of an “individual choice.” Second, judgments about the 
consequences of certain (kinds of) human actions are involved in the application of such 
conceptual categories. And third, judgments about the consequences of certain (kinds of) human 
actions are involved in judging whether or not, in light of its consequences, some particular 
(kind of) human action, in some particular (kind of) context, is an instance of the conceptual 
category in question, e.g., judgments about what or not this particular (kind of) action is (or 
typically has such consequences as would warrant us in presuming it to be) an “individual 
choice.”  
Now, we need not consider the first two ways in which empirical inquiry is involved 
here; we already did so in our discussion of tasks (a) and (b), the only difference being that we 
referred there to “concepts” instead of “conceptual categories.” (But what I said of the former 
term can also be said of the latter term, so I need not say anything more here.) However, we have 
not yet considered how our interlocutor might respond to our claims about the third way that 
empirical inquiry is involved here.  
So, we return to our earlier case. For our purposes, we’ll assume that person A already 
has an understanding of what she means by an “individual choice” (the same understanding that 
we previously considered), and that, for the reasons already indicated, how, if at all, empirical 
inquiry is “involved” in the formation and application of that category is not in question here. 
Rather, the question is now: What role, if any, does empirical inquiry have in generating a 
judgment about whether or not the choice of whom to have sexual relations with, in the privacy 
of one’s own home, is an “individual choice,” indeed, a paradigmatic example of such a choice?  
Now, we have already said that, on our view, it is true that A may arrive at that judgment 
without herself engaging in any kind of social (-scientific) inquiry, and without “directly 
appealing to” (or even [consciously or unconsciously] referring to) others’ social (scientific-) 
inquiries. However, our own position is that such inquiries are nevertheless “involved” here. 
And, very simply, the reason for this is that once we have some idea of what we mean when we 
invoke a conceptual category, any judgment about whether or not this or that (kind of) action 
does fall under that category will still presuppose a judgment about whether or not that (kind of) 
action, in some particular (kind of) context, does have such consequences as would warrant us in 
saying that it falls under that category (or that would warrant us in presuming that it does). 
Furthermore, this includes any judgment about whether or not this or that (kind of) action is a 
paradigmatic example of (the actions falling under) that category. And even when A does not 
herself “inquire” into those circumstances (in the sense of observing relevant circumstances), her 
ability to engage in a process of reasoning that leads her to that judgment is tied to, and therefore, 
in our extended sense, “involves,” someone else’s (or other people’s) doing so. 
Once again, however, we’ll suppose that our interlocutor objects to our use of 
“involvement” here. Suppose, for instance, that she objects to our earlier claim that if indeed 
there are any “innate ideas,” the idea of an “individual choice” is surely not one of them. 
Suppose, therefore, that she objects to our earlier conclusion that whatever the precise content 
one ascribes to the concept of an “individual choice,” that content has arisen (in part at least) out 
of a particular history of judgments about the consequences of certain kinds of human actions, 
i.e., out of empirical observations.  
Correspondingly, let us say that A believes that, first, “the content” of the conceptual 
category of an “individual choice” is given to her by her “universal reason,” and that, second, her 
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universal reason also allows her to determine that particular (kinds of) actions “fall under” that 
conceptual category. (“I need not ‘inquire’ into the consequences of my choice to have such and 
such sexual partner, in the privacy of my home,” she thinks. “I simply know that, there, no 
‘public’ can be ‘affected’ in this way or that. Accordingly, I simply know that that choice is 
therefore an ‘individual choice.’”) Consequently, A objects to our contention that her ability to 
engage in a process of reasoning that leads her to the judgment in question is tied to, and 
therefore, in our extended sense, “involves,” someone else’s (or other people’s) inquiring into 
relevant social circumstances. How, then, might we respond? 
Once again, we might just prescind from the disagreement, instead pressing the following 
point. The effort to offer some account of how we might “weigh” our democratic norms and 
values in relation to whatever other norms and values we might have is (presumptively) best 
realized whenever it is the result of, inter alia, direct appeals to empirical inquiry. As before, 
there are a number of angles from which we can defend this claim. Here, however, we shall only 
consider one of these.  
Again, we should first notice that our interlocutor’s objection to our claim about the 
inevitable “involvement” of empirical inquiries in her reasoning does not, by itself, amount to a 
denial of the claim that we are now pressing. In other words, to deny that empirical inquiries are 
necessarily “involved” in one’s inquiries is not yet to deny that the effort to offer some account 
of how we might “weigh” our democratic norms and values in relation to whatever other norms 
and values we might have is (presumptively) best realized whenever it is the result of, inter alia, 
“direct appeals to such inquiry.” What else, then, would A have to maintain in order to see 
grounds for objecting to the point we are now pressing, in addition to defending the two claims 
already noted? (To recall, these claims are: first, that “the content” of the conceptual category of 
an “individual choice” is given to her by her “universal reason”; and second, that her universal 
reason also allows her to determine that particular [kinds of] actions “fall under” that conceptual 
category).  
Well, perhaps most importantly, she would have to maintain a much more ambitious 
version of the second claim: she would not only have to maintain that her universal reason allows 
her to determine that “particular actions” fall under the category of an “individual choice” (such 
as the one we’ve considered all along); she would have to maintain that her universal reason 
allows her to determine whether or not all present and future [kinds of] actions do so too. If she 
could plausibly claim this, she would, then, have grounds for objecting to the claim that we are 
pressing (though not unassailable grounds, as I’ll indicate below). For she would, then, be able 
coherently to maintain that the particular case we’ve considered is neither anomalous nor 
representative of just a portion of the actions-to-be-judged, but rather is representative of all such 
judgments.   
Now, again, we are, for present purposes, setting aside objections of the kind that 
(purport to) show the inevitable “involvement” of empirical inquiries in A’s reasoning when she 
makes such judgments about any particular case we have adduced. Doing so, how might we 
nevertheless critique her now-more-ambitious claim? I suggest that we do so by pointing out the 
utter implausibility of the presumption that her “universal reason” would allow her to determine 
whether or not all present and future (kinds of) actions fall under the category of an individual 
choice, especially given that, on her own interpretation (as we’ve stipulated it), this entails that 
she may do so without any “direct appeals” to empirical inquiry. For notice carefully what is 
involved in this.  
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First, it entails that she defend the claim that she knows that all present (kinds of actions) 
are so determinable, which in turn entails that she knows what all present (kinds of) actions are, 
that is, how, in terms of their (actual or possible) consequences on those other than the agent 
performing the act in question, they may be accurately characterized. Second, it entails that she 
defend the claim that she knows that all future (kinds of) actions are also so determinable, which 
in turn entails that she knows what all future (kinds of) action will be like, that is, how, in terms 
of their (actual or possible) consequences on others, they may be accurately characterized. 
Surely, however, neither of these claims has any plausibility whatsoever. Consequently, our 
interlocutor appears not to have plausible grounds for claiming that her universal reason would 
allow her to determine that all present and future (kinds of) actions fall under the category of an 
“individual choice.” And, accordingly, she appears not to have plausible grounds for denying 
that the effort to offer some account of how we might “weigh” our democratic norms and values 
in relation to whatever other norms and values we might have is (presumptively) best realized 
whenever it is the result of, inter alia, direct appeals to empirical inquiry.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
What do the above arguments come to? Let us recall what we’ve established here, now 
adding some elaborative remarks that will help to bring the preceding arguments together.  
On any plausible account of the proper character of normative democratic theory, we 
said, our charge is to carry out at least three central tasks. Roughly, these are: (a) to articulate a 
conception of what our “democratic norms and values” are; (b) to labor through one or another 
form of justification for our wanting to uphold those norms and to realize those values; and (c) to 
offer some account of how we might “weigh” those norms and values against whatever other 
norms and values we might have.65  
Now, at first blush, it might appear that these are quintessentially “normative” tasks, 
hence ones that can productively be carried out without the aid of social (-scientific) inquiry. 
This conclusion might be thought to find support in the extant boundaries that characterize 
certain of our academic disciplines: for instance, in the “sharp boundaries [that] currently 
separate normative political theory from empirical political science.”66 Indeed, with Rogers 
Smith, it is well to observe that, from the 1960s through the 1980s, the major works in political 
theory written by Strauss, Rawls, Nozick, Derrida, Dworkin, Foucault, Ackerman, Riker, and 
Habermas “display[ed] only limited direct engagement either with contemporary political issues 
or with empirical social science.”67 Observing this separation between political theory and 
empirical social science, it might be thought that this division of disciplinary labor reflects a 
justifiable division of conceptual tasks – conceptual tasks that can, indeed, be conducted 
separately, and perhaps even ought to be: for instance, between the task of articulating a 
conception of what one’s “democratic norms and values” are (a “normative” task), and the task 
of determining the conditions in which those norms and values are most likely (approximately) 
to be realized (an “empirical” task). Indeed, one might think that this helps to explain why, as Ian 
Shapiro has remarked, “normative and explanatory theories of democracy grow out of literatures 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 On my view, these tasks are not, however, the only tasks of a reasonable conception of normative democratic 
theory. We have just focused on these three tasks for expository purposes.	  
66 Fung (2007: 443). 
67 Smith (2003: 76). 
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that proceed, for the most part, along separate tracks, largely uninformed by one another.”68 And 
some might even want to go further, convinced of the veracity of the claim that political theory 
either is or could be an “evidence-free zone” altogether. 
However, the above analysis suggests a completely different interpretation, one that is 
consistent with Fung’s observation that “this division of labor [between “normative political 
theory” and “empirical political science”] has become a segregation of thought that now poses a 
fundamental obstacle to progress in democratic theory.”69 And it suggests this conclusion 
because, among other reasons, the three tasks of normative democratic theory that we have 
considered are best conducted through direct appeals to social (-scientific) inquiry, rather than in 
the absence of such appeals. Hence, to the extent that “normative political theory” is cut off from 
structured, in-depth empirical inquiry, one could reasonably presume that the quality of that 
theory would suffer. And if so, the “fundamental obstacle” alluded to in Fung’s diagnosis should 
not surprise us: we should not be surprised that the “division of labor [between “normative 
political theory” and “empirical political science”] has become a segregation of thought that now 
poses a fundamental obstacle to progress in democratic theory.” 
Recall, however, that our suggestion has not only been that, in point of fact, tasks (a)-(c), 
are best conducted via direct appeals to empirical inquiry; we have also suggested that, indeed, 
when we actually carry out these tasks, our reasoning inevitably “involves” empirical inquiry (in 
our sense of that term: in the sense that a person’s ability so to reason is tied to, is in some way 
dependent upon, her own or others’ empirical inquiries).70 This is because, in a sense, each of the 
three tasks under consideration is actually itself a “practical task,” hence, when actually carried 
out, inevitably involves practical reasoning: reasoning that is directed toward deciding what to 
do, toward decision or action. Accordingly, when we actually carry out the tasks under 
consideration, we are then engaged in a form of situated practical reasoning, one that inevitably 
“involves” empirical inquiry. 
Correspondingly, my suggestion has been that when we reason about what we think 
democracy should look like, we should avoid any sharp distinction between “normative” and 
“empirical” forms of reasoning, just as we should avoid any such distinction between 
“theoretical” and “practical” forms of reasoning. In this way, the paper has argued for a re-
engagement of “normative” and “empirical” democratic theory. Indeed, it has suggested that 
because normative democratic theory just is a form of practical reasoning and because practical 
reasoning inevitably does involve empirical inquiry, it follows that normative democratic theory 
just is a form of empirical inquiry. Accordingly, the call for a “re-engagement” of normative and 
empirical democratic theory consists, then, in two main injunctions – one, so to speak, about how 
we should look backward, the other about how we should look forward. Looking backward, the 
injunction is to be aware of how our existing democratic norms and values – hence normative 
democratic theories – have been “empirically generated.” By following this first injunction, I 
believe, we may enhance our ability to articulate, and so interrogate, our existing democratic 
norms, values, and theories. Looking forward, the injunction is to be aware of how our future 
democratic norms and values – hence normative democratic theories – will be “empirically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Shapiro (2003: 2). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Hence, while “normative democratic theory” may be “sharply separated” from “empirical political science,” it 
cannot be sharply separated from empirical inquiry as such. But, to the extent that it is regarded as properly or 
reasonably being so, we would expect the actual role of empirical inquiry to be obscured in the development and 
presentation of such theory, as I believe it often is. 
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generated.” By following this second injunction, we are encouraged to engage in normative 
democratic theory – to formulate and re-formulate our present and future democratic norms, 
values, and practices – in a more self-consciously and deliberately “empirical” manner. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Practical Reasoning is About a Unique Context 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The last chapter called for a re-engagement of “normative” and “empirical” democratic 
theory. To explain my primary reasons for making that call, the strategy was to indicate why it is 
the case that when we actually carry out certain tasks that are indispensable to any “reasonable” 
conception of normative democratic theory, we are then engaged in a form of “practical 
reasoning,” one that inevitably “involves”1 empirical inquiry. (Call this “the central claim from 
last chapter.”) In other words, the strategy was to indicate why it is the case that when we 
actually carry out those tasks, we just are engaged in empirical inquiry. Hence, normative 
democratic theory just is an empirical enterprise, and the call for re-engagement amounts, then, 
to two main injunctions: first, to be aware of how our past and present democratic norms and 
values – hence normative democratic theories – just have been “empirically generated”; and 
second, to be aware of how our future normative democratic norms and values – hence 
normative democratic theories – just will be “empirically generated.”  
The purpose of this chapter is to develop four specific claims that will clarify the 
meaning and import of the central claim from last chapter, four claims that will also serve to 
extend it.  
Very briefly, the first claim is that it is a situated kind of reasoning that is demanded 
when we carry out the tasks that we have identified as indispensable to any “reasonable” 
conception of normative democratic theory. The second claim is that such reasoning always 
involves reasoning about “norms” and “values,” and norms and values inevitably come into 
conflict in unanticipated and unforeseeable ways. More specifically, the claim is that: reflection 
on lived experience reveals that such reasoning always involves reasoning about norms and 
values; our norms and values often come into conflict; and there is no way to foretell how (if at 
all) they will come into conflict, how (if at all) they will “trade off” against one another, in the 
actual situations in which one finds or puts oneself. Furthermore, norms and values may simply 
be “incommensurable.” The third claim is that practical reasoning not only inevitably involves 
reasoning about norms and values, but also that our norms and values always need “contextual 
interpretation ‘in their application.’” We never provide a definitive or exhaustive interpretation 
of a norm or value (and our norms and values themselves evolve and change), but deciding how 
appropriately to act in some specific context demands that we give a fuller sense of what, in that 
specific situation, we (believe we) (would) mean by (certain of) our norms and values. The 
fourth claim is that we should abandon a sharp distinction between “theoretical” and “practical” 
reasoning, a distinction of the kind that is common in Western philosophical thinking and that, as 
we saw, Elijah Millgram, for instance, apparently endorses.2 
Taking these four claims together, the extended version of the central claim (hereafter 
simply referred to as the Central Claim [CC]) then looks like this: When we actually carry out 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Recall that, for our purposes, to say that a form of reasoning “involves” empirical inquiry is just to say that a 
2 In chapter 2, I already offered some reasons in support of this suggestion. But the suggestion needs further support, 
which I offer here. 
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certain tasks that are indispensable to any “reasonable” conception of normative democratic 
theory, we are then engaged in a situated form of practical reasoning, one that inevitably 
“involves” empirical inquiry; and this reasoning always involves a unique context, one in which 
our norms and values may come into conflict and in which those norms and values always need 
“contextual interpretation ‘in their application.’” 
As before, the discussion will proceed simply by making reference to the three tasks that 
we have already said are indispensable to normative democratic theory: what we referred to in 
the last chapter as tasks (a)-(c). To recall, task (a), roughly stated, is to articulate a conception of 
what our democratic norms and values are; task (b) is to labor through one or another form of 
justification for our wanting to uphold those norms and to realize those values; and task (c) is to 
offer some account of how we might “weigh” those norms and values in relation to whatever 
other norms and values we might have. 
 
I. Four Claims 
 
We turn now to the four closely related claims that should help to clarify and substantiate 
the CC. 
 
1.1 Normative Democratic Theory is a Situated Form of Practical Reasoning (Claim 1)  
 
First, the kind of reasoning that is demanded by tasks (a)-(c) is a situated form of 
reasoning. We are not, then, engaged in a form of reasoning that applies “regardless of the 
context” – as when, for instance, we reason through a mathematical proof. Instead, tasks (a)-(c) 
each demand that we reason from within and about a context.  
Consider, for instance, task (c). In order for me to offer some account of how I would 
“weigh” my democratic norms and values in relation to whatever other norms and values I might 
have, I obviously must do various other things as well. Take the case of my democratic “values.” 
For one thing, I obviously need to develop a sense of what my values are. I may enter a situation 
with some sense of what my democratic values are, and again, I can, of course, reason about 
those values “abstractly.” (Indeed, all reasoning is arguably “abstract.” Hence, if I can “reason” 
about those values,3 it follows that I can reason about them “abstractly.”) Likewise, I may enter 
that situation with some sense of what (certain of) my other values are, and I can, of course, 
reason abstractly about those values too. Furthermore, I may enter that situation with some sense 
of how I would weigh certain of my democratic values against certain of my other values, and 
abstract thinking can help me to determine this. For instance, I might (as person A from chapter 
2 did) regard myself as a “libertarian,” hence place a very high premium on “individual liberty.” 
Furthermore, I might regard myself as a “democrat,” hence place a very high premium on broad 
public participation in collective decision-making. Still further, I might give much thought to my 
democratic and my libertarian values, and so also have a strong sense of how, in certain (kinds 
of) circumstances, (I believe) I would weigh certain of the former values against certain of the 
latter ones. For instance, I might think (again, as person A thought): that there are choices that 
are unequivocally “individual choices,” where these are understood as choices that don’t affect 
any “public” (they affect, and only affect, the individuals who themselves make those choices); 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It is well to recall that a broad variety of authors have argued, or implied, that we cannot reason about our values. 
For some examples, see Sayer (2011), especially chapter 3. And for a recent defense of the idea that we can indeed 
reason about our values, see Sayer (2011), especially chapters 2 and 3.  
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and that there are other decisions that are unequivocally “public choices,” where these are 
understood as choices that do affect some “public” (individuals other than those who themselves 
make those choices). Accordingly, I might think that “individual choices” are not properly 
subject to any kind of “public,” hence “democratic,” decision-making, while “public choices” 
are. Furthermore, I might have a well-thought-out list of decisions that I regard as individual and 
as public choices, hence have a strong sense of how I would “weigh” certain of my “libertarian 
values” against certain of my “democratic values”: I might, for instance, give no weight to my 
democratic values (e.g. that of broad public participation in decision-making) whenever an 
“individual choice” is at stake, and full weight to my libertarian values (e.g. “individual 
autonomy”) when it is so. And I might therefore think that I could successfully carry out task (c) 
by just reasoning abstractly, without making any reference to a “context.” Hence, I might see 
grounds for questioning the above claim that task (c) demands a form or situated reasoning, 
fundamentally different from, say, the deductive reasoning involved in a mathematical proof, 
reasoning which, if properly executed, should always, regardless of the context, generate the 
same result. 
 I would, however, be mistaken in seeing such grounds. To begin with, notice that the 
situation sets the context for the process of reasoning itself. In a mathematical proof, “the 
problem” is set by the nature of the question itself; and the nature of the question does not vary 
from this situation to that. (Of course, we might have more or less reason to ask a mathematical 
question in this situation or that, or, for various reasons, more or less difficulty in solving it. But, 
for instance, “the problem” of proving the Pythagorean theorem does not itself vary from this 
situation to that, in the sense that I can prove the theorem without any reference to “the situation” 
in which I do so.) By contrast, whenever we carry out task (c), the nature of the question does 
vary from this situation to that; I simply can’t successfully carry out that task without making (at 
least implicit) reference to a “situation.” Indeed, I wouldn’t actually be carrying out that task 
were I not (at least implicitly) to make such a reference.  
True, I can reason as I suggested I might in the penultimate paragraph, hence not make 
any explicit reference to a situation. But the situation in which I find or place myself nevertheless 
“sets the context” for the process of reasoning that is involved in actually executing task (c) (as 
opposed to just reasoning abstractly – in general – about how I might execute it [in some 
context]). For instance, even if I do enter a situation having a well-thought-out list of decisions 
that I regard, respectively, as “individual choices” and as “public choices” (again invoking the 
previously described understandings of these terms), and I do have a strong sense of how I would 
“weigh” certain of my “libertarian values” against certain of my “democratic values,” no list, no 
matter how “well-thought-out,” can guarantee that the individual and/or public choices that are 
“on my list” are the ones at play in that situation. Nor obviously can it guarantee that certain 
values (e.g., only my “libertarian values” and my “democratic values”) are the only ones at play 
there, nor can it foretell how my (and others’) values will “trade off” against one another in any 
specific situation.  
Indeed, as William James has written, “every real dilemma is in literal strictness a unique 
situation; and the exact combination of ideals realized and ideals disappointed which each 
decision creates is always a universe without a precedent, and for which no adequate rule 
exists.”4 Here, James speaks of situations in which we feel ourselves to be in a “dilemma”; but 
his point can be generalized to situations as such: every “situation” is “in literal strictness a 
unique situation,” and so no “rule” can guarantee that we will create the “exact combination of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 James (1979: 158). 
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ideals [or values] realized and ideals [or values] disappointed” that we might have hoped for. As 
Dewey reminds us, “Practical activity [and hence deliberation about how to act] deals with 
individualized and unique situations which are never exactly duplicable and about which, 
accordingly, no complete assurance is possible.”5 Fesmire elaborates:  
 
In addition to interminable dealings with incompatible moral demands, we all daily and 
hourly encounter situations too unique – unique, not just complicated – for reflection to 
be exhausted merely by subordinating what is before us as an instance of an already 
sedimented classification. Plainly you cannot put your foot in the same river twice. It is 
equally true that you cannot unproblematically apply a rule to the same situation twice. 
Situations do not come in duplicates.6  
 
Hence, in deciding how to decide (in some particular situation), any actual “weighing” of 
one’s values is always, as it were, a “weighing on the fly,” which always involves a 
consideration of what values are, or might be, at play in that situation. And, in that sense, we can 
therefore say that the kind of reasoning that is demanded by task (c) is a “situated from of 
reasoning.” Of course, it may happen that I find myself in a situation in which there is some kind 
of “value trade-off” that is precisely of a nature that I had previously contemplated, and hence I 
may not need to adapt anything about the (kind of) decision that I had previously thought I 
would make in such a situation. However, to recognize this is not to deny that the situation itself 
“sets the context” for the process of reasoning whereby I conclude this. It is only to point out 
that I may find myself in a context in which I can easily adopt my previous conclusions. But I 
still have to refer myself to “the context at hand” in order to decide that I have found myself in 
“such a context.” 
What of the second through fourth claims that I mentioned above? Each of these is 
embedded in, or at least has been suggested by, what has already been said; I just need to clarify 
and elaborate on each of them.  
 
1.2 Norms and Values Inevitably Come into Conflict in Unanticipated and Unforeseeable 
Ways (Claim 2) 
 
This second claim was already made in the above exposition of the first claim. So, allow 
me to repeat it, just adding a few expository remarks. Briefly stated, the claim is that reflection 
on lived experience reveals that our norms and values often come into conflict, and there is no 
way exactly to foretell how and when they will come into conflict, how and when they will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Quoted in Caspary (2000:19). Dewey (EW 3: 98) also reminds us that conduct is “absolutely individualized…there 
is no such thing as conduct in general; conduct is what and where and when and how to the last inch.” Indeed, for 
Dewey, one of the major problems that has plagued traditional moral philosophies is that they have not adequately 
recognized the uniqueness of each (morally or ethically) problematic situation we face. As Pappas (2008: 30) writes, 
“Dewey observed that ‘one cause for the inadequacy of moral philosophies has been that in their zeal for a unitary 
view they have oversimplified the moral life’ (LW 5: 288). Moral theory will continue to be inept in throwing light 
upon the actual predicaments of moral conduct as long as it continues to ignore ‘the elements of uncertainty and of 
conflict which can properly be called moral’ (LW 5: 279).” Elaborating on Dewey’s view, Pappas (2008: 29-30) 
also writes: “Ethical theorists have neglected the non-cognitive, pluralistic, and incommensurable aspects of moral 
life because they are not of use in constructing a theoretically coherent system that can presumably provide solutions 
to moral problems. The results are reductionism and simplification. These might be considered virtues in academic 
circles but they are usually vices when it comes to making decisions in our moral life.”  
6 Fesmire (2003: 58). Fesmire is summarizing and affirming a view expressed by John Dewey (MW 14: 167-168). 
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“trade off” against one another, in the actual situations in which one finds or puts oneself.7 And 
some norms and values, we may add, may be “incommensurable.” This is a familiar observation, 
both from the writings of Isaiah Berlin and from the ethical writings of the classical pragmatists.8 
William James, for instance, was particularly sensitive to this feature of lived experience – and 
also offered insightful comments about how philosophers sometimes forget it. Witness James’s 
phenomenological sensitivity in arguing for a “casuistic” approach to morality/ethics, one that 
recognizes the need to try to ameliorate moral-ethical problems on a case-by-case basis.  
 
If the ethical philosopher were only asking after the best imaginable system of goods; he 
would indeed have an easy task; for all demands as such are prima facie respectable, and 
the best simply imaginary world would be one in which every demand was gratified as 
soon as made. Such a world would, however, have to have a physical constitution 
entirely different from that of the one which we inhabit. It would need not only a space, 
but a time, "of n-dimensions," to include all the acts and experiences incompatible with 
one another here below, which would then go on in conjunction – such as spending our 
money, yet growing rich; taking our holiday, yet getting ahead with our work; shooting 
and fishing, yet doing no hurt to the beasts; gaining no end of experience, yet keeping 
our youthful freshness of heart; and the like. There can be no question that such a system 
of things, however brought about, would be the absolutely ideal system; and that if a 
philosopher could create universes a priori, and provide all the mechanical conditions, 
that is the sort of universe which he should unhesitatingly create. But this world of ours 
is made on an entirely different pattern… The actually possible in this world is vastly 
narrower than all that is demanded; and there is always a pinch between the ideal and the 
actual which can only be got through by leaving part of the ideal behind. There is hardly 
a good which we can imagine except as competing for the possession of the same bit of 
space and time with some other imagined good. Every end of desire that presents itself 
appears exclusive of some other end of desire. Shall a man drink and smoke, or keep his 
nerves in condition? – he cannot do both. Shall he follow his fancy for Amelia, or for 
Henrietta? – both cannot be the choice of his heart…. So that the ethical philosopher's 
demand for the right scale of subordination in ideals is the fruit of an altogether practical 
need. Some part of the ideal must be butchered, and he needs to know which part. It is a 
tragic situation, and no mere speculative conundrum, with which he has to deal.9 
 
Dewey, who was greatly influenced by James’s ethical thought, likewise noted that one 
of the major problems that has plagued traditional moral/ethical philosophies is precisely that 
they have not adequately recognized the uniqueness of each (morally or ethically) problematic 
situation we face.10 “Dewey observed that ‘one cause for the inadequacy of moral philosophies 
has been that in their zeal for a unitary view they have oversimplified the moral life’ (LW 5: 
288). Moral theory will continue to be inept in throwing light upon the actual predicaments of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Dewey (EW 3: 98) also reminds us that conduct is “absolutely individualized…there is no such thing as conduct in 
general; conduct is what and where and when and how to the last inch.” The implication is that deliberation about 
how to act – about how to “conduct” oneself – should be similarly “individualized.” 
7 Fesmire (2003: 58). Fesmire is summarizing and affirming a view expressed by John Dewey (MW 14: 167-168). 
8 For some of Berlin’s views on such matters, see, for instance, “The Pursuit of the Ideal,” in Berlin (2013).  
9 James (2012: 90).  
10 This is a theme that we return to in chapter 4.  
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moral conduct,” Pappas says of Dewey’s view, “as long as it continues to ignore ‘the elements of 
uncertainty and of conflict in any situation which can properly be called moral’ (LW 5: 279).”11 
Furthermore, “ethical theorists,” Dewey thought, “have neglected the non-cognitive, pluralistic, 
and incommensurable aspects of moral life because they are not of use in constructing a 
theoretically coherent system that can presumably provide solutions to moral problems.”12 
However, “the results are reductionism and simplification,” which are “usually vices when it 
comes to making decisions in our moral life.”13  
To close our brief discussion of claim 2, here is a summary statement of Dewey’s 
position, offered by David Bakhurst, which reinforces what was previously said and connects the 
point more directly to democratic theory and practice in a way that we’ll develop at greater 
length in chapter 4: 
 
We can see Dewey as offering us a perceptive description of our practices of moral 
evaluation, designed to reveal something profound about the nature and objectives of 
moral inquiry, something that discloses to us where the good lies. Like all classical 
pragmatists, Dewey portrays thought as aspiring to interpret and control experience; on 
his view, the problems that experience poses and the strategies we adopt to solve them 
are always informed by values. Experience is perceived as recalcitrant relative to the ends 
of the experiencer, and what counts as accommodating such experience depends on our 
theoretical and practical objectives (though the latter may themselves be revised under 
pressure from experience). [So too may the former.] Human beings acquire a multiplicity 
of values through socialization into habits of thought and behavior, and they attain 
independence in so far as they become aware of those habits, reflect and modify them, 
and thereby act intelligently. Dewey argues that reflection on moral experience reveals 
an irreducible plurality of values. We encounter situations of conflict between moral 
values, and between moral and other values.... These questions cannot be resolved from 
the standpoint of abstract reason, but require the exercise of a situational intelligence… 
Thus Dewey’s description of our ethical inquiry quickly commends something akin to the 
non-codifiability thesis [that is, the thesis that “sound moral judgment issues from the 
exercise of a sensibility that transcends codification into rules or principles”14]. But it also 
reveals the importance of democratic conditions of inquiry. Dewey stresses that 
experience poses moral problems not to isolated individuals, but to social beings who can 
solve them only by working in consort. It is not just that successful moral agents are alive 
to a multiplicity of perspectives; solutions to moral problems often require transformation 
in social institutions. Dewey’s account also brings out the dynamism of moral inquiry. 
Our ends continuously evolve as we learn from reflection on the fruits of our moral 
practice. Thus meaningful moral ideals will fix, not upon the realization of some final 
end, but on a process, such as the personal growth of individuals in pursuit of an 
expanding common good.15 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Pappas (2008: 30). Notice how much Dewey sounds just like James when he writes that in moral problems the 
struggle is often “between values each of which is an undoubted good in its place but which now get in each other’s 
way” (LW 7: 165). 
12 Ibid. 29-30. 
13 Ibid. (29-30). 
14 Bakhurst (2007: 122). 
15 Ibid. 130-131; my emphasis. 
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1.3 Norms and Values Always Demand Contextual Interpretation in Their Application (Claim   
      3) 
 
Again, there are many reasons for which this is so, hence many angles from which we 
can appreciate this. But one of those reasons can be stated as follows.  
At a certain level of abstraction, it is surely reasonable to say that those who deserve the 
label “democrats” invariably endorse certain “core values”; otherwise, we couldn’t identify them 
as democrats and they wouldn’t have any legitimate claim to being so. As an example, consider 
the fact that “genuine democrats” invariably endorse some notion of “equal treatment”: a 
democratic process is one that, among other things, treats certain persons as “equals.”16 Without 
some such commitment, it is hard to see how one could indeed deserve the label. Furthermore, 
they invariably endorse a corresponding norm, such as, “in collective decision-making (at least 
of a “binding” or “authoritative” sort), citizens (or members or those who are affected) ought to 
be treated as political equals.” However, there is much disagreement about what this “value,” 
what “equal treatment,” consists in, or ought to consist in, hence also about the corresponding 
norm. For the moment, I don’t want to defend a particular interpretation of that value. (I do 
defend such an interpretation in chapter 5, however.) Rather, I want briefly to describe the 
process by which someone – I’ll speak in the first person – might come to clarify what he means 
by his endorsement of that value. This should help to clarify why it is the case that our values 
always need “contextual interpretation ‘in their application,’” and, by extension, why our norms 
do too. 
Now, at first blush, suppose I think that “equal treatment” could also be expressed as 
“treated in the same way.”17 For there are, indeed, circumstances in which we use “the same” 
interchangeably with “equal,” without any change in meaning. (As when we describe slices of 
pie; see below.) Hence, I might begin with the tentative conclusion that to say that a democratic 
process should “treat each participant in the same way” is also to say that it should “treat them 
equally.”  
However, suppose I quickly come to believe that this could be misleading.  
First off, suppose I notice that there are circumstances in which “the same” and “equal” 
are not synonymous. This puts me on guard; I now think: I have to be careful to pay attention to 
the circumstances in which I (would) use one versus the other of these terms. And, I notice, the 
explanation for why I (would) do so surely lies with the different purposes I (would) have in the 
respective circumstances.  
Next, suppose I notice that, typically, in trying to divide a pie in “equal” shares, the 
purpose just is to give the relevant persons “the same” (kind of) slice.18 Here, that’s what I take 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Who precisely these persons ought to be is, of course, a very large question. We briefly take it up in chapter 4. 
17 And, indeed, democratic theorists, including commentators on “deliberative democracy,” sometimes do appear to 
think this, employing exactly this phrase. Chappell (2012: 86), for instance, writes that “the rules regulating 
deliberation have to treat each participant in the same way,” a view that (rightly or wrongly) she also ascribes to 
Cohen (1989). Here, I leave open what exactly Chappell means by this claim. I also leave open whether the 
depiction of Cohen is accurate. In citing this passage, my point is just to indicate that democratic theorists do, 
indeed, sometimes state that a democratic process should “treat each participant in the same way.” Doing so is 
useful because it helps to motive my choice of example here. For “equal treatment” is sometimes interpreted as 
having the meaning of “treating each participant ‘in the same way’”; and, as we’ll see, this “value” does always need 
“contextual interpretation ‘it its application,’” because the idea of “treating each participant ‘in the same way’” can 
be highly ambiguous, even, indeed, misleading and objectionable.  
18 Son: “Mom! What’s taking you so long?” Mother: “I’m trying to give everyone the same slice; I want them all to 
be equal.” 
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“equal treatment” to mean. However, suppose I then reflect on what I believe to be the purpose 
of “equal treatment” in a democratic process. In brief, the purpose, let us suppose I conclude, is 
to give “equal consideration” to, and to show “equal concern and respect” for, the good or 
interests of the relevant persons.19 (Here, the purpose is not to apportion “equal shares” of some 
object, but to “apportion” mental, emotional, and other resources to some number of persons, or, 
to the good or interests of each of those persons. This is the first clue that, comparing the first 
and the second cases, my purposes are different when I invoke some concept of “equality.”)  
Thinking this, I then ask: Can a process that “treats each participant in the same way” 
accomplish this? Can it give “equal consideration” to, and show “equal concern and respect” for, 
the good or interests of relevant persons?  
Well, I notice that much depends on what is meant by “in the same way.” For instance, 
we sometimes describe two persons’ respective behaviors as constituting “doing something ‘in 
the same way’” when, for all relevant purposes, those behaviors are (effectively) identical. (As 
when two persons solve a math problem “in the same way”: they’ve carried out the exact same 
operations, even if, say, one of them carried out one of those operations in her head, while the 
other one did so on paper.) And two things that are “identical” are often construed as being 
“equal.” (Hence why, in mathematics, an “identity” is an “equality” between functions that are 
differently defined. More broadly, we might ask: If two things were considered to be “literally 
identical,” in what sense would they not be “equal”? Surely they would be.) These considerations 
seem to suggest a possible equivalence between something being treated “in the same way,” 
“identically,” and “equally.” Accordingly, I momentarily entertain the conclusion that to treat 
persons “equally” just is to treat them “in the same way.” This leads me to entertain the idea that 
in order for me to give “equal consideration” to, and to show “equal concern and respect” for, the 
good or interests of relevant persons, I also need to treat them “in the same way.” 
Correspondingly, I then entertain the idea that in order for a “democratic process” to give “equal 
consideration” to, and to show “equal concern and respect” for, the good or interests of relevant 
persons, “it” needs to treat them “in the same way” too. Hence why self-styled democrats 
maintain, for instance, that the citizens of a political order “ought to be granted ‘the same rights’ 
of political participation,” e.g., “equal voting rights.” 
However, further thought complicates this suggestion. In every day life, we surely 
recognize that to treat two persons “in the same way” is not always to treat them “equally.” 
Indeed, it is a commonplace that a parent ought to treat her children “equally,” but that doing so 
sometimes demands that each of them be treated “differently.” For instance, if one child has 
significant trouble with her homework while the other one breezes through it, giving “equal 
consideration” to the well-being of the two children may well demand spending more time on 
weekday evenings with the former relative to the latter. And surely this is a form of treating them 
“differently.” Moreover, the same thing could be said of the aim of showing “equal concern” for, 
and “equal respect” to, the two children.  
Seeing this, I think: Perhaps equal consideration, concern, and respect are shown here by 
giving the two “equal opportunities” to succeed academically, which here entails devoting more 
time to the one, so that she is not disadvantaged relative to the other. This leads me to think: 
Perhaps it is the case that in order for a “democratic process” to give “equal consideration” to, 
and to show “equal concern and respect” for, the good or interests of relevant persons, that 
process ought to ensure that those persons have certain “equal opportunities for participation” in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 For the purposes of this illustration, we need not concern ourselves without how the phase “the relevant persons” 
is understood here. 
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that process. And this entails that “the process” sometimes treat participants “differently.” So, 
reflecting on what opportunities those persons should have, let us say that I conclude that 
participants should have (inter alia) “equal opportunities to express their reasons for endorsing 
some outcome rather than another.”20 (Otherwise, I think, how could the process give, say, 
“equal consideration” to their respective interests or to the good of each of them? It could do so 
only on the presumption that, in general, others know best what their respective interests are, or 
what the good of them is, a presumption that I regard as highly implausible.) And, on the above 
view, this would entail that the process sometimes treat them differently: for instance, that it give 
some participants more time to speak than others, where, say, some of those participants have 
severe speech impediments. (Giving some participants more time to speak for this reason is 
analogous to a parent giving more weekday-evening time to one of her children due to her 
academic struggles.)  
Now, roughly in this way, I offer a contextual interpretation of (part of) what I mean by a 
value, how, in some particular situation, I might “apply it.” Not a definitive interpretation, not an 
exhaustive one, but a fuller sense of what, in some particular situation, I (believe I would) mean 
by it. Let us clarify and summarize the steps.  
I start by recognizing that I (implicitly or explicitly) endorse a vague but important value: 
in this case, “equal treatment.” Then I try to clarify what I mean by that value, what, in a 
particular situation, (I believe) it would “mean” to endorse it “in practice.” To do so, I cast about 
for a “space of comparison and contrast,” analogous to what I do when I try to clarify a semantic 
meaning by consulting a dictionary. Dictionaries define words in terms of their near synonyms; 
so, consulting one helps me to identify certain comparisons that make up my space of 
comparison and contrast. Moreover, thinking through the meaning of the word in question, I 
recognize that near-synonyms are just that: near-synonyms, not words that are “literally 
synonymous,” interchangeable with no shift in meaning. Hence, the near-synonyms do provide 
useful comparisons, but also at the same time useful contrasts. (Sometimes, we also define words 
in terms of their antonyms. Where so, this also helps us to identify certain contrasts that make up 
our spaces of comparison and contrast.) Thus, the space of comparison and contrast is made up 
of a cluster of words (and perhaps phrases and examples sentences that employ the word in 
question), which provide the context in which I can reason abstractly about the “definition” of a 
word. But, of course, a dictionary is only an aid to interpretation; alone, it cannot tell me the 
meaning of a word (or phrase) as it is actually used (its “hermeneutic meaning”21). For that, what 
I need is knowledge of “the context” in which it is used. And, of course, a crucial “component” 
of that context is the purpose that a speaker has in using it. Furthermore, the speaker’s purposes 
cannot be understood apart from a consideration of the (socio-linguistic) circumstances in which 
she speaks; these are also “part of ‘the context.’”22  
Analogously, when I try to clarify what I mean by a value, what, in some situation, it 
would “mean” to endorse it “in practice,” I also cast about for a space of comparison and 
contrast. In the above hypothetical, this began with the observation that “equal” is sometimes 
synonymous with “the same.” This, however, is only in some circumstances, for some purposes, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Note that I am still offering a case of hypothetical reasoning here; I am not myself making this argument. This is 
important to note because my own argument is that a democratic process should ideally give participants certain 
“equal and adequate opportunities.” (See chapter 5.) But I need not make that more detailed argument for the 
purposes of the illustration here. 
21 Bevir (1999). 
22 Huang (2014); Lycan (2008: Part III); Pitkin (1972: chapter 4); Stanley (2007). 
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as when I am speaking of slices of cake and my purpose is to treat persons “equally” or “in the 
same way” by giving them “the same slice,” that is, “equal slices.” In other circumstances and 
for other purposes, the synonymy between “the same” and “equal” is absent, or at least 
questionable, as when I am speaking of a democratic process “treating participants in ‘the same’ 
way” and “equally.” Here, the purpose I have in mind in invoking the concept of “equal 
treatment” is for a democratic process to give “equal consideration” to, and to show “equal 
concern and respect” for, the good or interest of relevant persons. Such “consideration, concern, 
and respect” entails that participants have certain “equal opportunities,” e.g., equal opportunities 
“to express their reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.” And this entails that 
the democratic process sometimes treat them differently (not “in the same way,” where this is 
construed as “identically.”) So, in a context in which, for example, some participants have severe 
speech impediments, “equal treatment” means, inter alia, “giving them different amounts of time 
to offer their reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another, depending upon (certain 
aspects of) their speech abilities, so that participants have ‘equal opportunities’ to offer such 
reasons.” 
Hence, in reflecting on what (I believe) it would mean to endorse some value (say, “equal 
treatment”) in some particular context, I am led from “abstract statements” about my “value” to 
progressively more “concrete statements” about the circumstances in which I believe that value 
is most likely (approximately) to be realized. And in doing so, I see that a change in the situation 
can always shift the way in which I articulate the “meaning” of that value (just as a change in 
“the context of utterance” can always change the “meaning” of an utterance).23 Thus, I see that 
our values always need “contextual interpretation ‘in their application,” and that, by extension, 
the same could be said of our norms too.  
Consider, for instance, the norm referred to above: “In collective decision-making (at 
least of a “binding” or “authoritative” sort), citizens (or members or those who are affected) 
ought to be treated as political equals.” Recall that this norm corresponds to, or is derived from, 
the value of “equal treatment.” Now recall that, for me, “equal treatment” has the entailment that 
each participant ought to have certain “equal opportunities” for participation in the pertinent 
decision-making. And this includes the claim that they have “equal opportunities to express their 
reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.” Again, where, say, some participants 
have severe speech impediments, “equal treatment” therefore means, inter alia, “giving them 
different amounts of time to offer their reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another, 
depending upon (certain aspects of) their speech abilities, so that participants have ‘equal 
opportunities’ to offer such reasons.” And, on the assumption that the meaning of “political 
equality” is partly given by the meaning of “equal treatment,” this entails that the meaning of 
“political equality” should shift accordingly. Hence, the norm in question, I think, might be 
stated as follows: “In collective decision-making (at least of a “binding” or “authoritative” sort), 
citizens (or members or those who are affected) ought to be treated as political equals, which 
entails, among other things, that participants be given equal opportunities to express their reasons 
for endorsing one outcome rather than another. Where some have severe speech impediments, 
this entails that the process give them different amounts of time to offer their reasons for 
endorsing one outcome rather than another, as is appropriate for the granting of ‘equal’ such 
opportunities.”  
Roughly in this way, I offer a contextual interpretation of (part of) what I (believe I 
would) mean by a norm, how, in some particular situation, I might “apply it.” Again, not a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Lycan (2008: 138). 
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definitive or an exhaustive interpretation, but a fuller sense of what, in some particular situation, 
I (believe I would) mean by it. 
 
1.4 A Sharp Distinction Between Theoretical and Practical Reasoning is Untenable (Claim 4) 
 
The fourth claim is that we should abandon a sharp distinction between “theoretical” and 
“practical” reasoning, a distinction of the kind that, as we earlier saw in chapter 2, Millgram 
apparently endorses. Again, as is conventional, Millgram contrasts “practical reasoning” with 
“theoretical reasoning”: “Practical reasoning is reasoning directed toward decision or action, as 
contrasted with theoretical reasoning, which is directed toward belief.”24 (Elsewhere, Millgram 
also says that practical reasoning is “reasoning directed toward deciding what to do.”25) As far as 
it goes, Millgram’s brief characterization of “practical reasoning” seems reasonable enough. As I 
earlier indicated, however, I am skeptical of the strong distinction he draws between such 
reasoning and “theoretical reasoning.” Indeed, with the classical pragmatists, I believe that there 
are good reasons for regarding all reasoning as, in some sense, “practical” or “prudential.”26 
However, instead of trying to argue directly for that claim, it is sufficient, for present purposes, 
to underscore why I regard Millgram’s strong distinction between “practical” and “theoretical” 
reasoning as problematic; this should be enough to render our fourth claim plausible. (Again, 
claim 4 is that that we should abandon a sharp distinction between “theoretical” and “practical” 
reasoning.) Still, a brief consideration of the grounds on which, for instance, Dewey would 
regard all theoretical reasoning as “practical” can help us do so. Here is Festenstein’s useful 
summary:  
 
Reflective thought (‘intelligence’ or ‘inquiry’) gains its power from its capacity to 
abstract, and to be applied to a variety of situations, but it is called into being by, and 
ultimately addresses, the singular needs of particular situations. Inquiry ‘necessarily 
contains a practical factor, an activity of doing and making which reshapes antecedent 
intellectual material which sets the problem of inquiry’. Dewey uses ‘doing’, ‘making’, 
and ‘reshaping’ quite literally, emphasizing the role of experiment, and the production 
and manipulation of phenomena (the range of what Ian Hacking calls ‘intervening’ 
activities)[,] in the growth of knowledge. However, the institution of grounded assertion 
necessarily contains this practical factor because the conclusion of inquiry is understood 
not simply as a change in belief but as a recoordination of dispositions to act in certain 
ways, dispositions which have been found inadequate for the problematic situation in 
which the inquirer is embedded.27  
 
Indeed, “the practice of inquiry does not merely recoordinate the inquirers’ future dispositions to 
act in certain ways, but effects an ontological change on its subject-matter, producing an object 
of knowledge which can then be used…”28 This is because, on Dewey’s view, the “hypotheses 
posited in scientific inquiry are understood as ends-in-view, which, in Dewey’s idiosyncratic 
usage[,] are in turn identified with the ‘objects’ of inquiry: the ‘name objects will be reserved for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Millgram (2005: 312); my emphasis. 
25 Ibid. 185.  
26 Fesmire (2003: 28). 
27 Festenstein (2007: 38-39). 
28 Ibid. 39. 
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subject-matter so far as it has been produced and ordered in settled forms by means of inquiry; 
proleptically, objects are the objectives of inquiry.’”29 Here we get a glimpse of Dewey’s 
“constructivist” approach to the objects of scientific (“controlled” or “intelligent”) inquiry: the 
sciences “construct” objects of knowledge, which are used to resolve (intellectually and 
practically) “problematic situations.”  
Furthermore, on Dewey’s view, the hypotheses, theories, standards, criteria, and so forth 
that guide inquiry emerge out of practice: 
 
the frameworks for the resolution of problems, which the [hard and natural] sciences now 
possess, have developed over time: the role of epistemology or what is called ‘logic’ is to 
delineate the criteria that have been developed by these established practices of inquiry; it 
is not to prescribe a priori criteria for the resolution of the problematic. Dewey 
emphasizes that there are only the ‘empirically regulative’ and fallible norms of particular 
practices: no ‘cast-iron rules can be laid down’…. Like Thomas Kuhn and Nelson 
Goodman, Dewey sees standards as internal to practices. As Hilary Putnam puts the point 
in writing on Goodman, ‘what we have here…are practices, which are right or wrong [or 
more or less adequate] depending on how they square with our standards. And our 
standards are right or wrong [or more or less justifiable] depending on how they square 
with our practices. This is a circle, or better, a spiral, but one that Goodman, like John 
Dewey, regards as virtuous.” With Kuhn, Dewey envisages science as an institutional 
practice with a history, where there is no sharp distinction between observation and 
theory [nor between theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning, or between fact and 
value]… For neither thinker does this mean that there are no standards; rather such values 
as are reasonably thought to be relevant in assessing scientific theories can never 
constitute a formal algorithm, leaving an irreducible residue of human discretion: ‘the 
valuation operation is inherent in the judgment itself.’ For both, inquiry is embedded in a 
matrix of cultural and historical norms.30 
 
Robert Brandom’s insightful discussion of classical pragmatism can also help us to 
appreciate why we should abandon a sharp distinction between “theoretical” and “practical” 
reasoning. Tracing a line of thinking that began with Kant, was picked up by Hegel, and was 
inherited by the classical pragmatists, Brandom describes what he terms “fundamental 
pragmatism.” The idea of fundamental pragmatism helps us to understand why “semantics” must 
answer to “pragmatics,” and, correspondingly, why “theoretical” reason emerges out of 
“practical” reason. On the idea of “fundamental pragmatism,” Brandom says: 
 
This is the idea that one should understand knowing that as a kind of knowing how (to 
put it in Rylean terms). That is, believing that things are thus-and-so is to be understood 
in terms of practical abilities to do something. Dewey, in particular, saw the whole 
philosophical tradition down to his time as permeated by a kind of platonism or 
intellectualism that saw a rule or principle behind every bit of skillful practice. He 
contrasted that approach with the contrary pragmatist approach, which emphasizes the 
implicit context of background practices and practical abilities that forms the necessary 
background against which alone states and performances are intelligible as explicitly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Ibid. 39. 
30 Ibid. 39-40. 
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contentful believings and doings.  In this reversal of the traditional order of explanation, 
Dewey is joined by the Martin Heidegger of Being and Time, with his project of 
understanding Vorhandenheit as a precipitate of the more ‘primordial’ Zuhandenheit, and 
by the later Wittgenstein. All three thinkers are downstream from Kant’s fundamental 
insight about the normative character of cognition and agency, and share a commitment 
to the explanatory priority of norms implicit as properties of practice to norms explicit as 
rules or principles.31  
 
To understand what Brandom means by “Kant’s fundamental insight about the normative 
character of cognition and agency,” we need to elaborate on “two of Kant’s master ideas,” both 
of which were picked up by the classical pragmatists. The first is what Brandom calls Kant’s 
“normative turn,” the second what he calls “(tendentiously but only proleptically) his pragmatist 
methodology.”32  
 
As I understand his work, Kant’s most basic idea, the axis around which all his thought 
turns, is that what distinguishes exercises of judgment and intentional agency from the 
performances of merely natural creatures is that judgments and actions are subject to 
distinctive kinds of normative assessment. Judgements and actions are things we are in a 
distinctive sense responsible for. They are a kind of commitment we undertake. Kant 
understands judging and acting as applying rules – concepts – that determine what the 
subject becomes committed to and responsible for by applying them. Applying concepts 
theoretically in judgment and practically in action binds the concept user, commits her, 
makes her responsible, by opening her up to normative assessment according to the rules 
she has made herself subject to…. The responsibility one undertakes by applying a 
concept is a task responsibility: a commitment to do something. On the theoretical side, 
what one is committed to doing, what one becomes liable to assessment as to one’s 
success at doing, is integrating one’s judgments into a whole that exhibits a distinctive 
kind of unity: the synthetic unity of apperception. It is a systematic, rational unity, 
dynamically created and sustained by drawing inferential consequences from one’s 
judgments, by finding reasons for them, and by rejecting commitments incompatible with 
those one has undertaken…. Each new episode of experience, paradigmatically the 
making of a perceptual judgment, requires integration into, and hence transformation of, 
the antecedent constellation of commitments…. Kant’s new normative conception of 
what the activity of judging consists in, of what one must be doing in order to be judging 
(a corresponding story applies to acting), puts important structural constraints on how he 
understands the judgeable contents for which one is taking responsibility in judgment. 
The dominant order of logical and semantic explanation of the tradition Kant inherited 
began with a doctrine of terms or concepts. On that base, a doctrine of judgments was 
erected, and then finally a doctrine of consequences or syllogisms. But the minimal unit 
of responsibility is the judgment. It is judgments, not concepts, that one can invest one’s 
authority in, commit oneself to, by integrating them into a constellation that exhibits the 
rational synthetic unity of apperception. Accordingly, in a radical break with his 
predecessors, Kant takes judgments to be the minimal units of experience. Concepts are 
to be understood analytically, as functions of judgment – that is, in terms of the 	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contribution they make to judgeable contents…. Kant’s thought here, I think, is that…one 
must understand what conceptual content is in terms of what judgeable contents are, and 
must understand that in terms of what one is doing in judging, in making oneself 
responsible for such contents. The functionalism about conceptual contents that consists 
in understanding them as functions of judgment…is motivated by an overarching 
methodological pragmatism according to which semantics must answer to pragmatics (in 
a broad sense). It is the strategy of understanding discursive content in terms of what one 
is doing in endorsing or applying it, of approaching the notions of judgeable, and 
therefore conceptual content generally, in terms of the constraints put on it by 
requirements derived from the account of the activity of judging.33 	  
Kant, Brandom is claiming, should thus be thought of as “a pragmatist avant la lettre because of 
the way his normative theory of conceptual activity (theoretical and practical) shapes his account 
of conceptual content (both theoretical and practical).34 However, to grasp the “fundamental 
pragmatism” of the classical pragmatists themselves (that is, to grasp how they in particular 
understood the claim that “believing that things are thus-and-so is to be understood in terms of 
practical abilities to do something”35), we need to recall how this claim was transformed in the 
hands of Hegel before being picked up by the pragmatists. Brandom reads Hegel as “taking over 
from Kant commitment both to a normative account of conceptual doings, and to a broadly 
pragmatist approach to understanding the contents of our cognitive and practical commitments in 
terms of what we are doing in undertaking those commitments.”36 However, he also reads him as 
 
taking an important step toward naturalizing the picture of conceptual norms by taking 
those norms to be instituted by public social recognitive practices. Further, Hegel tells a 
story about how the very same practice of rational integration of commitments 
undertaken by applying concepts, that is, the synthesis at once of recognized and 
recognizing individual subjects and of their recognitive communities, is at the same time 
the historical process by which the norms that articulate the content of the concepts 
applied are instituted, determined, and developed. He calls that ongoing social, historical 
process “experience” (Erfahrung), and no longer sees it as taking place principally 
between the ears of an individual…. In the broadest sense, the classical pragmatists, 
Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, developed this German idealist 
tradition by completing the process of naturalizing it, which had begun already with 
Hegel.37 
 
How did they do so? Briefly, naturalism, in their hands,  
 
was to take on the shape of an empirical scientific account of us and our transactions with 
our environment. The sort of understanding they sought was decisively shaped by two 
new models of scientific explanation, codifying new forms of intelligibility characteristic 
of late nineteenth-century science. Principal among these, of course, was Darwinian 	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evolutionary explanation. Pragmatism begins with a philosophy of science, pioneered by 
Peirce, that saw these two explanatory innovations as aspects of one conceptual 
revolution in science…. One dimension along which evolutionary and statistical 
explanations differ from those of the older mathematical physics concerns the dominant 
modality in which they are expressed. The modality of Newtonian laws is necessity. One 
explains something by showing that it is necessitated by eternal, exceptionless, and 
universal laws. Evolutionary and statistical explanations explain contingent happenings, 
by displaying conditions under which they can be seen to have been probable. Both are 
ways of making intelligible the contingent emergence of collective order from individual 
randomness. 
 
Arguably the most important way in which Pierce substantially generalized evolutionary-
statistical explanations  
 
was an idea that was picked up by James and above all by Dewey: the recognition that 
evolution, at the level of species, and learning, at the level of individuals, share a 
common selectional process. Both can be understood as processes of adaptation, in 
which interaction with environment selects (preserves and reproduces) some elements, 
while eliminating others. This insight is encapsulated in the concept of habit, and the 
picture of individual learning as the evolution-by-selection of a population of habits. This 
master idea made possible the naturalistic construal of a cognitive continuum that runs 
from the skillful coping of the competent predator, through the practical intelligence of 
primitive hominids, to the traditional practices and common sense of civilized humans, 
all the way to the most sophisticated theorizing of contemporary scientists. All are seen 
as of a piece with, intelligible in the same general terms as, biological evolution.38  
 
This new form of naturalism was joined by a new from of empiricism as well. 
 
The experimental scientific method is seen as just the explicit, principled distillation of 
the selectional learning process that is the practical form common to intelligent creatures 
at all stages of development. Dewey’s term for that process, in all its varieties, is 
‘experience’…Experience in this sense is not the ignition of some internal Cartesian light 
– the occurrence of a self-intimating event of pure awareness, transparent and incorrigible 
to the subject of experience. Experience is work: the application of force through 
distance. It is something done rather than something that merely happens – a process, 
engaging in a practice, the exercise of abilities, rather than an episode…. Earlier 
empiricists had thought of experience as the occurrence of conscious episodes that 
provide the raw materials for learning, via processes such as association, comparison, and 
abstraction. For the pragmatists, experience just is learning: the process of perception and 
performance, followed by perception and assessment of the results of the performance, 
and then further performance, exhibiting the iterative, adaptive, conditional-branching 
structure of a test-operate-test-exit loop. The result of experience is not best thought of as 
the possession of items of knowledge, but as kind of practical understanding, a kind of 
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adaptive attunement to the environment, the development of habits apt for successful 
coping with contingencies. It is knowing how rather than knowing that.39 
 
But the pragmatists introduced not only a new concept of experience but also of reason.  
 
They understand the rationality of the theoretical physicist as continuous with the 
intelligence of the culturally primitive hunter and the skill of the non-human predator. 
The grooming and development of discursive cognitive and practical commitments is a 
learning process of a piece and sharing a structure with the achievement of practical 
attunement to an environment and the acquisition of habits successful in that environment 
that in one form or another is a part of the natural history of all sentient beings.40  
 
It is in the context of this new from of naturalistic empiricism, with its accompanying 
conception of reason, that we can best understand the classical pragmatists’ “fundamental 
pragmatism”: again, “the idea that one should understand knowing that as a kind of knowing 
how… That is, believing that things are thus-and-so is to be understood in terms of practical 
abilities to do something.”41 
Now, as should already be clear, the above summary of Dewey’s view that inquiry is 
embedded in a matrix of cultural and historical norms and of the idea of “fundamental 
pragmatism” as it first developed with Kant, was later picked up and modified by Hegel, and was 
then adapted by the pragmatists provides us with further resources for challenging a sharp 
distinction between “practical” and “theoretical” reasoning.42 Let me recapitulate the main 
claims of interest, emphasizing how this is so.43  
First, the idea of “fundamental pragmatism,” as described above, suggests that we should 
replace the idea of beliefs-as-intellectual-abstractions with the idea of beliefs-as-tendencies-to-
act.44 Recall, however, that it is conventional to draw a sharp distinction between “theoretical 
reasoning” and “practical reasoning,” as, for instance, Millgram does: “practical reasoning,” he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ibid. 6-7. 
40 Ibid. 8. Compare Fesmire (2003: 38): “Classical pragmatism situates reason within the broad context of the whole 
person in action. It replaces beliefs-as-intellectual-abstractions with beliefs-as-tendencies-to-act, pure reason with 
practical inquiry, and objectivist rationality with imaginative situational intelligence. In contradistinction from 
orthodox moralists, all reasoning is in some sense prudential. There is no refuge to be found in a pure and universal 
“Reason itself ” lurking mysteriously behind concrete acts of thinking.”  
41 Ibid. 9. 
42 I say “further resources” because, to recall, I adduced a number of considerations that are also relevant for 
challenging such a sharp distinction in chapter 2. 
43 Note that the following claims are arguably different ways of making the same basic point, namely, that 
theoretical reasoning just is a form of practical reasoning. 
44 The formulation is borrowed from Fesmire (2003: 38); see note 40 above. The view that we should replace the 
idea of beliefs-as-intellectual-abstractions with the idea of beliefs-as-tendencies-to-act was suggested by the above 
history of “fundamental pragmatism,” and is one that all of the classical pragmatists shared. In Christopher 
Hookway’s  (2013) words, “all of the classic pragmatists identified beliefs and other mental states as habits. 
According to Peirce, our beliefs ‘Guide our desires and shape our actions’ (EP1: 114). The content of a belief is not 
determined by its intrinsic phenomenal character; rather, it is determined by its role in determining our actions. This 
was reflected in Peirce's formulations of his pragmatist maxim. In order to be clear about the content of a concept or 
hypothesis, we must reflect upon its role in determining what we should do in the light of our desires and our 
background knowledge. In Robert Brandom's happy form of words, the philosopher ‘makes explicit’ aspects of our 
practice that are implicit in our habits and dispositions. The role of tacit habits of reasoning and acting in fixing our 
beliefs and guiding our actions is a theme that recurs in the work of all of the pragmatists.” 
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says, “is reasoning directed toward decision or action” (or “toward deciding what to do”), “as 
contrasted with theoretical reasoning, which is directed toward belief.” Yet, if beliefs are 
tendencies to act, then reasoning about one’s beliefs just is reasoning about how one should (be 
disposed to) act. (At least where “reasoning about one’s beliefs” is understood to entail 
“reasoning about whether one’s beliefs are justified or justifiable,” hence about whether they are 
in need of modification or rejection.) And “reasoning about how one should (be disposed to) act” 
surely qualifies as “reasoning directed toward action.” Hence, if beliefs are regarded as 
tendencies to act, to engage in theoretical reasoning just is to engage in practical reasoning. And 
Millgram’s sharp distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning appears, then, to be 
untenable. 
Second, the standards by which we come to judge the rightness or wrongness, the 
adequacy or inadequacy, of our practices emerge out of our practices themselves. They are, if 
you like, “internal” to our practices. Now, insofar as we regard our “theories” as frameworks for 
the resolution of problems (whether “theoretical” or “practical”), we can also say that they are 
“standards” for resolving problems. And, qua standards, we can say that they, too, emerge out of 
practice. So, to reason about our theories is to reason about the standards that emerge out of a 
practice, standards that provide us with frameworks for judging the rightness or wrongness, or 
adequacy or inadequacy, of that practice, hence for judging how to resolve problems that emerge 
in it. And what is such reasoning if not “reasoning [that is] ‘directed toward action,’” viz., 
“practical reasoning”?  
 Third, the naturalistic empiricism of the classical pragmatists counsels a “fundamental 
pragmatism,” according to which one should understand knowing that as a kind of knowing how. 
Hence, believing that things are thus-and-so is to be understood in terms of practical abilities to 
do something. States and performances are only intelligible as explicitly contentful believings 
and doings against the background of an implicit context of practices and practical abilities. 
Thus, “the fundamental pragmatist aspiration is to be able to exhibit discursive intentionality as a 
distinctive kind of practical rationality.”45 Loosely, “practical rationality is [here construed as] 
the kind of attunement to their environment that intelligent nonlinguistic animals display – the 
way they can practically take or treat things as prey or predator, food, sexual partner or rival and 
cope with them accordingly.”46 And “discursive rationality is [here construed as] using concepts 
in judgment and intentional action, being able explicitly to take things to be thus-and-so, to 
entertain and evaluate propositions, formulate rules and principles.”47 Hence, “fundamental 
pragmatism counsels looking first to what discursive subjects are doing, to the abilities they 
exercise, to the practices they engage in.” 48  This recommendation applies not only to 
understanding what typically falls under the label of pragmatics but to understanding semantics 
as well. Indeed, “semantics must answer to pragmatics”;49 fundamental pragmatism suggests that 
discursive content is to be understood precisely “in terms of what one is doing in endorsing or 
applying it.”50 And this is true as much of the “representational” content of our discursive 
performances as it is of any other aspect of them. “Not everything we think or say need be 
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understood as representing the world as being some way,” Brandom writes.51 But if something 
we think or say is so understood, 
 
fundamental pragmatism invites us to understand [that] representation in terms of what 
discursive subjects must do in order to count thereby as representing, as taking or treating 
some state, episode, or performance as a representation of something. For 
representational content is explicit – believing that things are thus-and-so. And that is to 
be made sense of in terms of what is implicit in what the subjects do in virtue of which it 
is correct to say of them that they believe that.52  
 
Thus:  
 
Fundamental pragmatism is opposed to a representationalist order of explanation: one 
that begins with a notion of representational content, and appeals to that notion to make 
sense of what it is that knowing and acting subjects do. That is not to say that pragmatists 
in this sense can have no truck at all with the concept of representation. It is to say at 
most that talk of representation should come at the end of the story, not the beginning.53  
 
So, if representational content is explicit, and explicit content is to be made sense of in 
terms of “what is implicit in what subjects do,” it follows, on this view, that insofar as the 
content of “theoretical reasoning” is representational content, it also is to be understood in terms 
of our practical abilities and reasoning. (Surely “theoretical reasoning” does partly consist in an 
attempt to offer explicit “representations” of phenomena.) And to the extent that this is so, once 
again, a sharp distinction between “practical” and “theoretical” reason appears to be untenable. 
 
Concluding Remarks: The Four Claims Taken Together in Support of the Central Claim 
 
Now, recall that I offered the above four claims in an attempt to clarify and substantiate 
the Central Claim (CC): When we actually carry out certain tasks that are indispensable to any 
“reasonable” conception of normative democratic theory, we are then engaged in a situated form 
of practical reasoning, one that inevitably “involves” empirical inquiry; and this reasoning 
always involves a unique context, one in which our norms and values may come into conflict and 
in which those norms and values always need “contextual interpretation ‘in their application.’” 
Let me now just make explicit how this is so.  
Again, the first claim is that the kind of reasoning that is demanded by tasks (a)-(c) is a 
situated kind of reasoning. The situation, as it were, sets the context for the process of reasoning 
itself. Whenever one actually executes any of these tasks, the nature of the question varies 
somewhat from this situation to that; we simply can’t successfully carry out that task without 
making reference to a “situation.” Indeed, we wouldn’t actually be carrying out that task were we 
not (at least implicitly) to make such a reference. For instance, task (c) is to offer some account 
of how we might “weigh” our “democratic norms and values” in relation to whatever other 
norms and values we might have. And again, we may, of course, enter a situation with some 
sense of what our (say) democratic values are, and we can, of course, reason about those values 	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abstractly. Likewise, we may enter that situation with some sense of how we would weigh 
certain of our democratic values against certain of our other values, and abstract thinking can 
help us to determine this. Still further, we might give much thought to what our democratic and 
our other values are, and so also have a strong sense of how, in certain (kinds of) circumstances, 
(we believe) we would weigh certain of the former values against certain of the latter ones. 
However, no amount of forethought can guarantee that the values we have given consideration to 
are the only ones that will be relevant, nor can we know how our values will “trade off” against 
one another in a specific situation. And, what is perhaps even more discomfiting, we cannot 
know in advance how we would precisely “define” our values in that situation. (Again, the 
analogy with semantic interpretation: the meaning of a word, phrase, or sentence can only be 
interpreted in the context of utterance.) Indeed, every situation is, in strict literalness, a unique 
situation. So, we concluded, tasks (a)-(c) therefore demand a situated kind of reasoning, where 
we reason from within and about a context. This clarifies and substantiates why the CC states 
that when we actually carry out the tasks under consideration, “we are then engaged in a situated 
form of practical reasoning, one that inevitably ‘involves’ empirical inquiry; and this reasoning, 
we may add, always concerns a unique context.” 
Again, the second claim is contained in our exposition of the first claim: namely, that 
reflection on lived experience reveals that our norms and values often come into conflict, and 
there is no way to foretell how (if at all) they will come into conflict, how (if at all) they will 
“trade off” against one another, in the actual situations in which one finds or puts oneself. And, 
we may add, some values may simply be “incommensurable.” When we recognize that every 
situation is a unique situation, we should also recognize that this entails that we can never 
foretell how (if at all) our norms and values might come into conflict, nor how (if at all) they will 
“trade off” against one another in any particular context. For any change in circumstances can 
present a new “norm” or “value,” and any “new norm” or “new value” can conflict with an 
existing norm and/or value or with existing norms and/or values. Moreover, as I’ll reiterate 
below, the “meaning” of a “norm” or “value” can always shift with circumstances, just as the 
meaning of a word or phrase can too. This clarifies and substantiates why the CC states that 
when we actually carry out the tasks under consideration, “we are then engaged in a situated 
form of practical reasoning, one that inevitably ‘involves’ empirical inquiry; and this reasoning, 
we may add, always concerns a unique context, one in which our norms and values may come 
into conflict.” 
The third claim is that our norms and values always need “contextual interpretation ‘in 
their application.’” We never provide a definitive or exhaustive interpretation of a norm or value, 
but deciding how appropriately to act in some specific context demands that we give a fuller 
sense of what, in that situation, we (believe we) (would) mean by (certain of) our norms and/or 
values. Briefly, we do this by first recognizing that we do (implicitly or explicitly) endorse a 
vague but important norm or value. For instance, if we are genuine democrats, we begin by 
recognizing that we invariably endorse some notion of “equal treatment.” We then try to clarify 
what we mean by that value, what, in a particular situation, (we believe) it (would) mean to 
endorse it “in practice.” In doing so, we cast about for a “space of comparison and contrast,” 
analogous, in a way, to what we do when we try to clarify a semantic meaning by consulting a 
dictionary. Doing so, we might, for instance, notice that in some circumstances, for some 
purposes, “the same” and “equal” are synonymous, as when we are speaking of slices of cake 
and our purpose is to treat persons “equally” or “in the same way” by giving them “the same 
slice,” that is, “equal slices.” But then we might notice that in other circumstances and for other 
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purposes, the synonymy between “the same” and “equal” is absent, or at least questionable, as 
when we are speaking of a democratic process “treating participants in ‘the same’ way” and 
“equally.” Here, for instance, the purpose we have in mind in invoking the concept of “equal 
treatment” might be for a democratic process to give “equal consideration” to, and to show 
“equal concern and respect” for, the good or interests of each relevant person. Such 
“consideration, concern, and respect” entails, inter alia, that participants have certain “equal 
opportunities,” we might conclude. And because persons always have different capacities and 
resources, this entails that the democratic process sometimes treat them differently. So, in a 
context in which, for example, some participants have severe speech impediments, “equal 
treatment” means, inter alia, “giving them different amounts of time to offer their reasons for 
endorsing one outcome rather than another, depending upon (certain aspects of) their speech 
abilities, so that participants have ‘equal opportunities’ to offer such reasons.” But in other 
circumstances, this stipulation might fall away, and the “value” of “equal treatment” might 
“mean” something else there. 
Hence, in reflecting on what it would mean to endorse some value (say, “equal 
treatment”) in some particular context, we are led from “abstract statements” about our “value” 
to progressively more “concrete statements” about the circumstances in which we believe that 
value is most likely to be approximately realized. In doing so, we see that a change in the 
situation can always shift the way in which we articulate the “meaning” of that value (just as a 
change in “the context of utterance” can change the meaning of an utterance). Thus, we see that 
our values always need “contextual interpretation ‘in their application,” and that, by extension, 
the same could be said of our norms too. This clarifies and substantiates why the CC states that 
when we actually carry out the tasks under consideration, “we are then engaged in a situated 
form of practical reasoning, one that inevitably “involves” empirical inquiry; and this reasoning 
always involves a unique context, one in which our norms and values may come into conflict and 
in which those norms and values always need contextual interpretation ‘in their application.’” 
Finally, the fourth claim is that we should abandon a sharp distinction between 
“theoretical” and “practical” reasoning, a distinction of the kind that, for instance, Millgram 
apparently endorses: “Practical reasoning is reasoning directed toward decision or action, as 
contrasted with theoretical reasoning, which is directed toward belief.”54 We substantiated this 
claim by briefly defending three further ones.  
First, pragmatists counsel that we replace the idea of beliefs-as-intellectual-abstractions 
with the idea of beliefs-as-tendencies to act. Doing so, we then see that when we reason about 
whether or not our beliefs are justified – which surely counts as “theoretical reasoning” 
(including on Millgram’s own view) – we are reasoning about how we should (be disposed to) 
act. But such reasoning surely qualifies as “reasoning directed toward action,” which just is 
“practical reasoning.” Hence, on this view, theoretical reasoning just is a form of practical 
reasoning. Second, pragmatists hold that the standards by which we judge the rightness or 
wrongness, the adequacy or inadequacy, of our practices emerge out of practice itself. But they 
also counsel that we view our theories as “standards,” that is, standards for the resolution of 
problems (whether “theoretical” or “practical”). Doing so, we conclude that, qua standards, they 
(a) emerge out of practice and (b) provide us with frameworks for resolving problems that 
emerge in that practice. Hence, on this view too, “theoretical reasoning” is also reasoning that is 
“directed toward action,” and so, again, is a form of “practical reasoning.” Third, the pragmatists, 
as naturalistic empiricists, counsel what Brandom has called a “fundamental pragmatism,” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Millgram (2005: 312); my emphasis. 
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according to which one should understand knowing that as a kind of knowing how: believing 
that things are thus-and-so is to be understood in terms of practical abilities to do something. For 
them, states and performances are only intelligible as explicitly contentful believings and doings 
against the background of an implicit context of practices and practical abilities. This entails that 
the discursive content of our theoretical reasoning, including its “representational” content, 
should be understood precisely in terms of what one is doing in applying it, in judging that things 
are thus-and-so. Accordingly, insofar as discursive content is the medium through which we 
reason “theoretically,” it follows that “theoretical reason” (reasoning “directed toward belief”) is 
to be understood in terns of what one is doing in applying the relevant discursive content, that is, 
in terms of reasoning that is (at least implicitly) “directed toward action.” Hence, one’s 
“theoretical reasoning” in is to be understood in terms of one’s “practical reasoning” (and 
abilities). This clarifies and substantiates why the CC states that when we actually carry out the 
tasks under consideration, we are then engaged in a situated form of practical reasoning.” For, 
as the classical pragmatists tried to teach us, all reasoning – including our “theoretical reasoning” 
– is, in some sense, “practical” reasoning (“directed toward action”). 
So, taken together, the four claims clarify and substantiate the CC: When we actually 
carry out certain tasks that are indispensable to any “reasonable” conception of normative 
democratic theory, we are then engaged in a situated form of practical reasoning, one that 
inevitably “involves” empirical inquiry; and this reasoning always involves a unique context, one 
in which our norms and values may come into conflict and in which those norms and values 
always need “contextual interpretation ‘in their application.’” 
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Chapter 4  
 
 
Normative Democratic Theory as a Tool for Practical Reasoning 
 
 
The serious matter is that philosophies have denied that common experience is capable of 
developing from within itself methods which will secure direction for itself and will create 
inherent standards of judgment and value…” – John Dewey, Experience and Nature 
 
As philosophy has no private store of knowledge or methods for attaining truth, so it has no 
private access to good. As it accepts knowledge and principles from those competent in science 
and inquiry, it accepts goods that are diffused in human experience. It has no Mosaic or Pauline 
authority of revelation entrusted to it. But it has the authority of intelligence, of criticism of these 
common and natural goods.” – John Dewey, Experience and Nature  
 
 
Introduction 
In chapter 2, I began to offer a strategy for “re-engaging” so-called “normative” 
democratic theory and so-called “empirical” democratic theory. To recall, I argued that 
normative democratic theory just is a form of “practical reasoning,” and so, like any form of 
practical reasoning, inevitably “involves” empirical inquiry (in the extended sense of 
“involvement” that I specified.1) Indeed, because normative democratic theory just is a form of 
practical reasoning and because practical reasoning inevitably just does involve empirical 
inquiry, it follows that normative democratic theory just is an “empirical enterprise.” In chapter 
3, I then tried to give greater clarity to the character of that empirical enterprise. More 
specifically, I then tried to give further clarity to the character of the practical reasoning that is 
involved in it. (Recall that, in chapter 2, I also argued that empirical inquiry always involves 
“practical reasoning.” Indeed, following the classical pragmatists, I pointed out that all reasoning 
is, in some sense, “practical.”) In doing so, we arrived at what I called the “central claim” (CC): 
When we actually carry out certain tasks that are indispensable to any “reasonable” conception 
of normative democratic theory, we are then engaged in a situated form of practical reasoning, 
one that inevitably “involves” empirical inquiry; and this reasoning is always about a unique 
context, one in which our norms and values may come into conflict and in which those norms 
and values always need “contextual interpretation ‘in their application.’” 
Now, it might be thought that this conclusion leaves little, if any, room for anything that 
deserves the name of a “normative democratic theory.” For again, according to the CC, such 
reasoning: is “directed toward action”; inevitably “involves” empirical inquiry; and always 
concerns a “unique context.” And each of these clauses expresses an idea that might be seen to 
stand in tension with the idea of “theory,” as this term has often been construed. For one thing, 
theory, as we have noted, has often been seen as “directed toward belief,” not as “directed 
toward action.” For another thing, theory (“analysis”) has often been sharply distinguished from 
empirical research (“observation”). And for yet another thing, theory has typically been thought 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Recall that, in my sense, a person’s reasoning about something “involves” empirical inquiry if it is the case that her 
ability to reason about that something is tied to, in some way depends upon, her own or others’ empirical inquiries.	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of as general and abstract, not as concrete or as concerning unique situations or contexts. Hence, 
at first blush, it might seem odd, if not downright mistaken, to say that the form of reasoning in 
question is “theoretical” at all. 
In this chapter, my aim is therefore to clarify the “proper” status and function of 
normative democracy theory in democratic practice. On reflection, it should be clear that 
normative democratic theory is a kind of moral theory and that democracy is a kind of moral 
practice. Yet, as we will see, the proper status and function of moral theory in moral practice is 
much in dispute. Consequently, so is the proper status and function of normative democratic 
theory in democratic practice. Indeed, some authors (the so-called “anti-theorists”) argue that we 
needn’t – some even say shouldn’t – develop moral or ethical “theories” at all. Hence what 
motivates our topic in this chapter is not just the observation that, at first blush, it may appear to 
some that the form of reasoning in question isn’t “theoretical” at all; it is also the observation 
that, at first blush, it may appear to some that even if the form of reasoning in question is 
“theoretical,” its not clear what, if anything, its actual use might be. 
In response to this problem, the paper develops the idea that normative democratic theory 
ought to be viewed as a “tool” for practical reasoning, one that can assist democracy’s 
participants in carrying out two principal tasks. First, it can help them to clarify what their own 
democratic norms and values are. Second, it can help them to conduct empirical inquiries that 
illuminate how, in some particular context, they might best uphold those norms and realize those 
values.  
To develop these ideas, Section I discusses John Dewey’s “empirical-instrumentalist” 
approach to moral theory, juxtaposing it with two more familiar approaches: what I’ll refer to 
respectively as the “generalist” approach and the “particularist” approach. Very briefly, the 
“generalist” approach is to articulate moral principles that are purportedly universal in scope and 
that purportedly “tell us” how we are to act in cases of a particular kind. By contrast, the 
“particularist” approach rejects the idea of moral principles altogether or, at a minimum, holds 
that, in moral deliberation, there need be no attempt to bring such principles to bear on particular 
situations. Sound moral judgment is non-codifiable, and can only be found as one decides 
particular cases.  
The chapter suggests that normative democratic theory is a kind of moral theory, and a 
Dewey-inspired approach to it is more appropriate than either a generalist or a particularist one. 
As we’ll see, Dewey’s approach is “empirical” in the sense that moral theory is said properly to 
emerge out of (anthropological-interpretive) empirical inquiry into our actual moral practices, or, 
into actual “moral experience.” And it is “instrumentalist” in the sense that theory is self-
consciously treated as a “tool” for aiding intelligent, situated action, rather than as something that 
articulates the pre-existing “true” or “correct” rules, laws, and/or principles. Dewey’s approach 
recognizes the need for moral principles that are broad in scope. It also recognizes, however, that 
sound moral judgment responds to the exigencies of particular situations and is, therefore, non-
codifiable. Hence, a Dewey-inspired approach to normative democratic theory is sensitive to the 
need for such theory to balance a kind of generalism with a kind of particularism.  
Section II illustrates the logic of how normative democratic theory, construed in this way, 
can assist democracy’s participants in carrying out the two principal tasks mentioned above: 
again, clarifying what their own democratic norms and values are, and conducting empirical 
inquiries that illuminate how, in some particular context, they might best uphold those norms and 
realize those values.  
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I. John Dewey’s Empirical-Instrumentalist Approach to Moral Theory 
 
Now, as I’ve said, a useful way to develop an understanding of Dewey’s approach to 
moral theory is by juxtaposing it with the two more familiar approaches already mentioned, 
which lie at the extremes of contemporary moral philosophy. Here I can only present stylized 
versions of these approaches. Fortunately, however, that is all that is needed here. For it may be 
that no single person who self-identifies, or, as is more often the case, is described by others, as a 
“generalist” subscribes to all of the views that I here associate with the label, and the same may 
also be true of “particularism” as I describe it. Yet, some who do subscribe to the labels do 
subscribe to many of the beliefs that I associate with them. Moreover, each of the more specific 
claims that I associate with these two viewpoints does have a fair amount of currency in 
contemporary moral philosophy (and, though I won’t pursue this claim, in popular culture more 
generally), even if, again, no single person subscribes to all over them. Consequently, we can 
usefully treat each of these approaches as a composite of a number of more specific views that 
do have a good deal of currency, setting aside the issue of whether or not this or that particular 
person, or indeed anyone, actually endorses all of them.  
 
1.1 The Generalist Approach: A Brief Statement 
 
 Again, very briefly, the generalist approach is to articulate moral principles that are 
purportedly universal in scope and that purportedly “tell us” how we are to act in cases of a 
particular kind. Thus, on this approach, the principal aim of moral theory is to articulate the 
“true,” or the “correct,” universal moral rules, laws, and/or principles. And to the extent that we 
reason properly, we are said to “discover” universal moral rules, laws, and/or principles.  
Generalism, so understood, has been the typical approach to moral theory in the Western 
philosophical tradition. Typically, the rules, laws, and/or principles that moral theory has 
articulated have been characterized as “universal,” in the sense that they are thought to apply to 
all humans at all times, independent of any particular social circumstance. These rules, laws, 
and/or principles have been variously conceived of as the product of revelation, pure intuition, or 
pure reason; they have even been said “to represent the true or higher will of a benighted 
mankind.”2 Even utilitarianism – often celebrated as an eminently “empirical” approach – 
“declares certain moral principles to be universally justified and unexceptionable.”3  
Of course, there is disagreement about the origins of these universal principles, as we’ve 
just seen. Nevertheless, generalism arguably remains dominant in Western culture. As Mark 
Johnson has observed,  
 
A great many people believe that the way out of our present moral confusions is to get 
clear about the ultimate moral principles or laws that ought to govern our lives and to 
learn how to apply them rationally to concrete situations we encounter every day. Some 
people believe that these moral laws come from God, others regard them as derived by 
universal reason, and still others see them as based on universal human feelings. 
However much they might disagree about the source of moral principles, they all agree 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Gouinlock (1976: xxii).	  
3 Ibid. 
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that living morally is principally a matter of moral insight into the ultimate moral rules, 
combined with strength of will to ‘do the right thing’ that is required by those rules.4 
 
“In Western culture,” Johnson continues, we have inherited the view that “morality is nothing 
more than a system of universal moral laws or rules that come from the essence of reason.”5 On 
this view, “correct moral reasoning is,” therefore, simply “a matter of applying these moral laws 
to the concrete situations we face in our daily lives.”6  
 Now, again, our aim here is to clarify the “proper” status and function of moral theory in 
moral practice in general, before turning to the “proper” status and function of normative 
democratic theory in democratic practice in particular. Accordingly, it is useful to say something 
about the way in which generalists – which is to say, the dominant moral-philosophical traditions 
in Western culture – have traditionally conceived of the role that moral principles and theories 
have been thought properly to play in moral practice.  
To do so, let us take a closer look at the main aims of moral theory as this has 
traditionally been understood. Mark Timmons provides a useful starting point. 
 
There are two fundamental aims of moral theory: one practical, the other theoretical. The 
practical aim of theory has to do with the desire to have some method to follow when, for 
example, we reason about what is right or wrong. Scientists employ scientific 
methodology in arriving at scientific conclusions about various phenomena under 
investigation, and such methodology provides a means of resolving scientific disputes. 
Similarly, we might hope to discover a proper moral methodology – a decision 
procedure, as it is often referred to by moral philosophers – that could be employed in 
moral thinking and debate and which would help to resolve moral conflicts.7 
 
So, Timmons says that we might summarize the “practical aim of moral theory” in this way: 
“The main practical aim of a moral theory is to discover a decision procedure that can be used to 
guide correct moral reasoning about matters of moral concern.” 8  What, though, of the 
“theoretical aim”? The theoretical aim of moral theory is, he says, “to explore the underlying 
nature of right and wrong action in order to be able to explain what it is about an action that 
makes it right and wrong… Similar remarks apply to matters of good and bad: part of the 
theoretical aim of a moral theory is to discover what it is about persons that makes them good or 
bad.”9 So, Timmons suggests that we might summarize the “theoretical aim of moral theory” in 
this way: “The main theoretical aim of moral theory is to discover those underlying features of 
actions, persons, and other items of moral evaluation that make them right or wrong, good or 
bad.”10   
How, though, have the “practical” and “theoretical” aims of moral theory been thought to 
relate to one another? Typically, these aims have been thought to relate to one another “in that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Johnson (1993: ix); my emphasis. Johnson regards this view as fundamentally mistaken, as does Dewey. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid; my emphasis. 
7 Timmons (2002: 1). 
8 Ibid. 3. 
9 Ibid. 4. 
10 Ibid. 4. 
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satisfying one is either required for, or at least the best way of, satisfying the other.” 11 To explain 
this point, we need to understand the role of moral principles in moral theory for the generalist.12  
 
In attempting to satisfy the practical aim of providing a decision procedure for correct 
moral reasoning, moral philosophers have often been guided by the idea that such 
reasoning must be based on moral principles…. [T]he practical aim of providing a 
decision procedure for arriving at justified moral verdicts about actions (and other items 
of moral concern) has often been supposed to be a matter of reasoning from moral 
principles to conclusions about actions (and other items of moral concern). Understood as 
a decision-procedure, then, a moral principle guides proper moral reasoning by indicating 
those features of actions whose recognition can guide one to well-reasoned verdicts about 
the morality of actions.13  
 
However, it is obviously not the case that just any moral principle or set of principles will satisfy 
this “practical aim.” It is rather the case that  
 
In order to provide a decision procedure to guide correct moral reasoning, the moral 
principles used must themselves be correct. And this brings us to the theoretical aim of 
moral theory and the role of principles in achieving this aim…. In attempting to satisfy 
the theoretical aim of explaining what makes an action right or wrong or what makes 
something good or bad, moral philosophers have typically sought to formulate moral 
principles that express this information. In fulfilling this theoretical aim, then, moral 
principles concerned with right and wrong action can be understood as indicating those 
most basic features of actions that make them right or wrong…. Moreover, moral 
principles that serve to explain what makes actions right or wrong will thus unify morality 
by revealing those basic features that determine in general an action’s rightness or 
wrongness. (Similar remarks apply to principles of goodness and badness.) Finding the 
underlying unity behind the diversity of moral phenomena has thus been an aim of 
traditional moral theory – an aim that can supposedly be achieved by discovering moral 
principles that satisfy the main theoretical aim of moral theory.14  
 
Now, as we’ll see, I read Dewey as offering a depiction of the proper status and function 
of moral theory in moral practice, and, in consequence, of the proper status and function of moral 
principles in moral theory and practice, that, in many respects, is highly distinct from the one 
depicted in the above passages. But we can better appreciate this by first looking at the 
particularist approach to moral theory, which stands at the opposite extreme of contemporary 
moral philosophy. 
 
1.2 The Particularist Approach: A Brief Statement  
 
In contemporary moral philosophy, there are a significant number of commentators who 
are skeptical of moral or ethical “theory” as such. As Nick Fotion has observed, “The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 6. 
14 Ibid. 6. 
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[indispensable] role of theory in science is taken for granted. But it is not in ethics.”15 Of course, 
“many do in fact insist that theories in ethics are very useful. Some of these theorists even go so 
far as to say that we cannot do without theories. But others, so called anti-theorists, argue that 
theories in ethics are a waste of time. Worse still, theories are said to be counterproductive.”16 
Indeed, “the anti-theorists are not content to snipe at the theorists because the latter create a 
variety of fabulously intricate intellectual constructions. They also argue that the principles 
found in the theory are too abstract to be of any use in dealing with concrete moral problems.”17 
Hence, Bernard Williams, for instance, has declared that “philosophy should not try to produce 
ethical theory,”18 while Jonathan Dancy has concluded that “morality can get along perfectly fine 
without principles.”19  
In contemporary moral philosophy, such views are typically associated with moral or 
ethical “particularism.” Very briefly, the “particularist” approach, as I construe it, rejects the idea 
of moral principles altogether or, at a minimum, holds that, in moral deliberation, there need be 
no attempt to bring such principles to bear on particular situations. For the particularist, sound 
moral judgment is non-codifiable, and can only be found as one decides particular cases; it 
“issues from the exercise of a sensibility that transcends codification into rules or principles.”20  
For instance, John McDowell, taking inspiration from Aristotle, argues that the ability to 
discern moral reasons is a form of practical reason (phronēsis). This he depicts as a “sort of 
perceptual capacity” that cannot be codified.21 Correspondingly, McDowell concludes that 
“occasion by occasion, one knows what to do, if one does, not by applying universal principles 
but by being a certain kind of person: one who sees situations in a certain distinctive way.”22 
McDowell further maintains that to comprehend a virtuous person’s conception of how one 
should live, and to comprehend how their various actions are manifestations of virtue, is “to 
comprehend, essentially from within, the virtuous person’s distinctive way of viewing particular 
situations.”23 These ways of seeing are features of our “second nature.” That is, we acquire them 
not by comprehending timeless, invariant rules, laws and/or principles but through an 
enculturation into certain ways of perceiving, thinking, and feeling.24 
In short, “moral competence” is construed here as a perceptual capacity to respond to the 
particular configuration of morally salient features presented by particular cases. It does not 
consist in having knowledge of invariant, universally applicable, rules, laws, and/or principles.  
 Now, again, I read Dewey as offering a depiction of moral theory and of moral practice 
that, in many respects, is highly distinct from the one offered in the above description of 
particularism. To see why, we need to appreciate the way in which Dewey departs from a 
number of assumptions characteristic of the Western philosophical tradition. These assumptions 
stand behind a number of the claims made by some generalists and by some particularists.  
 
1.3 Dewey’s Empirical-Instrumentalism: An Alternative to Generalism and to Particularism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Fotion (2014: 1). 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 3; my emphasis. 
18 Williams (1985: 17). 
19 Dancy (2004: 2). 
20 Bakhurst (2007: 122) 
21 McDowell (1994: 51) 
22 Ibid. 73. 
23 Ibid. 7. 
24 Ibid. 78-84. 
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  We begin with Dewey’s “radical empiricism,” which sets the background for his “radical 
contextualism.” Without appreciating how Dewey challenged and reconstructed aspects of the 
empiricist tradition, we cannot appreciate the kind of “contextualist” he was. And without 
appreciating the kind of contextualism he endorsed, we cannot appreciate how Dewey’s 
approach offers an attractive alternative to generalism and to particularism. 
 
1.3.1 Radical Empiricism Cum Radical Contextualism 
 
The classical pragmatists – C.S. Pierce, William James, G.H. Mead, and John Dewey – 
were all naturalistic empiricists. And a genuine naturalistic empiricism is one that seeks an 
empirical grounding for ethics, just as it seeks an empirical grounding for all other topics of 
inquiry. Turning to Dewey in particular, Gregory Pappas has recently reminded us that Dewey 
had the lifelong aim of rooting philosophy in lived experience. “A genuine empiricism in 
philosophy entails that, no matter how abstract and remote our philosophical speculations might 
turn out, we need to start and end with direct experienced subject matter.”25 For Dewey, 
experience is regarded as the “starting point and [the] terminal point, as setting problems and as 
testing proposed solutions.”26  
By contrast, the starting point in philosophy has typically been the “theoretical 
abstractions (or as Dewey says, ‘reflective products’) [of philosophers], rather than primary 
experience, that is, everyday experience as it is found, present and given.”27 Indeed, “even 
modern empiricism has not been radical (or empirical) enough to distinguish a theory about 
experience from experience as it is experienced.”28 Typically, “experience in modern philosophy 
has been understood as the content of consciousness, that is, [as the thought-content] of a 
knowing subject who is a spectator to an antecedent world or object.”29 Moral philosophers have 
often begun their inquiries with “the isolated subject who has a purely cognitive apprehension of 
moral truths”; this is the counterpoint in ethics to the Cartesian starting point in epistemology.30 
And for those philosophers who favor a theoretical standpoint they associate with science, the 
starting point in ethics has typically been “a natural world with natural properties but without 
values.”31 In point of fact, 
 
the abstraction of a thinking rational subject in a value-less world is a common theoretical 
starting point implicit in a variety of ethical theories. It is discernible in those positions 
that assume that our moral principles or our desires are the sources of our moral 
experiences and, therefore, that morality is a human projection upon nature. It is in views 
that assume that ethical theory must provide rational reasons that would convince an 
imaginary skeptic to be moral or to take morality seriously.32 In such views, it is as if to 
be rational (usually defined as pursuing one’s self interest or following the rules of logic) 
is primary, while all else (especially moral value) is questionable and must be derived 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Pappas (2008: 20) 
26 Dewey (LW 1: 14); emphasis added. 
27 Pappas (2008: 20-21). 
28 Ibid. 20-21. 
29 Ibid. 21. 
30 Ibid. 35. 
31 Ibid. 21. 
32 Pappas cites three examples of contemporary philosophers who favor this theoretical starting point: James (2001); 
Brandt (1979); and Gauthier (1986).  
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from this imaginary standpoint. For Dewey, this is not to start with moral experience as it 
is had[,] because we start in a morally value-laden world. Morality is no more in need of 
justification or legitimacy than the existence of the external world. Morality is just as 
basic, natural, and given as rationality (in any of its possible meanings). There is no more 
need to show that morality is rational than a need to show that rationality is moral.33 
 
Of course, when we adopt a theoretical point of view, we may or may not choose to employ a 
picture of the world in which we do not experience a world laden with moral and other values. 
Such a picture is not, however, consistent with “how we experience our everyday life from 
an…engaged point of view.”34 And, what is more, the engaged point of view is primary, because 
“any inquiry and its theoretical standpoint is experienced as embedded in the more everyday, 
practical point of view.”35 From the point of view of engaged experience, values are, so to speak, 
ubiquitous; and if moral or ethical values are not also so, they are at least common.  
Now, again, it is important to understand how Dewey’s “radical empiricism” sets the 
backdrop for his “radical contextualism.” In the Western philosophical tradition, nature has 
commonly been regarded as “a perfectly rational and harmonious system,” and the view has been 
that “human affairs contained implicitly a similar harmony. Men needed only to exercise their 
reason, perceive the inherent natural order appropriate to social existence, and conform 
themselves to it.”36 “This position,” Dewey thought, “was at bottom theological and unsupported 
by any evidence of experience.”37  
As we saw in chapter 3, Dewey, like his fellow pragmatist William James, held that 
reflection on actual moral experience reveals an irreducible plurality of values.38 Furthermore, it 
reveals that we inevitably encounter conflict between our moral-ethical values, and between our 
moral-ethical values and our other values.39 Dewey’s view of human nature “makes it entirely 
clear that nothing in the nature of things” prohibits conflicts over values, even among reflective 
and thoughtful persons.40 “Accounts of our moral life that ignore this, and begin with the 
assumption of absolutes across time and history, are adopting a God’s-eye view that neglects the 
situational context of both our investigation [such as it is] and our morality [such as it is].”41 It is 
well to recall Dewey’s reminder that “practical activity [and hence deliberation about how to act] 
deals with individualized and unique situations which are never exactly duplicable and about 
which, accordingly, no complete assurance is possible.”42 Hence, Dewey would surely have 
agreed with William James’s observation that “for every real dilemma is in literal strictness a 
unique situation; and the exact combination of ideals realized and ideals disappointed which each 
decision creates is always a universe without a precedent, and for which no adequate rule 
exists.”43 Accordingly, Dewey hoped that attention to moral experience as it is experienced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Pappas (2008: 37); my emphasis. 
34 Ibid. 21. 
35 Ibid. 34. 
36 Gouinlock (1976: xlii). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Bakhurst (2007: 130).  
39 Ibid. 130-131. For elaboration, see Dewey (1981-90: v. 279-88).   
40 Gouinlock (1976: xliii). 
41 Ibid. 41. 
42 Quoted in Caspary (2000: 19). Dewey (EW 3: 98) also reminds us that conduct is “absolutely 
individualized…there is no such thing as conduct in general; conduct is what and where and when and how to the 
last inch.”  
43 James (1979: 158). 
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would lead to a shift in ethical thought toward situations as the center of gravity of moral 
endeavor.”44 Indeed, “he insisted that moral philosophy must quit seeking ends or standards that 
were over and above unique morally problematic situations. The resolution of each morally 
problematic situation was, he believed, the goal of morality.”45  
Now, these comments might seem to suggest that, for Dewey, there is no role for 
anything that deserves the name of moral or ethical “theory.” However, this is mistaken. For 
Dewey, we do not need to jettison the very idea of moral or ethical “theory,” as the strong 
version of particularism suggests we should. But we do need to adopt an alternative conception 
of the proper status and function of moral theory in moral practice, one that does not suffer from 
the problems associated with generalism. 
 
1.3.2 Moral Theories as Tools that Emerge out of Moral Experience Itself 
 
 We have already noted Dewey’s criticism of modern empiricism’s tendency to start with 
philosophers’ theoretical abstractions about experience rather than with experience as it is 
experienced. And below we’ll come back to this point. But Dewey offered another incisive 
criticism of empiricism that we should note here. Earlier empiricists had generally regarded ideas 
as summaries of antecedent sense data. In that sense, ideas were thought to “mirror” the past. But 
empiricists were not alone in this: rationalists, too, generally thought that ideas should be 
conceived of as mirroring the past. The difference was that rationalists typically regarded them 
as copies of antecedently existing essences.46 But in neither case is there “any reference to the 
future or an awareness of the creative function of ideas.”47  
Influenced by C.S. Pierce, Dewey, by contrast, repeatedly drew our attention to a crucial 
characteristic of science: the predictive and hypothetical character of its ideas. Guinlock offers an 
apt description of Dewey’s thinking in this regard. 
 
Ideas, and not only scientific ideas, he pointed out, are not summaries of antecedent 
experience. They are not composites of sensations, and they are not copies of the 
antecedently existing structure of reality. Rather, an idea has reference to anticipated 
events, forthcoming events. Behaviorally, to possess an idea is to be prepared to interact 
with nature in specified ways. Logically, an idea is a tool of inference: it forecasts events 
which are contingent upon specific occurrences. Thus an idea (a meaning, a definition, a 
proposition) is sharply distinguished from an image. The image of something specifies its 
function in natural processes…. To determine the truth about a proposition regarding an 
alleged piece of wood, one does not compare a visual image to antecedent sensations or 
essences. He performs operations on the alleged wood to see if predicted events in fact 
ensue.48 
 
Here we can begin to appreciate Dewey’s “instrumentalism”: ideas are treated as tools or 
instruments that help to guide conduct, to make it more intelligent. They are, in short, tools for 
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46 Gouinlock (1976: xxxiv). 
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practical reasoning. Indeed, for Dewey “to have an idea [just] is to be prepared to act in certain 
ways.”49 For instance, “to believe that something is wood means it will be acted with as wood.”50 
Let us be clear on Dewey’s conception of how ideas guide conduct. “Ideas predict events 
which result from specific operations. The formulation has reference to future events which are 
contingent upon present action.”51 For example, the idea of wood means that “if an object is 
wooden, it will cut in two when sawed, float when immersed in water, burn when placed in fire, 
etc.”52 In the conduct of inquiry, ideas take the form of hypotheses. For Dewey, all “inquiry” or 
“problem-solving” takes place in a given context, in response to a “problematic situation.” And 
for him, “the problems that experience poses and the strategies we adopt to solve them are 
always informed by values. Experience is perceived as recalcitrant relative to the ends of the 
experiencer, and what counts as accommodating such experience depends on our theoretical and 
practical objectives,” which we can always revise.53  
Now, the hypotheses that we formulate propose means of reordering present activity to 
achieve a specific result, and the formulation of our hypotheses is a creative venture. But our 
hypotheses are not sheer guesswork. They are based on knowledge of more or less similar 
situations, that is, on analogical reasoning (on a sufficiently broad interpretation of such 
reasoning.) “Any person seeking a solution to any problem would be at a complete loss if every 
feature of the problem were new to him.”54 The proposed solutions can be formulated as 
hypotheses: the introduction of certain conditions is necessary to solving these problems. In any 
such case, our hypotheses propose “means for solving a problem already at hand: an existing 
problematic situation.”55 “Such ideas direct activities by specifying means to an end. This is how 
Dewey understands ideas to guide conduct.” 56   
 Now, this account of our ideas and inquiries applies to our moral-ethical ideas and 
inquiries as well. When we encounter morally or ethically “problematic situations,” where our 
moral-ethical values conflict or conflict with other values, Dewey implores us to inquire into the 
means of reconstructing these problematic situations. And he suggests that these inquiries are 
means of revising our existing moral or ethical valuations too. As with our other inquiries, we 
generally do not enter such situations with no understanding of how we might resolve our 
predicament; we generally have knowledge of more or less similar situations. Here as elsewhere, 
these proposed solutions can be formulated as hypotheses: the introduction of certain conditions 
is necessary to resolve or to mitigate these specific moral-ethical problems. Again, such ideas – 
often embodied in rules or principles – direct activities by specifying means to an end. And, as a 
first approximation, this is how Dewey understands moral or ethical principles as properly 
guiding conduct.  
 We need, though, to look at this conception in greater detail, to appreciate the specific 
way in which moral or ethical principles are themselves conceived, and the specific way in 
which these principles are thought to have a role in moral practice. Here is where we can begin 
to see why Dewey’s approach is clearly an “empirical-instrumentalist” approach, and where we 	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can begin to see why it is superior to both the generalist and the particularist approaches. Pappas 
provides a useful starting point. 
 
In an early essay Dewey explains the functional relation between theory and practice by 
using the example of an engineer building a tunnel. No matter how many times the 
engineer has constructed similar tunnels, what she is building is not a tunnel in general. 
‘It is a tunnel having its own special end and called for by its own set of circumstances’ 
(EW 3: 156). However, because similar tunnels have been built under similar 
circumstances[,] one may develop theories or techniques that, because of their generality, 
can function as tools of analysis for particular cases. Hence, the general character of 
theories is not a limitation [as the particularist approach suggests it is] but the key to their 
possible functional importance for practice. To be sure, not all of the theoretical resources 
available to the engineer have the same kind of instrumental value. The most immediate 
ready at hand tools are principles or rules of thumb that provide a suggestion as to what 
to do when one is building this kind of tunnel. An engineer might also have a very 
general theory about the nature of the materials used to make a tunnel. Even if this theory 
makes no reference to the practice of building tunnels, it is not entirely divorced from or 
irrelevant to that practice…. The refined conclusions (i.e., secondary products) of moral 
theory are, like the theoretical resources of the engineer, instrumentalities by which we 
might be able to indirectly assist or illuminate the decisions and problems encountered in 
primary moral experience. When theory is conceived as something within practice it 
becomes a part of the available means for the intelligent amelioration of practice. 
“Theory located within progressive practice instead of reigning statically supreme over it, 
means practice itself made responsible to intelligence” (MW 4: 48).57 
 
Perhaps the instrumental function of our moral theories can best be depicted through an analogy 
with mapmaking and map use. A map  
 
can be general to the point of becoming a useless abstraction. [Hence, by analogy, we do 
not want our theories to be, or always to remain at least, too abstract.] On the other hand, 
a map that pretends to capture the uniqueness of the streets we travel or that tells us 
where to go becomes a bad tool. [Hence, by analogy, we do not want our theories to try 
to capture every imaginable detail of a (particular kind of) “situation,” an impossible task 
in any case, and we do not want our theories to purport to tell us what to do in advance of 
our even being in some particular problematic situation, without yet having surveyed its 
particular features.] Furthermore, the fact that a map cannot have this kind of precision is 
hardly a good excuse for not using or making maps…. Ethical theories can become so 
abstract and general that they are of no use to moral practice; but the general character of 
theory is a precondition for it to inform and be informed by practice. It makes possible a 
dynamic relation between theory and practice where ‘the former enlarges, releases and 
gives significance to the latter; while practice supplies theory with its material and with 
the test and check which keep it sincere and vital” (LW 2: 58)… Like our best maps, it 
can orient us, but we must do our own traveling and learning…. [Hence,] a philosopher 
should be more concerned with a survey of the subject matter than with making 
judgments for others. “Then his survey may be of assistance in the direct experience of 	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others, as a survey of a country is of help to the one who travels through it, while dicta 
about worth operate to limit personal experience” (LW 10:313).58   
 
When we view theories and principles in this way, as tools that we generate from within our 
moral practices and that we may use to improve and refine those practices, to make them more 
responsive to the exigencies of particular circumstances and so more intelligent, we can more 
easily appreciate the similarities and differences that Dewey has with contemporary 
particularism and with traditional generalism. And we can thereby give clearer content to 
Dewey’s approach itself. 
As Pappas rightly observes, “the conception of moral theory as somehow existing outside 
or above the context of moral practice is the source of recent skepticism about theory,” such 
skepticism as is evinced, for instance, by some particularists.  
 
Bernard Williams, for example, criticizes the history of moral philosophy for its futile 
attempt to find an “Archimedean point.” This is the place from which (1) one can 
objectively evaluate competing answers to how to live; or (2) one can discover universal 
criteria of right or wrong action; or (3) where one can argue that anyone (even the moral 
skeptic or anarchist) has reasons to live an ethical life. Indeed, traditional ethical theory 
usually assumes that to have a normative ethics is to have answers to these issues [as 
suggested by Timmons’s outline of the “theoretical” and “practical” aims of traditional 
moral theory]. For Williams, as Susan Wolf explains, we must come to terms with the 
fact that our “point of view, even in philosophical reflection, is inevitably from here, and 
not from a ‘mid-air position.’” This should deflate significantly our expectations about 
what moral theory can do for moral practice. Williams asserts the Deweyan thesis that 
ethical theories “still have to start from somewhere, and the only starting point is ethical 
experience itself”; but unlike Dewey, he doesn’t derive constructive implications from the 
conception of theory within moral experience. [Indeed, as we’ve noted, Williams declares 
that “philosophers should not try to produce ethical theory” at all.]59  
 
 Like Williams, Dewey believes that the only place to start is with moral or ethical 
experience itself. And like particularists in general, Dewey thinks that each situation is a unique 
one, which calls for a solution that is so too. As we earlier saw, for Dewey, the resolution of each 
morally problematic situation just is the goal of morality. This is already suggested by Dewey’s 
observation that each time the engineer decides how to build a tunnel, he should recognize that 
“it is a tunnel having its own special end and called for by its own set of circumstances.”60 
Analogously, whenever a situated agent places or finds herself in a morally problematic 
situation, she too should recognize that it is a situation that has its own special solution (if any 
solution is to be had), appropriate to the circumstances of “the problem.” Dewey’s adoption of 
an empirical-instrumentalist conception of moral theories and principles allows him to appreciate 
the need for sensitivity to context, and the need for us to recognize that the only place we can 
start is with “moral or ethical experience itself.” But, in contrast to Williams and certain other 
particularists, his contextualism does not commit him to anything like Williams’s thesis that we 
should abandon “ethical theory” altogether. Rather, Dewey would say that while tools can 	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never, of course, “solve” problematic situations by themselves, they can surely be useful in the 
effort to do so.61 And, moreover, whatever theoretical tools one uses to address a problematic 
situation, they have to be adapted to the circumstances in which the problem itself arises.  
The contrast with Williams’s brand of particularism is also recognizable in that author’s 
treatment of the “general” character of traditional ethical theory. As Pappas observes, Williams 
contrasts the thickness of ethical terms and the deliberation of actual moral agents with the 
thinness characteristic of ethical theories. “Williams believes that ethical theory can be 
discredited because ‘it looks characteristically for considerations that are very general and have 
as little distinctive content as possible.’”62 But for Dewey,  
 
the problem with the abstract and general categories of traditional ethical theories is not 
that they are thin or general, but that these reflective products are used to discredit, ignore 
and replace the richness of concrete moral experience. The implication is that so long as 
ethical theories recognize that our actual ethical lives are richer, more variegated and 
thicker than our theoretical articulations, an ethical theory can be thin and speculative 
without undermining its legitimate instrumental function.63 
 
If these brief comments help us to appreciate how Dewey’s viewpoint bears similarities 
as well as differences with contemporary particularism, they also help us to compare his 
viewpoint to, and to differentiate it from, the generalism of traditional moral theories and 
principles, earlier sketched in the Johnson and Timmons passages.   	   Yes, pace Williams, Dewey concluded that it is useful to formulate moral or ethical 
“theories.” And, pace certain other particularists, he concluded that our moral theories ought to 
consist in, among other things, articulations of certain moral “principles” that should guide 
conduct. At this quite abstract level, Dewey, one might say, could also be considered a 
generalist. Again, however, there are crucial differences. And again, for our purposes the most 
important of these concern the proper status and function of moral theories and principles in our 
moral practices.  	   Above, we saw Timmons describe how “the main practical aim of a moral theory is to 
discover a decision procedure that can be used to guide correct moral reasoning about moral 
matters.”64 And “the main theoretical aim of a moral theory,” he says, “is to discover those 
underlying features of actions, persons, and other items of moral evaluation that make them right 
or wrong, good or bad.”65 Again, however, what ostensibly allows us to accomplish these aims? 
Well, again, moral philosophers have often thought that the key is to articulate the correct moral 
principles by which we should decide how to live and to act, typically understood as “universal” 
in character. As we saw, these “correct moral principles” ostensibly allow us to accomplish the 
main practical and theoretical aims of moral theory.  
Now, our discussion of Dewey’s empirical-instrumentalist conception of moral theories 
and principles can aid us in appreciating how Dewey’s viewpoint is quite distinct from the 
conception offered in Timmons’s discussion. To begin with, Dewey would object to the idea that 	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there is a decision-making “procedure’” to “discover,” and still more, I presume, to the idea that 
there is just one procedure that we could simply describe as “correct.” Indeed, for Dewey, it is 
rather the case that 
 
in order to evaluate an action or to adjudicate conflicts among possible actions or 
obligations in concrete circumstances we must rely on the qualitative context rather than 
on some meta-rule, criteria, or fixed procedure…Instead of trying to come up with 
comprehensive theories that provide answers or decision-making procedures[,] he 
believed that we should attend to the particular, the qualitative, and the unique[,] 
equipped with the best habits of reflection, imagination, and sensitivity available, that is, 
with what he sometimes called moral intelligence. Any theory that pretends to provide 
theoretical answers to moral quandaries prior to actual situations cannot be empirical, 
for it simply overlooks the experienced uniqueness of each situation and how the moral 
relevance of any feature can vary depending on the situation.66  
 
Talk of the “discovery,” as opposed to the “construction,” of moral principles, as in 
Timmons’s depiction of the traditional ambitions of moral theory, suggests that the principles 
are already there to be discovered. We need only reason correctly to discover them. And talk of 
the “correct” moral principles reinforces this suggestion. Often, things we “discover” remain as 
they are: neither the fact that we discover them nor the way in which we discover them changes 
“how they are.” Analogously, if “correct principles” exist, this might suggest that the task is just 
to reason correctly so as to discover them. And, indeed, this is the general picture that emerges 
from Timmons’s (and Johnson’s) depiction of the traditional aims of moral theory. By contrast, 
things we “construct” obviously take on the character they do – indeed, exist (in the way they do) 
– because (of the way) we construct them. Dewey’s empirical-instrumentalist conception clearly 
recognizes this: principles are constructed out of empirical inquiry; they are “empirical 
generalizations from the ways in which previous judgments of conduct have practically worked 
out.”67 And while we sometimes do talk of things we construct as being “correct,” when we do 
so we recognize that they are always subject to improvement and refinement (hence to no longer 
remaining “as they are”). (Think again of how we talk about, and continually refine and improve, 
maps.) Here it is useful to recall the pragmatist idea that standards (and, by extension, theories 
and principles) are “internal” to practices. Again, as Hilary puts it in writing on Nelson 
Goodman, “what we have here…are practices, which are right or wrong [or more or less 
adequate] depending on how they square with our standards. And our standards are right or 
wrong [or more or less justifiable] depending on how they square with our practices. This is a 
circle, or better, a spiral, but one that Goodman, like John Dewey, regards as virtuous.”68 For 
both, empirical inquiry is embedded in a matrix of cultural and historical norms. And as theories 
and principles are the products of empirical inquiry, they too are embedded in such norms. 
Hence, the language of “discovery” is misleading here. For the pragmatists, moral principles are, 
indeed, ends; however, they are not just ends but also means.69 The creative task with respect to 
our moral theories and principles is, therefore, to modify our practices in light of those principles 
and theories, and to reconstruct those principles and theories in light of our practices. “In other 	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words, both the actual and the ideal are open to modification and improvement by an 
experimental and continuous process.”70  
For another thing, Dewey would object to the supposition that there is an “underlying 
unity behind the diversity of moral phenomena,” as well as to the injunction that moral theory 
should therefore aim to discover it. To begin with, the supposition that there is such a unity is 
just that: a supposition. And if there are not good “empirical reasons” for adopting the 
supposition, the injunction to try to discover “the unity behind the diversity of moral 
phenomena” seems to lose any force. As we’ve seen, Dewey’s naturalistic empiricism led him to 
the viewpoint that in moral or ethical theory, as in all other forms of inquiry, we should begin 
and end our inquiries with lived experience. Does lived experience reveal such unity? For 
Dewey, the answer would surely be no. Once again, Dewey, like William James, held that 
reflection on actual moral experience reveals an irreducible plurality of values, and that we 
encounter situations of conflict between our moral-ethical values, and between our moral-ethical 
values and our other values.71 And again, like James, Dewey would maintain that “every real 
dilemma is in literal strictness a unique situation; and the exact combination of ideals realized 
and ideals disappointed which each decision creates is always a universe without a precedent, 
and for which no adequate rule exists.”72 Lived experience reveals that situations are always, in 
some respect, unique; so, heading into each new situation, “no complete assurance is possible.”73 
For Dewey, questions concerning moral or ethical conduct cannot, therefore, “be resolved from 
the standpoint of abstract reason, but require the exercise of a situational intelligence."74 
However, moral-ethical theories and the principles they articulate can surely enhance our 
situational intelligence. The key, in short, is treat the principles that our theories articulate in an 
“empirical-instrumentalist” fashion: as relatively-stable-but-always-revisable standards that 
emerge out of empirical inquiry into relevant aspects of our actual moral-ethical practices and 
that in turn function as tools or instruments that we can use to guide those practices as we move 
forward and inquire into new morally or ethically problematic situations.  
 
II. Normative Democratic Theory as a Tool for Practical Reasoning 
 
Now, if our moral theories are “tools” that emerge out of, and that in turn help to guide, 
our moral practices, then, in turning to normative democratic theory in particular, two important 
questions immediately arise. First, what kind or “moral experience” (or what aspects of “moral 
experience”) are pertinent here? Second, how might this particular kind of moral theory guide 
the particular kind of moral practice that is “democratic practice”? 
To respond to these questions, we begin with a brief overview of my Dewey-inspired 
approach to normative democratic theory. We’ll then go into greater detail, paying closer 
attention to the logic by which we arrive at my normative theory in particular. 
 
2.1 A Dewey-Inspired Approach to Normative Democratic Theory: An Overview 
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On my account, normative democratic theory can function as a “tool” for practical 
reasoning, one that can help the participants to a (nominally) democratic process in reasoning 
about how best to create an actual democratic process in the specific context in which they might 
attempt to do so. Here, normative democratic theory is said to emerge out of empirical inquiry 
and to consist in a set of “ideal standards” that can help democracy’s participants to carry out 
two principal tasks. More specifically, I suggest that normative democratic theory should emerge 
out of anthropological-interpretive inquiry into moral experience itself and should consist in a 
set of “ideal procedural criteria” that can: first, help democracy’s participants to clarify what, in 
the specific context in which they do (have to) act, their own democratic norms and values are; 
and second, help them to conduct empirical inquiries that, in that context, clarify how they might 
best uphold those norms and realize those values. 
Here, the procedural criteria are conceived of as descriptions of the ideal, defining 
features of a process for binding, collective decision-making process that treats persons as free 
and equal – or, that treats them in a way that is consistent with the twin values that arguably 
justify the adoption of a “democratic process” in the first place: the values of treating persons as 
“moral equals” and as “autonomous.”75 Thus, when I refer to a particular kind of “moral 
experience,” or to particular aspects of “moral experience,” as laying the basis for my theory, 
these two values are what I have in mind: I have in mind those moments in which we are most 
likely to think and to feel that we are being treated as “moral equals” and as “autonomous.” 
Accordingly, the “ideal procedural criteria for a democratic process” are said to emerge out of 
anthropological-interpretive inquiry into those moments that are paradigmatic of when we are 
most likely to think and to feel that we are being treated as moral equals and as autonomous in 
joint or collective decision-making, or, in the standard terminology, as “free and equal” in such 
decision-making. In short, they are seen as emerging out of inquiry into certain paradigmatic 
moments of “free and equal treatment” in joint or collective decision-making. And, as I indicate 
below, we can appeal to certain joint or collective decisions between or among friends to find 
such paradigmatic moments. 
Now, recall that we began this paper with two epigraphs, both drawn from John Dewey’s 
Experience and Nature. The first reads: “The serious matter is that philosophies have denied that 
common experience is capable of developing from within itself methods which will secure 
direction for itself and will create inherent standards of judgment and value…”76 And the second 
reads: “As philosophy has no private store of knowledge or methods for attaining truth, so it has 
no private access to good. As it accepts knowledge and principles from those competent in 
science and inquiry, it accepts goods that are diffused in human experience. It has no Mosaic or 
Pauline authority of revelation entrusted to it. But it has the authority of intelligence, of criticism 
of these common and natural goods.”77  
In suggesting that normative democratic theory should emerge out of anthropological-
interpretive inquiry into moral experience itself and that it should consist in a set of “ideal 
procedural criteria,” I am following Dewey in explicitly affirming that “common experience is 
capable of developing from within itself methods which will secure direction for itself and will 
create inherent standards of judgment and value.” In addition, I am explicitly affirming that 
“philosophy has no private access to good,” that, in developing (say) a normative democratic 
theory, we should “accept” the “goods that are diffused in human experience,” rather than look 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Dahl (1989: chapters 6 and 7). 
76 Dewey (1958 [1929]: 38).  
77 Dewey (LW1: 305). 
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for The Good (or, for that matter, The Right) outside of human experience. Finally, I am 
explicitly affirming that normative democratic theory “has no Mosaic or Pauline authority of 
revelation entrusted to it,” and I am also, for that matter, explicitly affirming that the “principles” 
(“ideal procedural criteria”) that it articulates are never the product of “intuition” or “pure 
reason” alone. Rather, with Dewey, I regard whatever “authority” such principles (ideal 
procedural criteria) have as being the product of whatever “intelligence” (or “wisdom”) they 
exhibit, where this is judged in light of the consequences of acting on them in a particular 
context. 
 
2.2 Justifying a Dewey-Inspired Approach to Normative Democratic Theory 
 
So, let’s look closer at the logic by which I arrive at my own normative democratic 
theory in particular, elaborating on the justification for the philosophic method by which I 
develop it. The theory itself I develop in the next chapter. Here, we just review the way in which 
I develop it.  
As indicated, my Dewey-inspired approach to normative democratic theory places great 
stress on “inquiry”: it proposes not only that we develop such theory through (anthropological-
interpretive) empirical inquiry but also that democracy’s participants use it as a tool for further 
such inquiry. What, though, is the basis for saying that participants should engage in such 
inquiry? It is one thing to say that democratic theorists, qua theorists, should develop normative 
democratic theories to clarify their democratic norms and values (or those they believe that all of 
us or some particular group should have), quite another to say that democracy’s participants 
should do so too. And it is still another to say that democracy’s participants should use that 
theory as a “tool” for guiding further inquiry. So, assuming that the claim about democratic 
theorists is fairly self-evident, we should think through the question: Why should democracy’s 
participants (think they should) carry out the aforementioned tasks?  
 
2.2.1 The First Task: Developing a Normative Democratic Theory 
 
As to the first task (developing a normative democratic theory), the claim, I think, is 
fairly straightforward. To commit oneself sincerely to advancing some value is to commit 
oneself sincerely to the presumptive means for its advancement. Hence, in the case of the values 
of treating persons as “free” and as “equal” in collective decision-making, this means the 
presumptive means for advancing those values. And, at the most general level, this means 
sincerely committing oneself to some decision-making process that advances them. (Without 
some “process,” how else could we advance them?) So, the question then becomes: In order to 
advance those values as best as possible, what would such a process ideally look like? Well, still 
at a very general level, inquiry into those moments that are paradigmatic of when we are most 
likely to think and to feel that we are being treated as “free and equal” in joint or collective 
decision-making reveals – quite unambiguously, I think – that we think and feel this way 
because the participants involved in that process grant certain (equal and adequate) 
opportunities to one another and assume certain (corollary) responsibilities in relation to one 
another.78 If so, the question then becomes: What, more specifically, are these opportunities and 
responsibilities? Once we have specified them, I believe that we have articulated a set of “ideal 
procedural criteria for a democratic process,” viz., a normative theory of the democratic process.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 See below for an explanation of the terminology here. See also chapter 5. 
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Let’s look closer, then, at the way in which I propose to arrive at an articulation of these 
opportunities and responsibilities. Sticking to the Deweyan injunction to start with moral 
experience itself, we ask: When do we believe that “binding” decisions are made between or 
among individuals in such a way that the process does treat them as moral equals and as being 
autonomous? For present purposes, assume that a “binding” decision has the loose meaning of a 
joint or collective decision that generates a “policy,” with which the members of the 
“association” in question are expected to comply; they are expected to shape their conduct in 
conformity with it.79 Hence, the presumption is that the decision in question is reasonably 
anticipated to affect, or potentially to affect, the good or interests of the members; we presume 
that the policy could affect the well-being of each of them.80 Doing so, we notice that the above 
question can be restated thus: When do we believe that decisions with which the decision-makers 
themselves are expected to comply are made in such a way that the process treats them as moral 
equals and as autonomous? Well, when we state the question this way, one obvious example 
suggests itself: certain decisions among genuine friends. 
So, we next ask: What is it that specifically leads us to judge these decisions in this way? 
To begin with, the process by which the decision is made gives “equal consideration” to the good 
or interests of each of the participants. Where this is not the case, the friendships in question are 
themselves imperiled. (Or at least they are imperiled where this is recurrently so.) And notice 
why this is the case: because friendship is a relationship that, inter alia, is based on “mutual 
respect” between “moral equals” who regard each other as “autonomous,” and anytime one 
friend makes (what should be) a “joint or collective decision” without giving “equal 
consideration” to the good or interests of the other friend(s) (that should be) involved in that 
decision, one shows a lack of respect. Hence, to show one another mutual respect qua moral 
equals and qua autonomous persons, friends give equal consideration to each other’s good or 
interests in joint or collective decision-making.  
Notice, however, that there is something potentially misleading about just saying that, in 
joint or collective decision-making, friends give “equal consideration” to each other’s good or 
interests. For moral experience indicates that, for instance, two persons who show each other 
mutual respect in the context of joint decision-making do not just give “equal consideration” to 
each other’s good or interests; they also show “equal concern” for each other’s good or interests. 
Or, to put the point differently, one simply can’t give (genuine) “consideration” to the good or 
interests of another person without showing “concern” for that person.  
Briefly, to give “genuine consideration to another person’s good or interests” is to engage 
in an active process in which one seeks to understand that person qua “person.” And what is a 
“person”? She is, inter alia, a being who has, or is surely likely to have, her own conception of 
her own interests, preferences, projects, cares, commitments, sense of fairness and justice, and so 
on. In other words, we typically presume that adult persons, at least, are what we sometimes call 
“autonomous persons.”81 And when we give equal consideration to the good or interests of 
persons, qua persons (so understood), we cannot help but “show ‘care’ for them.” (This is not to 
collapse any possible distinction that we might want to make between “showing care for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Cf. Dahl (1989). For present purposes, an “association” is used loosely to refer to any collection of individuals 
that belong to a group in which there is a perceived need for joint or collective decisions. So, the term “association” 
includes groups of friends for present purposes. 
80 For present purposes, we’ll simplify by assuming that “the members” are the same persons as those who make the 
policies (that the members are “the decision-makers” and “the participants”), and that these policies affect, and only 
affect, those persons. 
81 For discussion, see Dahl (1989: chapter 7). See also chapter 5. 
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someone” and “showing consideration for someone.” It is just to say that, at least in the context 
of joint or collective decision-making, the two are tightly interwoven.) Hence, for clarity’s sake 
it is better to say that, in joint or collective decision-making, genuine friends “give equal 
consideration to, and show equal concern and respect for, each other’s good or interests.” 
Moreover, they do this in order precisely to show “equal respect” to one another qua moral 
equals and autonomous persons. 
What, though, does this mean “in practice”? Well, again, for present purposes I just want 
to pick out certain elements of what is at play in these paradigmatic moments of “treatment as 
free and equal” in joint or collective decision-making. So, very generally, experience indicates, I 
believe, that friends give equal consideration to, and show equal concern and respect for, each 
other’s good or interests by “granting certain (equal and adequate) opportunities to each another” 
and by “assuming certain (corollary) responsibilities in relation to each another.” And it is by 
articulating these specific opportunities and responsibilities that we may arrive at “ideal 
procedural criteria for a democratic process,” i.e., at a normative theory of the democratic 
process. In other words, the specific “(equal and adequate) opportunities” and the specific 
“(corollary) responsibilities” that we are after are those that, when granted/assumed, allow the 
participants to joint/collective decision-making to “give equal consideration to, and to show 
equal concern and respect for, the good or interests of each of them.” So, we are looking, still 
more specifically, at these aspects of “paradigmatic moments” of “free and equal treatment” in 
joint or collective decision-making. 
As to the opportunities, consider just one example, which can be used to make the initial 
point about “corollary responsibilities” too. As I’ve said, friends recognize each other qua 
persons, hence regard each other as, in some sense, “equal and autonomous” (in the sense 
indicated). Hence, in joint or collective decision-making, where the presumption is that the 
decision is reasonably anticipated to affect the good or interests of the persons in question (or is 
reasonably anticipated to potentially do so), the presumption is also that each of those persons 
ought to have “an equal opportunity to express her reasons for endorsing one outcome rather 
than another.” Without such an opportunity, the others cannot know what her conception of her 
own interests, preferences, projects, cares, commitments, sense of justice and fairness, and so 
forth are, hence cannot judge what her own conception of what her “good” is, nor her own 
conception of what her “interests” are. Nor can the others formulate their own conceptions of 
what her good is/interests are. And the same point can be made of each individual person in 
relation to each of the other ones. Hence, the participants cannot give “equal consideration to, 
and show equal concern and respect for, good or interests or each of them.” We might, therefore, 
simply conclude that the presumption should be described as being that “each of the participants 
ought to have an equal opportunity to express her reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than 
another.” Actually, however, the presumption is more accurately described as being that each 
person should have an “equal and adequate” such opportunity. For “equal opportunities” can, of 
course, be inadequate for the purposes that they are meant to serve – even, let me stress, when 
those opportunities are, indeed, “equal.” If, say, each person only has one second to “express her 
reasons” in some deliberation about what to do, surely we would not say that the purpose of each 
person having that “opportunity” was well served. Hence, though we often do speak simply of 
“equal opportunities,” we are tacitly endorsing the idea of “equal and adequate opportunities” 
when we do so. Hence the presumption in question should be stated thus: In joint or collective 
decision-making, where the presumption is that the decision in question is reasonably anticipated 
to affect the good or interests of the persons in question (or is reasonably anticipated to 
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potentially do so), the presumption is also that each of those persons “ought to have an equal and 
adequate opportunity to express her reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.”  
Notice, however, that this implies that each person assume responsibility for granting 
each of the other persons this opportunity. There are various ways to see this. One is to notice 
that part of the purpose of having an opportunity “to express one’s reasons for endorsing one 
outcome rather than another” is to bring the others to understand one’s perspective. But to have 
that opportunity, friends – we easily recognize from lived experience – need to assume certain 
responsibilities, both “negative” and “positive” in character.82 On the negative side, for instance, 
they need to refrain from certain kinds of possible interruption when others are trying to speak. 
On the positive side, they need, for instance, to make a sincere effort to try to understand the 
perspective that the speaker is trying to convey in offering her reasons. Otherwise, the purpose 
of getting the others to understand her perspective is not well served. Indeed, perhaps, then, it is 
not served at all. 
Now, this much is enough to suggest that, in a decision-making process that exhibits 
genuine mutual respect between or among persons, it is obviously the case that those persons 
have to grant certain (equal and adequate) opportunities to one another and assume certain 
(positive and negative) responsibilities in relation to one another. Might, then, our goal simply be 
to offer a “list” of these opportunities and responsibilities? Again, a better response, I think, is to 
notice how these reflections lay the basis for a “normative theory of the democratic process.” 
Recall that, for Dewey (as for Nelson Goodman and Hilary Putnam as well), theories are 
standards by which we judge the rightness or wrongness, or, as the case may be, adequacy or 
inadequacy, of the practices out of which the standards themselves emerge. More elaborately, 
they are standards that emerge out of our inquiries into how our practices have fared under 
various circumstances, which we in turn use to judge the rightness or wrongness, or adequacy or 
inadequacy, of the practices out of which the standards themselves emerge. And as we bring 
those standards to bear on modifying or rejecting (certain aspects of) our practices, so we (may 
come to) modify the standards that guide them too.  
I can now offer an overview of what the ideal procedural criteria offer. Again, on my 
view, a normative democratic theory is something that we develop out of moral experience itself. 
As democrats, we start form the view that the members of the pertinent association ought to be 
treated as free and equal persons, hence with equal respect. We then look (for example) to joint 
or collective decisions among genuine friends as paradigmatic examples of decision-making 
processes in which the value of mutual or equal respect is exhibited. Again, what we find is that 
in such processes the participants grant certain (equal and adequate) opportunities to one another 
and assume certain (corollary positive and negative) responsibilities in relation to one another. 
More specifically, they do this in order to give equal consideration to, and to show equal concern 
and respect for, the good or interests of each of them. Indeed, at a certain level of abstraction, 
this, I submit, is what it means for a joint or collective (hence democratic) decision-making 
process to “exhibit the value of ‘equal respect.’” So, we begin with the democratic values of 
equal consideration, concern, and respect, translating these into ideal procedural criteria that 
specify the (equal and adequate) opportunities that participants ought ideally to grant one another 
and the (corollary) responsibilities that participants ought ideally to assume in relation to one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 I do not mean to erect a sharp distinction between “positive” and “negative” responsibilities here. The terms are 
just meant as heuristics, useful for reasoning through a variety of different kinds of responsibilities that the 
participants to a joint or collective decision ought ideally to assume in order to treat one another with mutual or 
equal respect. 
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another. In this way we build up our normative theory of the democratic process out of moral 
experience itself.  
Thus, the ideal procedural criteria articulated by a normative theory of the democratic 
process can be thought of as offering descriptions of the ideal, defining features of a process that 
gives equal consideration to, and that shows equal concern and respect for, the good or interests 
of each participant, hence that treats them as free and equal. And these “defining features” refer 
to the specific (equal and adequate) opportunities that the members of an association ought 
ideally to be granted (and to grant one another) and to the (corollary) responsibilities that they 
ought ideally to assume in relation to one another in order that they are so treated.83   
In sum, then, we begin with a commitment to the twin values of treating persons as free 
and as equal (which arguably justify the adoption of a democratic process in the first place); 
recognize that a sincere commitment to these values commits us to the presumptive means for 
realizing those values in collective decision-making; acknowledge that these “means” include 
crafting a process in which we grant certain (equal and adequate) opportunities to one another 
and assume certain (corollary positive and negative) responsibilities in relation to one another; 
acknowledge the need to articulate these opportunities and responsibilities; and so develop a 
normative theory of the democratic process that consists in the articulation of a set of “ideal 
procedural criteria” that does so. And in this way we indicate not only the philosophic method by 
which we arrive at our normative theory but also why democracy’s participants should (think 
they should) ideally carry out this first form of inquiry, that is, why they should develop a 
normative theory that clarifies their own democratic norms and values through informed 
reflection on paradigmatic moments of “treatment as free and equal” in joint or collective 
decision-making.84  
 
2.2.2 The Second Task: Using Normative Democratic Theory as a “Tool” for Guiding Further 
Inquiry 
 
 What, though, of the second task? Why should democracy’s participants not only develop 
a normative theory of the democratic process that clarifies their own democratic norms and 
values but also (think they should) use that theory as a “tool” for guiding further such inquiry? 
And what is meant by the suggestion that the ideal procedural criteria can help democracy’s 
participants to conduct empirical inquiries that illuminate how they might best uphold the norms 
and realize the values that the theory itself helps them to articulate? Let us start with the second 
of these questions. For, by addressing it, I can also clarify my response to the first of them. 
Following the Deweyan considerations about the “proper” status and function of moral 
theory in moral practice adduced in section 1.3 above, my suggestion is that we should treat the 
ideal procedural criteria for a democratic process as criteria that “open situations up” to further 
inquiry. More specifically, we should treat them as opening situations up to inquiry into how, 
when acting in this or that particular situation, we might best uphold the norms and realize the 
values that the criteria themselves articulate, in that way clarifying what we (reflectively think 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Again, for simplicity, I am assuming here that “the members” is synonymous with “the participants” and “the 
decision-makers,” which is in turn synonymous with “those who are, or are reasonably expected to be, (somehow) 
importantly affected or bound by the policy in question.” 
84 As previously indicated, in chapter 5, I will offer my own normative theory in an effort to help democracy’s 
participants do so. But, at a minimum, these reflections should serve to indicate why, as I say, democracy’s 
participants should (think they) should develop such a theory in the first place. 
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we should there) mean by those norms and values. It is easiest to indicate what I mean here by 
way of an example.  
Earlier I said that inquiry into those moments that are paradigmatic of when we are most 
likely to think and to feel that we are being treated as “free and equal” in joint or collective 
decision-making reveals that we think and feel this way because the participants involved in that 
process grant certain (equal and adequate) opportunities to one another and assume certain 
(corollary positive and negative) responsibilities in relation to one another. Correspondingly, I 
suggested that, in developing a normative theory of the democratic process, our task is to try to 
articulate these opportunities and responsibilities.  
Now, without trying to articulate these opportunities and responsibilities here,85 let me 
proceed by just making reference to the one procedural opportunity that I have already discussed.  
As we’ve seen, inquiry into those moments that are paradigmatic of when we are most 
likely to think and to feel that we are being treated as “free and equal” in joint or collective 
decision-making reveals that, in those moments, participants grant one another, for instance, 
(equal and adequate) opportunities to express their respective reasons for endorsing one outcome 
rather than another and assume certain (corollary positive and negative) responsibilities in 
relation to one another. For instance, they refrain from certain kinds of possible interruption 
when others are trying to speak (a “negative responsibility”) and they make a sincere effort to try 
to understand the perspective that the speaker is trying to convey in offering her reasons (a 
“positive responsibility”). 
Now, once we appreciate that informed reflection on these paradigmatic moments reveals 
the importance of these opportunities and responsibilities and suggests that democracy’s 
participants should develop a normative theory of the democratic process that articulates them, it 
is easy also to appreciate how such a theory can assist democracy’s participants in carrying out a 
second, closely related task: conducting empirical inquiries that illuminate how, in the particular 
context in which they do (have to) act, they might best grant the opportunities and assume the 
responsibilities articulated (or entailed) by the theory itself. The key, in short, is not only to see 
the criteria as emerging out of empirical inquiry and as serving in turn to clarify what 
participants’ democratic norms and values are; it is also to see those criteria, like other criteria, 
as “opening situations up” to further such inquiry, inquiry that allows participants to clarify 
what, in some particular context, (they reflectively think) their democratic norms and values 
(would) mean there, and how they might best uphold those norms and realize those values, grant 
the relevant opportunities and assume the relevant responsibilities. 
Keeping this in mind, let us note a number of further insights gained through inquiry into 
paradigmatic moments of “free and equal treatment” in joint or collective decision-making, 
referring again to certain decisions made among genuine friends. Such reflection reveals not only 
that, in order to give equal consideration to, and to show equal concern and respect for, the good 
or interests of each of the participants, the participants grant certain (equal and adequate) 
opportunities to one another and assume certain (corollary positive and negative) responsibilities 
in relation to one another; it also reveals that: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Again, however, in chapter 5 I do a set of ideal procedural criteria that articulates the principal opportunities that I 
think that lived experience with “free and equal treatment” indicates that a democratic process ought to grant 
participants (and that participants ought to grant one another), and that articulates the primary responsibilities that I 
believe it indicates that they should ideally assume. 
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1) Participants recognize that, in order effectively to grant one another such 
opportunities and to assume such responsibilities, they often need to adopt a 
specific procedure for doing so.  
a. In, say, a group of five friends, much of the “work” involved in their 
collective decision-making process may well be done in a way that is highly 
informal, fluid, on-the-fly. However, even here we are not surprised if/when 
more “routinized” and “explicit” decision-making practices emerge, indeed, of 
the kind that start to look like “procedures.” (“Just make sure you run it by the 
rest of the guys before you go ahead with these kinds of things”; “It’s good 
always to talk about these things first”; “We’ve been trying to figure this out 
forever; let’s just put it to a vote likely we typically do”; “Whenever we’re 
divided like this, we just toss a coin”; etc.) And, even in groups of friends, if 
mutual respect is to be maintained, surely such procedures will develop, even 
if they remain largely tacit. Accordingly, we may presume that, in joint or 
collective decision-making that does “exhibit the value of mutual or equal 
respect,” procedures are needed and will be(come) manifest; and all the more 
so as the size of the “association” increases.  
2) Participants recognize that there are certain moral, ethical, and intellectual virtues 
that would assist the participants to the process in granting such opportunities (or 
that would dispose them to do so) and that would assist them in assuming such 
responsibilities (or that would dispose them to do so), and that they would 
necessarily exhibit were they to grant such opportunities/assume such 
responsibilities. 
a. For instance, they recognize that in order to grant one another equal and 
adequate opportunities to express their reasons for endorsing one outcome 
rather than another, each of them has to assume responsibility for (among 
other things) making a sincere effort to try to understand the perspective that 
the speaker-at-the-moment is trying to convey in offering her reasons. And 
they further recognize that, especially where participants are of strongly 
differing opinions on relevant matters (as is often the case even among 
genuine friends), certain moral or ethical virtues (like being “patient,” “kind,” 
and “tolerant”) assist them in assuming that responsibility (hence assist them 
in granting that opportunity), just as they recognize that, especially where 
participants are of strongly differing opinions on relevant matters, certain 
intellectual virtues (like being “self-aware,” “self-critical,” and “open-
minded”) do so too. 
b. Furthermore, they recognize that whenever they do grant such 
opportunities/assume such responsibilities (like the one just mentioned) they 
just do exhibit some such virtues. 
i. For instance, if person 1 has a lot to say on issue X because he has 
“had a tough time of it here,” and a lot of what he has to say is “not 
easy to listen to,” persons 2-N just will “exhibit the moral/ethical virtue 
of patience” in listening to him – assuming that they are “listening to 
him,” in the genuine sense of “listening to someone.”  
ii. Or, if person 1 has a lot of critical, even hostile, things to say about the 
behavior of persons 2-N in the group (say, that they are hypocritical in 
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certain respects or that they sometimes act self-interestedly in ways 
that prevent him from “feeling respected”), persons 2-N just will 
“exhibit the intellectual virtue86 of open-mindedness” if they actually 
“hear him out” and genuinely “evaluate what he’s saying,” especially 
if they recognize that “there’s truth in it” and even more especially if 
they change their behavior in response to it.  
3) And participants recognize that there are certain cultural practices that can 
promote a social environment that is conducive to the effective granting of such 
opportunities and to the effective assumption of such responsibilities, hence to the 
exhibition of the moral, ethical, and/or intellectual virtues that they would 
necessarily exhibit were they to grant such opportunities/assume such 
responsibilities. 
a. For instance, they recognize that no “procedure” alone (like voting, or 
bargaining, or deliberating, or flipping a coin) can ever ensure that, say, each 
participant assumes responsibility for trying to understand the perspective of 
the speaker-at-the-moment, hence can ever ensure that all participants have 
equal and adequate opportunities to express their reasons for endorsing one 
outcome rather than another. But they further recognize that there are 
practices in the broader culture that, in certain circumstances at least, can help 
to create a social environment that is more conducive to the effective 
assumption of the aforementioned responsibility, and so to the effective 
granting of the aforementioned opportunity.  
i. For instance, friends sometimes recognize that other friends tend not to 
verbally participate in an “equal” fashion with the other members of a 
friendship circle when that group makes decisions about (say) what 
events to attend together. (Perhaps the individuals in question are shy 
and deferential, or have had a history of conflict with other individuals 
from the group who are more assertive, and so are timid about 
expressing their opinions.) So, the former individuals sometimes 
consult the latter individuals in advance of the discussion that will 
decide the matter to see what their opinions are and to ensure that they 
get a “fair hearing” when the discussion does occur. (We might think 
of this as a kind of informal, selective consultation to “even out 
participation.”) Similarly, friends sometimes recognize that other 
friends cannot make the gatherings in which group decisions are often 
made as easily as other friends can (perhaps because of childcare 
obligations or long work hours). So, again, the former individuals 
sometimes consult the latter individuals in advance of the discussion 
that will decide the matter to see what their opinions are and to ensure 
that they get a “fair hearing” when the discussion does occur. 
 
Furthermore, inquiry into paradigmatic moments of “free and equal treatment” in joint or 
collective decision-making reveals that: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 As this example indicates, the categories of “ethical virtues,” “moral virtues,” and “intellectual virtues” are not 
mutually exclusive. If, for instance, participants acted in the “open-minded” fashion depicted in this example, “open-
mindedness” would surely be an ethical virtue, a moral virtue, and an intellectual virtue here. 
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4) Participants recognize that there is sometimes a need to inquire, and that they 
sometimes do inquire, into the specific procedures that, in the specific context in 
which they do (have to) act, are most likely to allow them effectively to grant 
such opportunities and to assume such responsibilities;  
a. For instance, I mentioned above that, even in small groups (say, of five 
friends), participants recognize that in order effectively to grant one another 
such opportunities (e.g. equal and adequate opportunities to express their 
reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another) and to assume such 
responsibilities (e.g. trying to understand relevant social situations from each 
other’s perspective), they often need to adopt a specific procedure for doing 
so. What is more, however, participants recognize that no one “procedure” is 
“best suited” to the granting of (say) the aforementioned opportunity and to 
the effective assumption of (say) the aforementioned responsibility. 
Accordingly, they recognize that there is a need to inquire, and so sometimes 
do inquire, into the specific procedure that, in the specific context in which 
they do (have to) act, is “best suited” to the effective granting of (say) that 
opportunity and to the effective assumption of (say) that responsibility.  
i. So, in one context they might conclude that, on reflection, the “best 
way” for each of them to have equal and adequate opportunities to 
express their reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another is 
just to put it to a quick vote via email, since circumstances are such that 
the “costs” of meeting up (or talking about the issue at length on the 
phone or online) outweigh the “benefits” of doing so, perhaps because 
there are severe time constraints; participants know the issue is divisive; 
and while they regard the decision as important enough for each of them 
to want each of the other participants to have an equal and adequate 
“say” in it, they also regard it as not so important that it is worth “the 
trouble” of trying to “go beyond” a quick vote. Perhaps the friends are in 
a foreign country together, where they don’t have stable Internet or 
phone access. And perhaps they are temporarily in different states and 
the decision in question is where to meet up in order to travel to a further 
destination. Equally, however, the circumstances may shift (they may 
now find themselves with stable internet access), and they might then 
decide that “talking the issue through” via Skype is preferable to just 
“putting it to a vote” via a quick chain of emails. 
ii. Furthermore, and sticking with the same hypothetical, similar comments 
can be made about how they might approach figuring out the “best way” 
for each of them to assume responsibility for trying to understand each 
other’s perspectives on relevant social situations and activities. So, in the 
context where Internet/phone communication is highly strained, they 
might just say: “We’ll do this in two emails. In the first one, everyone 
should just list a couple of reasons for preferring the one destination to 
the other destination (supposing there are just two choices at play). In a 
second email, each of us will then express our final choice, and we’ll go 
with the majority vote.” By contrast, supposing they now have stable 
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Internet access, they might instead decide to have “a good long chat 
about the two options via Skype.” 
5) Participants recognize that there is sometimes a need to inquire, and that they 
sometimes do inquire, into the specific virtues that would assist the participants to 
the process in granting (or that would dispose them to grant) such opportunities 
and that would assist them in assuming (or that would dispose them to assume) 
such responsibilities;  
a. For instance, they recognize (as I said under 2a above) that in order to grant 
one another equal and adequate opportunities to express their reasons for 
endorsing one outcome rather than another, each of them has to assume 
responsibility for making a sincere effort to try to understand the perspective 
that the speaker-at-the-moment is trying to convey in offering her reasons. 
And they further recognize that, especially where participants are of strongly 
differing opinions on relevant matters (as is often the case even among 
genuine friends), certain moral or ethical virtues (like being “patient,” “kind,” 
and “tolerant”) assist them in assuming that responsibility (hence assist them 
in granting that opportunity), just as they recognize that, especially where 
participants are of strongly differing opinions on relevant matters, certain 
intellectual virtues (like being “self-aware,” “self-critical,” and “open-
minded”) do so too. What is more, however, they also recognize that different 
virtues are more and less important to their ability to grant that 
opportunity/assume that responsibility in different contexts. And they 
recognize that they can’t adequately judge these matters in advance. 
i. So, where some participants are frequently impatient with several 
other participants, one participant’s observations of the other 
participants’ interactions might lead her to see the need to “cultivate 
the virtue of patience” in selected participants, perhaps by repeatedly 
saying things like: “You guys have had plenty of space to express your 
opinions thus far. Donovan and Samantha should have their own 
opportunities now too; they likely have as much to say as you do, and 
deserve to have the space to say it.” 
ii. Or, where some participants frequently seem incapable of 
understanding some other participants’ perspectives on relevant social 
situations and activities, one participant’s observations of the other 
participants’ interactions might lead her to see the need to think hard 
about what virtues might help the participants in question to assume 
that responsibility. On reflection, she might come to recognize that one 
of the principal reasons that some are frequently incapable of 
understanding other participants’ perspectives is that the participants in 
question are “close-minded” in certain respects; they aren’t capable of 
even listening to certain others’ perspectives on some issue X or Y. So, 
the participant who has made this observation comes to see the need to 
“cultivate the virtue of open-mindedness” in selected participants, 
perhaps recurrently saying things like: “I know it seems that way from 
your perspective, but you have to consider it from Samantha’s 
perspective; she’s had a tough time of it and has learned some valuable 
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lessons that are worth considering.” Or: “I used to think just like you 
do on this issue, but listening to Donovan these last few months has 
made me realize that I was mistaken. You might witness a similar 
change of thought were you actually to listen to him carefully.” 
6) And participants recognize that there is sometimes a need to inquire, and that they 
sometimes do inquire, into the cultural practices that can promote a social 
environment that is conducive to the effective granting of such opportunities and 
to the effective assumption of such responsibilities. 
a. For instance, they recognize, as I said under 3a above, that no “procedure” 
alone can ever ensure that, say, each participant assumes responsibility for 
trying to under the perspective of the speaker-at-the-moment, hence can ever 
ensure that all participants have equal and adequate opportunities to express 
their reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another. But they further 
recognize that there are practices in the broader culture that, in certain 
circumstances at least, can create a social environment that is more conducive 
to the effective assumption of the aforementioned responsibility, and so to the 
effective granting of the aforementioned opportunity. And, what is more, they 
also recognize, I now emphasize, that different cultural practices are more and 
less likely in different contexts to promote (for instance) the effective 
assumption of the aforementioned responsibility, hence are more and less 
likely, in those respective contexts, to promote the effective granting of the 
aforementioned opportunity. 
i. So, friends sometimes recognize that other friends tend not to verbally 
participate in an “equal” fashion with the other members of a 
friendship circle when that group makes decisions about (say) what 
event to attend together. (Perhaps the individuals in question are shy 
and deferential, or have had severe conflicts with other individuals 
from the group, hence are timid about expressing their opinions.) So, 
the former individuals sometimes consult the latter individuals in 
advance of the discussion that will decide the matter to see what their 
opinions are and to ensure that they get a “fair hearing” when the 
discussion does occur. (Again, we might think of this as a kind of 
informal, selective consultation to “even out participation.”) At other 
times, however, friends sometimes recognize that other friends cannot 
make the gatherings in which group decisions are often made as easily 
as other friends can (perhaps because of childcare obligations or long 
work hours). So, for that reason, the former individuals might again 
consult the latter individuals in advance of the discussion that will 
decide the matter to see what their opinions are and to ensure that their 
opinions get a “fair hearing” when the discussion does occur. Yet, 
what I would now add is that some given participant, for instance, 
might come to see that this strategy is not enough in some particular 
case. For instance, he might come to realize that “Donovan really 
needs to be there to speak for himself; nobody can quite do it the way 
that he does! Plus, I don’t really have much of a stake in this issue, so 
why don’t I just pick his kids up from the soccer game and let him 
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attend the meeting instead? I’m happy to go with whatever the group 
thinks on this issue.” 
 
Finally, informed reflection on paradigmatic moments of “free and equal treatment” in 
joint or collective decision-making” also reveals that:  
 
7) Participants’ conceptions of the opportunities in question and of the 
responsibilities in question “guide them” as they move into novel circumstances, 
from one unique, problematic situation to another. However, 
8) Participants don’t view those conceptions as offering fixed rules or prescriptions 
for upholding a norm (or a number of norms) and/or for realizing a value (or a 
number of values). Rather, 
9) Participants view each such conception as offering an abridgement of a variable 
practice (or of a variable cluster of practices) for upholding a norm (or a number 
of norms) and for realizing a value (or a number of values), one that always needs 
to be interpreted in, and often adjusted to the exigencies of, a particular situation, 
rather than just “applied” to it, as if it were the case that it had a fixed “content.”  
a. Points seven through nine were already suggested by the discussion of points 
four through six (as well as by the discussion in chapter 3, “Practical 
Reasoning is About a Unique Context.”) But, as I indicate below, they are 
worth making explicit here. 
 
Taken together, points six through nine suggest that informed reflection on moments that are 
paradigmatic of when we are most likely to think and to feel that we are being treated as “free 
and equal” in joint or collective decision-making reveals that we treat a claim such as 
“participants should grant one another equal and adequate opportunities to express their reasons 
for endorsing one outcome rather than another” as a “tool” for practical reasoning, which 
“guides” empirical inquiry into what (we reflectively think) our democratic norms and values 
might mean in whatever context we do (have to) act, that is, into how we might best uphold those 
norms and realize those values in that context. It reveals, in other words, that we treat such a 
claim as a hypothesis about the conditions in which “free and equal treatment” is apt to occur, 
one which we refine on an as-needed basis by inquiring into the specific procedures, virtues, and 
cultural practices that are “best suited” to the context in question. 
So, in sum, inquiry reveals not only that, in paradigmatic moments of free and equal 
treatment in joint or collective decision-making, we recognize that we think and feel that we are 
being treated as such because we are being granted certain (equal and adequate) opportunities 
and assuming certain (corollary positive and negative) responsibilities in relation to one another; 
it also reveals that we recognize the need to inquire, and, as appropriate, that we actually do 
inquire, into the procedures, virtues, and cultural practices that, in the particular context in which 
we do (have to) act, are most apt to promote the effective granting of those opportunities and the 
effective assumption of those responsibilities. That is why I say that, ideally speaking, 
democracy’s participants should (think they should) develop a normative democratic theory that 
clarifies their own democratic norms and values through informed reflection on paradigmatic 
moments of “treatment as free and equal” in joint or collective decision-making, and why I say 
that they should (think that they should) use that theory as a “tool” for guiding further inquiry 
(inquiry into what [they reflectively think] their democratic norms and values mean in some 
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particular context). In other words, it is why I say that democracy’s participants should ideally 
carry out the two main tasks that I’ve repeatedly referred to: first, developing a normative 
democratic theory that clarifies what their own democratic norms and values are; and, second, 
conducting empirical inquiries that illuminate how, in some particular context, they might best 
uphold the norms and realize the values that the theory itself helps them to articulate. 
 
2.3 Normative Democratic Theory in Action: A Brief Illustration of the Logic  
 
Now, seeing normative democratic theory as a tool for practical reasoning in this way, we 
can easily appreciate that, in “using” that theory, we move back and forth between “the level of 
theory” and “the level of practice,” recognizing that, in the way I’ve already suggested, the 
theory itself has emerged out of practice and is treated experimentally within it. Hence, in any 
given case democracy’s participants would ideally ask: What might it mean, in this particular 
context, for “the process” to grant us the (equal and adequate) opportunities specified by our 
theory and what would it mean for us to do so? Likewise, what might it mean for us to assume 
the responsibilities specified (or entailed) by our theory? And what are the consequences of our 
actually doing or not doing so – of our granting or not granting those opportunities to varying 
degrees and of our assuming or not assuming those responsibilities to varying degrees? 
These questions cannot be answered, we now recognize, through abstract reasoning 
alone; rather, they themselves require empirical inquiry. Recalling the discussion from section 
1.3 above, we notice, however, that we can use our theory as a kind of “map,” indicating, at least 
in broad strokes, a good deal of what, given our basic democratic norms and values, we should 
look out for in any particular case. (If we were only to bring to the situation at hand the 
democratic norm of equal consideration, concern, and respect, surely we would be less well 
equipped than with our “map” in hand.)  
As we’ve seen, our ideal procedural criteria indicate that equal consideration, concern 
and respect are shown when participants are granted, for instance, “equal and adequate 
opportunities to express their reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.” Thus, 
participants do not go into a situation of collective decision-making with no “concrete” 
conception of what “equal consideration, concern, and respect” might mean here. As there are 
stabilities in (moral) experience, so they can formulate general (moral) ideas about how best to 
act in (relevantly) similar situations, e.g., in contexts that are diverse but that all call for 
“binding” decision-making (in, say, the loose sense specified in section 2.2.1 above). And again, 
the idea that participants should have (equal and adequate) opportunities "to express their reasons 
for endorsing one outcome rather than another” is precisely one such idea. However, the map 
only “guides them” to that expectation; it does not “tell them,” for instance, what, in practice, 
equal and adequate such opportunities would precisely mean here. To make such a judgment, 
they would need to inquire into, for instance: how many people will be participating; what, if 
any, major differences there are among those persons with respect to speech impediments; what, 
if any, major differences there are among them in terms of educational levels and socio-
economic statuses; and so forth.  
Suppose, for instance, that there are typically 20-some participants in a regularly held 
parent-teacher meeting. At first, the participants involved in crafting the decision-making process 
for that meeting might formulate a procedural requirement according to which, in the forum in 
question, each person will have five minutes in which to offer her reasons in support of some 
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proposal. 87  However, they might then realize that two individuals have severe speech 
impediments. This might push them to recognize that, in practice, five minutes would neither 
amount to an “adequate” opportunity nor to an “equal” one. So, they revise the procedural 
requirement to accommodate these two individuals, affording them more time to speak.  
Suppose now that there is a facilitator for the meeting, and suppose that, based on past 
experience, the facilitator perceives that participants sometimes lose patience with individuals 
who have severe speech impediments. This leads them, she has noticed, to begin chattering in the 
space in which the meeting is held. With the aid of our approach to normative democratic theory, 
let us suppose that she comes now to reason as follows.  
For a process to treat all participants with equal consideration, concern, and respect, all 
participants should be granted (inter alia) equal and adequate opportunities to express their 
reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another. But there are two individuals with severe 
speech impediments. Therefore, she concludes that the procedural requirement should indeed be 
amended as indicated above. However, she also recognizes that procedural opportunities have 
(corollary) procedural responsibilities.88 For instance, part of the purpose of each participant 
having the opportunity in question is, she recognizes, to try to get the other participants to 
understand the perspective that the speaker is trying to convey in offering her reasons for a 
certain outcome. Hence, other participants should assume responsibility for trying to understand 
that perspective. Furthermore, the facilitator recognizes that to the extent that participants assume 
this responsibility, they exhibit, among other things, the virtue of “patience.” Equally, she 
recognizes that, on average, “patient individuals” will be more likely than “impatient 
individuals” to be able to assume responsibility for trying to understand that perspective. But she 
recognizes that the behavioral tendency previously referred to – the tendency of some 
participants to start chattering when those with speech impediments are speaking – prevents 
them from exhibiting this virtue; undermines their ability to assume the responsibility in 
question; and undermines the effective granting of the opportunity in question. So, she begins the 
discussion with a reminder to everyone to exercise due patience in listening to everyone’s 
presentations. Furthermore, let us suppose that the tactic “works,” that there is (say, 
experimental) evidence (from this organization’s own meetings or other organizations’ meetings) 
that suggests that the issue in question is significantly less likely to occur in those meetings that 
are preceded by the reminder as compared to those that those are not. So, the reminder becomes 
a regular feature of the meetings, becomes “institutionalized in its ‘procedure.’”  
Now, suppose that survey data indicates that regular participants to our imaginary parent-
teacher meetings come from a very broad range of socio-economic backgrounds, but also that 
participation is biased toward higher status groups. Furthermore, suppose that ethnographic 
evidence from the meetings indicates, not surprisingly, that members of lower status groups (say, 
the very poor) are significantly less likely to participate verbally in the meetings. The facilitator 
might then ask: Are there any cultural practices that we might employ to “even out 
participation,” that is to say (among other things), to make the opportunity to offer one’s reasons 
in support of a proposal more “equal” and “adequate” in relation to others’ opportunities to do 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 I use the term “procedural requirements” to refer to specific, codifiable rules that, until they are modified at least, 
are seen as “binding” on all participants. I use the term to differentiate such rules from the broader democratic 
“procedure” or “process” of which they may be a part, since, as these latter two terms are sometimes used, such 
“procedures” and “processes” may, indeed almost certainly will, have other, non-codifiable “features,” like informal 
greetings and ad-hoc breaks. 
88 These are shorthand terms for, respectively, the opportunities specified by our ideal procedural criteria and the 
responsibilities specified (or entailed) by them. 
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so? Here she concludes that, based on previous research, there is some reason to believe that 
“deliberative” decision-making processes that begin with storytelling sometimes make it easier 
for lower-status persons to participate.89 So, as the facilitator, she proposes to employ this as a 
cultural practice in each forum to encourage “more even participation.” And again, let us 
suppose that (say, experimental) evidence suggests that such persons are significantly more 
likely to participate verbally in the meetings that begin with a period in which participants are 
encouraged to tell pertinent stories. So, the practice becomes a regular feature of the meetings, 
again being “institutionalized in its ‘procedure.’”  
These comments serve to indicate, I hope, how normative democratic theory can function 
as a “tool” for practical reasoning about how best to act in whatever specific, unique contexts 
democracy’s participants do (have to) act. More specifically, they serve to indicate, I hope, that 
normative democratic theory can not only help democracy’s participants to clarify what their 
own democratic norms and values are, but also that it can provide “guidance” about how to 
conduct empirical inquiries that help them, in whatever specific contexts they do (have to) act, to 
uphold those norms and to realize those values better than they otherwise might have.90  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter, our main aim has been to clarify the “proper” status and function of 
normative democracy theory in democratic practice. As discussed in Section I, the “proper” 
status and function of moral theory in moral practice is much in dispute, and, in consequence, so 
is the “proper” status and function of normative democratic theory in democratic practice. In 
response to this problem, the paper has developed the idea that normative democratic theory 
ought to be viewed as a “tool” for practical reasoning, one that can assist democracy’s 
participants in carrying out the two principal tasks just mentioned at the end of Section II.  
To develop these ideas, the paper discussed John Dewey’s “empirical-instrumentalist” 
approach to moral theory, juxtaposing it with two more familiar approaches: what I respectively 
referred to as the “generalist” approach and the “particularist” approach. The “generalist” 
approach is to articulate moral rules, laws, and/or principles that are purportedly universal in 
scope and that purportedly “tell us” how we are to act in cases of a particular kind. Again, the 
principal aim of moral theory is, here, to articulate the “true,” the “correct,” universal moral 
rules, laws, and/or principles. Hence, to the extent that we reason properly, we are said to 
“discover” universal moral rules, laws, and/or principles. By contrast, the “particularist” 
approach rejects the idea of moral principles altogether or, at a minimum, holds that, in moral 
deliberation, there need be no attempt to bring such principles to bear on particular situations. 
Sound moral judgment is non-codifiable, and can only be found as one decides particular cases.  
In this chapter, I have suggested that normative democratic theory is a kind of moral 
theory, and that a Dewey-inspired approach to it is more appropriate than either a generalist or a 
particularist one. Dewey’s approach, we saw, is well described as an “empirical-instrumentalist” 
one. It is “empirical” in the sense that moral theory is said properly to emerge out of 
(anthropological-interpretive) empirical inquiry into our actual moral practices, or, into relevant 
aspect of actual “moral experience.” And it is “instrumentalist” in the sense that theory is self-
consciously treated as a “tool” for aiding intelligent, situated action. Like the generalist, Dewey’s 
approach recognizes the need for moral principles that are broad in scope. With the particularist, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Steiner (2012: chapter 2). 
90 Two additional hypothetical examples (much more extensive that the above example) will be given in chapter 7.	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however, Dewey also recognizes that sound moral judgment responds to the exigencies of 
particular situations and is, therefore, non-codifiable. Hence, a Dewey-inspired approach to 
normative democratic theory is sensitive to the need for such theory to balance a kind of 
generalism with a kind of particularism.  
At the same time, however, his approach avoids several of the major problems associated 
with the other two approaches. On the generalist side, Dewey’s approach avoids having to 
“ground” its principles on anything that isn’t “empirically based”: for instance, on revelation, 
intuition, or pure reason. Accordingly, it sidesteps the well-known problems with 
“foundationalism” in moral-ethical theory. On the particularist side, Dewey’s emphasis on the 
unique, the concrete, the qualitative aspects of our moral problems and dilemmas might lead us 
to see him as a precursor to moral or ethical particularism. But while Dewey’s moral-ethical 
thought does bear certain affinities with particularism, there are, we saw, important differences 
as well. As with generalism, the most important of these concern his conception of the role of 
moral theory in moral practice. Unlike the particularist, Dewey avoids the problematic 
conclusion that we should abandon ethical or moral “theory” altogether. While Dewey thinks of 
our theories as “tools” that can aid intelligent, situated action, he also recognizes that tools can 
never “solve” problematic situations by themselves. Yet, so long as they are adapted and refined 
on an as-needed basis, they can surely be useful in the effort to mitigate them.  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Toward a Normative Theory of the Democratic Process: Deliberative Reinterpretations of 
Dahl's “Criteria for a Democratic Process”  
 
 
Introduction 
In the last chapter, the aim was to clarify the “proper” status and function of normative 
democratic theory (of a “normative theory of the democratic process”) in democratic practice. In 
this chapter, the aim is now to develop a specific normative theory of the democratic process. 
The chapter does so by juxtaposing Dahl’s normative democratic theory with insights gleaned 
from informed reflection on paradigmatic moments of “treatment as free and equal” in joint or 
collective decision-making. In doing so, the chapter indicates the benefits of an anthropological-
interpretive approach to developing our normative theory of the democratic process. 
In Democracy and Its Critics, Robert Dahl offers his own “theory of the democratic 
process.”1 Dahl’s theory is an attempt to articulate the ideal, defining features of a process for 
“binding,” collective decision-making that treats citizens as “political equals.” The theory is 
based on two major assumptions and two major premises that derive from those assumptions.  
Briefly stated, the first assumption is that persons are, in some sense, “intrinsically 
equal.”2 Accordingly, the first premise is that if we regard persons as being, in some sense, 
“intrinsically equal” (that is, if we endorse the “Idea of Intrinsic Equality”), it follows that, when 
rendering “binding”3 collective decisions, the processes by which our associations govern 
themselves ought to give “equal consideration” to the good or interests of those who are “bound 
                                                                          
1 Dahl (1989). Dahl's theory is meant to apply to a broad variety of associations, not just the state (1989: 106-7, 
130). Here, I'll follow Dahl in developing a normative theory of the democratic process that is meant to apply to a 
broad range of associations, wherever: first, there is a need for "binding” collective decisions; and second, the 
assumptions justifying the adoption of a specifically democratic political order may be said to apply. As Dahl (1989: 
130) writes, "the assumptions [justifying the adoption of a democratic political order] and the criteria for a 
democratic process do not specify any particular kind of association. The implication is that in any association for 
which the assumptions are valid, the democratic process, and only the democratic process, would be justified." The 
“assumptions” here referred to are discussed in section II below. And the “criteria for a democratic process” here 
referred to – which, as Dahl (1989: 106) says, "follow from the assumptions" – are discussed in section III. 
2 For discussion of this assumption, see Dahl (1989: chapter 6). 
3 For the purposes of this chapter, I follow Dahl in understanding “binding” collective decisions in this way. 
Associations, Dahl (1989: 106-7) writes, need “to adopt policies, with which members will be obligated to act 
consistently. Ordinarily, their obligation to act consistently with the policies of the association is expressed in a rule 
or a law that includes penalties for noncompliance. Because members are obligated to obey the rules or laws, the 
decisions may be said to be binding.” However, “that decisions are binding does not imply that the association is 
necessarily coercive, employs the threat of violent sanctions to bring about compliance, or possesses other similar 
characteristics that are often used to distinguish a state from other sorts of associations. Although the government of 
the association might create an expectation that violators will be punished by officials, in some circumstances 
decisions might be binding without punishments by officials or even by other members. To evoke an expectation of 
divine or magical sanctions might be sufficient. Or the mere process of enacting or announcing a rule might cause 
enough members to adopt it as a principle of conduct to produce a quite satisfactory level of compliance. In short, 
although the association could be a state in the sense of a coercive order, it might not be; likewise the government of 
the association need not be the government of a state. Thus we can describe a general theory of the democratic 
process applicable to associations whether or not they constitute a state.”	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by,” or “subject to,” those decisions. Briefly stated, the second assumption is that the adult 
members of our respective associations are presumed to be “autonomous” – that is, are presumed 
to be the best judges of, and the most reliable defenders and promoters of, their own good or 
interests.4 Accordingly, the second premise is that if we maintain that the adult members of our 
respective associations are presumed to be autonomous (that is, if we endorse the “Presumption 
of Personal Autonomy”), we should also assume that they are adequately qualified to participate 
in the processes by which those associations govern themselves. Hence, as I proposed we should 
do in chapter 4, Dahl’s theory explicitly starts from the twin values that arguably justify the 
adoption of a democratic process in the first place: the “values” of treating persons as “free” and 
as “equal,” or as “autonomous moral equals.” 
Taking the aforementioned assumptions and premises together, Dahl offers four “criteria 
for a democratic process.”5 Again, the criteria are meant as descriptions of the ideal, defining 
features of “binding,” collective decision-making processes that treat citizens as “political 
equals,” or, what is to say the same thing for Dahl, as persons who are intrinsically equal and 
autonomous, and so as persons who ought to have certain equal and adequate opportunities for 
participation in those processes, which are to give equal consideration to the good or interests of 
each of them. 
In this chapter, I suggest that we should endorse Dahl’s major assumptions, but 
reconsider certain of the implications of our doing so. More specifically, I suggest that if we 
endorse the Idea of Intrinsic Equality and the Presumption of Personal Autonomy, we should 
also endorse a “deliberative” conception of democratic decision-making. That is, if we adopt the 
two major assumptions (as a very broad range of democrats apparently do), we not only have 
reason to adopt the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests (in qualified form6) and to offer 
the citizens or members of our respective associations certain equal and adequate opportunities 
for participation in the processes by which those associations render “binding,” collective 
decisions; we also have reason to maintain that those processes should be self-consciously 
“deliberative” ones.  
Accordingly, I propose to revise Dahl’s criteria. Informed reflection on paradigmatic 
moments of “free and equal treatment” in joint or collective decision-making suggests that 
persons who regard each other as intrinsically equal and autonomous owe each other 
justifications for their expressed policy preferences. Therefore, they should ideally assume a 
number of responsibilities related to such justification. So, I suggest that, in making “binding” 
                                                                          
4 For discussion of this assumption, see Dahl (1989: chapter 7). 
5 These four criteria are presented and defended in chapter 8 of Dahl (1989), entitled “A Theory of The Democratic 
Process.” In chapter 9 (“The Problem of Inclusion”) of that volume, Dahl offers a fifth criterion, which concerns the 
constitution of the demos itself. Here, we do not take up this fifth criterion, mainly because I intend my normative 
democratic theory as a tool for practical reasoning about how to create a “democratic process” in a variety of 
associations, not just in “the state.” (As noted above, so does Dahl. However, the fifth criterion, as he articulates it, 
specifically concerns inclusion in the state.) And different such institutions will and should be constituted according 
to different criteria. So, for this reason (and for reasons of scope), I just consider Dahl’s first four criteria, and set 
aside the issue of what specific criterion we should invoke regarding “inclusion” in any particular association or 
demos. Hence, what I offer here is actually best described as a “normative theory of the democratic process in 
relation to a demos,” where a “demos” can refer to the citizens of a state or to the members of a non-state 
association. Only when a fifth criterion, concerning the constitution of the demos, is included do we have what I 
would call a “normative theory of the democratic process” as a whole. 
6 In Section III, I suggest that we should revise this principle, renaming it the Principle of Equal Consideration of, 
and Concern and Respect for, the Good or Interests of Relevant Persons. Until Section III, however, I will simplify, 
just stating (or implying) that “we endorse” the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests. 
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decisions, the participants to any ostensibly “democratic process” should ideally assume 
responsibility for offering one another (and those they [ought to] represent) justifications for 
their expressed preferences as to the final outcome of that process. That is, in order to treat one 
another (and those they [ought to] represent) as intrinsically equal and autonomous, those 
persons should engage in a “moral dialogue and deliberation” with one another, seeking out what 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have referred to as “mutually acceptable” and “generally 
accessible” reasons for their expressed policy preferences.7 Ideally, each participant should 
accept responsibility for seeking out such reasons (and, indeed, for assuming certain further, 
more specific responsibilities that follow from one’s doing so). On my account, that is part of 
what it means for participants “to treat one another as ‘political equals,’” or, as persons who are 
intrinsically equal and autonomous, and so as persons who ought to have certain equal and 
adequate opportunities to participate in “binding,” collective decision-making processes that give 
equal consideration to (and, indeed, that show equal concern and respect for8) the good or 
interests of each of them. And, by implication, it is part of what it means for “the democratic 
process” to “treat citizens (or members) as political equals” too. 
So, I propose a number of “deliberative reinterpretations” to Dahl’s criteria for a 
democratic process. As he articulates them, the criteria only specify certain opportunities that, 
ideally speaking, the citizens or members of an association ought to be granted. By contrast, I 
maintain that informed reflection on paradigmatic moments of “treatment as free and equal” in 
joint or collective decision-making suggests that the criteria should also articulate the principal 
responsibilities that, ideally speaking, participants ought to assume in relation to one another, 
and, indeed, to those they (ought to) represent. In this way we are led from Dahl’s own major 
assumptions to a deliberative conception of the democratic process. 
 
I. On the Relevance of a Certain Tendency in Democratic Thought 
 
Now, before turning to the discussion of Dahl’s criteria and how he arrives at them, I 
want to take note of a certain tendency in democratic thought that will help to motivate the 
discussion that follows. I refer to the tendency discussed in the Introduction and in chapter 1, 
namely, the tendency to focus either on (ideal) procedures/procedural criteria, or on civic virtues, 
or on cultural practices that would arguably facilitate a more inclusive democratic process. And, 
in point of fact, this tendency, as we saw in chapter 1, is evident in Dahl’s “theory of the 
democratic process.” Briefly, let’s recall at how this is so, trying to make clear why it is 
important that we notice it. 
As indicated, Dahl offers four “criteria for a democratic process.” The criteria are 
“standards – ideal standards, if you like – against which procedures proposed ought to be 
evaluated in any association to which the assumptions [“justifying a democratic political order” 
may be said to] apply.”9 “The criteria specify that citizens...ought to have equal and adequate 
opportunities to act in certain ways.”10 Nevertheless, Dahl also notes that he “can readily 
imagine” a certain objection to “this formulation.” The objection might go like this:  
                                                                          
7 See Gutmann and Thompson (2004), especially chapter 1. For my own brief interpretation and defense of this 
terminology, see section III below.  
8 Dahl does not speak of “equal concern and respect for the good or interests” of citizens. As intimated by note 6 
above, I add this clause below (in Section III). 
9 Dahl (1989: 108-109). Again, these assumptions are discussed in section II below. They refer to the Idea of 
Intrinsic Equality and the Presumption of Personal Autonomy. 
10Ibid. 114. 
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An opportunity to act to do something [in a certain way] necessarily implies that one 
might choose not to act [in that way]. If the democratic process is desirable, then should 
the criteria not specify duties as well as opportunities – duties of the citizen to participate, 
to vote, to become informed, and the duty of the demos to determine how the agenda is to 
be decided? While I believe that the democratic process does imply duties like these, they 
are moral duties. They take their place among an array of obligations, rights, and 
opportunities that would confront citizens in a democratic order. I cannot say that it 
would always be wrong for a citizen to choose not to fulfill the political obligations 
implied by the criteria of the democratic process. It seems to me more consistent with the 
Presumption of Personal Autonomy and with freedom of self-determination and moral 
autonomy to ensure that citizens have the freedom to choose how they will fulfill their 
political obligations.11 
 
Now, it is not my intention to criticize this line of reasoning. Indeed, as far as it goes, I believe it 
is basically plausible. However, I want to raise a certain problem with our leaving it as it stands. 
As the above suggests, Dahl’s theory contents itself with: an articulation of the equal and 
adequate opportunities that citizens ought to be granted; a recognition that his theory does, 
however, seem to imply certain “duties”; and a further stipulation that it is best to leave it to 
citizens themselves to weigh those duties against the other obligations, rights, and opportunities 
that they (would) confront in a “democratic political order.” Now, what I want to emphasize is 
that in so contenting itself, his theory focuses exclusively on the ideal procedural criteria that he 
believes are best fitted to the realization of the basic aim of treating citizens or members as 
political equals.12 And, notice, these “criteria” are understood as properly articulating – and as 
only articulating – the equal and adequate opportunities for participation that citizens ought to 
have.13 Thus, Dahl’s theory does not incorporate any explicit discussion of the responsibilities 
that, based on the very same two assumptions and the very same two premises that he offers in 
defense of our granting those opportunities, participants ought ideally to assume.  
Correspondingly, the theory offers no reflections on the virtues that would assist 
participants in assuming (or that would dispose them to assume) those responsibilities and that 
would assist them in granting (or that would dispose them to grant) the equal and adequate 
opportunities that the theory specifies, or that participants would necessarily exhibit were they to 
assume those responsibilities/grant those opportunities. Nor does it offer any reflections on the 
cultural practices that, if they were somehow incorporated into the democratic process, would 
arguably assist the participants in assuming (or that would arguably dispose them to assume) the 
responsibilities that they ideally should assume and that would arguably promote the effective 
granting of the opportunities that the theory specifies. In short, this is why I have suggested that 
Dahl’s theory exhibits the tendency in democratic thought that I’ve identified. Accordingly, my 
aim here is to remedy this shortcoming, revising Dahl’s criteria for a democratic process so as to 
take account of the primary responsibilities that citizens ought ideally to assume, and that 
participants would necessarily exhibit were they to do so. (This, in turn, will provide resources 
for thinking about the virtues that would assist them in assuming those responsibilities and in 
                                                                          
11Ibid. 115. 
12 As indicated, Dahl actually refers to his “criteria for a democratic process” as “standards” or as “ideal standards,” 
not as “ideal procedural criteria.” However, the latter term is consistent with his intent and is the term that I use in 
various other chapters. So, for simplicity, I’ll use the latter term here too. 
13 This will become evident in section III, where we will consider these criteria at some length. 
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granting those opportunities and in thinking about the cultural practices that would promote the 
effective assumption of those responsibilities and the effective granting of the opportunities in 
question.14) Among these ideal responsibilities, we’ll see, is the responsibility that participants 
have for seeking out “mutually acceptable” and “generally accessible” reasons for their 
expressed policy preferences. For again, that is part of what I take it to mean for them “to treat 
one another as ‘political equals.’” And, by implication, it is part of what it means for a 
“democratic process” to do so too.  
 
II. Justifying the Adoption of a Democratic Process 
 
So, following Dahl, let us begin by setting out the grounds on which we might hope to 
justify the adoption of a democratic process.  
 The first assumption refers to an idea that we might call the Idea of Intrinsic Equality. As 
Dahl suggests, the idea is arguably “so fundamental that it is [simply] presupposed in most moral 
argument.”15 While the basic idea is familiar, it nevertheless comes in a variety of forms. 
 
To Locke, [for instance,] intrinsic equality evidently means that no one is naturally 
entitled to subject another to his (or, certainly, to her) will or authority. It follows that “no 
one can be…subjected to the Political Power of another without his own Consent”... To 
some, however, intrinsic equality means that all human beings are of equal intrinsic worth, 
or, put the other way around, that no person is intrinsically superior to another. To John 
Rawls, who finds the idea that human beings are of equal intrinsic worth excessively 
vague and elastic, their intrinsic equality consists rather of the capacity for having a 
conception of their good and acquiring a sense of justice. To others, intrinsic equality 
means that the good or interests of each person must be given equal consideration; this is 
the well-known Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests...16 
 
Here, the differences among the interpretations of the Idea of Intrinsic Equality that Dahl cites in 
this passage need not detain us.17 Rather, let us focus on the Principle of Equal Consideration of 
Interests, which evidently derives from that idea. For arguably, it is this “implication” of the Idea 
of Intrinsic Equality that is most relevant to democratic theory. 
 What might that principle imply? The answer to this question is hardly self-evident. But:  
                                                                          
14 In this chapter, I focus on the responsibilities that participants should ideally assume. In chapter 7, I develop the 
claim about how this discussion of responsibilities provides us with resources for reasoning about the virtues that 
would arguably assist participants in assuming (or dispose them to assume) those responsibilities and that would 
arguably assist them in granting (or dispose them to grant) the opportunities that they should ideally grant one 
another, or that they would necessarily exhibit were they to do so. There, I also develop the claim that this 
discussion provides us with resources for reasoning about the cultural practices that would arguably assist 
participants in assuming (or dispose them to assume) those responsibilities and that would arguably assist them in 
granting (or dispose them to grant) the opportunities that they should ideally grant one another. 
15 Dahl (1989: 84-85).  
16 Ibid. 85. 
17 I say this because, on any plausible interpretation of the views that Dahl summarizes here, it follows, as an ideal 
principle, that “the good or interests of each person [who is subject to a “binding,” collective decision-making 
process] must be given equal consideration.” (Of course, what counts as a “binding,” collective decision-making 
process will be controversial. But dealing with that important issue would move us beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.)  
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To begin with, it [evidently] implies that during a process of collective decision-making 
[in some particular association], the interests of every person who is subject to [or “bound 
by”] the decision must (within the limits of feasibility) be accurately interpreted and made 
known. Obviously, without this first step, the interests of each “subject” could not be 
considered, much less given equal consideration. Yet the principle [taken by itself] does 
not imply that the “subject” whose interests must be considered should also be the 
“interpreter.” Nor need the interpreter necessarily be the decisionmaker.18 
 
“Standing alone,” therefore, “the Idea of Intrinsic Equality is not robust enough to justify much 
in the way of conclusions – and certainly not democracy.”19 For “nothing in the assumption of 
intrinsic equality [or in the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests that is premised on it] 
implies that [those whose interests are to be given “equal consideration”] are the best judges of 
their own good or interests.”20 Indeed,  
 
Suppose it were true that a few people…not only understood much better than the others 
what constitutes their individual and collective good, and how best to bring it about, but 
could be fully trusted to do so. Then it would be perfectly consistent with the Idea of 
Intrinsic Equality to conclude that these persons of superior knowledge and 
virtue…should rule over all the others. Even more: if the good of each person is entitled to 
equal consideration, and if a superior group of guardians could best ensure equal 
consideration, then it follows [on the assumption that we endorse the Idea of Intrinsic 
Equality and the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests] that guardianship would 
definitely be [relatively] desirable, and democracy just as definitely be [relatively] 
undesirable.21 
 
Therefore, our first major assumption (the Idea of Intrinsic Equality) and our first major premise 
(the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests) need to be accompanied by a second major 
assumption and a second major premise. And to arrive at a clear view of the importance of our 
endorsing these, we could extend what has already been said by reasoning thus:  
 
Democracy – rule by the people – can be justified only on the assumption that ordinary 
people are, in general, qualified to govern themselves. For it seems self-evident that 
people ought not to govern themselves if they are not qualified to do so. After all, because 
we believe that children are not qualified to govern themselves we insist that they be 
governed by others who, we presume, are more qualified to do so.22 
 
It seems, then, that in order to arrive at a justification for a democratic process, we need to adopt 
an assumption to the effect that, in general, the members of the pertinent association are 
(reasonably presumed to be) so qualified. Perhaps we could state the assumption like this: 
 
                                                                          
18Ibid. 86-77. 
19 Ibid. 87.	  
20 Ibid. 87. 
21Ibid. 88. 
22Ibid. 97. 
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no person is, in general, more likely than yourself to be a better judge of your own good or 
interest[s] or to act to bring it about. [This, in brief, is Dahl’s second major assumption.] 
Consequently, you should have the right to judge whether a policy is, or is not, in your 
best interest. [This is the closest Dahl comes to stating the second major premise in the 
chapter from Democracy and Its Critics that we are reviewing.23] The assumption is, 
further, that what holds for you holds, generally speaking, for other adults. By a “policy” I 
mean a decision to adopt certain means to bring about certain results. On this assumption, 
then, no one else is more qualified than you to judge whether the results are in your [best] 
interest – both the results expected from a decision before it is taken and the actual results 
following the decision. You may choose to delegate the choice of means to those you 
judge to be more qualified than yourself to select the most appropriate means. But you 
could not, without acting contrary to the assumption [and the second major premise], yield 
your right to judge whether the results (intended and actual) were in your interests.24 
 
To state the second major assumption more succinctly, we might just say: “In the absence of a 
compelling showing to the contrary everyone should be assumed to be the best judge [and most 
reliable promoter and defender] of his or her own interests.”25 With Dahl, we might call this 
simply the Presumption of Personal Autonomy. By assuming this, we agree that, if we also 
endorse the Idea of Intrinsic Equality and the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests,  
 
each adult person whose interests are involved in the outcome ought to have the right to 
specify what those interests are…if A holds that her interests are best served by policy x 
rather than policy y, then insofar as the rules and procedures are intended to take A’s 
                                                                          
23 But, as stated, it is not the second premise. Again, the second major premise, on my reading, is that if we maintain 
that the adult members of our respective associations are presumed to be “autonomous” (that is, are presumed to be 
the best judges of, and the most reliable defenders and promoters of, their own good or interests), we should also 
assume that they are adequately qualified to participate in the processes by which those associations govern 
themselves. Compare this with Dahl’s statement, just quoted: “no person is, in general, more likely than yourself to 
be a better judge of your own good or interest or to act to bring it about. [The second major assumption.] 
Consequently, you should have the right to judge whether a policy is, or is not, in your best interest.” The reason 
that Dahl believes it justified to move from the first statement to the second one is that, at the point at which this 
passage appears in the text, he is already assuming an endorsement of what he calls the Idea of Intrinsic Equality and 
the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests. In other words, he is, at this point, taking what I’ve described as 
the first major assumption (the Idea of Intrinsic Equality), the first major premise (the Principle of Equal 
Consideration of Interests), the second major assumption (the Presumption of Personal Autonomy), and the second 
major premise (which we could now name – but which Dahl does not name – the Presumption of Qualification for 
Political Participation) together, concluding that they amount to the claim that, briefly stated, citizens “should have 
the right to judge [in the democratic process itself] whether a policy is, or is not, in [their] best interest.” But that 
claim is not the second major premise. Again, it is a brief summary of the conclusion Dahl derives from taking the 
first major assumption, the first major premise, the second major assumption, and the second major premise 
together. Accordingly, the second major assumption remains implicit in the chapter in question, chapter 8. But it is 
explicitly defended at length in chapter 7, entitled “Personal Autonomy.” 
24 Ibid. 99. 
25 Ibid. 100. To this I would just add that persons who are (to be presumed) “the best judges, and most reliable 
defenders and promoters, of their own good or interests” are also (to be presumed) “the best judges of how certain 
actions bear on their own good or interests.” As Dewey once put the basic point, “there is one thing [individuals] are 
wiser about than anybody else can be, and that is where the shoe pinches, the troubles they suffer from” (LW 11: 
219). 
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interest equally into account, along with B’s, C’s, and others’, then what is counted as A’s 
interest is what A – not B, C, or any other – says A’s interests are.26 
 
Now, taking these assumptions and premises together, we might then say that “strong equality” 
ought to exist between the members of whatever association we have in mind.27 And arguably, 
we would then want to adopt the Strong Principle of Equality, which we could characterize like 
this:  
If the good or interests of everyone should be weighed equally [read: if we endorse the 
Idea of Intrinsic Equality and adopt the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests], and 
if each adult person is in general the best judge of his or her interests [read: if we adopt the 
Presumption of Personal Autonomy], then every adult member of an association is 
[presumed to be] sufficiently well qualified, taken all around, to participate in making 
[the] binding decisions that [somehow significantly] affect his or her good or interests [or 
that we have good reason to expect might do so], that is, to be a full citizen of the demos 
[read: we should adopt the second major premise]. [And Dahl should here add: 
“Furthermore, every adult member should therefore be regarded as equally deserving of 
such citizenship.”] More specifically, when binding decisions are made, the claims of each 
citizen as to the laws, rules, policies, etc. to be adopted must [therefore] be counted as 
valid and equally valid. Moreover, no adult members are so definitely better qualified than 
others that they should be entrusted with making binding collective decisions. More 
specifically, when binding decisions are made, no citizen’s claims as to the laws, rules, 
and policies to be adopted are to be counted as superior to the claims of any other 
citizen.28 
 
 Now, proceeding on the assumption that this line of reasoning is essentially defensible, 
what benefit may be derived from our making it explicit? For one thing, we are better able to 
specify certain “ideal” criteria or standards by which ostensibly “democratic” processes can be 
evaluated (what I called in chapter 4 a set of “ideal procedural criteria”).  
 
Suppose that the assumptions [and premises] justifying a democratic political order [the 
ones we’ve just specified] are valid with respect to [some] group [that wishes to constitute 
a political order or that already constitutes such an order]. Because these assumptions [and 
premises] are valid, [just as the derivative Strong Principle of Equality is,] we [therefore] 
conclude that we ought to adopt a democratic order and therefore that the process ought to 
meet certain criteria. [And] when [we] say that the process ought to meet certain criteria, 
[what we mean is] that if one [endorses] the assumptions [and derivative premises], then 
one must reasonably affirm the desirability of the criteria; conversely, to reject the criteria 
is in effect to reject one or more of the assumptions [or the derivative premises].29 
 
What, though, are these criteria?  
 
                                                                          
26Ibid.100. 
27 The phrase “strong equality” is used to differentiate the present interpretation of equality from the “simpler” Idea 
of Intrinsic Equality “taken alone.”  
28Ibid. 105. 
29Ibid. 108. 
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III. Deliberative Reinterpretations of Dahl’s Criteria for a Democratic Process 
 
 Thus far we have essentially followed Dahl’s argument. But I want now to depart from it, 
revising Dahl’s criteria to include the primary responsibilities that, based on the very same 
assumptions and premises that he offers in defense our granting citizens certain equal and 
adequate opportunities, citizens ought ideally to assume. Doing so will lead us, I submit, toward 
a defensible normative theory of the democratic process that is well describe as a “deliberative” 
one.   
 So, let us turn now to Dahl’s four “criteria for a democratic process.” 
 
3.1 The First Criterion 
 
 Dahl’s first criterion is the Criterion of Effective Participation. This is how he states it:  
Throughout the process of making binding decisions, citizens ought to have an adequate 
opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their preferences as to the final 
outcome. They must have adequate and equal opportunities for placing questions on the 
agenda and for expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.30  
  
3.1.1 Revisiting the Idea of Equal and Adequate Opportunities 
 
 Now, before I explain my proposed revision of this criterion, let me briefly explain why it 
is clear that citizens or members should at least have the equal and adequate opportunities that 
Dahl refers to here. The justifications for these opportunities are (more or less clearly) implicit in 
Dahl’s exposition. But it is useful to make them explicit here, drawing on insights from everyday 
“moral experience” with “free and equal treatment.” 
 So, imagine an “association,” constituted by just two persons: A and B. To treat A and B 
as equally “deserving” of participation, it is should not be hard to understand why, in making 
some decision, A and B should both have a say in deciding what matters are to be discussed 
before they, and in order for them, to do so. If the discussion were to treat only what A had 
placed on the agenda, B could plausibly claim that, in practice, his “ability to participate” was 
not then “equally ‘valued.’” (In democratic theory, it is a familiar observation that those who 
control the agenda may, therefore, control the outcome of a decision-making process.31 Where 
so, it is fair to say that their control of the agenda undermines the aim of equal treatment. For 
part of the purpose of “equal treatment” is to give relevant parties an equal opportunity precisely 
to “influence the outcome of the process.”) Consequently, B could plausibly claim that he 
himself was not being “treated as a ‘political equal,’” and hence was not being treated as equally 
“deserving” of participation. Indeed, suppose even that B did have some control of the agenda. If 
B nevertheless had (notably) less control than A did, B could still plausibly make that claim: that 
he was not being treated as a “political equal.” And, mutatis mutandis, the same could be said of 
A if B were exclusively or predominantly in control of it. Hence, to treat A and B as equally 
“deserving” of participation, they should not just be able “to place questions on the agenda”; they 
should actually have “equal” and “adequate” opportunities to do so.  
                                                                          
30 Ibid. 109. 
31 See Dahl’s (1989: 112-114, 146) own explication of this familiar observation. See also Birkland (2011) especially 
chapter 6. 
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 As to the requirement of “adequacy,” I have so far left this implicit; but it is easy briefly to 
explicate. Suppose that A and B had equal opportunities to set the agenda, but neither had 
adequate opportunities to do so. Suppose, for instance, that A and B’s meeting were facilitated 
by a third party who gave each of them just one second to yell out what they wanted to discuss. 
In such a case, surely we would not say that their having “equal” opportunities to “set the 
agenda” gave them an appropriate kind of “control” over it. Nor would we say that it gave them 
an appropriate “extent” of control over it. 
 Likewise, to treat A and B as equally capable of participation, they should also have equal 
and adequate opportunities for agenda-setting. To see this, first suppose that one of them (A, let 
us say) didn’t have any opportunity to set the agenda, while the other one (B) had an adequate 
opportunity; this is perhaps the clearest case. Notice that, in that event, A could plausibly read 
his complete lack of agenda control as a sign that he was regarded as “incompetent” for (or 
“incapable” of) participation, while B was regarded as “competent”/“capable.” For one of the 
reasons that one may be excluded from having any such control is precisely that one may be so 
regarded (as in the case of children). And on the assumption that A and B are regarded as 
“equally deserving” of participation, that interpretation is plausible. Indeed, practical-logistical 
considerations aside, it is arguably the most plausible one.32 (However, even if A and B were not 
regarded as equally “deserving” of participation, A could still read his complete lack of agenda 
control as a sign that he was regarded as “incompetent” for, or “incapable” of, participation. It is 
just that, in that case, another plausible explanation suggests itself: that he is excluded from 
having that control precisely because he is not regarded as equally “deserving” of it. Of course, 
he could also be excluded for both of these reasons.) Notice, moreover, that even if A did have 
some control of the agenda, but less than B (who had “adequate” control of it), A could still see 
this as a sign that he was regarded as “incompetent” for (or “incapable” of) participation. In that 
case, A might have been given some control in order to make him think that he was regarded as 
competent, while, all along, B was regarded as the competent (or capable) one (hence afforded 
more control). And the same thought might occur to him wherever B had more control than A, 
even if, in reality, the amount of control that A had was, for him, “adequate.” Accordingly, in 
order for A and B both to believe that they were treated as adequately “competent” for, or 
“capable” of, participation, each should have equal and adequate opportunities for agenda-
control. And, mutatis mutandis, we could arrive at the same conclusion for any association with 
N participants.   
 Furthermore, note that the preceding line of reasoning could be repeated, mutatis 
mutandis, for the phrases: “expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another” 
and “expressing their preferences as to the final outcome.” Though I won’t spell out the logic, 
unless A and B both have equal and adequate opportunities to take these actions too, each could 
plausibly claim that “the process” did not “treat them as ‘political equals,’” as equally 
“deserving” and as equally “competent for/capable or” participation. And again, mutatis 
mutandis, we could arrive at the same conclusion for any association with N participants. 
 
3.1.2 Revising the First Criterion 
 
 So, returning to Dahl’s first criterion, let us again consider his exact wording:  
                                                                          
32 In other words, I assume that there are no “practical-logistical” reasons for A’s lacking any agenda control, e.g., 
that he is incapacitated (perhaps because of a car accident) and so literally can’t “put something on the agenda” 
(perhaps because he is in surgery [but has not lost the requisite mental capacities for participation).	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Throughout the process of making binding decisions, citizens ought to have an adequate 
opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their preferences as to the final 
outcome. They must have adequate and equal opportunities for placing questions on the 
agenda and for expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.  
 
Notice the phrases: “expressing their preferences as to the final outcome”; “placing questions on 
the agenda”; and “expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.” Are these 
actions, indeed, the only (or even just the primary) elements of “effective participation”? And in 
speaking of “effective participation,” should we only be concerned with the opportunities that 
participants ought to have? Or should we be concerned with their responsibilities too?  
 Well, as indicated in chapter 4, I believe that a defensible normative theory of the 
democratic process should articulate both the (equal and adequate) opportunities that citizens or 
members should ideally be granted and the (corollary) responsibilities that participants should 
ideally assume in relation to one another.33 In brief, this is because inquiry into those moments 
that are paradigmatic of when we are most likely to think and to feel that we are being treated as 
“free and equal” (or as “intrinsically equal” and “autonomous” in Dahl’s terminology) reveals 
that we think and feel this way because the participants involved in that process grant certain 
(equal and adequate) opportunities to one another and assume certain (corollary) responsibilities 
in relation to one another. Hence, as ideal standards for judging the adequacy or inadequacy of 
some “democratic process,” our “ideal procedural criteria” should capture these opportunities 
and responsibilities. So, how, then, should we reinterpret Dahl’s first criterion, now registering 
the responsibilities that participants ought ideally to assume?  
 To begin with, it is useful to ask: At a very general level, what does “the process” that we 
are considering consist in? And what might follow from our explicitly recognizing this? Well, 
“the process” in question is an activity in which participants express their preferences for 
imposing binding laws, rules, and/or policies on one another. Hence, in order for “the process” 
to treat those persons as political equals, it should be evident that the participants themselves 
must do so. Any time a “process” is, in actuality, a human activity, it obviously follows that 
certain persons have to assume certain responsibilities in order for the guiding aims of that 
activity effectively to be promoted or realized. For a “process,” mind you, cannot literally “do” 
anything; but, of course, people can. Accordingly, when we speak of the “democratic process” as 
“doing” something, like “treating persons as ‘political equals,’” we have to remember that this is 
an elliptical, shorthand way of talking about a specific kind of activity, which, like any activity, 
can be performed more and less adroitly depending on the responsibilities that relevant persons 
assume (or fail to assume) and depending on the virtues (and vices) of those persons. 
Accordingly, we have to remember that in reasoning about how best to realize, or to promote, the 
aim of equal treatment “through the democratic process,” we have to concern ourselves with the 
responsibilities that the relevant persons would have to fulfill in order for them to do so and with 
the virtues that would assist them in assuming (or that would dispose them to assume) those 
responsibilities.34 
 So, to treat one another as political equals, participants themselves should manifest 
support for a procedure in which citizens or members have equal and adequate opportunities for: 
                                                                          
33 Later in this section, however, I suggest that a defensible normative theory of the democratic process will specify 
certain responsibilities that participants should ideally assume in relation to “those they (ought to) represent” as 
well, not just “in relation to one another.” 
34 But again, I put an explicit discussion of virtues aside until chapter 7. 
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placing questions on the agenda; expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than 
another; and expressing their preferences as to the final outcome. Now, up till this point, we are 
in agreement with Dahl.35 Surely, however, they should do more than this. Surely, for instance, 
“treating one another as political equals” demands that in expressing their preferences as to the 
final outcome of the pertinent decision-making process, participants show one another mutual 
respect. And, on a deliberative conception, this implies that they seek out reasons for the binding 
policies that they would impose on each other (and on those they [ought to] represent). But, on 
that conception, not just any reasons. Rather, in order to treat one another as “political equals,” 
they have to treat one another as persons who are “equally deserving,” and who are “adequately 
competent for/capable of,” of such participation. And in order for them to do so, they need to 
search out reasons that “treat them so.”36 These “reasons,” I believe, are those we may properly 
describe as “mutually acceptable” and as “generally accessible.” Indeed, in the context of a 
“democratic” decision-making process, searching out such reasons is, I take it, part of what it 
means for participants to “treat one another with mutual respect.” And, by implication, it is part 
of what it means for “the process” to “treat them as ‘political equals.’”  
 Now, to explicate in more detail the main line of thinking that leads me to these 
conclusions, let us begin with an “association” of two persons: A and B. We’ll then refer to a 
larger, political association. 
 First, what are A and B likely to want to have equal and adequate opportunities to do, and 
what is each of them likely to want the other to do? Well, suppose that A and B consider 
themselves “friends”37 (and wish to act as such), and, furthermore, view each other as being 
“intrinsically equal” and “autonomous” (in our sense).38 They are, in virtue of these facts, likely 
to agree that in deciding what decision(s) to adopt, they should each have the equal and adequate 
opportunities that we’ve already discussed: to place questions on the agenda; to express reasons 
for endorsing one outcome rather than another; and to express their preferences as to the final 
outcome. Though friends do not, as friends, take “binding” decisions in the sense in which this 
term is typically used in democratic theory,39 they often take decisions that “(somehow) 
significantly affect the good or interests” of each of them.40 And when they do, a “friend” who 
does not allow another “friend” to participate equally and adequately in deciding what matters 
are to be discussed before they do so, and in order for them to do so, fails, to that extent, “to be a 
                                                                          
35 Dahl does not himself say that participants should “manifest such support.” He speaks, rather, of “procedures,” or 
of “the democratic process,” granting citizens the opportunities just mentioned. But I can find no reason for 
supposing that he would not endorse the claim that, ideally speaking, they should “manifest such support.” 
36 A clear example of a “reason” that would not “treat them so” would be a “justification” for a policy to the effect 
that blacks, qua blacks, are undeserving of some basic opportunity, e.g., the opportunity to vote.  
37 To recall, the reason I begin by reasoning from an “association” based on “friendship” is briefly as follows. As 
described in chapter 4, I begin by asking: “When do we believe that decisions with which the participants are 
themselves expected to comply are made in such a way that the process treats them as ‘free and equal’ or (in Dahl’s 
terminology reviewed in section II of this chapter) as ‘intrinsically equal’ and ‘autonomous’?” I then note that when 
we state the question in this way, one obvious example suggests itself: certain decisions among genuine friends. So, 
we look to these decisions for paradigmatic moments of “free and equal treatment” in joint or collective decision-
making, inquiring into what they tell us about the (equal and adequate) opportunities that participants should ideally 
grant one another and about the (corollary) responsibilities that they ought ideally to assume. 
38 I assume that “friends” normally do view each other this way. 
39 I refer to state policies that legally “bind” people, that are backed by the coercive power/authority of the state. 
40 And notice that the reason that we care about how “binding” decisions are made is precisely because they 
“(somehow) significantly affect the good or interests of persons” – or because they “may reasonably be expected to 
do so.” 
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friend.” In other words, a “friend” who does not let another “friend” have an equal and adequate 
opportunity to “set the agenda” for their joint decision-making process fails, to that extent, “to be 
a friend.” Similarly, a “friend” who does not allow another “friend” to participate equally and 
adequately in expressing his or her reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another fails, 
to that extent, “to be a friend.” Likewise, so does a “friend” who does not allow another “friend” 
to participate equally and adequately in expressing their preferences as to the final outcome.  
 Indeed, part of what it means “to be a friend” is that one is willing to grant, and in the 
appropriate circumstances does grant, each of these opportunities to one’s “friend(s).” When one 
doesn’t, we are apt to say that she either doesn’t (adequately) understand the concept of 
“friendship,” or, for whatever reason, fails to live up to the obligations of “being a friend.” 
Furthermore, our willingness to accept either of these conclusions grows as the “the importance” 
of the decision does; or, putting the same point differently, grows with the extent of the actual or 
anticipated effect of the decision on the relevant person’s good or interests. (To be still more 
precise, it grows to the extent that we perceive that its actual or anticipated effect grows.) For 
instance, if the decision is, or is anticipated to be, a fairly inconsequential one, A may not see it 
as a “failure of friendship” that B did not give him the opportunity to decide what matters were 
to be discussed before some decision was made. Perhaps, A might think, B was just being 
considerate, “saving him the time.” (“When I made the reservations, I just figured he’d like that 
restaurant,” B might say. “Plus, I know that A likes it when I take some initiative.”) However, if 
the decision is, or is anticipated to be, a highly consequential one, A is apt to respond differently: 
the same behavior will likely be regarded as a “failure of friendship.” What is more, the cases 
that concern us here are (presumed to be) precisely of that character: we are concerned with 
“binding” decisions, which are presumed to (somehow) significantly affect the good or interests 
of certain persons, or which we presume we have good reason to expect might so affect them. 
Accordingly, in those cases, we’ll presume, A and B would want to grant each other the 
aforementioned opportunities. 
 However, we may reasonably assume that they would want more than this. Think of an 
ordinary conversation between two friends, which is to result in a decision that is reasonably 
anticipated to “(somehow) importantly affect the good or interests of both of them.” Suppose it 
were only characterized by the aforementioned equal and adequate opportunities. We would, 
then, surely regard it as dysfunctional qua such a “conversation.”  
 True, conversational etiquette has it that friends should allow one another to decide what 
matters are to be discussed before they take some decision, and in order for them to do so, 
especially where the decision is thought “(somehow) importantly to bear on the good or interests 
of both of them.” Similarly, conversational etiquette clearly has it that, in those circumstances, it 
is especially important that friends give one another the chance to express their reasons for 
preferring one outcome to another. Likewise, it clearly has it that, in such moments, friends 
should give one another the chance to express their choices as to the final outcome.  
 But conversational etiquette clearly demands more than this. To begin with, it demands 
that friends listen to one another, not just that they allow one another to speak. Furthermore, it 
demands that, as appropriate, friends respond to one another, not just that they allow one another 
to speak and that they listen to each other. Moreover, the responsibility to listen and respond to 
one another implies a further responsibility: to try to understand relevant social situations and 
activities from the perspective of the other person. (And note that “relevant” here means “what is 
regarded as ‘relevant’ by one’s friend.”) Indeed, when we say (things like), “your friend should 
‘listen to you,’” what we mean is not just that she should literally just “hear your words”; we 
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mean that she should try to “hear what you’re saying”: to try to understand why you’re saying 
what you’re saying, as well as how you’re saying it, by, among other things, (sympathetically) 
projecting herself into your heart and mind, thereby trying to understand relevant social 
situations and activities from your perspective, to see and feel them as you do. Equally, when we 
say (things like), “your friend should ‘respond to you,’” we don’t just mean that she should give 
you a verbal or other response, whatever its content; we mean that she should try to give you a 
response that not only takes account of “what you’re saying,” in the manner suggested, but that 
also shows you that it is important to her, that she’s “taking it in,” that it will shape the course of 
her thinking and of the developing conversation. Furthermore, conversational etiquette clearly 
has it that where an important decision is to be made, one that will affect (or that is reasonably 
expected to affect) the good or interests of each of the parties to the conversation, friends should 
not only have the opportunity to “express their reasons for preferring one outcome to another”; it 
has it that they should also use that opportunity to seek out reasons for preferring that outcome, 
reasons that their friends could accept (as justifiable41). Or, putting the same point differently, it 
has it that each of them has the responsibility to do so. What is more, these responsibilities 
augment as “the importance” of the decision does. That is, each of these responsibilities grows 
with the extent of the actual or anticipated effect of the decision on the good or interests of each 
of the friends. (Or again, to be still more precise, it grows to the extent that they perceive that the 
actual or anticipated effect grows.) Moreover, part of what it means “to be a friend” is that one is 
willing to assume these responsibilities with each of one’s “friends.” Again, when one isn’t, we 
are apt to say that she either doesn’t (adequately) understand the concept of “friendship” or that 
she fails to live up to the obligations of “being a friend.” 
 Furthermore, notice that a failure to grant any of the aforementioned opportunities, or to 
assume any of the aforementioned responsibilities, may cause a strain in one’s “friendship” with 
someone, indeed, may even be the effective cause of its dissolution. What is more, notice that the 
reason for this is that (there are common circumstances in which) any of these failures may 
plausibly be interpreted as rooted in, and/or as demonstrating, a lack of respect. For instance, a 
“friend” who does not grant a “friend” the opportunity to discuss the matters that she wishes to 
discuss, before taking some “important decision,”42 typically will be interpreted as being 
inconsiderate, or, depending on the circumstances, even selfish or egotistical.43 And the same 
may be said of a “friend” who fails to grant a “friend” the other two opportunities we’ve 
considered. Likewise, a “friend” who does not take responsibility for listening and responding to 
a “friend,” or for trying to understand relevant social situations and activities from her 
perspective, typically will too. And the same may be said of a “friend” who fails to seek out 
reasons for preferring some outcome that her “friend” could accept (as justifiable): typically, she 
will also be interpreted as “inconsiderate,” or, depending on the circumstances, as “selfish” or 
“egotistical.” More importantly, a friend who regularly fails to grant any one of these 
opportunities, or to assume any one of these responsibilities, is not only liable to be judged this 
way; she is liable to be regarded as “‘lacking respect’ for her ‘friend.’” And it is for that very 
reason that the friendship may be strained, even dissolved, indeed, that we may come to question 
whether it even is a “friendship.”  
                                                                          
41 Not under pain of punishment or coercion, say. 
42 That is, one that is reasonably anticipated to “(somehow) importantly affect the good or interests of both of them.” 
43 These are but a few of the possibilities. In certain cases, other plausible predicates will suggest themselves: e.g., 
“vindictive,” “cruel,” “rude,” and so on. 
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 Moreover, it is important to stress why this is so: because friendship is a relationship 
between equals, based on mutual respect.44 Hence any time that either “friend” engages, or fails 
to engage, in a behavior that shows a lack of it, the relationship itself is imperiled. For, in such a 
relationship, the good (or interests) of both parties has (have) to be taken into account, and 
indeed equally so; and showing mutual respect is one indispensable way that “friends” do so. 
(Equally, we could say that, in such a relationship, both parties have to show one another mutual 
respect, and giving equal consideration to each other’s good or interests is one indispensable way 
that “friends” do so.) Otherwise, we begin to question whether it is “a friendship.”  
 So, to summarize: We are, I believe, warranted in saying that when a decision is to be 
made by two friends, one that they have good reason to expect might “(somehow) importantly 
affect the good or interests of each of them,” each of them is likely to want “the process” by 
which they make that decision to give equal consideration to the good or interests of both parties. 
Moreover, each of them is likely to want that “process” to show them “equal respect” (to each of 
them qua persons who have their own conception of their own good or interests.) (Again, I 
assume that they are “friends,” and wish to act as such.45) This generates the (ideal) expectation 
that, when making that decision, any procedure that they adopt should meet these conditions. 
(Further, it generates the [ideal] expectation that, by assuming certain responsibilities in the right 
kinds of ways, each of them should exhibit the appropriate virtues while making that decision.46) 
Specifically, we assume that they would want to have, and to grant each other, equal and 
adequate opportunities: to place questions on the agenda; to express reasons for endorsing one 
outcome rather than another; and to express their preferences as to the final outcome. And we 
assume that they would expect each other to assume responsibility: for listening and responding 
to each another (hence for trying to understand relevant social situations and activities from each 
other’s perspectives), and for seeking out reasons for their preferred outcomes that the other 
could accept (as justifiable). Based on our “shared understandings”47 of what friendship means, 
these conditions constitute, I think, the basic elements of “effective participation” in such a 
decision. 
 What, though, of an association where the participants don’t (necessarily) “regard 
themselves as ‘friends’”? Here, too, the same conclusions are warranted, I think. For while we 
obviously shouldn’t assume that just any “association” is based on mutual respect, we should 
maintain that its “binding,” collective decision-making processes should convey or express it.48  
 Now, in moving from a case of an “association” of two friends (who wish to act as such) 
to a broader, political association, recall that we are assuming an endorsement of the Idea of 
Intrinsic Equality and of the Presumption of Personal Autonomy. Bearing this in mind, think 
now from a first person perspective. 
                                                                          
44 I do not claim that friendship is based only on mutual respect; I claim only that mutual respect is an indispensable 
part of “the basis” of any genuine “friendship.”  
45 In offering this description, I am assuming not only that both consider themselves “friends” and wish to act as 
such, but that they are reflectively clear on the responsibilities that come with “friendship,” that is, according to 
common custom.	  
46 But again, I don’t develop a discussion of “virtues” here, leaving that discussion for chapter 7. 
47 For discussion, see Walzer (1983). 
48 I proceed here on the assumption that we endorse the two main assumptions discussed earlier: that the citizens or 
members of the association in question are regarded as intrinsically equal and as autonomous. Note also that the idea 
that legislation/decision-making should show “equal respect” to those who (in one sense or another) are “bound by” 
or “subject to” it is, of course, a familiar Kantian ideal. For recent discussion, see the essays collected in Steinhoff 
(2015). 
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  As an “autonomous person” who views herself as “intrinsically equal” to others, how do I 
believe that I deserve to be treated when binding decisions are made in my association? Well, 
surely I believe that I have good reason to want the relevant procedures to grant me the same 
equal and adequate opportunities that we’ve already considered, and, as appropriate, to want the 
other participants to do so too. And surely I have good reason to want the other participants to 
assume the same responsibilities that we’ve considered.  
 How do I arrive at these conclusions? In the context of a “binding,” collective decision-
making process, I do so in the following main steps.49 First, as an “autonomous person” (who is 
aware of being such a person), I perceive that, in many (perhaps [almost] all) (such) 
circumstances, I am likely to have my own conception of what course of action is best suited to 
my interests, preferences, projects, values, cares, commitments, sense of fairness and justice, and 
so on. Second, I believe that, in virtue of the fact that I am a being that has (or, in any such 
situation, is capable of having and indeed likely to have) such a conception, I therefore should be 
treated “with dignity and respect.” Third, recognizing that the decision-to-be-made may well 
bear on my ability to realize or to promote that conception (individually or jointly with others), I 
therefore believe that the decision-making process should take that conception into account. 
Indeed, that, I take it, is part of what it means “to be treated ‘with dignity and respect.’” Fourth, I 
believe that in order for the “the decision-making process” to treat me with dignity and respect, 
the decision-making procedures that we adopt ought to grant me the opportunities that we’ve 
considered. And fifth, I believe that in order for “the decision-making process” to treat me “with 
dignity and respect,” the participants themselves do too. This implies both that they assume the 
responsibilities that we’ve considered, and, as appropriate, that they grant me the aforementioned 
equal and adequate opportunities too. In any particular instance, having these opportunities and 
seeing others assume these responsibilities may be, I assume, necessary for my feeling/thinking 
that I am being treated “with dignity and respect” as someone who is intrinsically equal to the 
other participants to the process and as someone who is autonomous.  
 As someone who endorses the Idea of Intrinsic Equality and the Presumption of Personal 
Autonomy, I then ask: What opportunities should I grant to the other participants, and what 
responsibilities should I assume in relation to them, in light of those endorsements?  
 Well, broadly speaking, I assume that I should extend the above process of reasoning to 
include the other participants. More specifically, I assume that those other persons are also 
autonomous, and that, in (many) relevant respects, autonomous persons (should) reason 
similarly.  
 Doing so, I first notice that, in any given case, they too are each liable to have their own 
conceptions of what course of action is best suited to their respective interests, preferences, 
values, cares, commitments, projects, and so on. So, I suppose that they, too, believe that they 
should be treated with dignity and respect, and suppose that they, too, conclude that the decision-
making process should therefore take their conceptions into account as well. Further, I therefore 
suppose that they, too, believe that the “the procedure” ought to grant them the opportunities 
we’ve considered (and, where appropriate, the participants too), and suppose that they, too, 
believe that the other participants should assume the responsibilities we’ve considered.  
 Next, I observe that, given that I endorse the Idea of Intrinsic Equality, I (should) also 
endorse the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests.50 I then observe that this implies that I 
grant others the same opportunities that I want them to grant me, and that I assume the same 
                                                                          49 I do not maintain that this is the only way to arrive at these conclusions, only that it is one way to do so.	   
50 Again, however, I revise this principle below. 
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responsibilities that I want them to assume in relation to me. More specifically, I notice that, in 
order for them “to give consideration” to my good or interests and for them to “treat me with 
‘dignity and respect,’” I would want them to grant me the above opportunities and to assume the 
above responsibilities. But then I notice that, as autonomous persons, they would want this too. 
Moreover, in light of the fact that I do endorse the Idea of Intrinsic Equality, I conclude that they 
deserve that too. Furthermore, I conclude that I am no more deserving of such treatment than 
they are, just as they are no more deserving of it than I am. Hence, I conclude that “the process” 
should not only give consideration to the good or interests of each of us but should give equal 
such consideration; and that “it” should not only show concern and respect for the good or 
interests of each of us but equal such concern and respect.51 And I conclude that in order for “it” 
to do so, I have to grant to the others the above opportunities and to assume the above 
responsibilities, and they have to too.  
 Finally, I presume that, as persons who also endorse the Presumption of Personal 
Autonomy and the Idea of Intrinsic Equality, they (should) reason this way too. So, taking us all 
together, we (should) all reach the same conclusion, I conclude. 
 At this point, we are two steps shy of understanding how I’d like to revise Dahl’s Criterion 
of Effective Participation.  
 Earlier I mentioned that participants should seek out reasons for their expressed policy 
preferences that are “mutually acceptable” and “generally accessible.” I have already suggested 
why they should seek out reasons that are “mutually acceptable.” Why, though, should the 
reasons be “generally accessible” too? Well, if I cannot even understand the “reasons” you offer 
me, I cannot “accept them.”52 Or, more properly, I cannot “accept them as mutually justified,” 
which, in the present context, I take to be the appropriate meaning of “mutually acceptable 
reasons,” and hence of the notion that “I ‘accept’ your reasons.” Consequently, I cannot say that 
those reasons justify anything, much less that they justify a rule, law, or policy that you wish to 
impose on me (and on my fellow citizens or members). The idea of a person, call her A, 
“justifying” something to another person, call her B, presupposes the idea that B can understand 
what it is that person A “seeks to justify.” True, B might say, “I admit that I do not understand 
your reasons; but I am nonetheless willing to accept them. For I believe you to be a reasonable 
person, and presume that your reasons are reasonable too. But I simply cannot understand them.” 
                                                                          
51 To give further support to this conclusion, we might recall the line of reasoning offered in section 2.2.1 of chapter 
4. Allow me to cite the relevant passage verbatim. There I said that “moral experience indicates that, for instance, 
two persons who show each other mutual respect in the context of joint decision-making do not just give ‘equal 
consideration’ to each other’s good or interests; they also show ‘equal concern’ for each other’s good or interests. 
Or, to put the point differently, one simply can’t give (genuine) “consideration” to the good or interests of another 
person without showing “concern” for that person.” For, “to give ‘genuine consideration’ to another person’s good 
or interests’ is,” I said, “to engage in an active process in which one seeks to understand that person qua ‘person.’ 
And what is a ‘person’? She is, inter alia, a being who has, or is surely likely to have, her own conception of her 
own interests, preferences, projects, cares, commitments, sense of fairness and justice, and so on. In other words, we 
typically presume that adult persons, at least, are what we sometimes call ‘autonomous persons.’ And when we give 
‘equal consideration to the good or interests of persons,’ qua persons (so understood), we cannot help but ‘show 
“care” for them.’ (This is not to collapse any possible distinction that we might want to make between ‘showing care 
for someone’ and ‘showing consideration for someone.’ It is just to say that, at least in the context of joint or 
collective decision-making, the two are tightly interwoven.) Hence, for clarity’s sake it is better to say that, in joint 
or collective decision-making, genuine friends ‘give equal consideration to, and show equal concern and respect for, 
each other’s good or interests.’ Moreover, they do this in order precisely to show ‘equal respect’ to one another qua 
moral equals and autonomous persons.” 
52 Gutmann and Thompson (2004: 3-5) offer an argument that is, I think, complementary to the one articulated here.  
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However, in that event, A would not have “justified” her reasons to B. Rather, we should want to 
say that B had “accepted” A’s reasons without “accepting their justifiability.” Accordingly, if we 
understand by “mutually acceptable reasons,” “reasons that could be mutually justified” (as I 
believe that deliberative democrats generally do, and as I believe that inquiry into paradigmatic 
moments of “treatment as free and equal” suggests that we should too), “mutual acceptability” 
(in the context of a moral dialogue and deliberation aimed at “binding,” collective decision-
making) presupposes the idea that person B understands what it is that person A “wishes to 
justify.” Consequently, we may conclude that, here, “mutual acceptability” is dependent on 
“mutual accessibility.” Hence the claim that in justifying the decisions that they would impose 
on one another, participants should seek out “mutually acceptable” and “generally accessible” 
reasons. When there are only two agents, we might reasonably speak of “mutual” accessibility; 
when there are more, of “general” accessibility. 
 Now, before offering my own articulation of the Criterion of Effective Participation, 
notice finally that the preceding remarks suggest that we have good reason to rename The 
Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests. For, on the above conception of what it means “to 
treat participants as intrinsically equal and as autonomous,” hence as “political equals,” the 
democratic process should not only “give equal consideration to the good or interests of each of 
them”; it should also “show equal concern and respect for the good or interests of each of them.” 
Hence, I propose that we rename the principle thus: The Principle of Equal Consideration of, and 
Concern and Respect for, the Good or Interests of Relevant Persons.  
 Notice, furthermore, that I speak of “relevant persons” here, not of “citizens” or 
“members.” In brief, the reason for this is that, as I have been intimating all along, persons 
deserve to have equal consideration given to, and equal concern and respect shown for, their 
good or interests in virtue of their personhood, not their citizenship status. Morally speaking, if a 
“binding,” collective decision may reasonably be expected to “(somehow) significantly affect the 
good or interests of some person,” the principle should apply to their good or interests as much 
as to anyone else’s – regardless of their citizenship or membership status.  
 The reason that Dahl doesn’t himself say this can briefly be summarized as follows. First, 
Dahl maintains that those persons whose good is, or whose interests are, (somehow) significantly 
affected by a “binding,” collective decision-making process (or who may reasonably be expected 
to be so affected) should be “full citizens of the demos.” 53 Second, he assumes that those persons 
generally are (in some sense) “members” of the association in question. Third, he thus holds that 
those who are (in some sense) “members” of the association in question should be granted full 
citizenship status. Fourth, he therefore seems to believe that as long as these persons are granted 
full citizenship in the demos, “members” should be co-extensive with “citizens,” which should in 
turn be co-extensive with “those whose good is, or whose interests are, (somehow) significantly 
affected by the binding, collective decision-making process in question, or who may reasonably 
be expected to be so affected.”  
 Notice, however, that whenever these phrases are not co-extensive – as they clearly will 
often not be54 – the suggestion that the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests applies only 
                                                                          
53 See, for instance, Dahl’s formulation of the Strong Principle of Equality (1989: 105). More broadly, consider the 
arguments presented in chapters 6 and 7 and how they lead to that Principle.  
54 Think, say, of those who, in some sense, are clearly “members” of a given state but who are not citizens; or of 
those who are neither members nor citizens but who clearly are affected by a decision, for instance, some foreign 
policy.  
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to citizens would be tantamount to denying the validity of the main idea on which the Principle is 
predicated: again, the Idea of Intrinsic Equality.  
Hence, it is better to speak of “Relevant Persons” in renaming the Principle of Equal 
Consideration of Interests, and to understand these persons as being “all those persons whose 
good or interests may reasonably be expected to be (somehow) importantly affected by the 
‘binding,’ collective decision-making process in question.” Included here are: (a) the participants 
themselves; (b) those, if any, they “represent” (in the electoral sense); and (c) those they “ought 
to represent” (i.e., “anyone whose good or interests may reasonably be expected to be 
[somehow] importantly affected by the ‘binding,’ collective decision-making process in 
question,” but who does not herself participate in the process and does not herself have 
“representation” in it [in the electoral sense].) (For simplicity, we might call these persons “the 
moral constituents.”55) Accordingly, when we speak of the participants to a democratic process 
upholding the Principle of Equal Consideration of, and Equal Concern and Respect for, the Good 
or Interests of Relevant Persons, we (should) refer to the good or interests of all those persons 
who fall under categories (a)-(c).56 And when we speak of participants assuming responsibility 
for justifying their expressed policy preferences, we (should) again refer to a process of mutual 
justification that, ideally speaking, involves all those persons falling under (a)-(c). Hence why I 
have now and again referred to the ideal of participants assuming certain responsibilities in 
relation to one another, and, indeed, to those they (ought to) represent. 
So, taken together, the proceeding remarks suggest that, with good reason, we might 
recast the Criterion of Effective Participation in this way: 
 
Throughout the process of making binding decisions, citizens or members ought to have 
an adequate opportunity, and an equal opportunity: to place questions on the agenda; to 
express reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another; and to express their 
preferences as to the final outcome. In expressing the reasons for which they endorse one 
outcome rather than another, participants should assume responsibility for seeking out 
mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons for their expressed preferences. 
Hence, before expressing their final choices, each participant should also have an equal 
and adequate opportunity to listen and respond to the reasons offered by each of the other 
participants. In doing so, they should try to understand relevant social situations and 
activities from relevant persons’ perspectives. 
 
3.2 The Second Criterion 
 
                                                                          
55 Gutmann and Thompson (1996: chapter 4).	  
56 Here I stress that, for reasons of scope, I will make no attempt to specify how to draw “the boundaries” around 
categories (a)-(c). This would be an unmanageable task here, in part because I am proposing that my normative 
theory of the democratic process could “apply” to a variety of associations, not just to the state. And, obviously, 
different associations are, and should be, constituted for different reasons and on the basis of different (moral, 
ethical or other) criteria. Still, very quickly, let me just state a tentative proposal for how we might think of an 
association’s “moral constituents” (i.e., for how we might think of category [c]), one that I think is worth 
considering. However membership/citizenship in any given association is determined, the “moral constituents” for 
any given decision should be construed as those persons whose interests are (or whose good is) “just as likely” to be 
“(somehow) significantly affected by the decision in question” as any given member or citizen of the association in 
question. 
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Now, here is Dahl’s articulation of the second criterion, which he refers to as Voting 
Equality at the Decisive Stage: 
 
At the decisive stage of collective decisions, each citizen [or member57] must be ensured 
an equal opportunity to express a choice that will be counted as equal in weight to the 
choice expressed by any other citizen [or member]. In determining outcomes at the 
decisive stage, these choices, and only these choices, must be taken into account.58  
  
What, though, is the justification for this criterion? Dahl writes: 
 
 Its justification rests, I think, on the practical judgment that voting equality at the decisive 
 stage is necessary in order to provide adequate protection for the intrinsic equality of 
 citizens and the Presumption of Personal Autonomy. Without it, citizens would face the 
 prospect of an infinite regress of potential inequalities in their influence over decisions, 
 with no final court of appeal in which, as political equals, they could decide whether their 
 interests, as they interpreted them, were given equal consideration. Just as inequalities in 
 other resources could give advantages to some persons in securing consideration for their 
 interests, so too, without a requirement of equal voting at the decisive stage, inequalities 
 in votes could work cumulatively to violate the Principle of Equal Consideration of 
 Interests.59    
 
“Obviously,” Dahl observes, “something like this requirement has been a mainstay of democratic 
theory and practice from classical Greece onward.”60 And I see no reason to abandon an 
endorsement of this requirement now – nor, indeed, to revise Dahl’s specific articulation of it. 
(No insights derived from inquiry into paradigmatic moments of “free and equal treatment” lead 
me to think that there are reasons for abandoning or revising this requirement.)  
Before proceeding, however, I do want to enter a few points of clarification. Democracy 
has sometimes been associated with the idea of arriving at a “consensus” on laws, rules, and/or 
policy decisions. Indeed, as Will Kymlicka has noted, some have thought that shared deliberation 
would at least sometimes lead to  
 
greater agreement on various important issues, as seemingly implacable disagreements 
turn out to be based on misunderstandings or incomplete information, and that we would 
converge on a ‘common ordering of individual needs and wants into a single vision of the 
future in which all can share’ (Barber 1984: 224). For most deliberative democrats, 
                                                                          
57 Below I say that I see no reason to abandon or to revise this criterion. The one, small qualification to this 
statement is that, as indicated, I add the phrase “or member” to take account of the fact that my theory is meant to 
apply to a broad range of associations, not just the state. (See note 1 above.)  
58 Dahl (1989: 109). In interpreting this criterion, it is important to note the following. “The process for making 
binding decisions includes at least two analytically distinguishable stages: setting the agenda and deciding the 
outcome. Setting the agenda is the part of the process during which matters are selected on which decisions are to be 
made (including a decision not to decide the matter). Deciding the outcome, or the decisive stage, is the period 
during which the process culminates in an outcome, signifying that a [law, rule, or] policy has been adopted or 
rejected.” (107) To be clear, then, the criterion of Voting Equality at the Decisive Stage applies to this (analytically 
distinguishable) second stage and to this stage alone.   59	  Ibid.	  60	  Ibid.	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however, this sort of consensus is at best a happy but occasional by-product of 
deliberation, not its presupposition or goal – deliberating about our differences is not the 
same as eliminating our differences… At the end of the day after the arguments are duly 
considered, some voting or electoral procedure is needed for resolving the remaining 
disagreements.61  
 
Here, I put aside the large question of whether or not “consensus” should be the “presupposition” 
and/or “goal” of “shared deliberation.” I also do not challenge or defend the claim that “for most 
deliberative democrats...this sort of consensus is at best a happy but occasional by-product of 
deliberation, not its presupposition or goal.” Here, however, I should say that I agree with the 
assessment that “at the end of the day[,] after [the] arguments [and other “relevant 
considerations” (which, I should also say, need not all take the form of “arguments”) have been] 
duly considered, some voting or electoral procedure is needed for resolving the remaining 
disagreements.” And, what is more, a broad range of self-styled deliberative democrats (would 
seem to) agree here. Indeed, this is true of some (important representatives) of those who do take 
“consensus” to be the “presupposition” and/or “goal” of “shared deliberation” as well as of some 
(important representatives) of those who don’t. For instance, on the side of those who don’t take 
it to be the presupposition and/or goal of deliberation, we find Jane Mansbridge and eight other 
scholars of deliberative democracy. Hence, in their “reformulation of the deliberative ideal,”62 
Mansbridge and her collaborators write, “we assume that the goal at the outset of deliberation 
ought not necessarily to be a substantive consensus.”63 Furthermore, “when interests or values 
conflict irreconcilably, deliberation ideally ends not in consensus but in a clarification of conflict 
and structuring of disagreement, which sets the stage for a decision by non-deliberative methods, 
such as aggregation or negotiation among cooperative antagonists.”64 And on the side of those 
who do take consensus to be the presupposition and/or goal of deliberation, we find, for instance, 
Joshua Cohen. Deliberation, Cohen writes, “aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus – 
to find reasons that are persuasive to all who are committed to acting on the results of a free and 
reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals.”65 But, Cohen adds: “Even under ideal conditions 
there is no promise that consensual reasons will be forthcoming. If they are not, then deliberation 
concludes with voting, subject to some form of majority rule.”66  
 There is, then, broad agreement among prominent deliberative democrats that voting may 
properly be construed as part of the deliberative-democratic ideal itself.67 And, again, no insights 
derived from inquiry into paradigmatic moments of “free and equal treatment” lead me to think 
                                                                          
61 Kymlicka (2002: 291-292). 
62 Mansbridge et al. (2010: 64). 
63 Ibid. 68.	  
64 Ibid. 
65 Cohen (2009: 24-25). 
66 Ibid. 25.  
67 Gerry Mackie (2011: 78) also concludes that deliberation and voting are essential to the (deliberative-) democratic 
ideal. Interestingly, however, he concludes that “deliberative democrats uncritically accept the political science 
discipline’s cynical account of democratic voting.” This is mistaken, Mackie argues, for there is good reason to 
conclude that “voting beneficially transforms citizens’ preferences from self-interested to public-spirited 
[preferences],” a goal many associate with deliberation not voting. Mackie (2011: 78) also holds that there is 
“overwhelming evidence that voters are in fact public-spirited.” Indeed, Mackie (2011: 78) believes that “the 
beneficially transformative effects of deliberation are due as much to voting as discussion.” If plausible, these 
arguments would provide further reason to include voting in the deliberative-democratic ideal itself. 
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that there are reasons for thinking otherwise. I therefore conclude that we should also endorse 
Dahl’s second criterion, the criterion of Voting Equality at the Decisive Stage.  
 
3.3 The Third Criterion 
 
 Let us now consider Dahl’s third criterion, the Criterion of Enlightened Understanding:  
 
Each citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for discovering and 
validating (within the time permitted by the need for a decision) the choice on the matter 
to be decided that would best serve the citizen’s interests.68 
 
Now, “one might object,” Dahl observes, “that enlightenment has nothing to do with 
democracy.”69 But, he continues,  
 
I think this would be a foolish and historically false assertion. It is foolish because 
democracy has usually been conceived as a system in which “rule by the people” makes it 
more likely that the “people” will get what it wants, or what it believes is best, than 
alternative systems like guardianship in which an elite determines what is best. But to 
know what it wants, or what is best, the people must be enlightened, at least to some 
degree. And because advocates of democracy have invariably recognized this and placed 
great stress on the means to an informed and enlightened demos, such as education and 
public discussion, the objection is also historically false.70 
 
The reasoning here is, I think, essentially on track, and aligns with reflection on paradigmatic 
moments of “free and equal treatment” in joint or collective decision-making, where participants 
see the discussion, dialogue, and deliberation that features in such decision-making as a way of 
arriving at more informed and enlightened decisions, and where participants prefer to make 
decisions themselves, collectively, rather than letting an “elite” (say one or two friends in a 
group of five friends) make all the decisions for them. But we should again ask: How might we 
reinterpret this criterion, now registering the primary responsibilities that participants should 
ideally assume?   
 Actually, I’d like to focus on a number of things that follow from our endorsing this 
criterion, even on Dahl’s articulation of it, some of which, however, do not come out clearly in 
his presentation. Based on what was said in previous sections, I would, though, first like to 
suggest this revision: 
 
Each citizen or member ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for discovering 
and validating (within the time permitted by the need for a decision) the choice on the 
matter to be decided that would best serve the citizen’s or member’s good or interests. In 
considering that choice, each participant should have an equal and adequate opportunity 
to offer his or her reasons for preferring one outcome to another, and to listen and 
respond to the reasons offered by each of the other participants. In doing so, participants 
should assume responsibility for seeking out mutually acceptable and generally 
                                                                          
68 Ibid. 112. 
69 Ibid. 111.	  
70Ibid. 111-112.	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accessible reasons for their expressed preferences, hence for trying to understand relevant 
social situations and activities from relevant persons’ perspectives. 
 
Now, the criterion implies, Dahl says, that “alternative procedures for decision-making 
ought to be evaluated according to the opportunities they furnish citizens for acquiring an 
understanding of [the] means and ends [of policymaking], of one’s [good or] interests and the 
expected consequences [of the means and ends of policymaking] for interests, not only for 
oneself but for all other relevant persons as well.”71 Of course, as Dahl himself observes, the 
criterion is not unambiguous. Nevertheless, it can evidently provide “guidance for the shape that 
institutions should take.”72 For instance, it  
 
makes it hard to justify procedures that would cut off or suppress information that, were 
it available, might well cause citizens [or members] to arrive at a different decision; or 
that would give some citizens [or members] much easier access to information of crucial 
importance; or that would present citizens [or members] with an agenda of decisions that 
had to be decided without discussion; and so on.73 
 
Now, with this much I am in agreement.74 But I want to extend Dahl’s reasoning, briefly 
discussing a range of responsibilities that the criterion itself can also help us to specify.  
 To begin with, recall that the criterion (as I’ve revised it) specifies that each participant 
should assume responsibility: for seeking out mutually acceptable and generally accessible 
reasons for their expressed preferences; for listening and, as appropriate, for responding to the 
reasons offered by the other participants; and for trying to understand relevant social situations 
and activities from the perspectives of relevant others. Surely, however, more can be said about 
the responsibilities that the criterion helps us to specify. Indeed, if the criterion implies that 
alternative procedures are to be assessed in virtue of the opportunities they provide citizens or 
members for acquiring an understanding of the means and ends of policymaking, and of one’s 
interests and the consequences of policies for interests (not only for oneself but for all other 
relevant persons too), it likewise implies, I submit, that alternatives sources of 
information/knowledge production and alternatives philosophies of social inquiry should also be 
so evaluated. In other words, the criterion implies not only that participants ideally assume 
responsibility for evaluating procedures in this way but also alternative sources of 
information/knowledge production and alternative philosophies of social inquiry too.75 Hence, 
the criterion not only makes it hard to justify procedures that would “cut off or suppress 
information that, were it available, might well cause citizens [or members] to arrive at a different 
                                                                          
71 Ibid. 112; my emphasis. In speaking of “all other relevant persons” here, I presume that Dahl means (something 
like) “anyone whose good or interests might be ‘(somehow) significantly affected by’ the decision(s) in question.” 
Whether or not this is fair to his intention, however, that is what I shall mean by it.  
72 Ibid.	  	  
73 Ibid; emphasis added.	  
74 Although, as chapter 4 already indicated, this and the other criteria ought to be used to reason not just about 
“procedures,” but also about “virtues” and “cultural practices” too. More on this in section IV and chapter 7. 
75 Indeed, it implies that they should ideally evaluate anything that is relevant to assessing to what extent citizens or 
members can acquire an understanding of the means and ends of policymaking, and of one’s interests and the 
consequences of policies for interests (not only for oneself but for all other relevant persons too). To focus the 
discussion, however, I concentrate on the two issues just signaled: alternative sources of information/knowledge 
production and alternative philosophies of social inquiry. 
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decision; or that would give some citizens [or members] much easier access to information of 
crucial importance; or that would present citizens [or members] with an agenda of decisions that 
had to be decided without discussion; and so on”; it also makes it hard to justify a reliance on 
sources of information/knowledge production that would also produce any of these results. And, 
likewise, it makes it hard to justify an advocacy of, or an implicit endorsement of, a philosophy 
of social inquiry that, compared to some other such philosophy, is more liable to do so. 
 
3.3.1 Alternative Sources of Information/Knowledge Production  
 
Consider first the claim about alternative “sources of information/knowledge 
production,” and reflect on the possibility that certain such sources might (for instance) “cut off 
or suppress information that, were it available, might well cause citizens [or members] to arrive 
at a different decision.” To do so, let us begin by noticing the “political function” that is often 
assigned to “the free press” in American constitutional interpretation and in much political 
commentary generally.76 It is widely held that the press, or, better yet, (elements of) the media 
more broadly, ought to seek out “the information needed for the intelligent discharge of [the 
citizen’s] political responsibilities,” thereby “enabling the public to assert meaningful control 
over the political process.”77 Without a media to accomplish this function, it is commonly 
supposed, citizens would only have government-provided or government-sanctioned information 
to rely on in assessing the state’s actions.78 And, it is thought, this would surely imply that 
important information would then be “cut off or suppressed,” information that, we presume, 
would often cause citizens to arrive at very different decisions.79     
The basic viewpoint may briefly be summarized as follows.80 First, we presume that, in 
the context of the American “democratic process” (such as it is), citizens need some (adequate) 
level of “relevant” information to make political participation (at least reasonably) “meaningful” 
and to allow them reasonably to judge how government actions bear on the interests of 
whomever they affect (as the Criterion of Enlightened Understanding suggests they should have 
equal and adequate opportunities to do). Second, we presume that in order to obtain such 
information, or an adequate level of it, no single individual may conceivably act alone. Third, we 
presume that in order to obtain such information, citizens cannot rely solely on information 
provided by the public authorities themselves; rather, they should have access to “independent” 
and “critical” sources of such information. What is more, we presume that such information is 
best generated, and then dispersed, socially or publically, but not in the sense of “by the state or 
government,” and that the press and (elements of) the media are to play this role. To the extent 
that they do, the press/media, we believe, therefore serve a crucial function on behalf of “the 
democratic process,” presumably allowing the demos to play a more meaningful role in it. 
Accordingly, an independent and critical media is viewed as an important contributing factor to 
citizens’ ability to assess what political choices might best serve citizens’ interests. We therefore 
                                                                          
76 For discussion, see, for instance, Mermin (1999), especially chapter 1, and Bollinger (2010). See also chapter 7 of 
this dissertation. 
77 Lewis (1987). 
78 Well, not quite: they could also rely on their own personal observations as well as rumors and word-of-mouth 
accounts of government actions.	  
79 Here I am just referring to “citizens” because I am briefly reviewing how the “political function” of the “free 
press” is often depicted in American constitutional interpretation and political commentary, where “American 
citizens” are the concern. 
80 A much more detailed treatment is provided in chapter 7.	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presume that, “from a democratic point of view,” we have good reason to want to protect the 
right, and to guard or enhance the ability of, the media to be independent and critical. Such 
media, we may add, place citizens in a better position to assume the responsibilities specified by 
the Criterion of Enlightened Understanding. And, we may add, the criterion itself implies that 
participants to the democratic process should ideally assume responsibility for assessing which 
sources of information/knowledge production best allow them to assume these responsibilities.  
 
3.3.2 Alternative Philosophies of Social Inquiry 
 
Now, a “philosophy of social inquiry” cannot be assessed in quite the way that “a source 
of information/knowledge production” can be. As I am using these terms, the latter has a 
“product” that can be assessed in terms of its actual “content.” The members of a news 
organization, for instance, themselves “produce” information through their actions. Thus, “the 
organization itself” is a “source of information/knowledge production,” whose product can be 
directly evaluated. By contrast, a “philosophy of social inquiry” cannot be so assessed. For “a 
philosophy” does not directly “produce” anything that can be so. Nevertheless, one’s implicit or 
explicit endorsement of the ideas “contained in a philosophy” may, of course, incline one to 
produce “information” or “knowledge” in this way or that. For it gives one a certain sensibility, 
hence influences how one acts in the world. Thus, it may influence the actual production of 
“information” and “knowledge” (as well as what is regarded as “information” and 
“knowledge”). So, it is sensible to ask: Are there ways in which one philosophy of social inquiry 
may lead participants to meet the Criterion of Enlightened Understanding better than some other 
such philosophy?  
Here, it is challenging to offer a brief but compelling response to this question.81 
Nevertheless, consider the possibility that some such philosophy could lead participants to 
think/act in ways that “cut off or suppress information that, were it available, might well cause 
[them] to arrive at a different decision.” To do so, compare a philosophy of social inquiry that 
begins from the supposition that all inquiry is “value-guided” and “value-laden” with one that 
explicitly rejects that claim, holding that “value-free” and “value-neutral” social inquiry is 
possible.82 More specifically, compare how one may be disposed to act if one endorses the 
former philosophy with how one may be disposed to act if one endorses the latter. Where one 
endorses the former, I submit, one will be disposed to look for norms and values “everywhere.” 
And where one endorses the latter, one will be disposed to believe that norms and values are 
sometimes “absent” (e.g., in properly conducted “social-scientific research,” which is construed 
as being “value-free” and “value-neutral”).  
                                                                          
81 But part of chapter 6 is devoted to giving a compelling response to it. 
82 For an historical account of the rise of the idea of “value-free/neutral” science/inquiry, see Proctor (1999). For 
critical accounts of this idea, see, among others, Kincaid et al. (2007) and Putnam (2002). The view that “all 
inquiry is ‘value-guided’ and ‘value-laden’’” is one that I associate with, among others, the classical 
pragmatists. To the best of my knowledge, though, none of the classical pragmatists explicitly made that claim, 
explicitly invoking that terminology. Rather, I  am offering my own way of stating a viewpoint that I believe 
that they would endorse, and that would seem to follow from beliefs that they did explicitly endorse. (See  
chap te r  6 . )  As Hilary Putnam (2002: 30) has remarked, “The classical pragmatists, Peirce, James, Dewey, 
and Mead, all held that value and normativity permeate all of experience. In the philosophy of science, what 
this point of view implied is that normative judgments are essential to the practice of science itself.” Note that, 
as the classical pragmatists also recognized, there are many different kinds of “values,” including not just “moral” 
and “ethical” values but also “epistemic” and “aesthetic” ones too. For discussion, see Putnam (2002) and Walsh 
(2011).   
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Now, suppose that, indeed, all inquiry is “value-guided” and “value-laden.”83 If so, this 
would imply that when someone does think that “value-free” and “value-neutral” social inquiry 
is possible and hence is disposed to believe that norms and values may be “absent” in some 
given inquiry, one is therefore inclined to miss certain moments when indeed they are “present.” 
Additionally, suppose that some of those moments are ones in which what is said (and not said) 
then can be said to “have moral or ethical significance and implications,”84 and precisely 
because of the norms and values that are “present” there. Depending on the circumstances, this 
                                                                          
83 In chapter 6, I defend the claim that all inquiry can fairly be characterized this way. (Note that I do not just speak 
of ethical or moral values here, but also of other values, like epistemic and aesthetic ones.) For the purposes of this 
chapter, I wish merely to make it plausible to say that, if that claim can be adequately defended, we have good 
reason for endorsing a philosophy of social inquiry that affirms that claim over a philosophy that (implicitly or 
explicitly) denies it. Chapter 6 will give a more robust account of why we should endorse a philosophy of inquiry 
that affirms the claim that all inquiry is “value-guided” and “value-laden.” 
84 Why do I refer here to the “moral or ethical significance and implications” of “what is said (and not said)” in some 
inquiry? Well, to enter into a moral dialogue and deliberation about the justifiability of some “binding,” collective 
decision is, I have suggested, to search out mutually justifiable and mutually acceptable reasons for one’s expressed 
policy preferences. And to do so, one has to try and understand the (potential or actual) “moral or ethical 
significance and implications of what is said (and not said) about “‘relevant’ social situations and activities,” where 
“relevant” has the meaning of “whatever is sincerely regarded as ‘relevant’ by one’s interlocutors.” So, for instance, 
where a dialogue/deliberation concerns the justifiability of some proposed foreign intervention, participant 1 might 
well regard the potential impact of the proposed intervention on the children of the society-to-be-“intervened-in” as 
a primary topic of concern. So, ideally speaking, participants 2 through N have the responsibility for trying to 
understand the “(potential or actual) moral or ethical significance and implications” what is said (and not said) about 
the potential impact of the proposed intervention on said children. Now, so far I can see, there is no way to specify 
in advance what (kinds of) words, terms, phrases, or sentences or other communicative symbols or gestures will 
“(potentially or actually) have moral or ethical significance and implications” when they are employed (or not 
employed) by participant 1’s interlocutors in relation to said topic. Instead, it seems to me that the responsibility in 
question is for participants 2 through N to try to understand “the (potential or actual) moral or ethical significance 
and implications” of whatever is said (and not said) about said topic from the perspective of person 1. A very brief 
example should serve to illustrate.  
Suppose, for instance, that in the first dialogue/deliberation about the proposed intervention, participants 2 
through N make no reference or allusion to children at all. In reaction, person 1 might think that all of what said by 
participants 2 through N in the dialogue/deliberation in question “is morally or ethically significant” in that “that 
level of inattention to something so important as the lives of children evinces a sad lack of sensitivity to the likely 
humanitarian consequences of the proposed intervention.” Equally, she might say that what was not said by 
participants 2 through N “is morally or ethically significant” for the same reason. Furthermore, she might say that all 
of what was said by participants 2 through N “has moral or ethical implications” because it means that deliberators 
“are less likely even to consider the impact of the proposed intervention on said children, hence are more likely to 
make a decision that adversely affects their well-being.” Equally, she might say that what was not said by 
participants 2 through N “has moral or ethical implications” for the same reason. Or, recognizing that there are other 
dialogues/deliberations to come, she might say that all of what was said (or what was not said) is potentially 
“morally or ethically significant” because “that level of inattention to something so important as the lives of children 
could evince a sad lack of sensitivity to the likely humanitarian consequences of the proposed intervention,” 
assuming that the same pattern is observed in the remaining dialogues/deliberations on said intervention. 
Furthermore (and again recognizing that there are further dialogues/deliberations to come), she might say that all of 
what was said (or what was not said) by participants 2 through N potentially “has moral or ethical implications” 
because it means that deliberators “might be less likely even to consider the impact of the proposed intervention on 
said children, hence are more likely to make a decision that adversely affects their well-being,” assuming that the 
same pattern is observed in the remaining dialogues/deliberations on said intervention.  
These considerations suggest the conclusion that, ideally speaking, each participant should try to 
understand “the (potential or actual) moral or ethical significance and implications” of whatever is said (and not 
said) about “relevant social activities and social situations” from the respective perspectives of each of the other 
participants. 
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could imply that “relevant” information was being “cut off or suppressed,” indeed, information 
that, “were it available, might well cause citizens to arrive at a different decision.” And, in 
consequence, it could imply that the Criterion of Enlightened Understanding would have been 
better served by the alternative philosophy that had disposed participants to look for norms and 
values “everywhere.” 
 To see this, suppose that, in trying to understand the character of some particular 
policy, the participants produce, and then come solely to rely on, a particular description of that 
policy. Furthermore, suppose that they begin by endorsing a philosophy of social inquiry 
that does hold that “value-free/neutral” social inquiry is possible. Still further, suppose that, 
partly in consequence of that endorsement, they begin by regarding their policy description as 
being merely a “factual” account, hence as being “value-free/neutral.”  
 Now, suppose that the participants subsequently choose to adopt a philosophy that holds 
that all inquiry is “value-guided” and “value-laden,” and are, therefore, disposed to look for 
norms and values “everywhere.” Consequently, they decide to conduct an inquiry that serves to 
reveal the value-guided character of the description in question (and, as we’ll see, its value-
laden character as well). More specifically, suppose that, by conducting their inquiry, they 
reveal how certain o f  t h e i r  o w n  norms and values h a d  o r i g i n a l l y  l e d  them, in 
describing the policy, not to include a consideration of certain persons’ actions, motives, and 
intentions – including those that, even for the “minimal” purposes of “descriptive accuracy,” 
they retrospectively come to agree t h a t  they should have included. (We need not postulate 
any moral or ethical motives or intentions behind the participants’ choices about 
what to include. Indeed, let us just suppose that, in producing the original 
description, the information in question was simply not regarded as “relevant” to the 
description in question, for whatever “epistemic reasons” you like: say, for reasons of 
“parsimoniousness,” or “coherence,” or “plausibility.” The citizens’ epistemic values, 
and their epistemic values alone, are what led them not to include the information, 
we’ll say.85) In particular, suppose that the description is of a policy implemented by a 
foreign state, but with crucial support from the citizens’ own. Further, suppose that the role of 
those participants’ own state in supporting the policy is precisely what is excluded from the 
description, and that, in consequence, the actions, motives, and intentions of their state’s 
decision-makers are too. 
 Now, suppose that, through a process of reflection triggered by their inquiry, the 
participants come to see that, by originally viewing the description in question as being merely a 
“factual account” (hence “value-free/neutral”), they had failed to recognize “the moral or 
ethical significance and implications” of what was said (and not said) in that description. In 
particular, let us say that they come to see that they had failed to recognize who certain of the 
                                                                          
85 Note that, to be intelligible, any social inquiry will have to include an implicit or explicit description of certain 
persons’ actions, motives, and intentions. Moreover, note that, by necessity, all inquiries are selective about all of 
the (different kinds of) information they include. Furthermore, all inquiries are selective for reasons that partly have 
to do with our “epistemic values,” e.g. reasons that have to do with “relevance,” “coherence,” etc. Hence all 
intelligible social inquiries selectively include information/claims about certain persons’ actions, motives, and 
intentions, and do so partly for epistemic reasons. The question, then, is whether this “necessary selectivity” (about 
persons’ actions, motives, and intentions) leads us to think, on reflection, that what is said (or is not said) in the 
inquiry in question may reasonably be said to “have moral or ethical significance and implications.” If so, we can 
then say that in recognizing how an inquiry is “value-guided” we may come to see how it is also “value-laden.” (I 
assume that in recognizing how an inquiry is “value-guided,” we therefore recognize that it conveys values. And an 
inquiry that “conveys” values is also one that is “value-laden.”)   
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persons were whose interests were “(somehow) significantly affected by” their own state’s 
actions.86 In other words, they see that they had failed to recognize who certain of their “moral 
constituents” were. Furthermore, we may suppose that the inquiry thereby helps them “to 
understand relevant social situations and activities from the perspectives of relevant others” – 
more specifically, to understand the consequences of the policy they had (unwittingly) supported 
from the perspectives of those whose interests were (somehow) importantly affected by it. For, 
as I’ve characterized this hypothetical, the participants began with a description that failed to 
recognize the actions of agents of their own state in executing or implementing the policy. 
As such, the description failed to indicate that their own state did support the policy in 
question, and, accordingly, it did not point them to the possibility that they bore some 
responsibility for it. Consequently, “the description/factual account” did not allow them to see 
that “their” actions were “relevant” here. Hence, the moral or ethical significance and 
implications of the description was evident to the moral constituents but was shielded from the 
participants. (Here, let us suppose that the moral constituents had always recognized that the 
state in question had supported the policy in question. Moreover, let us suppose that they had 
always recognized that the participants’ original description of the policy in question had not 
recognized the actions of the participants’ state. Hence, in getting the participants also to 
recognize these facts, the inquiry brings them to better understand the perspectives of the moral 
constituents. Moreover, we may suppose that it gets them to see why the moral constituents had 
always seen the description in question as “value-guided” and “value-laden,”87 given that they 
had always recognized that the participants’ choices about what to include in the description 
implied that their own status as “moral constituents” would remain unrecognized.) But the 
participants’ inquiry brings them to see this, and hence to understand the consequences of the 
policy they had supported from the perspectives of those who were “(somehow) significantly 
affected by it.”  
 If so, it would also be fair to say that the imagined inquiry aided them in better living up 
to the Criterion of Enlightened Understanding. For recall that, on my reinterpretation of it, the 
criterion specifies that participants should assume responsibility for seeking out mutually 
acceptable and generally accessible reasons for their expressed policy preferences. And this 
responsibility entails a number of further, more specific responsibilities, including: (a) that they 
try to identify who their moral constituents are, hence to whom they owe a justification for any 
policy that they (would) support; and (b) that they try to understand relevant social situations 
and activities from the perspectives of relevant others (including their moral constituents), hence 
also that they to try to understand “the moral or ethical significance and implications” of what 
is said (or is not said) about those relevant social situations and activities by those who support 
the pertinent policy. If the inquiry in question succeeded in helping the participants to live up to 
those commitments, it could fairly be said to have served the Criterion of Enlightened 
Understanding too. 
 Furthermore, it would then be fair to say that, by originally regarding the description in 
question as merely being a “factual account” (hence “value-free/neutral”), certain relevant 
information was then being “cut off or suppressed,” indeed, information that, conceivably at 
least, could have led the participants to arrive at a different decision. (It is conceivable that had 
the participants originally recognized the moral constituents, they would have changed 
                                                                          
86 Recall that, in o u r  hypothetical description, t h e i r  state’s actions with respect to the policy in question were not 
at all recognized. 
87 Of course, in any actual case, they may not (indeed, very likely will not!) use that terminology.  
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something about, perhaps never even supported, the policy in question.) And it would then be 
fair to say that the participants’ choice to endorse the philosophy that holds that all social 
inquiry is “value-guided” and “value-laden” better served the Criterion of Enlightened 
Understanding than their original choice to endorse a philosophy that holds that “value-
free/neutral” social inquiry is possible.  
 
3.4 The Fourth Criterion 
 
 We turn now to Dahl’s final criterion: the Criterion of Final Control of the Agenda by the 
Demos. This is how he states it: 
 
The demos88 must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how matters are to be placed 
on the agenda of matters to be decided by means of the democratic process.89 
 
Now, I do not wish to revise this fourth criterion. For again, no insights derived from inquiry into 
paradigmatic moments of “free and equal treatment” lead me to think that there are reasons for 
abandoning or revising it. Here, however, I do want to say something about why Dahl offers the 
criterion, and about why I think that we should endorse it too. Furthermore, I want to mention 
some of the main responsibilities that the criterion would seem to entail. 
 Dahl notes that even if a democratic association were to meet the first three criteria 
“perfectly,” it nevertheless could be “a travesty of democracy.”90  
 
Let us imagine an independent country where the three criteria we have discussed are 
relatively well met, and in addition there are no limitations on the matters that citizens 
may decide. Their agenda of collective decisions is completely open. Suppose that an 
antidemocratic movement somehow seizes power. In a move to placate the democratic 
sentiments of their fellow countrymen the new rulers leave the old constitution 
symbolically in place. However, they modify it in one respect. Hereafter, the people may 
use their old democratic political institutions for only a few matters – purely local 
questions, let us say, such as traffic control, street maintenance, and residential zoning. 
The rulers keep all the rest strictly under their own control.91  
 
Now, such a political association, Dahl rightly observes, would be “a travesty of democracy.” 
“For citizens could not democratically decide matters they felt to be important other than those 
the rulers had allowed to remain on the pitifully shrunken agenda of the neutered democracy.”92 
 An analogous example could be given with respect to a group of friends, whose agenda-
setting, and so decision-making, processes become usurped by a new associate. Briefly, consider 
a case where a new associate “joins” a group of friends and offers to “coordinate the logistics” of 
an upcoming group vacation abroad. Group discussion (which includes the involvement of the 
new associate) leads the friends to think that the new associate is just going to arrange whatever 
                                                                          
88 For our purposes, we’ll use “the demos” either to refer to “the citizens of the state in question” or to “the members 
of the association in question.” 
89 Dahl (1989:113). 
90 Ibid. 113.	  
91 Ibid. 113. 
92 Ibid.	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exact trip the group decides to make in the forthcoming weeks. For whatever reason, group 
discussion leads them also to decide that it is easiest for them to pool their resources together and 
to have one person make the hotel reservations, pay for the day trips that they would like to do 
through various in-country travel agencies, purchase the plane tickets for in-country travel while 
abroad, and so forth. So, trusting the new associate, they pool their money, agreeing to allow the 
new associate to “coordinate the logistics” for the forthcoming trio. Once they have done so, 
however, they realize that, using their collective resources, the new associate has gone ahead and 
made hotel reservations where he alone decided he wanted to stay, planned and paid for the day 
trips that he alone decided that he wanted to make, and so forth – all without consulting any of 
his “friends.” Here, too, we would have a “travesty of democracy.” For the friends in question 
could not democratically decide matters they felt to be important (e.g., where to stay, which day 
trips to make) other than those that the new associate had allowed to remain on the “pitifully 
shrunken agenda of the neutered democracy” (perhaps which restaurants to eat at while abroad). 
 What, though, do these considerations suggest about the responsibilities that participants 
ought ideally to assume? To respond, notice first what the criterion, as stated, does not imply. 
 
According to this criterion, a political system would employ a fully democratic process 
even if the demos decided that it would not make every decision on every matter but 
instead chose to have some decisions made, say, in a hierarchical fashion by judges or 
administrators. As long as the demos could effectively retrieve any matter for decision by 
itself, the criterion would be met…. Thus the criterion of final control does not 
presuppose a judgment that the demos is qualified to decide every question requiring a 
binding decision. It does presuppose a judgment that the demos is qualified to decide (1) 
which matters do or do not require binding decisions, (2) of those that do, which matters 
the demos is qualified to decide itself, and (3) the terms on which the demos delegates 
authority. To accept the criterion as appropriate is therefore to imply that the demos is the 
best judge of its own competence and limits.  
 
Accordingly, we might observe that the criterion helps us to define the following principal 
responsibilities that, ideally speaking, those who choose to participate ought to assume. (I stress 
that, ideally speaking, the citizens or members of the association in question ought to have equal 
and adequate opportunities to participate in the decisions referenced under [1]-[3] above. I take 
this to be an implication of the claim that “the demos”93 must have the exclusive opportunity to 
decide how matters are to be placed on the agenda of matters to be decided by means of the 
democratic process.”) First, they ought to assume responsibility for judging which matters do or 
do not require binding decisions. Second, they ought to assume responsibility for judging which 
matters, of those that do require a binding decision, the demos is itself qualified to decide. And 
third, they ought to assume responsibility for judging the terms on which the demos delegates 
authority. 
 
Conclusion   
 
                                                                          
93 For our purposes, we’ll use “the demos” to refer either to “the citizens of the state in question” or to “the members 
of the association in question.” 
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 In closing, let us briefly review the main conclusions from this chapter, tying these into a 
variety of relevant considerations adduced in the previous chapter, “Normative Democratic 
Theory as a Tool for Practical Reasoning.” 
Having developed a Dewey-inspired approach to normative democratic theory in chapter 
4, I then, in this chapter, aimed to develop my own “normative theory of the democratic 
process.” I did so by critically engaging with Robert Dahl’s normative theory. Here, I reiterate 
the main points of similarity between our respective approaches, which highlight why I chose to 
engage with his theory in the first place. In doing so, I’ll highlight how my theory differs from 
Dahl’s theory, and so how it can be read as an improvement on it.94 Furthermore, I’ll underscore 
how the juxtaposition between Dahl’s theory and my own theory indicates the benefits of a 
Dewey-inspired anthropological-interpretive approach to normative democratic theory. 
To begin with, Dahl’s theory is based on two major premises (which refer us back to 
what I referred to in chapter 4 as “the twin values that arguably justify the adoption of a 
democratic process in the first place,” namely, the values of treating persons as “moral equals” 
and as “autonomous”). First, if we regard persons as somehow being “intrinsically equal,” it 
follows that the process by which an association governs itself ought to give “equal 
consideration” to the good or interests of each of its citizens or members. Second, if we presume 
that the adult members of an association are “autonomous” – that they are the best judges, 
promoters, and defenders of their own good or interests – we should assume that they are 
adequately qualified to participate in that process. Based on these premises, Dahl offers four 
“criteria for a democratic process.” Dahl’s criteria specify the equal and adequate opportunities 
for participation that citizens should ideally have in such a process. The criteria are “standards – 
ideal standards, if you like – against which procedures proposed ought to be evaluated in any 
association to which the assumptions [“justifying a democratic political order” may be said to] 
apply,” those assumptions being that persons are regarded as intrinsically equal and as 
autonomous.95 More specifically, the criteria, he says, ought to be used for assessing how well 
alternative procedures furnish citizens with the equal and adequate opportunities that the criteria 
articulate. 
In this chapter, I suggested that we should endorse Dahl’s two premises (in a modified 
form in the case of the first premise), but reconsider the implications of our doing so. First off, I 
agreed with Dahl that if we regard persons as being “intrinsically equal” (as both of us accept we 
should), it follows that the process by which a political association governs itself ought to give 
“equal consideration” to the good or interests of each of its members. However, I proposed an 
amendment to this first premise. Again, instead of saying that if we regard persons as somehow 
being “intrinsically equal,” it follows that the process by which a political association governs 
itself ought to give “equal consideration” to the good or interests of each of its members, I 
offered reasons for preferring to say that we should therefore give “equal consideration to, and 
show equal concern and respect for,” the good or interests of all relevant persons. The second 
premise I did not amend: if we presume that the adult members of an association are 
“autonomous” – that they are the best judges, promoters, and defenders of their own good or 
                                                                          
94 Often, the best way to make progress in theory is to differentiate one’s own theory from whatever theory is, in 
relevant respects at least, the theory that is “closest” to one’s own theory. This helps to make it clear how one’s own 
theory offers an improvement on what, in relevant respects at least, is “the best theory” currently on offer. 
95 Dahl (1989: 108-109). 
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interests – we should, indeed, assume that they are adequately qualified to participate in that 
process.96  
Moving on to the criteria themselves, I agreed with Dahl that we should think of the 
criteria for a democratic process as “ideal standards,” but chose to use the terminology “ideal 
procedural criteria” instead. However, taking the arguments developed in this chapter together 
with selected arguments from chapter 4, I disagreed with Dahl on two major substantive issues 
with respect to the criteria.  
First, I disagreed on how to characterize the ideal procedural criteria themselves and I 
disagreed on how to characterize their function (that is to say, the function of normative 
democratic theory) in democratic practice. On the first issue, I argued, the ideal procedural 
criteria should specify not only the (equal and adequate) opportunities that the process (and that 
participants) should ideally grant each other; they should also specify the responsibilities that 
participants should ideally assume in relation to one another (and, indeed, those they [ought to] 
represent).97 Anthropological-interpretive inquiry into paradigmatic moments of “free and equal 
treatment” reveals, I suggested, that persons who view each other as intrinsically equal and 
autonomous recognize that they owe each other justifications for their expressed policy 
preferences. Therefore, the ideal procedural criteria should not just articulate certain (equal and 
adequate) opportunities but also a number of responsibilities related to such justification. In this 
way, we are led from Dahl’s own premises to a deliberative conception of the democratic 
process. This, I submit, is an important outcome. As indicated in chapter 1, a broad range of 
democrats, including so-called “aggregative democrats” and so-called “deliberative democrats,” 
agree that democracy is a “moral or ethical ideal.” For it seems that all such democrats (at least 
tacitly) endorse some ideal of “free and equal personhood,” and, in consequence, some ideal of 
“free and equal citizenship or membership.” Nevertheless, such democrats currently arrive at 
very different conclusions about what an inclusive, democratic process should look like (for 
instance, “aggregative democracy” is sometimes understood to stand in sharp contrast to 
“deliberative democracy”). If, however, we can derive a deliberative conception of democracy 
from the core values that “aggregative democrats” and “deliberative democrats” both apparently 
endorse (that is, the values of treating citizens or members as “free” and as “equal”), my theory 
promises to bring more “aggregative democrats” into the “deliberative” fold, creating broader 
agreement on what a democratic process should at least ideally look like. 
On the second issue, I argued, the function of normative democratic theory in democratic 
practice should not be what Dahl suggests it should be. (Here is where we need to recall various 
conclusions from chapter 4). Again, Dahl suggests that normative democratic theory ought to be 
                                                                          
96 I did, however, add the comment that this presumption – the Presumption of Personal Autonomy – should be 
interpreted so as to include the implication that “autonomous persons” should be presumed to be the best judges of 
how actions bear on their own good or their own respective interests. 
97 Among the responsibilities that we either included in the criteria themselves or characterized as entailments of 
them are the responsibilities: to seek out mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons for one’s expressed 
policy preferences; to listen and, as appropriate, respond to the reasons offered by each of the other participants; to 
try to understand relevant social situations and activities from each other’s perspectives; to judge which matters do 
or do not require binding decisions; to judge which matters (of those that do require a binding decision) the demos is 
itself qualified to decide; to judge the terms on which the demos delegates authority; and finally, to evaluate 
alternative procedures, sources of information/knowledge production, and philosophies of social inquiry in virtue of 
the opportunities they furnish citizens for acquiring an understanding of the means and ends of policymaking, of 
one’s good or interests and the expected consequences of the means and ends of policymaking for interests, not only 
for oneself but for all other relevant persons as well. 	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used for assessing how well alternative procedures furnish citizens or the members of an 
association with the equal and adequate opportunities that the criteria articulate; he mentions no 
other role for it. By contrast, my view is that the participants to a democratic process ought to use 
the ideal procedural criteria as a tool for inquiring into the procedures, virtues, and cultural 
practices that, in the particular context in which they do (have to) act, are most apt to promote 
the effective granting of the (equal and adequate) opportunities that are specified by those criteria 
and are most apt to promote the effective assumption of the (corollary negative and positive) 
responsibilities that are specified (or entailed) by them. (Again, we arrived at that conclusion [in 
chapter 4] through informed reflection on paradigmatic moments of “treatment as free and 
equal” in joint or collective decision-making. Here again, I suggest, we can see the benefit of my 
Dewey-inspired philosophic method – that is, we can see the benefit of engaging in 
anthropological-interpretive inquiry into moral experience itself. For such inquiry helps us to see 
why participants ought ideally to engage in such inquiry in the first place. That is, when we 
reflect on those joint or collective decisions (say, among friends) in which we typically do think 
that we are being treated as moral equals, we notice that we do recognize the potential need to 
inquire, and that, as appropriate, we actually do inquire, into “procedures,” “virtues,” and 
“cultural practices” in this way. And, reasoning analogically, we can then appreciate that, in 
order to treat each other (and those, if any, they [ought to] represent) as free and equal, the 
participants to a democratic process should do so too. 
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Chapter 6  
 
 
 Why the Democratic Process Ought to Be Conducted as a Reflexive Social Practice 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 In chapter 4, “Normative Democratic Theory as a Tool for Practical Reasoning,” I 
suggested that the democratic process ought to be conceived of as a form of collective social 
inquiry. In chapter 5, “Toward a Normative Theory of the Democratic Process,” I then suggested 
that the normative theory that I developed in that chapter gives us reason to prefer some sources 
of information/knowledge production to other such sources, just as it gives us reason to prefer 
some philosophies of social inquiry to other such philosophies. More specifically, the claim was 
that the Criterion of Enlightened Understanding implies that, ideally speaking, participants not 
only assume responsibility for evaluating alternative decision-making procedures in virtue of the 
opportunities they afford participants for acquiring an understanding of the means and ends of 
policy-making, and of relevant persons’ interests and the consequences of policies for relevant 
persons’ interests; it also implies that participants evaluate alternative sources of 
information/knowledge production and alternative philosophies of social inquiry in this way too. 
Furthermore, recall that, in that chapter, I observed that the Criterion of Enlightened 
Understanding implies that, ideally speaking, participants should assume responsibility for 
seeking our mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons for their expressed policy 
preferences. And, I pointed out, this responsibility entails a number of further, more specific 
responsibilities, including that they try to understand relevant social situations and activities from 
the perspectives of relevant persons, hence also the “moral or ethical significance and 
implications” of whatever participants say (and do not say) about those relevant social situations 
and activities. 
 In this chapter, I want to develop a claim that can reasonably be understood as directly 
emerging from the observations summarized in the previous paragraph. The claim is that the 
democratic process is best conceived of as a form of collective social inquiry, conducted as a 
“reflexive social practice”: as a practice in which participants recognize the potential need to 
inquire, and, as appropriate, actually do inquire, into the (potential or actual) moral or ethical 
significance and implications of whatever is said (and not said) in whatever inquiries are fed into, 
or invoked in the context of, the democratic process.1 (In the rest of this chapter, I’ll sometimes 
refer back to this claim as “the main claim.”) 
 
I. Three Arguments for Conducting the Democratic Process as a Form of Collective Social 
Inquiry 
 
We begin with the reference to “whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context 
of, the democratic process” in the main claim. What are the “inquiries” that I refer to here?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See note 84, chapter 5, for an elaboration of why I refer to “the (potential or actual) moral or ethical significance 
and implications of whatever is said (or not said)” in those inquiries. 
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To begin with, recall that in chapter 4 I suggested that, ideally speaking, the democratic 
process ought to be conducted as a form of collective social inquiry. And recall that, more 
specifically, the suggestion was that informed reflection on paradigmatic moments of “free and 
equal treatment” in joint or collective decision-making reveals that in order to give equal 
consideration to, and to show equal concern and respect for, the good or interests of each of the 
participants, participants grant certain (equal and adequate) opportunities to one another and 
assume certain (corollary positive and negative) responsibilities in relation to one another. (This 
idea was developed in chapter 5 as well.) Furthermore, I suggested that informed reflection on 
such paradigmatic moments reveals that participants: recognize that, in order effectively to grant 
one another such opportunities, they often need to adopt a specific procedure for doing so; 
recognize that there are certain moral, ethical, and intellectual virtues that would assist the 
participants to the process in assuming (or that would dispose them to assume) the (positive and 
negative) responsibilities entailed by the effective granting of such opportunities; and recognize 
that there are cultural practices that can promote a social environment that is conducive to the 
effective granting of such opportunities and to the effective assumption of the (positive and 
negative) responsibilities that are involved in their doing so. Still further, the suggestion was that 
such reflection also reveals that participants: recognize that there is often a need to inquire, and 
frequently do inquire, into the specific procedures that, in the particular context in which they do 
(have to) act, are most likely to allow them effectively to grant such opportunities; recognize that 
there is often a need to inquire, and that they sometimes do inquire, into the specific virtues that 
would assist the participants to the process in assuming (or that would dispose them to assume) 
the (positive and negative) responsibilities entailed by the effective granting of those 
opportunities; and recognize that there is often a need to inquire, and that they frequently do 
inquire, into the specific cultural practices that can promote a social environment that is 
conducive to the effective granting of those opportunities and to the effective assumption of the 
(positive and negative) responsibilities that are involved in their doing so.  
In short, the suggestion was that informed reflection on paradigmatic moments of free 
and equal treatment in joint or collective decision-making reveals that, in those moments, 
participants recognize the need to inquire, and, as appropriate, actually do inquire, into the 
procedures, virtues, and cultural practices that, in the particular context in which they do (have 
to) act, are most apt to promote the effective granting of certain opportunities and the effective 
assumption of certain responsibilities. That, again, is why I said that, ideally speaking, 
democracy’s participants should (think they should) conduct empirical inquiries that illuminate 
how, in some particular context, they might best uphold the norms and realize the values that the 
normative democratic theory developed in chapter 5 helps them to articulate. And that, I also 
added, is one reason why I suggested that, ideally speaking, the democratic process ought to be 
conducted as a form of collective social inquiry. For brevity, let’s summarize this first argument 
for conducting the democratic process as a form of collective social inquiry as The Presumed 
Need to Inquire into Procedures, Virtues, and Cultural Practices. 
 There are, however, at least two other arguments for why the democratic process ought to 
be conducted as a form of collective social inquiry.  
The first of these emerges directly from the normative democratic theory developed in 
chapter 5. Recall that, on my interpretation, the Criterion on Effective Participation and the 
Criterion of Enlightened Understanding both say that participants should assume responsibility 
for seeking out mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons for their expressed policy 
preferences, and, consequently, for trying to understand relevant social activities and situations 
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from relevant persons’ perspectives. Now, notice that assuming these responsibilities entails 
conducting a good deal of inquiry, which we can even appreciate by looking at a case where 
there are just two agents involved.  
For two agents sincerely to seek out reasons that are mutually acceptable and mutually 
accessible, they have to assume numerous further responsibilities: for instance, for listening to 
each other and, as appropriate, for responding to each other. And these responsibilities entail still 
further ones. For instance, “listening and responding to another person” often entails questioning 
and even transforming one’s own self-understandings or self-perceptions. (“You say that you 
have ‘always’ been strongly committed to the social/economic/political ideal of ‘equal 
opportunity’; but what about your long-standing opposition to gay marriage and same-sex 
adoption? Don’t all members of our society deserve an ‘equal opportunity’ to start a family and 
to adopt children in the same way that heterosexual couples do?”). Or consider the fact that, 
often, “listening and responding to another person” entails “putting oneself in their shoes,” that 
is, sympathetically projecting oneself into their ‘heart and mind,’ thereby trying to understand 
relevant social activities and situations from their perspective, to see and feel them as they do. 
(“Imagine what you would feel like if you and you’re partner were neither able to bear your own 
children nor permitted to adopt children. How would you feel then? Before you respond with 
some platitude about the ‘disadvantages’ that my children are likely to suffer in virtue of the fact 
that they have gay parents, you should at least try to understand the matter from my 
perspective.”) Moreover, the assumption of these further responsibilities entails assuming still 
further ones: for instance, “questioning and even transforming one’s own self-understandings or 
self-perceptions” might entail revisiting the history of one’s policy positions and the way in 
which one has interpreted the aim of “equal opportunity,” while “sympathetically projecting 
oneself into another person’s ‘heart and mind’” may entail re-thinking the empirical evidence – 
such as there is – on the “disadvantages” that the children of same-sex couples face and placing 
that evidence alongside a more sensitive and nuanced understanding of the emotional burdens 
suffered by those who are denied marriage and adoption rights. And so on. Indeed, beginning 
with just one responsibility (e.g. the responsibility for seeking out mutually acceptable and 
generally accessible reasons for one’s expressed policy preferences), one can continue on almost 
indefinitely in the task of enumerating additional responsibilities that, in some particular context, 
(would) arguably follow on the sincere assumption of that “first responsibility.”    	   This observation puts the lie to the idea that an “ethics” or a “morality” could ever be 
made fully explicit. But there is another, related implication that I am driving at, namely, that our 
normative democratic theory itself suggests that there is reason to maintain that the democratic 
process ought to be conducted as a form of collective social inquiry. I refer to the fact that, as 
just indicated, the Criterion of Effective Participation and the Criterion of Enlightened 
Understanding both say that participants should assume responsibility for seeking out mutually 
acceptable and generally accessible reasons for their expressed policy preferences, and so for 
trying to understand relevant social activities and situations from each other’s perspectives, and 
that their doing so entails that they engage in various forms of inquiry: perhaps, for instance, 
questioning and even transforming their own self-understandings or self-perceptions; 
sympathetically projecting themselves into relevant persons’ “heart and minds”; revisiting the 
history of their own policy positions and the way in which they have interpreted certain relevant 
social/economic/political ideals; developing a more sensitive and nuanced understanding of the 
emotional burdens suffered by those who are critically impacted by relevant policies; and so on.  
For brevity, let’s summarize this second argument for conducting the democratic process as a 
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form of collective social inquiry as The Presumed Need to Inquire into What Could Count as 
Mutually Acceptable and Generally Accessible Reasons. 
 The third argument is one that, stated in a quite general form, applies, I believe, to any 
normative democratic theory worthy of the name, not just to our own theory from chapter 5. Let 
me first state the argument in its general form and then offer a brief articulation of the variant of 
it that is specific to our own theory.  
The basic idea is simple: any reasonable view of collective decision-making will view 
that process as, among other things, a way to generate knowledge and information that is 
relevant to making “informed,” “intelligent,” “reasonable,” or “rational” decisions, however one 
specifically interprets these adjectives. Correspondingly, any normative theory of the democratic 
process will presumably stipulate, or, if it forgets to do so, accept as a friendly amendment, that 
one desideratum for “informed,” “intelligent,” “reasonable,” or “rational” decision-making, 
however defined, is that participants have some “adequate” level of “relevant” information about 
the past, present, and/or proposed actions of “relevant” agents and/or agencies.2 One simply 
cannot make such a decision without some such information; for instance, an “informed,” 
“intelligent,” “reasonable,” or “rational” decision about future energy policy without any 
information about how past energy policy has worked out. Accordingly, any normative 
democratic theory will presumably recognize the need for the democratic process to function as a 
form of collective social inquiry, at least in the minimal sense that it ought to be an occasion to 
pool participants’ knowledge, information, and/or judgments about the actual or potential 
consequences of past, present, and/or proposed actions of “relevant” agents and/or agencies. 
Beyond this, however, differences will emerge with respect to what counts as “relevant” 
information about these “actual or potential consequences.”  
In any case, though, the primary claims that I would like to emphasize with respect to our 
own theory are as follows.  
In chapter 5, I defended the idea that, ideally speaking, the participants to a democratic 
process ought to give equal consideration to, and show equal concern and respect for, the good or 
interests of “relevant persons.” This was summarized in the Principle of Equal Consideration of, 
and Concern and Respect for, the Good or Interests of Relevant Persons. In doing so, I invoked 
the Presumption of Personal Autonomy, which, in its most succinct formulation, was stated as 
follows: “In the absence of a compelling showing to the contrary everyone should be assumed to 
be the best judge [and most reliable promoter and defender] of his or her own [good or] 
interests.”3 What I want now to add is that our joint endorsement of The Principle of Equal 
Consideration of, and Concern and Respect for, the Good or Interests of Relevant Persons and 
the Presumption of Personal Autonomy seems to have important implications for how we should 
interpret the idea that “the democratic process ought to be an occasion to pool participants’ 
knowledge about the potential or actual consequences of past, present, and/or proposed actions 
of ‘relevant’ agents and/or agencies.” Briefly, it implies, we might say, that the democratic 
process ought to be an occasion to pool all relevant persons’ knowledge, information, and 
judgments about the actual or potential consequences of past, present, and/or proposed actions of 
“relevant” agents and/or agencies, and to pool relevant persons’ own ideas about how those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 There is no way to stipulate who these “relevant” agents and agencies are in advance, since different agents and 
agencies will be pertinent to different decisions in different contexts: sometimes they will include this or that 
bureaucracy, sometimes this or that foreign leader, sometimes this or that local police force, this or that local social 
movement, and so on.  
3 Dahl (1989: 100).  
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actions bore, bear, and/or might bear on their own good or their own respective interests. For it 
would seem that persons who are (to be presumed) “the best judges, and most reliable defenders 
and promoters, of their own good or their own respective interests” are also (to be presumed) 
“the best judges of how certain actions bear on their own good or their own respective 
interests.”4 Hence the above suggestion “that the democratic process ought to be an occasion…to 
pool relevant persons’ own ideas about how [the actual or potential consequences of past, 
present, and/or proposed actions of ‘relevant’ agents and/or agencies] bore, bear, and/or might 
bear on their own good or their own respective interests.” 
There is, however, something potentially misleading about this formulation. Talk of 
“pooling” such knowledge, information, and/or judgments might be thought to suggest that the 
process in question is “aggregative” in character, where this is understood as follows. Any given 
participant may have knowledge, information, and/or judgments about how relevant agents’ 
and/or agencies’ actions have turned out, are turning out, and/or might turn out. Hence, in trying 
to formulate an “informed,” “intelligent,” “reasonable,” or “rational” decision in the democratic 
process in question, each participant ought ideally to “have access to” the knowledge, 
information, and/or judgments that each of the other participants has (made) and to the 
knowledge, information, and/or judgments that each of the other relevant persons has (made). 
(The reason that it might be thought to have this “aggregative” character is that when we 
sometimes talk of “pooling” things, like financial resources, the process of doing so does have a 
simple “aggregative” character in this way, as when, for example, the three sons of a sick mother 
pitch in whatever money they have to cover her exorbitant medical bills.) This, however, strikes 
me as altogether too “individualistic” or “atomistic” a rendering of the purpose and function of 
“democratic discussion,” even where, for the moment at least, the purpose of that discussion is to 
share knowledge, information, and/or judgments about how “relevant” agents’ and/or agencies’ 
actions have turned out, are turning out, and/or might turn out. For it seems to suggest the 
expectation that the resource that is “contributed” to the process in question will not in any way 
be transformed by it (much in the way that the money that son 1 contributes to his mom’s 
medical bills is not transformed by the money that son 2 contributes to it, or by the money that 
son 3 contributes to it, and so on). By contrast, our everyday, lived experience with discussions 
that are aimed at information generation and exchange indicates that the purpose of those 
discussions just is to “transform” the “resources” in question, that is, to transform the 
information, knowledge, and/or judgments in question. That is why, for instance, we speak of 
“improving the quality of the information at our disposal,” not just “the amount of it.”  
Accordingly, I should like to say that, in the context of our own normative democratic 
theory, the third argument for conducting the democratic process as a form of collective social 
inquiry is this: Our joint endorsement of The Principle of Equal Consideration of, and Concern 
and Respect for, the Good or Interests of Relevant Persons and the Presumption of Personal 
Autonomy implies that the democratic process ought to be an occasion to inquire into how all 
relevant persons interpret the actual or potential consequences of past, present, and/or proposed 
actions of “relevant” agents and/or agencies and an occasion to inquire into how all relevant 
persons interpret how (if at all) those actions bore, bear, and/or might bear on their own good or 
their own respective interests. For brevity, let’s summarize this third argument as The Presumed 
Need to Inquire into Relevant Persons’ Own Interpretations of Policy Consequences.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Again, recall Dewey’s (LW 11: 219) apt observation that “there is one thing that [individuals] are wiser about than 
anybody else can be, and that is where the shoe pinches, the troubles they suffer from.”  
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(To clarify, the Principle of Equal Consideration of, and Concern and Respect for, the 
Good or Interests of Relevant Persons explains the reference to inquiring into how “all relevant 
persons interpret the actual or potential consequences of past, present, and/or proposed actions of 
relevant agents and/or agencies” and the reference to inquiring into how “all relevant persons 
interpret how [if at all] those actions bore, bear, and/or might bear on their own good or their 
own respective interests.” And the Presumption of Personal Autonomy explains the reference to 
inquiring into “how all relevant persons interpret the actual or potential consequences of past, 
present, and/or proposed actions of relevant agents and/or agencies” and the reference to 
inquiring into “how all relevant persons interpret how [if at all] those actions bore, bear, and/or 
might bear on their own goods or their own respective interests.”) 
So, taking the above three arguments together, it is not difficult to appreciate why I have 
concluded that, ideally speaking, the democratic process ought to be conducted as a form of 
collective social inquiry. For at least three arguments stand in support of this conclusion, which I 
have summarized as: (1) The Presumed Need to Inquire into Procedures, Virtues, and Cultural 
Practices; (2) The Presumed Need to Inquire into What Could Count as Mutually Acceptable and 
Generally Accessible Reasons; and (3) The Presumed Need to Inquire into Relevant Persons’ 
Own Interpretations of Policy Consequences.  
These considerations clarify what I have in mind in referring to “collective social 
inquiry” and to “whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, the democratic 
process” in the main claim of this chapter. (To recall, the main claim is that the democratic 
process is best conceived of as a form of collective social inquiry, conducted as a “reflexive 
social practice”: as a practice in which participants recognize the potential need to inquire, and, 
as appropriate, actually do inquire, into the [potential or actual] moral or ethical significance and 
implications of whatever is said [and not said] in whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in 
the context of, the democratic process.”) What, though, of the idea of “inquiry into inquiries” 
that is expressed by the main claim? And, more specifically, what about the idea of inquiring into 
the “(potential or actual) moral or ethical significance and implications of whatever is said (and 
not said) in whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, the democratic 
process?” 
Here is where we come to the idea of reflexivity that is contained in the main claim but 
that we have not yet discussed. In section II, we begin with some general observations about the 
idea of reflexivity. In section III, we’ll then turn to the specific way in which I propose to employ 
the term for the purposes of our own normative democratic theory.   
 
II. Basic Tenets of a Generic Conception of Reflexivity  
 
As an adjective, the Oxford English Dictionary tells us, a “reflexive” person is someone 
who is “capable of, or inclined to, or characterized by reflection or serious thought.” However, 
“reflexive” may also refer to a “mental action, process, etc.” that is “turned or directed back upon 
the mind itself” or that involves “intelligent self-awareness or self-examination.” In the social 
sciences, the term has had the meaning of a “method, theory, etc.” that “takes account of itself or 
esp. of the effect of the personality or presence of the researcher on what is being investigated.” 
In literary theory, the term has had the meaning of a text, piece of artwork, or suchlike that 
“consciously calls attention to itself or its process or production.”  
Putting aside for the moment the precise manner in which I have expressed the notion of 
a “reflexive social practice” in the main claim, we might, then, begin with the following thought. 
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In claiming that the democratic process is best conceived of as a form of collective social 
inquiry, conducted as reflexive social practice, the suggestion is something like this: When the 
participants to a democratic process conduct the various inquiries described under the three 
arguments that stand in support of the conclusion that, ideally speaking, the democratic process 
ought to be conducted as form of collective social inquiry, they would ideally be capable of, 
inclined to, and characterized by serious, reflective thought. Moreover, as they conduct such 
inquiries, they would ideally turn or direct their mental processes back upon their own minds, 
always engaging in the kind of searching self-examination that would allow them to exhibit an 
intelligent self-awareness. For instance, when, in conducting such inquiries, they develop 
specific theories and employ particular methods, they would ideally take account of the effect of 
their personalities and their own presence on whatever is being investigated. And, ideally, 
whatever they create through these inquiries would consciously call attention to the process that 
went into producing it. 
Now, as far as it goes, this understanding of a reflexive social practice is well aligned 
with what I have in mind with the main claim. But it does not go far enough. For I should need to 
say something about the reasons I have for suggesting that participants should recognize the 
potential need to inquire, and that, as appropriate, they actually do inquire, into the (potential or 
actual) moral or ethical significance and implications of whatever is said (and not said) in 
whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, the democratic process. And I 
should need to give some indication of what specifically it would mean for them to do so, why I 
am specifically highlighting “the (potential or actual) moral or ethical significance and 
implications of whatever is said (and not said)” in those inquiries.  
Before doing so, however, it is useful to consider how the above, generic conception of 
reflexivity might benefit any conception of “informed,” “intelligent,” “reasonable,” or “rational” 
decision-making. This will set the background for the later discussion of how the specific form 
of reflexivity that I develop might benefit our own democratic conception from chapter 5. 
 
2.1 Self-Reflection and Serious Thought 
 
First off, there is little that is controversial in the idea that, ceteris paribus, persons who 
are well described as “capable of, inclined to, or characterized by reflection or serious thought” 
are better able to engage in “informed,” “intelligent,” “reasonable,” or “rational” decision-
making than those who are not well described this way. (Indeed, the claim is essentially 
tautological.) And similarly with respect to the idea that the participants to a decision-making 
process should preferably “turn their mental processes back upon their own minds, always 
engaging in the kind of searching self-examination that would allow them to exhibit an 
intelligent self-awareness.”  
For instance, there is little that is controversial in the idea that, ceteris paribus, someone 
who is well described as being inclined to “turn her mental processes back on her own mind” and 
to engage in “the kind of searching self-examination that would allow her to exhibit an 
intelligent self-awareness” is better able to engage in “reasonable” decision-making than 
someone who is not well described this way. Think, for instance, of what we describe as 
“reasonable” and “unreasonable” decision-making in everyday life. Often, a person who decides 
to do the same thing over and over again, expecting different results, does so precisely because 
they fail to turn their mental processes back on their own mind. They fail, then, to benefit from 
the insights that they could generate by engaging in a process of searching self-examination, of 
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the kind that could yield insights about why they continue to repeat the same action over and 
over again, expecting different results. (They miss such insights as these: “Thinking about it, I 
now realize that I do tend to pursue relationships with people who are in some sense 
‘unavailable.’ Maybe that is why I’ve remained single for so long. It’s a useful realization; I need 
to be more careful about who I chase. It’d also help to figure out why I do this. Perhaps I’m 
actually scared of being in a relationship, and it’s a unconscious form of self-sabotage.”) And 
parallel comments could be made about what we describe as “informed,” “intelligent,” and 
“rational” decision-making, not just at the individual but also the collective level.  
However, controversy is more likely to arise when we turn to the claim that – in 
conducting their inquiries, developing specific theories, and employing particular methods – 
participants should take account of the effect of their personalities and their own presence on 
whatever is being investigated. And likewise with the claim that whatever is produced by their 
inquiries should consciously call attention to the process that went into producing it. Both of 
these claims are associated with “reflexivity” as this term is commonly used in the contemporary 
human or social sciences.5 But different professional disciplines have different orientations 
toward these claims. Anthropology is perhaps paradigmatic of a professional discipline that, on 
the whole, is attuned to the need for reflexivity in the above two senses, while economics and 
political science are perhaps paradigmatic of disciplines that are not. These, however, are 
controversial claims, and I do not intend to stake my argument on them; I wish only to point out 
that there is some need to clarify why these senses of reflexivity warrant brief elaboration – if for 
no other reason than the fact that even those who are dedicated to generating social inquiries by 
profession sometimes appear divided on these issues.    
Now, despite these apparent divisions, a number of brief observations should serve to 
indicate why it should not be particularly controversial to say that – in conducting their inquiries, 
developing specific theories, and employing particular methods – the participants to a democratic 
process should take account of the effect of their personalities and their own presence on 
whatever is being investigated. And likewise with the claim that whatever is produced by their 
inquiries should consciously call attention to the process that went into producing it. Here I have 
in mind insights drawn from everyday experience, from linguistic philosophy, and from the 
philosophy of social science.   
 
2.2 Calling Attention to the Conditions of Production of Our Inquiries 
 
First consider the idea that whatever is produced by participants’ inquiries should 
consciously call attention to the process that went into producing it. To begin with, it is well to 
recall that in chapter 3 we briefly discussed the naturalistic empiricism of the classical 
pragmatists and, with Robert Brandom, observed that this variety of empiricism counsels a 
“fundamental pragmatism,” according to which one should understand knowing that as a kind of 
knowing how. On the fundamental pragmatist view, as saw, believing that things are thus-and-so 
is to be understood in terms of practical abilities to do something. States and performances are 
only intelligible as explicitly contentful believings and doings against the background of an 
implicit context of practices and practical abilities. Accordingly, “the fundamental pragmatist 
aspiration is to be able to exhibit discursive intentionality as a distinctive kind of practical 
rationality.”6 Roughly, “practical rationality is [here construed as] the kind of attunement to their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See, for instance, Bourdieu (2004) and Gouldner (1970). 
6 Ibid. 10; my emphasis. 
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environment that intelligent nonlinguistic animals display – the way they can practically take or 
treat things as prey or predator, food, sexual partner or rival and cope with them accordingly.”7 
And “discursive rationality is [here construed as] using concepts in judgment and intentional 
action, being able explicitly to take things to be thus-and-so, to entertain and evaluate 
propositions, formulate rules and principles.” 8  Hence, “fundamental pragmatism counsels 
looking first to what discursive subjects are doing, to the abilities they exercise, to the practices 
they engage in.”9 Hence it “invites us to understand representation in terms of what discursive 
subjects must do in order to count thereby as representing, as taking or treating some state, 
episode, or performance as a representation of something.” 10  Fundamental pragmatism is 
therefore “opposed to a representationalist order of explanation: one that begins with a notion of 
representational content, and appeals to that notion to make sense of what it is that knowing and 
acting subjects do. That is not to say that pragmatists in this sense can have no truck at all with 
the concept of representation. It is to say at most that talk of representation should come at the 
end of the story, not the beginning.”11  
Thus, on the fundamental pragmatist view, “consciously calling attention to the process 
that went into producing some inquiry” just is the way that you make sense of the “the content” 
of that inquiry, including its “representational content.” Hence, on that view, there is nothing 
controversial about the aspect of “reflexivity” in question: to understand “the content” of an 
inquiry (including its “representational content”), on that view, we always need to appeal to the 
practical activities and human abilities that were involved in producing it; any appeal to the 
“accuracy,” “truth,” “reasonableness,” or “veracity” of that content that does not do so will be 
regarded as an empty one.  
What is more, there is some reason to think that this conclusion holds not only for those 
who (would) subscribe to the fundamental pragmatist view that I just adumbrated, but for 
“everyday agents” as well. Indeed, in diverse areas of everyday life, we seem to recognize that in 
assessing (for instance) the “accuracy” of some “representation,” it is imperative that we evaluate 
the sources of our information, by which we understand that we are not just to evaluate how (for 
instance) “accurate” or “truthful” their “representations” are, but also that we are to evaluate the 
practical activities and human abilities that were involved in the production of those “sources.” 
Or, to put the point another way, we seem to recognize, in everyday life, that in order precisely to 
evaluate (for instance) the “accuracy” or “truthfulness” of some “representation,” we need to 
appeal to the practical activities and human abilities that were involved in the production of our 
sources of information. (“Are the facts based on eyewitness accounts? If so, how ‘reliable’ are 
the witnesses? What kinds of character traits do the eyewitnesses exhibit? Are they trustworthy? 
How and by whom were the accounts transcribed? Can we trust them? Is the narrative 
explanation a plausible rendering of what indeed happened that day? Have you cross-checked 
this particular account with those of other alleged witnesses?”) Indeed, at a very general level, 
this, we might say, is our considered judgment about how best to assess the “accuracy,” 
“truthfulness,” “veracity,” or “reliability” of some “representation.” (This is perhaps clearest 
with the idea of “reliability.”) Hence the importance we place, for instance, on character 
witnesses in jury trials.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 10-11. 
10 Ibid. 11. 
11 Ibid. 
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2.3 Taking Account of Inquirers’ Personalities 
 
Next consider the claim that in conducting their inquiries, developing specific theories, 
and employing particular methods, the participants to a democratic process should take account 
of the effect of their personalities on whatever is being investigated. It is a commonplace to say 
that two human observers may “observe ‘the same event’ differently.” This is true in several 
senses, but just consider two of them.  
First, two observers may literally observe – that is, may literally perceive – different 
aspects of “the same event,” as when, for instance, “the same event” is “within view” of two 
(potential) observers and, in principle at least, both of them are capable of observing all of “the 
same aspects” of “the same event,” but do not do so.  
Suppose that the event in question is an attack on some rural village by an army unit. And 
suppose that the two observers are: first, an army official who is not part of the unit in question 
but arrives on the scene just as the attack commences and so witnesses its initiation and 
execution; and second, a member of the village in question who arrives at the same time as the 
army official and so likewise witnesses the attack but is not himself subject to it.  
Now, suppose that the two observers are positioned so as literally to see “the same 
aspects of ‘the same event’” (and are physically capable of doing so), but in fact do not do so. If 
this happens, I submit, we are not likely to be surprised by it. Given who the two individuals are, 
it would not be surprising if they literally witnessed “different aspects of ‘the same event’” that 
was in front of them: our army official, let us say, witnesses three soldiers being struck down by 
village residents, while our village member witnesses two young boys being bludgeoned. In that 
event, an appeal to the respective “personalities” of our two witnesses – an appeal to those 
clusters of habits and dispositions that make up their respective “characters” – would likely help 
us to explain this outcome. Given the army official’s background, he, let us say, primarily has 
sympathies with the attacking soldiers. And given the villager’s background, he, let us say, 
primarily has sympathies with the village children. Hence, even though – as we have stipulated – 
the “sub-events” in question are literally all “before the eyes” of our two witnesses, they see 
“different aspects of ‘the same event,’” perhaps because, in scanning (most) of the “sub-events” 
that are a part of it, their “sympathies” lead them to focus on different things. Supposing all of 
this to be true, again, we would not be surprised, I think. What is more, an appeal to the 
respective “personalities” of our two witnesses – again, in the broad sense of those clusters of 
habits and dispositions that make up their respective “characters” – would likely help us to 
explain this outcome. 
A second sense in which it is surely the case that two human observers may “observe ‘the 
same event’ differently” relates to the fact that, as Ian Shapiro has emphasized, “all phenomena 
admit of multiple true descriptions.”12 Here, the more specific issue is not “seeing different 
aspects of ‘the same event,’” but “describing the same aspects of ‘the same event’ differently.” 
Consider Shapiro’s example, which concerns “possible descriptions of a woman who says ‘I do’ 
in a conventional marriage ceremony.” She could be: 
 
• “Expressing authentic love 
• Doing (failing to do) what her father has told her to do 
• Playing her expected part in a social ritual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Shapiro (2005: 187). 
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• Unconsciously reproducing the patriarchal family 
• Landing the richest husband she can 
• Maximizing the chances of reproducing her genes”13 
 
“Each description is theory-laden,” Shapiro observes, “in the sense that it leads to the search for 
a different type of explanation. This can be seen if in each case we ask the question why?, and 
see what type of explanation is called forth.” 
 
• “Why does she love him? predisposes us to look for an explanation in terms of her 
personal biography 
• Why does she obey (and disobey) her father? predisposes us to look for an 
anthropological explanation 
• Why does she unconsciously reproduce patriarchy? predisposes us to look for an 
explanation in terms of ideology and power-relations 
• Why does she do as well as she can in the marriage market? predisposes us to look for 
an interest-based rational choice explanation 
• Why does she maximize the odds of reproducing her genes? predisposes us to look for a 
sociobiological explanation”14 
 
“The claim that all description is theory-laden illustrated here is,” Shapiro observes, “a claim that 
there is no ‘raw’ description of ‘the facts’ or ‘the data.’ There are multiple possible true 
descriptions of a given action or phenomenon, and the challenge is to decide which is most 
apt.”15  
Shapiro’s discussion of this particular variant of the all-description-is-theory-laden thesis 
is motivated by a concern to challenge what he calls “theory-driven” research in the social 
sciences. “The theory-driven scholar,” Shapiro writes, “commits to a sufficient account of a 
phenomenon,” developing “debatably plausible conjectures about the creation and/or operation” 
of some phenomenon.16 Correspondingly, she at least sometimes posits research problems in 
ways that are “idiosyncratic artifacts of [her] theoretical priors,” characterizing some particular 
phenomenon “so as to vindicate a particular theory rather than to illuminate a problem that has 
been independently specified.”17 One of the problems with this type of theory-driven research is, 
Shapiro maintains, that it  
 
is part of a reductionist program. It dictates always opting for the description that calls for 
the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory. So the narrative historian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid; my emphasis. 
16 As illustrations, Shapiro (2005: 185) asks us to “consider theory-laden descriptions of institutions and practices 
that are problematic even though they do not fail on their own terms, such as Kathleen Bawn’s claim that an 
ideology is a blueprint around which a group maintains a coalition or Russell Hardin’s claim that constitutions exist 
to solve coordination problems. Here the difficulty is that, although it is arguable that ideologies and constitutions 
serve the designated purposes, they serve many other purposes as well. Moreover, it is far from clear that any 
serious investigation of how particular ideologies and constitutions came to be created or are sustained would reveal 
that the theorist’s stipulated purpose has much to do with either. They are ‘just so’ stories, debatably plausible 
conjectures about the creation and or [sic] operation of these phenomenon.”  
17 Ibid. 184. 
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who believes every event to be unique will reach for personal biography; the 
psychological reductionist will turn to the psychological determinants of her choice; the 
anthropologist will see the constitutive role of the social ritual as the relevant description; 
the feminist will focus on the action as reproducing patriarchy; the rational choice 
theorist will reach for the explanation in terms of maximizing success in the marriage 
market; and for the socio-biologist it will be evolutionary selection at the level of gene 
reproduction.18  
 
“Why do this?” Shapiro asks. 
 
The common answer rests, I think, on the belief that it is necessary for the program of 
social science. In many minds this enterprise is concerned with the search for general 
explanations. How is one going to come up with general explanations if one cannot 
characterize the classes of phenomena one studies in similar terms? This worry 
misunderstands the enterprise of science, provoking three responses, one skeptical, one 
ontological, and one occupational.19  
 
Summarizing,  
 
The skeptical response is that whether there are general explanations for groups of 
phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not one to be prejudged before 
conducting that inquiry…. The ontological response is that although science is in the 
second instance concerned with developing general knowledge claims, it must in the first 
instance be concerned with developing valid knowledge claims. It seems to be an 
endemic obsession of political scientists to believe that there must be general 
explanations for all political phenomena, indeed to subsume them into a single theoretical 
paradigm. Theory-drivenness kicks in when the pursuit of generality comes at the 
expense of empirical validity…. [One “pathology” that this leads to…] is that it invites 
tendentious characterizations of the phenomenon under study because the selection of 
one description rather than another is driven by the impulse to vindicate a particular 
theoretical outlook…. The occupational response is that political scientists are pushed in 
the direction of theory-driven work as a result of their perceived need to differentiate 
themselves from others, such as journalists, who also write about political phenomena for 
a living – but without the job security and prestige of the professoriate…. Too often [, 
however] the aspiration to do better than journalists is cashed out as manufacturing 
esoteric discourses with high entry costs for outsiders. All the better if they involve 
inside-the-cranium exercises that never require one to leave one’s computer screen.20  
 
Now, for our purposes, the important point is that Shapiro is plausibly appealing here to 
professional values, norms, and interests to explain why some social scientists end up being 
“theory-driven” scholars (or why they end up producing “theory-driven” research) in the first 
place, and so to explain why they end up “describing the same aspects of ‘the same event’ [or 
phenomenon] differently.” And notice that, prior to doing so, he plausibly appealed in part to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid. 188. 
19 Ibid. 188. 
20 Ibid. 189. 
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professional values, norms, and interests to indicate why different kinds of actors (for instance, a 
narrative historian, a psychologist, and a rational choice theorist) might end up “describing the 
same aspects of ‘the same event’ [or phenomenon] differently. Of course, even on the 
supposition that these claims are plausible, to plausibly make them is not yet to the say that 
researchers’ personalities can help us to explain this outcome. It is, however, to take us just one 
step short of doing so. And it is not hard to make that last step.  
 To see why, take the idea that “the narrative historian who believes every event to be 
unique will reach for personal biography” to justify why he describes the woman as “expressing 
authentic love” when she says “I do” in a conventional wedding, while “the rational choice 
theorist will reach for [an] explanation in terms of maximizing success in the marriage market” 
to justify why he describes the woman as “landing the richest husband she can.” One way to 
parse the difference is to say that professional values, norms, and interests dictate that these are 
the types of explanation that professionals in these respective disciplines should offer: historians 
should offer explanations in terms of personal biography and descriptions that are consist with 
such explanations, let us say, while economists should offer explanations in terms of utility 
maximization and descriptions that are consist with such explanations. Doing so, we might be 
inclined to think that an appeal to professional norms, values, and interests would be sufficient to 
explain why we do observe the professional historian describing and explaining the event in 
question one way, and the professional economist explaining and describing it another way – if 
indeed we do observe this outcome. Another way to parse the difference, however, is to say that 
people who start with certain beliefs and dispositions – hence “personalities” – are more inclined 
to enter this or that profession in the first place. So, part of what explains why different 
“professional values, norms, and interests” exist and arise in the first place is that different 
disciplines are populated by individuals who do start with different beliefs, dispositions, and 
personalities.  
A third option is surely more plausible than either of these interpretations, however. 
According to this interpretation, what we have here are different disciplines, characterized by 
different professional values, norms, and interests. In some measure, people who start with 
certain beliefs, dispositions, and personalities are more inclined to enter these respective 
disciplines in the first place. In part, this is because the different professional values, norms, and 
interests that characterize these different disciplines attract individuals at different rates. So, 
there is typically a degree of “stability” in the values, norms, and interests that characterize a 
discipline, and these values, norms, and interests are in part reproduced by the fact that the 
discipline is populated by many individuals who themselves have certain values, norms, and 
interests, ones which give them relatively little reason to challenge the values, norms, and 
interests that characterize the discipline. Thus, what we have here are disciplines that are 
characterized by certain values, norms, and interests, which attract individuals with different 
initial beliefs, dispositions, and personalities, which in turn serve to reproduce the values, norms, 
and interests of the discipline itself. In other words, what we have are cycles of reciprocal 
reinforcement between professional values, norms, and interests on the one hand, and 
individuals’ beliefs, dispositions, and personalities on the other. In short, this is what we refer to 
when we refer to disciplines or professions as having different “cultures.” And, arguably at least, 
these different cultures help to explain why individuals from different professions sometimes 
describe the same aspects of “the same event” [or phenomenon] differently. If so, it becomes 
hard to deny the claim that, in conducting their inquiries, developing specific theories, and 
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employing particular methods, professional social scientists should take account of the effect of 
their personalities on whatever is being investigated.21  
Of course, this is not yet to say that the participants to a democratic process should do so 
too. However, is there any reason for thinking that the same conclusion does not apply to them 
too? If the proposition that we need not take account of the effect of investigators’ personalities 
on whatever is being investigated (because their personalities are irrelevant to whatever is being 
investigated) indeed has any plausibility, surely it is with reference to those groups that have 
arguably tried the hardest to make it the case that their personalities are irrelevant to whatever 
they investigate. And, with respect to social matters at least, who fits this description better than 
(certain groups of) social scientists? Hence, if it is indeed the case that even professional groups 
that do strive for the absence of such influence often fail to attain it (as I have just been 
suggesting it is), it is therefore plausible that individuals and groups that do not necessarily strive 
for this will also conduct inquiries in which their personalities affect whatever is being 
investigated. And so for these reasons I am led to conclude that in conducting their inquiries, 
developing specific theories, and employing particular methods, the participants to a democratic 
process should also take account of the effect of their personalities on whatever is being 
investigated. 
 
2.4 Taking Account of Inquirers’ Presence 
 
Now consider the claim that, in conducting their inquiries, developing specific theories, 
and employing particular methods, the participants to a democratic process should take account 
of their own presence on whatever is being investigated. There are various ways to argue for this 
conclusion. For brevity, however, let us just consider some brief remarks on what has been 
termed the “Hawthorne effect.”  
“The Hawthorne effect,” McCambridge et al. write, “concerns research participation, the 
consequent awareness of being studied, and possible impact on behavior.”22  
 
The original studies that gave rise to the [concept of the] Hawthorne effect were 
undertaken at Western Electric telephone manufacturing factory at Hawthorne, near 
Chicago, between 1924 and 1933. Increases in productivity were observed among a 
selected group of workers who were supervised intensively by managers under the 
auspices of a research program…. A large literature and repeated controversies have 
evolved over many decades as to the nature of the Hawthorne effect. If there is a 
Hawthorne effect, studies could be biased in ways that we do not understand well, with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 In this connection, it is interesting to recall William James’s comment about the crucial role that the 
“temperaments” of philosophers have played in various philosophical disputes over the years. For parallel remarks 
could be made, I think, with respect to the role of social scientists’ “temperaments” (hence “personalities”) in 
various disputes in the social sciences. “The history of philosophy,” James (1975: 11) wrote, “is to a great extent 
that of a certain clash of human temperaments. Undignified as such a treatment may seem to some of my colleagues, 
I shall have to take account of this clash and explain a good may divergences of philosophers by it. Of whatever 
temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact of this temperament. 
Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so he urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet 
his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the 
evidence for him one way or the other, making a more sentimental or more hardhearted view of the universe, just as 
this fact or that principle would. He trusts his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any 
representation of the universe that does suit it.” 
22 MacCambridge et al. (2014: 267). 
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profound implications for research…. There is a widespread social psychological 
explanation for the possible mechanism for the Hawthorne effect as follows. Awareness 
of being observed or having behavior assessed engenders beliefs about research 
expectations. Conformity and social desirability considerations then lead behavior to 
change in line with these expectations. Chiese and Hobbs point out that just as there are 
different meanings given to the purported Hawthorne effect, there are also many 
suggested mechanisms producing the effect, some of which are contradictory.23 
 
Accordingly, McCambridge et al. carried out a systematic review whose aims were “to elucidate 
whether the Hawthorne effect exists, explore under what conditions, and estimate the size of any 
such effect, by summarizing and evaluating the strength of evidence available in all scientific 
disciplines.”24 The authors decided that 19 studies were eligible for inclusion in their review. 
Apart from one study, all of these had been undertaken in the health sciences. For the purposes 
of the review, the Hawthorne effect was operationalized as “the effects of reporting on one’s 
behavior by answering questions, being directly observed, or otherwise made aware of being 
studied.”25 The authors found “evidence of effects across these studies,” but also “inconsistencies 
in this evidence.”26 Putting the details aside, however, the authors’ main conclusion was that 
“there is no single Hawthorne effect”; but “consequences of research participation for [the] 
behaviors being investigated” were “found to exist in most studies included within [the] 
review.”27 These findings give support to the conclusion that, in conducting their inquiries, 
developing specific theories, and employing particular methods, social scientists should take 
account of their own presence on whatever is being investigated, just as the participants to a 
democratic process should too. 
 
2.5 Summary: Two Main Roles for “Reflexivity” on the Generic Conception 
 
The above considerations indicate some of the reasons for which I am suggesting that a 
“reflexive social practice” (as we have thus far construed it in this section) might serve to benefit 
any conception of “informed,” “intelligent,” “reasonable,” or “rational” decision-making. (Recall 
that, until this point in Section II, the notion of a reflexive social practice has only been given the 
meaning of a practice in which participants: are capable of, inclined to, and characterized by 
serious, reflective thought; turn or direct their mental processes back upon their own minds when 
they conduct their inquiries, develop specific theories, and employ particular methods, always 
engaging in the kind of searching self-examination that would allow them to exhibit an 
intelligent self-awareness; take account of the effect of their personalities and their own presence 
on whatever is being investigated; and craft inquiries that consciously call attention to the 
process that went into producing those inquiries.) One way to summarize these reasons is to 
point out that the abilities and dispositions that I have so far associated with such a practice can 
be useful to participants insofar as they can help them to identify the various ways in which 
norms, values, and interests may come into play in their inquiries.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid. 268; my emphasis. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 274. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 276.	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Now, hard on the heals of the observation that a reflexive social practice can help 
participants to identify the various ways in which norms, values, and interests may come into 
play in their inquiries is the thought that a reflexive social practice might therefore help them to 
purge their inquiries of those norms, values, and interests. (Indeed, this, I believe, is the main 
reason that some social scientists do argue for reflexivity.) And, undoubtedly, there is something 
to this thought.  
For instance, it is evident that “turning our mental processes back on our own minds” 
can, so to speak, help us to “purge” certain norms, values, and interests from our inquiries. (“I 
now recognize that I didn’t initially want to accept his alternative hypothesis, primarily because 
doing so would force me to revisit my own, published interpretation of the results, which would 
entail publicly recognizing that I had likely been wrong. But I decided it was the honest, not to 
say professional, thing to do, and so I did it.”) And, at times at least, doing so can surely help us 
to engage in “informed,” “intelligent,” “reasonable,” or “rational” individual decision-making, 
just as it can surely help us to engage in “informed,” “intelligent,” “reasonable,” or “rational” 
decision-making at the collective level.  
Recalling the above individual-level example, we can thereby come to such realizations 
as: “Although I recognized that renouncing my earlier, published interpretation of the results 
would force me to publically recognize that I had likely been wrong, I also came to recognize 
that doing so was in my own best interests in the long run. Had I not come to the realization that 
I originally didn’t want to accept my interlocutor’s alternative hypothesis precisely because it 
would force me to publically renounce my own published interpretation, it is likely that my 
interlocutor or someone else would have published a devastating critique of that interpretation. It 
is better, for my own professional reputation, that I be my own harshest public critique. Hence, 
the process of self-reflection that led me to recognize what personal desire was driving my 
refusal to accept the alternative hypothesis really helped me to make a better decision in the long 
run.” And similar insights can be had at the collective level: “In this country, ‘the mainstream 
media’ doesn’t give anything like the same coverage to (alleged) government-perpetrated human 
rights abuses in those countries with ‘friendly’ diplomatic ties with our own government as they 
do to (alleged) human rights abuses in ‘enemy states.’	   There is quite good scholarship that 
demonstrates these systematic ‘biases’ in the relevant news coverage. Whatever the precise 
explanation is for this pattern, there are, to be sure, norms, values, and interests at work that help 
to explain it. What is more, it is surely important for us to identify and counteract this pattern. If, 
say, we as a political community are sincerely committed to ‘cutting ties’ with those 
governments who engage in systematic human rights abuses, we need to have a reasonably 
accurate sense of which governments actually fit that description. Hence, revealing the pattern in 
question is in our own best interests. Furthermore, we would ideally develop a better sense of 
what precise norms, values, and interests are at play here, so that, in the future, we can better 
compensate for, or mitigate the detrimental effects of, the pattern in question.”  
However, it is a non sequitur to conclude that a reflexive social practice could allow us to 
“purge” our social inquiries of all norms, values, and/or interests. For, on the view that I would 
like to advocate, this is an impossible, indeed incoherent, aim in the first place. Briefly, this is 
because, on my view, all of our social inquiries presuppose, depend on, and convey norms, 
values, and interests, hence can reasonably be described as “value-guided” and “value-laden.” 
(The idea that our social inquiries are “value-laden” is a familiar, though not uncontroversial, one 
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in the contemporary social sciences.28 As far as I am aware, however, “value-guided” is a term of 
art, and in Section III I will therefore describe what I mean by it.) Hence, norms, values, and 
interests cannot be “purged” from our inquiries. (This is not to say that, in this or that specific 
case, some particular norm, value, or interest cannot be “purged” from an inquiry. It is rather to 
say that values, norms, and interests as such cannot be so.) If so, this suggests that reflexivity, as 
we have so far interpreted it, has two main purposes: first, to reveal the various roles that norms, 
values, and interests inevitably just do play in whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the 
context of, the democratic process; and second, to help participants to the democratic process to 
mitigate or compensate for the various roles that some norms, values, and interests do play in 
those inquiries.    
 
III. Inquiry as Value-Guided and Value-Laden 
 
What, however, is the relevance of these considerations for own normative democratic 
theory? As I have repeatedly indicated, our own normative democratic theory suggests that, 
ideally speaking, the participants to a democratic process should enter into a moral dialogue and 
deliberation with one another, seeking out mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons 
for their expressed policy preferences. Furthermore, the sincere assumption of this responsibility 
entails, I have suggested, that they assume responsibility for trying to understand relevant social 
situations and activities from relevant persons’ perspectives. (Again, the Criterion of Enlightened 
Understanding and the Criterion of Effective Participation both make these “ideal expectations” 
explicit.) And, from what was earlier said in chapter 5, it should already be clear that revealing 
the various roles that norms, values, and interests do play in the inquiries that are fed into, or 
invoked in the context of, the democratic process can help us to assume this responsibility. 
Likewise, it should already be clear that a failure to reveal the various roles that norms, values, 
and interests do play in some (set of) inquiries can prevent us from (better) assuming this 
responsibility.29 But, more generally, so can the idea that any inquiry either is, or could be, 
“value-free” and/or “value-neutral.” In chapter 5, I briefly illustrated how this is so, but the 
claim needs further elaboration. So, let me begin this section by briefly reiterating the main 
points that were made in the aforementioned illustration from chapter 5. In the rest of this section 
(Section III), we’ll then discuss the inevitable “value-guidedness” and “value-ladenness” of all of 
our inquiries. Then, in section IV, we’ll discuss how recognizing the inevitable value-guidedness 
and value-ladenness of our inquiries can help us to reason about the (potential or actual) moral or 
ethical significance of what we say (and do not say) in our inquiries. Finally, in the conclusion 
we’ll then bring the main arguments from Sections I-III together in support of the “main claim”: 
again, that the democratic process is best conceived of as a form of collective social inquiry, 
conducted as a “reflexive social practice”: as a practice in which participants recognize the 
potential need to inquire, and, as appropriate, actually do inquire, into the (potential or actual) 
moral or ethical significance and implications of whatever is said (and not said) in whatever 
inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, the democratic process. 
 
3.1 Reviewing the Earlier, Limited Comments about “Value-Guidedness” and “Value-
Ladenness” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For discussion, see, for instance, Kincaid et al. (2007), Proctor (1991), Putnam (2002), Putnam and Walsh (2012), 
Sayer (2011), and Taylor (1985). 
29 Recall the discussion of alternative philosophies of social inquiry in chapter 5, section 3.3.2. 
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As noted, the Criterion of Enlightened Understanding gives us reason to prefer some 
philosophies of social inquiry to other such philosophies. In chapter 5, I illustrated this through a 
brief comparison between two philosophies of social inquiry: between a philosophy that begins 
from the supposition that all inquiry is “value-guided” and “value-laden” with one that explicitly 
rejects that claim, holding that “value-free” and “value-neutral” social inquiry is possible. More 
specifically, I compared how one may be disposed to act if one endorses the former philosophy 
with how one may be disposed to act if one endorses the latter. Where one endorses the former, I 
submitted, one will be disposed to look for norms, values, and interests “everywhere.” Where 
one endorses the latter, I suggested, one will be disposed to believe that norms, values, and 
interests are sometimes “absent” (e.g., in “the content” of “properly conducted social-scientific 
research,” where this is construed as being “value-free” and “value-neutral”; more on this 
below). I then noted that, if this is so, one implication is that when individuals do think that 
“value-free” and “value-neutral” social inquiry is possible (and hence are disposed to believe that 
norms, values, and interests may be “absent” in some given inquiry), they are therefore inclined 
to miss certain moments when indeed they are “present.” I then indicated how there are cases in 
which this could imply that the individuals in question miss the “moral or ethical significance 
and implications” of what is said (and not said) there, precisely because of the way in which they 
do miss the norms, values, and interests that are “present” there. In brief, I did this by pointing 
out that all inquiry is “selective,” based in part on our “epistemic values,” and noted that, if we 
do not explicitly recognize this, we are apt to miss how our inquiries “convey” values, just as we 
are apt to miss the fact that, even where our selectivity is based on “epistemic values,” these 
values can nonetheless lead us to say things that can be described as having “moral or ethical 
significance and implications.”  
Additionally, I indicated how, depending on the circumstances, this could imply that 
“relevant” information was being cut off or suppressed, indeed, information that, were it 
available, might well cause the persons in question to arrive at different expressed policy 
preferences. If so, this would imply that the Criterion of Enlightened Understanding would have 
been better served by an alternative philosophy that had disposed them to look for norms, values, 
and interests “everywhere,” that is, one that begins from the supposition that all inquiry is 
“value-guided” and “value-laden.” Furthermore, I indicated how, depending on the 
circumstances, “missing moments” in which norms, values, and interests are present could (for 
instance) imply failing to recognize who certain “relevant persons” are, that is, certain persons 
whose interests were or are “(somehow) significantly affected by” the policy decision(s) in 
question. (The “necessary selectivity” of our inquiries can always potentially lead to this result, 
regardless of what motives are at play in those inquiries.) Realizing this, I suggested, could help 
someone to “understand relevant social activities and situations from the perspectives of relevant 
others” – for instance, from the perspectives of those whose interests were “(somehow) 
significantly affected” by it. Accordingly, I concluded that, in that case, it would be fair to say 
that recognizing that the inquiry in question was, indeed, “value-guided” and “value-laden” 
would help the person(s) in question to assume responsibility for trying to understanding relevant 
social situations and activities from the perspectives of relevant others. Hence, it would help 
them better to live up to the Criterion of Enlightened Understanding, and, I now add, to the 
Criterion of Effective Participation as well, since both of these criteria stipulate the “ideal 
expectation,” so to speak, that participants to the democratic process should try to understand 
relevant social situations and activities from the perspectives of relevant others.)  
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There are, however, various other ways to argue that all of our social inquiries are “value-
guided” and “value-laden,” hence to indicate how it is the case that what we say (and do not say) 
in our inquiries could be said to have “moral or ethical significance and implications,” whether 
or not we initially recognize or intend this to be the case. To be clear, however, let me just state 
as succinctly as possible what has so far been said about both of these claims: first, about why it 
is the case that all of our social inquiries are “value-guided” and “value-laden”; and second, 
about how, in light of this fact, anything we say (and do not say) in any of our inquiries could be 
said to have “moral or ethical significance and implications,” whether or not we initially 
recognize or intend this to be the case. 
On the first claim, I have so far suggested: that to be intelligible, any social inquiry has to 
include an implicit or explicit description of certain persons’ actions, motives, and intentions; 
that, by necessity, all inquiries are selective about all of the (different kinds of) “information” 
they include, at least partly for reasons that have to do with our “epistemic values,” e.g. for 
reasons that have to do with “relevance,” “coherence,” “plausibility,” etc.; that all intelligible 
social inquiries therefore selectively include information/claims about certain persons’ actions, 
motives, and intentions; that when we reveal how an inquiry is “value-guided” in this sense, we 
thereby recognize that it also “conveys” values; and that any inquiry that “conveys” values is 
also, therefore, a “value-laden” one. And on the second claim, I have so far suggested that the 
“necessary selectivity” about persons’ actions, motives, and intentions that inevitably does 
characterize our inquiries may lead us to think that, on reflection, what is said (and not said) in 
some inquiry does have “moral or ethical significance and implications.”  
 
3.2 A View of Moral Reasoning Based on the Idea of “Value-Free”/“Value-Neutral” Inquiry 
 
To set the background for our more extended discussion of value-guidedness and value-
ladenness, it is useful to say something more about the conception of “rational” 
moral or ethical decision-making that I am concerned to argue against here. There is a familiar 
and long-standing conception about what “rational” decision-making looks like at the individual 
level (including “rational” moral/ethical decision-making), as well as, what is more important 
here, a corresponding conception of what it looks like at a collective level. And the idea that, 
properly conducted, social (-scientific) inquiry either is or could be “value-free” and/or “value-
neutral” has bolstered this conception. 
Often, modern moral philosophers and social scientists have reasoned as follows. When 
we reason properly about the character of the circumstances that we find or have placed 
ourselves in, we only make “value judgments” in the moment or process of decision-making 
itself, that is, when we try to decide how to act in response to those circumstances, not when we 
engage in the “prior” task of formulating beliefs about what those circumstances are. As Hilary 
Putnam has observed, there is a widespread view that “statements of fact” are capable of being 
“objectively true” and “objectively warranted,” while “value judgments” are incapable of 
objective truth and warrant. Indeed, some have even gone so far as to conclude that “value 
judgments” are “outside the sphere of reason” altogether. 30  Thus, much modern moral 
philosophy has assumed that “value judgments” are properly made only after one has an 
adequate description of the situation at hand. Correspondingly, many moral philosophers have (at 
least tacitly) endorsed a dichotomy between “theoretical reasoning” (reasoning that is “directed 
toward belief”) and “practical reasoning” (reasoning that is “directed toward decision or action”), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Putnam (2002: 1). 
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where the former has been regarded as “reasoning about the facts” and the latter has been 
regarded as “reasoning about values.” Hence, “theoretical” and “practical” forms of reasoning 
have been sharply separated, and, correspondingly, reasoning about “facts” has been sharply 
separated from reasoning about “values.”31  
In sum, then, the thinking has been that we do not make “value judgments” when coming 
up with “rational” observations and descriptions of, and explanations and predictions about, the 
circumstances in which we are then to make “rational” decisions about how to act. Instead, 
rational decision-making consists in two clearly distinct and separable “moments”: a “value-
free” and/or “value-neutral” one, where we first figure out what our situation is; and (as we 
might put it) a “value-guided” and “value-laden” one, where we then decide how we would 
should (like to) act in light of that situation. 
Correspondingly, the view of “rational” collective decision-making (including 
democratic decision-making) has been that, in such decision-making, participants: first “gather 
the facts” about relevant circumstances, where this process is viewed as one of collecting and/or 
producing observational, descriptive, explanatory, and predictive information, data, and/or 
knowledge about the facts of those circumstances and where this process is viewed as not 
involving “value judgments”; and only subsequently decide together – through some form of 
collective decision-making – what (individual or collective) “ends” or “values” they would like 
to realize, and how they would like to do so, given those circumstances. What is more, for many 
such thinkers this division of intellectual labor has been defended by reference to the possibility 
of creating (or due to the reality of our already having created) “value-free” and/or “value-
neutral” sciences. That is, some have suggested that there are domains of “information,” kinds of 
“data,” and modes of “knowledge production” – variously grouped under the “natural sciences,” 
the “behavioral sciences,” and the “social sciences” – that are, indeed, “value-free” and/or 
“value-laden”; and they have suggested that, at their best, these sciences allow their practitioners 
to provide “value-free” and/or “value-neutral” (observational, descriptive, explanatory, and 
predictive) information, data, and/or knowledge to decision-makers, so that decision-makers 
themselves can engage in “rational” decision-making based on their own “ends” or “values.” 
(Thus, some social scientists have held, for instance, that their own work, even in the area of 
“democratic theory,” is “non-normative,” and that the practitioners in their field “eschew values 
judgments.”32) Correspondingly, if the social scientist has any role to play in collective decision-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 As Elijah Millgram (2001: 17) characterizes the typical view: “To draw the right conclusion about what to do, you 
normally have an adequate description of your situation. Arriving at such a description is usually regarded as 
theoretical rather than practical reasoning; you are reasoning about the facts, rather than about the values.” 
32 Consider, for instance, Cnudde and Neubauer’s (1969: 1-2; my emphasis) description of “empirical democratic 
theory”: “All political theories can be cast in one or more of any three modes: normative, empirical, or analytic. 
Normative theories are argumentative and prescriptive; they attempt to justify the choice of one value or set of 
values over another and prescribe that behavior (including institutional practices) presumed most appropriate for 
achieving that valued outcome. Analytic theories are definitional or conceptual expositions, examinations of the 
logical implications of concepts and their relationship to other concepts. Empirical theories are descriptive and 
explanatory, constructed from observations of the real world. These three modes of theory are thus differentiated by 
their goals (argumentation and prescription, exposition and implication, or description and explanation) and the 
kinds of “evidence” which are deemed appropriate as support for a given theory…. Historically, democratic political 
theory has been cast primarily in the normative and analytic modes…. The adoption of the empirical mode as a 
predominant form in the construction of democratic theory is of quite recent origin, a product of the so-called 
“behavioral” movement in political science. Contemporary empirical democratic theory is distinguished from 
traditional political theory in several respects. First, it is explicitly non-normative, although like normative theory it 
is frequently linked to analytic theory. Although almost any empirical finding which bears upon the functioning or 
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making qua “scientist,” her role is: first, to assist decision-makers in the process of collecting 
and/or producing observational, descriptive, explanatory, and predictive information, data, and/or 
knowledge about the facts of “relevant circumstances”; and second, to assist decision-makers in 
reasoning about the most efficient “means” to their own “ends” in light of those circumstances.  
Thus, as in individual “rational” decision-making about how to act, we have here a 
process involving two distinct “moments,” where the first involves “value-free” and/or “value-
neutral” “theoretical reasoning” about (what to believe about) relevant circumstances, and where 
the second moment consists in “value-guided” and “value-laden” reasoning about what “ends” or 
“values” to realize in light of those circumstances. Of course, “rational” decision-making, 
whether at the individual or collective level, sometimes, indeed more often than not, requires that 
we switch back and forth between these two “moments.” Nevertheless, when we are in the first 
of these two moments, values are not to play any role in the content of the reasoning that goes on 
in that moment (nor in the linguistic expressions that we employ in conveying our reasoning 
there), no matter how many times we “switch back and forth between these two ‘moments.’”  
Now, this conception of “rational” decision-making is (more or less implicitly or 
explicitly) based on, or, as the case may be, gains (more or less tacit or explicit support from) 
various traditional epistemologies and associated philosophies of language that have come under 
attack from a variety of different directions.33 Here, though, I want to focus on criticisms rooted 
in, or easily related to, the pragmatist tradition, beginning with the way in which Charles Sanders 
Peirce and John Dewey each reconstructed the notions of “experience” and “inquiry.” Reviewing 
these criticisms will allow me to clarify why I believe that it is untenable to think of any inquiry 
as being “value-free” and/or “value-neutral,” regardless of the subject matter. Moreover, it will 
clarify why I believe that it is better to say that, in point of fact, all of our inquiries are “value-
guided” and “value-laden.” 
Like any two thinkers, Peirce and Dewey had their disagreements, but these are not my 
concern here. Instead, I want to highlight how these authors’ writings can be used to support the 
idea of inquiry as being “value-guided” and “value-laden,” especially when taken together. 
Accordingly, I will first consider some relevant aspects of Peirce’s thought, then consider what 
of immediate relevance Dewey adds to it; I will not consider what Peirce in fact thought, or 
might have thought, of Dewey’s additions to his arguments, nor will I comment on any 
disagreements that Dewey may have had with Peirce. 
 
3.3 Resources for Critiquing “Value-Free/Neutral” Inquiry in the Pragmatist Tradition 
 
3.3.1 Peirce’s Reconstruction of Experience and Inquiry  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
dysfunctioning of a democratic political system has normative implications, empirical democratic theorists explicitly 
eschew attempts to justify values or prescriptive statements. Second, empirical democratic theorists are concerned 
with the description and explanation of observable phenomena, as opposed to hypothesized or conjectured 
occurrences. And third, empirical democratic theory shares with the broader tradition of modern political analysis a 
pretension to scientific status. That is, the primary concern of empirical democratic theory is not simply to be 
empirical, but to be systematically empirical and theoretical in the scientific sense.”  
33 As indicated below, I have in mind here: the various historical empiricisms that might be characterized as being 
dominated by “the metaphor of the fixed ‘mental eye,’ where “sensing, perceiving, and knowing [have] been 
analyzed in terms of the model of mental seeing” (Bernstein 1971:  219); the various epistemologies that might each 
be characterized by Dewey’s notion of a “spectator theory of knowledge”; and the various philosophies of language 
that adopt a “picture theory of language.” 
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 Early in his career, Peirce noted that, especially since the time of Descartes, philosophy 
had largely been “dominated by the metaphor of the fixed ‘mental eye.’ Sensing, perceiving, and 
knowing had been analyzed in terms of the model of mental seeing.”34 Hence, “disputes arose 
concerning what sees, what is seen, and what is the relation of what we see to ‘external 
reality.’”35 Typically, this “spectator” view of the knower had been accompanied by what Peirce 
called the “foundation metaphor.”36 Beginning with a series of papers published in 1868, 
however, Peirce set out to displace the Cartesianism that had dominated so much modern 
philosophy, including the metaphor of the fixed mental eye and the metaphor of the foundation 
that had gone with it. Of course, as Bernstein reminds us, the character of “the foundation” that, 
at least in principle, philosophers have thought could put us in a position to “legitimize” our 
knowledge “is an issue that has divided many modern philosophers – whether it consists of 
impressions, simple matters of fact, sense data, universals, a priori truths, etc. But in such diverse 
philosophic positions as rationalism and empiricism, there is such a foundation.”37 For all such 
thinkers, the knower “views the world aright, or has legitimate knowledge, when he penetrates 
the vagueness, indeterminancy and confusion of ordinary or common thought and opinions and 
sees clearly the foundation of legitimate knowledge.”38 With Descartes in particular, the thinking 
went like this: 
 
 Descartes drew upon the traditional philosophical distinction between two sorts of 
knowledge, direct and indirect, immediate and inferential. But he gives it a novel twist. 
The first sort of knowledge is conceived of as a two-term (dyadic) relation between a 
knowing mind and a known truth. A great deal of preliminary investigation may be 
required to discriminate and isolate these intuitions – to insure that they are clear and 
distinct – but once this is achieved, then we have direct immediate knowledge; these 
intuitions are not based upon, nor do they presuppose, any inferential knowledge. On the 
contrary, they serve as the basis (the premises) for our inferences. The Cartesian version 
of the distinction between intuitive and inferential knowledge has had a profound 
influence on subsequent philosophy in both its rationalist and its empiricist strains. For 
example, in the twentieth century Bertrand Russell distinguished between “knowledge by 
acquaintance” and “knowledge by description.” He characterized “knowledge by 
acquaintance” as follows: “We have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly 
aware without the intermediary of any process of inferences or any truths.”39 
 
Starting with his 1868 papers, Peirce attacks the Cartesianism that had dominated so 
much modern philosophy.40 “Peirce’s primary aim is to criticize Cartesianism and the thesis that 
we have direct intuitive knowledge – the type of intuition not determined by prior cognitions and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Bernstein (1971: 219). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 174. For more recent criticisms of the “foundation metaphor” which echo and extend Peirce’s critique, see, 
for instance, W.V.O Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” From a Logical Point of View; Karl Popper, “On the 
Sources of Knowledge and Ignorance,” Conjectures and Refutations; and Wilfred Sellars, “Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind,” Science, Perception, and Reality. 
37 Ibid. 174. 
38 Ibid. 174-75. 
39 Bernstein (2010: 39-40). 
40 Ibid. 174. 
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one that can serve as an epistemological foundation.”41 He “wants to break free from the 
Cartesian supposition that we can break out of language or systems of signs and have direct 
immediate knowledge of non-linguistic objects.”42 Peirce takes this supposition “to be at the core 
of Cartesianism, and to be a central dogma of many varieties of modern philosophy.”43 Of 
course, he “does not doubt that there are real things that are independent of our thought and that 
constrain our opinions. But he challenges the claim that we can have direct, immediate, intuitive 
knowledge of what is real.”44 “All such knowledge,” he thinks, “involves or presupposes 
inferential processes.”45 Indeed, “one of the most important claims that Peirce makes in these 
early papers is that there is no thought without signs, or, more precisely, no thinking without sign 
activity.”46 
 Bernstein reminds us that “every lawyer knows just how difficult it really is to discern 
what is presumably directly seen and known ‘immediately’ from what is actually inferred or 
conditioned by our expectations and interpretations.”47 And this reminder should immediately 
alert us to how counter-intuitive, or at the very minimum ambitious, is the Cartesian supposition 
that “we can break out of language or systems of signs and have direct immediate knowledge of 
non-linguistic objects.”48  
Peirce adduces a variety of arguments “developed from perceptual studies to illustrate our 
inability to sort out what is presumably intuited from what is inferred (consciously or 
unconsciously).”49 These arguments are still relevant today, for “one of the main ‘dogmas’ of 
contemporary philosophy has been the acceptance of a sharp dichotomy between causal 
constraint and rational justification; the former ascribed to experience and the latter to 
reasoning.”50 Peirce, however, offers us a way to escape this dichotomy, one that points to the 
fact that, as John McDowell has more recently argued, our “conceptual capacities” permeate 
experience.51 “Like McDowell, Peirce wants to preserve the central ‘truth’ of the empiricist 
tradition – that the world constrains what we believe – but he also wants to avoid the confusion 
between constraint and justification.”52 
To appreciate how he does so, consider a brief example. When we speak about 
experience or perception, we can focus our attention on its different aspects.53 Suppose we have 
a simple perceptual report where, as Bernstein writes,  
 
I am looking at the sky on a beautiful sunny day and report that “I see a cloudless blue 
sky.” I would not be able to make such a report unless I had already mastered what 
Wittgenstein calls a language game and what Sellars describes as a “battery of concepts.” 
Making such a report requires mastery of the inferences that Peirce designates as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Bernstein (2010: 46). 
42 Ibid. 18. 
43 Ibid. 18-19. 
44 Ibid. 111. 
45 Ibid. 111. 
46 Ibid. 45. 
47 Ibid. 41-42. 
48 Ibid. 18. 
49 Ibid. 41-42. 
50 Ibid. 48. 
51 McDowell (1996: 10) [PT 49] 
52 Bernstein (2010: 49). 
53 Ibid. 49. 
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Thirdness.54 But I can also focus on the insistency of this perceptual report. The 
perceptual judgment is forced upon me in the sense that if I look up (and have normal 
eyesight), I cannot help seeing that the sky is blue. But the fact that such perceptual 
judgments are forced upon us (where there seems no room for doubt) may turn out to be 
false. “We all know, only too well, how terribly insistent perception may be; and yet, for 
all that, in its most insistent degrees, it may be utterly false, – that it may not fit into the 
mass of experience”.55  
 
To clarify his meaning, Peirce introduces the technical term of a “percipuum”: 
 
We know nothing about the percept otherwise than by the testimony of the perceptual 
judgment, excepting we feel the blow of it, the reaction of it against us, and we see the 
contents of it arranged into an object, in its totality, –excepting also, of course[,] what the 
psychologists are able to make out inferentially. But the moment we fix our minds upon it 
and think the least thing about the percept, it is the perceptual judgment that tells us what 
we so “perceive.” For this and other reasons, I propose to consider the percept as it is 
immediately interpreted in the perceptual judgment, under the name of the 
“percipuum.”56  
 
Although we can discriminate the brute compulsion in a perception, Bernstein comments, 
 
this brute compulsion is not a Given. It does not authenticate a perceptual judgment. The 
percipuum is not a discrete sense datum. It is not a self-authenticating episode, which 
serves as an epistemological foundation of empirical knowledge. It is not a Given. It is a 
judgment forced upon us…. Peirce is disentangling the concept of brute compulsion from 
epistemic authority. Both are essential to account for perception and experience. The 
world does constrain our empirical knowledge, but this constraint…is mediated through 
our perceptual and experiential judgments.57 
 
In this way, Peirce anticipated many of the arguments that were later to be elaborated by 
Wilfred Sellars. Like Sellars, Peirce contends that once we give up (what Sellars terms) The 
Myth of the Given, we are led to a fallibilistic, non-foundational, intersubjective understanding 
of concept formation and inference. This understanding of concept formation and inference 
entails a non-representationalist semantics, one which interprets meaning and inference in a more 
holistic manner.58 “Without denying the ‘truth’ of empiricism – that in our empirical and 
scientific knowledge, we are subject to a brute compulsion – Peirce and Sellars challenge the 
very idea that there is (or can be) any knowledge ‘below’ the level of concepts, ‘below’ what 
Kant and Hegel call Verstand (understanding).”59 Thus, “there is no ‘pure’ receptive knowledge 
that does not always already involve what Kant calls spontaneity. There is no immediate 
knowledge by acquaintance when this is understood to be a type of immediate self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 For discussion of Peirce’s three “classes” of “Firstness,” “Secondness,” and “Thirdness,” see Bernstein (1970: 
177-87). 
55 Peirce (7.647). 
56 Peirce (7.643; emphasis added.)  
57 Bernstein (2010: 51). 
58 Bernstein (2010: 97). 
59 Ibid. 97-98. 
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authenticating episode that can presumably serve as an epistemic foundation for inferential 
knowledge.”60 In short, this is why Peirce challenges what he regarded as a profoundly 
misleading conception of a philosophical system, one that proceeds from allegedly unassailable 
premises and builds up a system of knowledge through a chain of reasoning. Hence Peirce’s 
emphasis on the importance of “multiform argumentation” in philosophy:  
 
Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods, so far as to proceed 
only from tangible premises which can be subjected to careful scrutiny, and to trust rather 
to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. It 
should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose 
fibres may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately 
connected.61  
 
The “chain metaphor” is closely linked to the “foundation metaphor.” “The dream of 
many philosophers,” Bernstein writes, “has been to discover ‘one thing which is certain and 
indubitable,’ or, more generally, to discover those basic truths (what Sellars calls ‘self-
authenticating episodes’) that can serve as an epistemological foundation.”62 Then, the thinking 
goes, we can build a solid edifice of knowledge through a systematic chain of reasoning 
(inferences).63 However, Peirce notes that the chain metaphor fails to capture how the sciences 
actually proceed.64 “Before Peirce, when philosophers turned their attention to science, it was 
primarily the results of the scientific process that preoccupied them. Or they approached 
empirical science with a set of independent epistemological biases which they set out to 
vindicate by an appeal to science.”65 Pierce, however, was a practicing scientist, and he sought to 
generalize from scientific investigation as a process, to articulate and clarify the spirit of science 
as an activity.66 And actual scientific reasoning is, he observed, more like a cable with multiple 
strands reinforcing each other than a chain of inferences. Any one of the strands in the cable may 
prove weak; taken together, however, they can have great strength. This cable model of 
multiform argumentation has been tremendously successful in the sciences, and it ought to be 
adopted in philosophical inquiry, he thought.67 
Thus, the new approach to knowledge and inquiry that Peirce was to develop was 
primarily a reaction to the Cartesianism that had dominated so much modern philosophy. For 
Peirce and the pragmatists that were to follow him, “knowledge” and “inquiry” neither have nor 
need a “foundation.”68 Critical of what Dewey was later to call the “spectator theory of 
knowledge” (see section 3.3.2 below), Peirce wanted to “shift our attention to know-how, to how 
we engage in the world and social practices.” 69 Furthermore, he repudiated what Rorty was to 
later to call “philosophy as the mirror of nature.”70 On his view, as we have seen, all cognition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Ibid. 97-98. 
61 Peirce (1992: 29). 
62 Bernstein (2010: 38). Bernstein is quoting Sellars (1997: 73). 
63 Bernstein (2010: 38). 
64 Ibid. 
65 Bernstein (1971: 199). 
66 Ibid. 
67 Bernstein (2010: 38). 
68 Bernstein (1971: 174). 
69 Bernstein (2010: 19). 
70 Ibid. 
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involves or presupposes inferential processes and, since all thinking and reasoning consists of 
sign activity, these inferential processes also involve the use of signs.71 Hence, it makes little 
sense to think of our minds – or our reasoning processes or even philosophies – as even 
potentially “mirroring nature.”  
The alternative paradigm that Peirce began to develop in his 1868 papers and that he 
continued to develop over the course of his life was a view of inquiry as a self-corrective 
process. Knowledge claims are legitimated not by their origins – for the origins of knowledge are 
diverse and fallible – but rather by the norms and rules of inquiry itself.72 On this view, every 
knowledge claim is part of a system of signs that is always open to further clarification and 
interpretation, and every knowledge claim is to be tested and confirmed publically. “The 
practices and norms of the critical community of inquirers are the locus for refining, testing, and 
validating our hypotheses and theories.”73 
Why did Peirce place so much emphasis on the communal character of inquiry? In large 
part, he did so because he believed that it is only through social interaction and criticism that we 
find the correctives for our prejudices and idiosyncratic perspectives.74 Hence, when Peirce 
declares that “to make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious,” he is 
placing on display one of the principal theses of his overall philosophy.75 As we saw, Peirce 
launched a sustained attack on the subjectivism that has characterized so much modern 
epistemology. His alternative is an “intersubjective (social) understanding of inquiry, knowing, 
communication, and logic.”76 Peirce wanted to shift our attention from the origins of ideas and 
hypotheses to their consequences for conduct.77 He insists that all inquiry, including scientific 
and philosophical inquiry, starts with tacit prejudices and prejudgments. These prejudices and 
prejudgments provide a necessary background and orientation to our inquiries. “We do not get 
rid of them by feigned or paper doubt. We must distinguish paper doubt form real doubt – the 
type for which we have positive reasons. Doubt, then, is not a mere psychological state; it is a 
normative concept insofar as it requires positive reasons.”78 Of course, in conducting any given 
inquiry, we may come to reject some of these prejudices; but we never escape from having (tacit) 
prejudgments that we do not question. Peirce emphasizes that figuring out which prejudments are 
to be criticized or rejected is not the starting point of inquiry but rather an end product – that is to 
say, an achievement – of it.79 “Popper echoes Peirce’s critique of Cartesianism when he attacked 
the search for epistemological origins that has dominated so much of modern philosophy. Like 
Peirce, Popper argues that this search, which has been characteristic of both rationalist and 
empiricist strains in modern philosophy, is misguided.”80 Thus, the idea of a community of 
inquirers is central to Peirce’s pragmatism precisely because he thought that “it is only in and 
through subjecting our prejudices, hypotheses and guesses to public criticism by a relevant 
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community of inquirers that we can hope to escape from our limited perspective, test our beliefs, 
and bring about the growth of knowledge.”81  
Now, these comments give a very brief account of the new approach to knowledge and 
inquiry that Peirce began to develop in 1868 (and that he refined throughout his career) and that 
would greatly influence John Dewey and other subsequent pragmatists. Before moving on to 
Dewey’s thought, however, I want to highlight two tightly related facets of Peirce’s fallibilistic, 
non-foundational, intersubjective understanding of concept formation and inference that will be 
important below. The first is Peirce’s view of the essentially social character of inquiry and its 
end product, knowledge. The second is the status of norms in his thought. 
 “Jürgen Habermas has argued that at the turn of the twentieth century there was a major 
paradigm shift from a ‘philosophy of subjectivity’ or a ‘philosophy of consciousness’ to an 
intersubjective (social) communicative model of understanding human action and rationality.”82 
And one of the primary sources of this shift is evident in Peirce’s early papers.83 We have 
already reviewed several features of Peirce’s attack on the Cartesian roots of the philosophy of 
subjectivity/consciousness. But I should now say something more about Peirce’s semiotics. For 
Peirce’s theory of signs is at the heart of the intersubjective model of understanding human 
action and rationality that he thought should replace the philosophy of subjectivity or 
consciousness. The core idea of his theory of signs is that signification is triadic in character.  
 
To elucidate what Peirce means, let us return to the Cartesian understanding of intuition. I 
have indicated that intuition is a two-termed (dyadic) relation between knower (mind) 
and known object. In representational epistemological and semantic accounts of 
language, attention is focused on the relation between a sign and what it represents. One 
of Peirce’s most original and central claims is that all sign activity is irreducibly triadic: 
a sign (first term) stands for an object (second term) to an interpretant (third term). This 
triadic structure is an essential characteristic of both linguistic and non-linguistic signs. In 
his theory of signs, Peirce typically speaks about the “interpretant” rather than the 
“interpreter” because he stresses that the interpretant is itself a sign.84 
 
Now, “the upshot of Peirce’s theory of signs is that all signification, which includes all language 
and thought, is essentially social in nature.”85 For “the very meaning of our concepts depends,” 
the theory suggests, “on the role that they play in a social context of rules and norms.”86 “In the 
17th century, epistemology was generally conceived in terms of the mental activity of an 
individual.”87 In contrast, pragmatists like Peirce stress the social character of language and so 
also epistemology.88 And this is evident in Peirce’s theory of signs. “In addition to the sign and 
the signified, there is always an interpreter who can be an immediate addressee as well as a 
future one. Meaning is generated in the prolonged interaction between speakers and 
interpreters.”89 Certain signs, hence words, exist to serve certain social-communicative purposes; 	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and we cannot understand our language, hence concepts and judgments, apart from those social 
purposes.  
 Peirce also emphasizes the social character of inquiry in another sense, however.  For he 
always emphasizes the social character of the individual himself. As Peirce writes: “A person is 
not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he is ‘saying to himself,’ that is, is saying to 
that other self that one is trying to persuade; and all thought whatsoever is a sign, and is mostly 
of the nature of language,” which is a social resource.90 	   Turn now to the status of norms in Peirce’s thought. Peirce’s emphasis on the social or 
communal nature of humans reflects his strong anti-subjectivistic orientation.91 Peirce not only 
claims that thought is a form of internal dialogue but also that dialogue presupposes a 
community in which there are effective standards and norms of discourse.92 This, indeed, is one 
of the fundamental tenants of his entire philosophy, and has already been suggested by the idea 
that “meaning is generated in the prolonged interaction between speakers and interpreters.”93 It 
helps us to understand how Peirce interprets “rational” thought and inquiry. Where thought is 
rational, Peirce characterizes it as being a form of self-controlled conduct in relation to norms or 
standards.94 Here the status of norms in Peirce’s thinking becomes clearer, and we again see 
Peirce’s rejection of what Dewey was later to call the “spectator theory of knowledge.” (Again, 
see section 3.3.2 below.) “A rational person,” Peirce writes, “not merely has habits, but also can 
exert a measure of self-control over his future actions.”95 For Peirce, beliefs themselves are 
habits, and when we reason about our beliefs we exert control over ourselves, shaping and 
modifying our conduct in this way or that. Hence he writes that “readiness to act in a certain way 
under given circumstances and when actuated by a given motive is habit; and a deliberate, or self 
controlled habit[,] is precisely a belief.”96 Indeed, thinking itself, he says, is a “kind of action,”97 
and intelligence consists in “acting a certain way.”98  
For Peirce, then, humans qua knowers or inquirers are viewed as agents who have and 
can control their own habits; they are not passive spectators of reality.99And there can be no 
rational self-control unless there are norms by which we distinguish the true from the false, the 
right from the wrong, the correct from the incorrect.100 More specifically, this self-control 
“consists (to mention only the leading constituents) first, in comparing one’s past deeds with 
standards, second in rational deliberation concerning how one will act in the future, in itself a 
highly complicated operation, third, in the formation of a resolve, fourth, in the creation, on the 
basis of the resolve, of a strong determination, or modification of habit.”101 Furthermore, self-
control requires constant self-criticism, which he regards as “the very life of reasoning.”102 As 
Bernstein observes, however, “self-criticism does not take place in a vaccum”: it requires “an 
active community of inquirers, a community that is not completely identified with any existing 	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community,” but, as Peirce says, a community “without definite limits, and capable of a definite 
increase in knowledge.”103 Thus, summarizing Peirce’s view, Bernstein concludes that “all 
reasoning exists in a logical space of norms,”104 and the community of inquirers is the origin of 
those norms and the linguistic resources that inquirers employ in invoking, challenging, and 
modifying them. 
 How are these “norms” best characterized, however? Sometimes, philosophers of science 
recognize that “logical,” “epistemic,” and/or “cognitive” “norms” and/or “values” play an 
indispensable role in our inquiries. Might, then, we simply say that the norms Peirce has in mind 
here are “logical,” or “cognitive,” or “epistemic” norms? Putting the point in any of these ways 
would, I believe, misrepresent Peirce’s view. For Peirce, a normative science “studies what 
ought to be.”105 And Peirce maintained that there is a hierarchy of such sciences, according to 
which logic is dependent on ethics, which is in turn dependent on esthetics. Hence to suggest that 
the “norms” in question are simply “logical,” or “cognitive,” or “epistemic” ones would, I think, 
misrepresent his view, especially in light of the fact that such norms and/or values are commonly 
construed as standing apart from – as neatly and categorically separable from – ethical and/or 
aesthetic norms and/or values. (More on this below.) Peirce’s idea that there is a hierarchy of 
normative sciences is evident, for instance, in the following rich passage: 
 
There are inhibitions and coordinations that entirely escape consciousness. There are, in 
the next place, modes of self-control which seem quite instinctive. Next, there is a kind of 
self-control which results from training. Next, a man can be his own training-master and 
thus control his self-control. When this point is reached much or all the training may be 
conducted in imagination. When a man trains himself, thus controlling control, he must 
have some moral rule in view, however special and irrational it may be. But next he may 
undertake to improve this rule; that is, to exercise a control over his control of control. To 
do this he must have in view something higher than an irrational rule. He must have some 
sort of moral principle. This, in turn, may be controlled by reference to an esthetic ideal 
of what is fine. There are certainly more grades than I have enumerated. Perhaps their 
number is indefinite. The brutes are certainly capable of more than one grade of control; 
but it seems to me that our superiority to them is more due to our greater number of 
grades of self-control than it is to our versatility.106 
 
“It should be clear,” Bernstein observes, “that Peirce is redefining ‘Ethics,’ at least when we 
consider some of the traditional meanings of this term. But there is a ‘core’ of its traditional 
meaning that he wants to preserve. The substantive point that Peirce is emphasizing is that logic 
is essentially normative; it is concerned with laying down rules that ought to be followed in 
reasoning.”107 
These rules or imperatives are not categorical, but instead hypothetical: they are laid 
down in light of some purpose, goal, or end to be realized.108 “The understanding and critique of 
these ends of logic is what Peirce labels ‘Ethics.’”109 Peirce apparently thought, Bernstein says, 	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“that the fundamental question of ethics is ‘What am I prepared deliberately to do, what am I to 
aim at, what am I after?’ And logic (broadly conceived) demands answers to these questions; ‘it 
is, therefore, impossible to be thoroughly and rationally logical except on an ethical basis,’” 
Peirce writes.110 “We can see here Peirce’s own version of the primacy of practical reason.”111  
 What, though, of the claim that ethics is in turn dependent on “esthetics”? “Reasoning is 
a deliberate form of voluntary conduct involving the use of logical norms,” Bernstein 
continues.112 “Although logic can be divided into different branches, logic is the critique of 
arguments and leading principles.”113 It “not only lays down rules which ought to be, but need 
not be followed,” Peirce says; “it is [also] the analysis of the conditions of attainment of 
something of which purpose is an essential ingredient.”114 However, “if logic is to lay down rules 
that ought to be followed in reasoning, then there must be an appeal to an end or purpose by 
which we can justify the rules that ought to be followed” in the first place.115 If we think of 
“esthetics” with many of its normal connotations we are sure to be misled. By “esthetics,” Peirce 
means a science of ends; and the business of the esthetician “is to say what is the state of things 
which is most admirable in itself regardless of any ulterior reason.”116 The problem of esthetics is 
“to determine by analysis what it is that one ought deliberately to admire per se in itself 
regardless of what it may lead to and regardless of its bearing upon human conduct.”117 “No 
matter how we may attempt to avoid the issue, the question of ultimate justification is crucial,” 
Bernstein comments.118 “To answer this question we must critically investigate our ultimate 
goals and purposes; we must find out what it is that we ought ultimately to admire and seek. It is 
in this sense that ethics is dependent on esthetics, or to put the issue more neutrally, the criteria 
of right and wrong in logic as well as in ethics ultimately depend on the ends of all human 
activity.”119 
 Now, this necessarily brief review of Peirce’s reconstruction of experience and inquiry 
(of his critique of Cartesianism and his alternative view of inquiry, his semiotics, and his idea 
that the three normative sciences of logic, ethics, and esthetics can be arranged hierarchically) 
provides us, I believe, with sufficient resources for rendering plausible the two overarching 
claims that at the beginning of this section (Section III) I signaled would be our central focus in 
Section III: first, that all inquiry presupposes, depends on, and conveys norms, values, and 
interests, hence may be described as “value-guided” and “value-laden”; and second, that, in light 
of this fact, anything we say (and do not say) in any of our inquiries could have “moral or ethical 
significance and implications.” (Hereafter, I refer to these two claims as the two “claims-of-
interest.”) But I want to hold off on making my initial defense of the two claims-of-interest. For, 
as previously indicated, I first want to review selected aspects of John Dewey’s thought (3.3.2 
below), which will allow me, in section 3.4, to make my initial pragmatist-inspired statement of 
the first claim-of-interest (the claim about the inevitable value-guidedness and value-ladenness 
of our inquiries). In section 3.5, we’ll then consider some further pragmatist (or pragmatist-	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type120) criticisms of the fact/value dichotomy that will strengthen the initial statement of that 
claim. These additional pragmatist (and pragmatist-type) considerations will also lay a firmer 
basis for the discussion of the second claim-of-interest (the claim about “the moral or ethical 
significance and implications” of what we say [and do not] say in our inquiries), which we take 
up in the subsequent section (Section IV).  
 
3.3.2 Dewey’s Reconstruction of Experience and Inquiry 
 
Now, Dewey, as I understand him, would agree with the Peircean perspectives on 
knowledge, inquiry, and language that I’ve just adumbrated. For our purposes, however, it is not 
important that I try to substantiate this claim – indeed, it is not even important that it is accurate. 
For, as I’ve just intimated, our own purpose is simply to evaluate selected ideas that arguably 
stand in support of the two overarching claims-of-interest just mentioned. So, let us turn to 
Dewey’s thought and see what relevant resources we may find there.  
 We have already reviewed various ways in which Peirce was concerned to reconstruct 
“experience.” To recall, Peirce offered at least the following tightly related theses in defense of 
his reconstruction of experience: experience is active, not passive, and is permeated by our 
conceptual capacities and funded with inference; thinking is itself a kind of action, activity, or 
conduct; thinking always proceeds against the background of (tacit) prejudgments (we cannot 
start from a position of having no prejudgments that we might later find reason to reject or 
modify – there is apparently no infallible starting point for reasoning about anything); and 
thinking always involves sign activity and so is essentially normative and social in character. 
With all of theses, I will say, Dewey surely did agree. But he also offered a battery of related 
arguments that warrant consideration here. For Dewey’s reconstruction of experience is arguably 
even more radical than Peirce’s, and what sets if off as being so gives us additional resources 
with which to argue for the all-inquiry-is-value-guided-and-value-laden thesis. 
Like Peirce, Dewey thought that past philosophy, especially since Descartes, had been 
dominated by the metaphor of the fixed “mental eye.”121 Indeed, as I’ve already suggested, “a 
distinctive and central theme in Dewey's epistemology was the rejection of a ‘spectator theory’ 
of knowledge, which he thought dominated western philosophy.”122 Here, “knowledge was 
understood on the model of the observation of a fixed and independent object on the part of a 
subject. The spectator account of knowledge was accompanied by a ‘quest for certainty’ in 
epistemology; that is, a search for a fixed and certain foundation for knowledge claims, for 
example in a priori truths or in the incorrigible data of our senses.”123 Dewey wanted “to 
displace this conception of knowledge with a notion of inquiry, understood as the struggle of 
human intelligence to solve problems. The goal of such inquiry was not to arrive at a certain 
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picture of the nature of things, but at an inevitably provisional solution to the practical and 
intellectual problem that sparked inquiry.”124 
Dewey thought that, by and large, past philosophers had offered highly abstract and 
artificial ways of discussing experience, and he wanted us to return to the concrete context of 
actual life as it is experienced.125 The analogy that Dewey thought appropriate for understanding 
human life – including, crucially, our mental activities and cognitive processes – was “the 
esthetic analogy of the craftsman involved in doing and making.”126 “According to Dewey, 
Greek philosophy limited the application of this analogy to our ethical and political life, to praxis 
as contrasted with theoria.”127 However, with the development of experimental scientific inquiry, 
he thought, this analogy should now be extended to what had traditionally been viewed as 
theoria. “Experimental knowing,” Bernstein comments, “is essentially an art that involves, like 
all arts, a conscious interaction between a craftsman and the subject matter that he is 
transforming. The craftsman perfects his art, not by comparing his product to some ‘ideal’ 
model, but by the cumulative results of experience – experience which benefits from tried and 
tested procedures, but always involves risk and novelty.”128 
 For Dewey, the craftsperson is to be viewed from a biological-anthropological 
perspective. After all, Dewey, like the other classical pragmatists, was a thoroughgoing 
naturalist. As such, Dewey emphasized that “every experience involves an interaction (or as he 
later put it, a transaction) between a living organism and its environment. In every experience 
there is both suffering or undergoing and activity.” 129  Viewed in this way, “a primary 
characteristic of human experience is its purposiveness. We are creatures who can imaginatively 
construct new possibilities and by intelligent inquiry we can reconstruct our experience so that 
the goods we most deeply desire can be achieved and made stable.”130 Like all natural creatures, 
humans’ responses to their environments are, of course, selective; “in acting we are always 
choosing.”131 In responding selectively to our environments and so inevitably making choices, 
we can, of course, do so blindly, motivated by impulse, convention or habit; but we can also do 
so intelligently.132 And our controlled or reflective inquiries can help us do so. Inquiry arises as 
the “dominant trait of a situation,” Dewey says, “when there is something seriously the matter, 
some trouble, due to active discordance dissentiency, conflict among the factors of a prior non-
intellectual experience: when… a situation becomes tensional.”133 The purpose of any specific 
inquiry is to locate the felt difficulty and to craft a method for coping with it.134 
 Thus, Dewey not only advocates that we view humans as agents in politics and morality, 
where it has conventionally been recognized that conflicts of values arise and something has to 
be done; he also advocates that we view humans this way when we consider all of their inquiries, 
including their most “theoretical” inquiries. 135  With Peirce, he maintains that traditional 	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epistemology has been overly focused on logics of proof and on the results of our inquiries.136 
Accordingly, “it has failed to focus on the status of our knowledge claims as they function within 
the process of inquiry itself.”137 Like Peirce, he also maintained that “the lesson to be learned 
from experimental science is that what distinguishes knowledge from fancy and mere speculation 
is precisely the procedures within inquiry by which we discover, test, and warrant our knowledge 
claims.”138 “When we focus on discovering and inquiring, we are lead to very different 
conclusions concerning knowledge itself.” 139  We then become aware of “the essentially 
hypothetical nature of all knowledge claims,” look to consequences rather than to the origins of 
knowledge, and “realize that the norms of inquiry are not supplied from some source ‘outside’ 
our inquiry, but are arrived at, refined, and modified in the course of the process of inquiry.”140  
 We can deepen our understanding of Dewey’s reconstruction of “experience” by looking 
at one of his boldest statements of how we might do so, namely, the statement he offers in “The 
Need for a Recovery of Philosophy.” Here, Dewey list five contrasts between his view of 
experience and what he calls the “orthodox” or “traditional” view of experience. 
 “In the orthodox view,” Dewey says, “experience is regarded primarily as a knowledge 
affair. But to eyes not looking through ancient spectacles, it assuredly appears as an affair of the 
intercourse of a living being with its physical and social environment.”141 “In the history of 
philosophy, especially in modern philosophy since Descartes,” Bernstein comments, “the 
primary question has been: What kind of knowledge, if any, does experience yield? Or what is 
the role of experience in our knowledge of the world?”142 For instance, empiricism and 
rationalism have typically been construed as opposing philosophies; and yet, “both movements 
have been primarily concerned with experience as a ‘knowledge-affair’ – empiricists maintaining 
that experience is the only source of knowledge of the world, while rationalists have argued that 
experience is never sufficient to yield genuine knowledge.”143 In both cases, “the concern with 
experience has been epistemologically oriented,” and “to approach the nature of experience from 
an exclusively epistemological orientation results in a major distortion of experience.” Dewey 
came to appreciate that there is surely more to experience than knowledge.144 
 
It is not difficult to grasp what Dewey means, in fact it is quite obvious. But philosophers 
have a way of forgetting or neglecting the obvious. When Dewey speaks of 
“nonreflective” or “noncognitive” experience, he means the type of experience in which 
knowing or inquiry is not the primary objective. “Anyone [who] recognizes the 
difference between an experiencing of quenching thirst where the perception of water is a 
mere incident, and an experience of water where knowledge of what water is, is the 	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controlling interest; or between the enjoyment of social converse among friends and a 
study deliberately made of the character of the participants; between esthetic appreciation 
of a picture and an examination by a connoisseur to establish the artist” recognizes the 
difference between noncognitive or nonreflective experiences and experiences in which 
knowing is primary. Dewey is not denying that there is thinking or conscious awareness 
in all human experiences. But we distort our experience as lived if we think that the 
paradigm of all experience is knowing.145 
 
When knowing is the primary objective and we do inquire, however, we do so in 
response to a felt problem, a “problematic situation.”146 Inquiry emerges as the “dominant trait of 
a situation when there is something seriously the matter, some trouble, due to active discordance, 
dissentiency, conflict among the factors of a prior non-intellectual experience: when…a situation 
becomes tensional.”147 Moreover, inquiry not only arises out of a particular problematic situation 
but is also guided by it. Hence, late in his career Dewey wrote that  
 
…the unsettled, indecisive character of the situation with which inquiry is compelled to 
deal affects all the subject matters that enter into all inquiry. It affects, on the one hand, 
the observed existing facts that are taken to locate and delimit the problem; on the other 
side, it affects all of the suggestions, surmises, ideas that are entertained as possible 
solutions of the problem.148  
 
 The second contrast with the “orthodox” or “traditional” view of experience that Dewey 
emphasizes in “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy” goes like this. “According to tradition 
experience is (at least primarily) a psychical thing, infected throughout by ‘subjectivity.’ What 
experience suggests about itself is a genuinely objective world which enters into the actions and 
sufferings of men and undergoes modifications through their responses.”149 Dewey is referring 
here to what Habermas was later to call the “philosophy of subjectivity’ or the ‘philosophy of 
consciousness” that we already discussed in relation to Peirce’s anti-Cartesianism. “Descartes’ 
dualism of mind and body, together with his conception of mind as a thinking substance which 
‘contains’ ideas by which the mind knows ‘external objects,’ led to an epistemological 
preoccupation with what is ‘in’ or ‘before’ the mind,” Bernstein comments. Hence,  
 
Experience as subjective experiencing became a dominant concern of philosophers. 
When this subjectivistic bias was followed to the bitter end, some philosophers came to 
the conclusion that man is trapped in the privacy of the acts and contents of his mind and 
the he lacks any adequate evidence for believing that there is any objective world 
“outside” his private, subjective experience. Dewey, like the other pragmatists, argued 
that the steps leading to the conclusion that experience is exclusively mental, private, and 
subjective consist of a tissue of fallacies. It is of course true that there is no experience 
without an experiencer and experiencing…. But all experience includes an objective 	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dimension. “Subjectivity” and “objectivity” are names for changing functional 
distinctions within experience.150 
 
Here, “Dewey cannot only draw support from the analyses of Peirce and James, but also 
continental phenomenology with its emphasis on the Lebenswelt and from Wittgensteinian 
analysis with its concern for Lebensform. In differing ways, all of these philosophic tendencies 
have been reacting against the misguided subjectivism of so much modern philosophy.”151  
 
Here now is the third contrast that Dewey stresses:  
 
So far as anything beyond a bare present is recognized by established doctrine, the past 
exclusively counts. Registration of what has taken place, reference to precedent, is 
believed to be the essence of experience. Empiricism is conceived of as tied up to what 
has been, or is “given.” But experience in its vital form is experimental, an effort to 
change the given; it is characterized by projection, by reaching forward into the 
unknown; connection with a future its salient trait.152 
 
Bernstein suggests that we can identify the dominant tendency that Dewey is explicating in the 
influential empiricism of David Hume. “A dominant tendency in traditional empiricism has been 
to identify experience with what is now presented to us or what is the result of past 
observations.”153 Hume, for example, “sought to explain how it is that when we are presented 
with an instance of the species of an object, we imagine the effect associated with it and believe 
that it will reoccur. To this extent Hume is concerned with the relation of past experience to the 
future.”154 In the present connection, however, it is useful to note “how easily Hume slides from 
the nature of experience to past experience.” 155  And we should note too “how Hume’s 
description of experience is oriented by his epistemological concern.” 156  “The nature of 
experience is this,” Hume writes. 
 
We remember to have had frequent instances of the existence of one species of objects; 
and also remember, that the individuals of another species of objects have always 
attended them, and have existed in a regular order of contiguity and succession with 
regard to them…. In all these instances, from which we learn the conjunction of 
particular causes and effects, both the causes and the effects have been perceiv’d by the 
senses and are remember’d: But in all cases where we reason concerning them there is 
one perceiv’d or remember’d, and the other supply’d in conformity to our past 
experience.157 
 
However, “when we shift our perspective to a biological-anthropological orientation and take 
seriously the experimental attitude so fundamental to modern scientific inquiry,” Bernstein 	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comments, “we realize that within experience ‘anticipation [as Dewey says] is …more primary 
than recollection; projection than summoning of the past; the projective than the 
retrospective.’”158  
Dewey, like the existentialists, “always underscores that man ‘lives forward,” although he 
draws very different conclusions from this. In maintaining that experience in its ‘vital form is 
experimental,” Dewey also indicates the dominant role that activity plays in human 
experience.”159 In this connection, it is again well to recall that “philosophers have frequently 
written as if our primary attitude toward the world is that of the spectator who passively observes 
and records what is happening and what has happened.”160 And again, it well to note that humans 
are agents; they are not spectators “looking into reality or nature from the outside.”161 They are 
part of nature and their activities condition and are conditioned by the full range of their 
cognitive activities.162 “The very nature of sensation, perception, and knowledge have been 
misunderstood because of the failure to appreciate the ways in which these processes themselves 
function within human activity.”163 “Once we recognize that experience is primarily an active 
transaction between a living organism and its environment, then our understanding of the entire 
range of man’s cognitive functions is transformed.”164 These functions are then to be located in 
the life activity of an individual; for, as Dewey says, “we are active beings from the start and are 
naturally…engaged in redirecting our action in response to change in our surroundings.”165 Thus, 
Dewey, I am confident, would have agreed with Stuart Hampshire’s claim that “the deepest 
mistake in empiricist theories of perception, descending from Berkeley and Hume, has been the 
representation of human beings as passive observers receiving impressions from ‘outside’ of the 
mind, where the ‘outside’ includes our own bodies.”166 In point of fact, “I not only perceive my 
body, I also control it: I not only perceive external objects, I also manipulate them.”167 
Accordingly, it is “wrong to represent experience of the external world as some synthesis of 
impressions of the five senses. A physical object is recognized as a potential obstruction, or as 
something to be manipulated, occupying a definite position in relation to me at the moment of 
perception.”168 And I am also confident that he would agree with Heidegger’s view that, as Axel 
Honneth has summarized it, “we do not encounter reality in the stance of a cognitive subject, but 
rather practically cope with the world in such a way that it is given to us as a field of practical 
significance.”169 
The fourth contrast with the “orthodox” or “traditional” view of experience Dewey states 
like this: “The empirical tradition is committed to particularism. Connections and continuities are 
supposed to be foreign to experience, to be byproducts of dubious validity. An experience that is 
an undergoing and a striving for control in new directions is pregnant with connections.”170 
Dewey, Bernstein comments, “is reiterating the point so eloquently made by William James in 	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his criticism of traditional empiricism and his demand for a “radical empiricism.”171 “In the 
history of British empiricism,” he continues, “there has been a strong particularistic and 
atomistic tendency. Experience consists of discrete and separable perceptions.”172 Like James, 
Dewey “accuses past philosophers of foisting upon us a highly abstract and artificial analysis of 
experience, one that mistakes an abstraction for the concreteness of experience itself.”173 When 
we return to the concreteness of lived experience, we see that, as Dewey says, “experience 
exhibits every kind of connection from the most intimate to mere external juxtaposition.”174 
“Connections and relations are as much a part of experience as the particulars that we isolate 
within experience.”175 “Dewey argued that we must not mistake distinctions and discriminations 
instituted for specific purposes with the experience as it is lived.”176 
The fifth contrast with the “orthodox” or “traditional” view of experience is based on the 
previous four. “In the traditional notion,” Dewey writes,  
 
experience and thought are anti-thetical terms. Inference, so far as it is other than a 
revival of what has been given in the past, goes beyond experience; hence it is either 
invalid, or else a measure of desperation by which, using experience as a spring-board, 
we jump out of a world of stable things and other selves. But experience taken free of the 
restrictions imposed by the older conception is full of inference. There is, apparently, no 
conscious experience without inference; reflection is native and constant.177 
 
In many of its philosophic uses, “experience” has been used as “a contrast term with ‘thought,’ 
or ‘inference,’ or ‘reason.’”178  Underlying this tendency, Bernstein comments, “is a fundamental 
epistemological doctrine that experience is limited to what is sensed, perceived, or remembered. 
Experience supplies the input and reason is the faculty or capacity by which we order, arrange, 
and draw inferences from this input.”179 For Dewey, however, the appropriate contrast is “not 
between experience and reason, but between experience which is funded by the procedures and 
results of intelligent activity and experience which is not.”180 “Experience can be nonrational and 
irrational, but it can also be funded with intelligence and controlled inference.”181  
 “As a living organism, man continually acts and reacts within an objective world.”182 As 
Dewey writes, “any reaction is a venture; it involves risk… But the organism’s fateful 
intervention in the course of events is blind, its choice is random, except as it can employ what 
happens to it as a basis for inferring what is likely to happen later. In the degree in which it can 
read future results into present on-goings, its responsive choice, its partiality to this condition or 
that, become intelligent.”183 “The fundamental issue for Dewey is always what will be the quality 	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and nature of our interactions and transactions.”184 Thus, “Dewey’s exploration of the five 
contrasts culminates with a plea for the realization of intelligence in all phrases of human life; 
not intelligence that is [as Dewey says] ‘the faculty of intellect honored in textbooks but 
neglected elsewhere,’” but intelligence that is ‘the sum-total of impulses, habits, emotions, 
records, and discoveries which forecast what is desirable and undesirable in future possibilities, 
and which contrive ingenuously in behalf of imagined good.’”185 
 
3.4 Inquiry as Value-Guided and Value-Laden: A Pragmatist-Inspired Summary Statement 
 
 I want now to offer a brief statement of how the above Peircean and Deweyan reflections 
provide us with a perspective from which to argue against the idea that any inquiry either is or 
could be “value-free” and/or “value-neutral.” Or, to state the first overarching claim-of-interest 
in its positive form, I want to offer a very brief explanation of how the above Peircean and 
Deweyan reflections provide us with a perspective from which to argue for the idea that all of 
our inquiries presuppose, depend on, and convey norms, values, and interests, hence may be 
described as “value-guided” and “value-laden.” Note, however, that while I believe that we 
already have the resources to offer a compelling statement of the second overarching claim-of-
interest as well (again, the claim that in light of the fact that all inquiry is value-guided and 
value-laden, anything we say [and do not say] in any of our inquiries could have “moral or 
ethical significance and implications”), I will again delay offering that statement until Section 
IV. Again, the reason for this is that there are additional pragmatist (and pragmatist-type) 
considerations that I would like to drawn on in making that statement, ones that will not only 
help us to defend the first overarching claim-of-interest but also the second one. So, in the rest of 
this subsection (3.4) I offer a statement of the first overarching claim-of-interest; in the next 
subsection (3.5) adduce the further pragmatist or pragmatist-type considerations that I’ve just 
referred to; and in Section IV then offer the statement of the second overarching claim-of-
interest. 
The above pragmatist arguments suggest that, as Brandom says, “experience” is 
“something done rather than something that happens – a process, engaging in a practice, the 
exercise of abilities, rather than an episode.”186 This construal of experience is congruent without 
our everyday understanding of it. But the highly abstract and artificial ways in which 
philosophers have discussed experience have often served to obscure this understanding. 
“Pragmatists hold not only, as do all empiricists, that our knowledge rests on experience,” Ruth 
Anna Putnam says; “they also demand that our philosophical claims should rest on experience 
and thus be liable to empirical refutation.”187 When we attend to actual human experience, 
pragmatists add, we then see that “what is experienced is not limited to what is apprehended by 
the five senses,” but “includes enjoying and suffering in various ways.”188 As we have seen, 
“earlier empiricists [and not just “empiricists” – think: Descartes] had thought of experience as 
the occurrence of conscious episodes that provide the raw materials for learning, via processes 
such as association, comparison, and abstraction.”189 But when we take experience as it is 	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experienced, as a pragmatist-inspired empiricism asks us to do, we plainly see that “experiencing 
is doing as well as cognizing.”190 Hence, “experience,” for pragmatists, “is not just an input to a 
learning process. It just is learning: the process of perception and performance, and then further 
performance, exhibiting the iterative, adaptive, conditional-branching structure of a test-operate-
test-exit loop.”191 Furthermore, “insofar as doing involves foresight,” it also “involves having 
ends-in-view, that is to say, values.”192  
From this perspective, it is not hard to understand why Hilary Putnam says that, for the 
classical pragmatists, “value and normativity permeate all of experience,”193 and it is not hard to 
understand why I suggest that all of our inquiries presuppose, depend on, and convey norms, 
values, and interests, hence may be described as “value-guided” and “value-laden.”  
If, on the one hand, “experience” is thought of in a Cartesian fashion, as “the occurrence 
of self-intimating event[s] of pure awareness, transparent and incorrigible to the subject of 
experience,”194 the notion that “value and normativity permeate experience” is an odd one 
indeed. And this is especially so when we recall that “knowledge,” which, for empiricists at 
least, is based on experience, has so often been understood in modern philosophy as a matter of 
“accurate representations” of an “external,” “value-less” world. If an “experience” can consist in 
the occurrence of a “self-intimating event of pure awareness, transparent and incorrigible to the 
subject of experience,” then it is not at all clear what it would mean to say that “value and 
normativity ‘permeate’ that experience.” Likewise, if knowledge that is based on such an 
experience does consist in an “accurate representation” of an “external,” “value-less” world, then 
it is not entirely clear what it would mean to say that some “true” or “accurate” knowledge claim 
presupposes, depends on, and conveys norms, values, and interests, hence may be described as 
“value-guided” and “value-laden.” Hence, in the case of, for instance, some given social (-
scientific) inquiry that (purportedly) just consists in “factual claims,” it may not be clear what it 
would mean to say that that inquiry presupposes, depends on, and conveys norms, values, and 
interests, hence may be described as “value-guided” and “value-laden.”  
If, on the other hand, “experience” is thought of as pragmatists think of it, the idea that 
“value and normativity permeate it” is not at all odd.  
Take first the idea of value “permeating” experience. Since pragmatists conceive of 
experience as always involving doing as well as cognizing, it always involves what Dewey calls 
“ends-in-view,” that is to say, “values.” Experience as we experience it tells us that even in our 
most “passive” experiences this is so (at least where the “experiences” in question are conscious 
ones). (Indeed, even where passivity itself is our aim, we still have ends-in-view in pursuing it. 
And even where we do not actively or consciously pursue passivity, but, as they say, simply “fall 
into it,” surely we do so in part at least because of our other ends-in-view: perhaps, for instance, 
avoiding this or that uncomfortable or awkward situation, or escaping from the stress of work, or 
avoiding anticipated confrontations, and so on.)  
Turn now to the idea of normativity “permeating” experience. Here again, the idea that 
experience involves doing as well as cognizing is relevant. As we saw, pragmatists emphasize 
that (in Dewey’s phrase) “reflection is native and constant”195 and that (in John McDowell’s apt 	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phrase) our “conceptual capacities”196 permeate experience. Pace the once-dominant tendency to 
conceive of epistemology solely in terms of the mental activity of an individual, pragmatists like 
Peirce and Dewey stress the social character of language and thought, and so epistemology. As 
we saw, Peirce, for instance, stresses that all signification, which includes all language and 
thought, is essentially social in nature and that the very meaning of our concepts depends on the 
role that they play in a social context of rules and norms. Indeed, he stresses that (in Bernstein’s 
phrase) “all reasoning exists in a logical space of norms”;197 that thought is a form of internal 
dialogue; and that such dialogue presupposes a community in which there are effective standards 
and norms of discourse. Taking these ideas together with the notion that “reflection is native and 
constant,” the notion that “normativity” permeates experience is not hard to understand. For the 
thought emerges that reflection is a native and constant part of experience, and that such thought 
presupposes and depends on norms and standards of discourse that are socially created and 
sustained. 
 
3.4.1 All of our Inquiries Presuppose, Depend on, and Convey Norms, Values, and Interests 
 
Seeing this, neither should it be hard to understand why I suggest that all of our inquiries 
presuppose, depend on, and convey norms, values, and interests, hence may be described as 
“value-guided” and “value-laden.”  
Take first the idea that our inquiries presuppose and depend on norms, values, and 
interests. To begin with, note that reflection on ordinary language suggests that wherever we can 
say that some practice or activity “depends on” and/or “presupposes” a “norm,” we can 
obviously also say that it “depends on” and “presupposes” some (cluster of) value(s) and 
interest(s) too. Indeed, there is hardly anything controversial about the claim that norms exist to 
realize, promote, or instantiate certain values and interests. Hence the claim that an inquiry 
“presupposes” and “depends on” some “norm” carries with it the implication that it 
“presupposes” and “depends on” some (cluster of) value(s) and interest(s) as well. So, insofar as 
it is plausible to claim that thought inevitably involves sign activity (including linguistic signs) 
and that signs get their very meaning from the role that they play in a social context of rules and 
norms, it is plausible to claim that thought presupposes and depends on “norms,” hence values 
and interests too. And this suggests that insofar as our inquiries presuppose and depend on 
language and thought, as they obviously do, they also presuppose and depend on norms, values, 
and interests too.  
What, though, of the idea that all of our inquiries “convey” norms, values, and interests? 
Following what has already been said, the point here is simple. Reflection on ordinary language 
suggests that any practice or activity that can be identified as “presupposing” and as “depending 
on” norms, values, and interests may be described as “conveying” norms, values, and interests. 
For it seems to me that we cannot make sense of the claim that some activity does “presuppose 
and depend on norms, values, and interests,” but does not “‘convey’ norms, values, and 
interests.” This is not to say that all of the norms, values, and interests that some inquiry does 
presuppose and depend on just are “conveyed” by that inquiry, as though it were the case that 
whatever norms, values, and interests are presupposed and depended on there were simply 
“transparent.” It is just to say that when we look and see what activities are involved in our 
inquiries (including our language and thought processes themselves), we should be able to 	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recognize that our inquiries inevitably just do “convey” norms, values, and interests, and that, in 
principle at least, we should be able to identify some of them.   
 
3.4.2 Value-Guidedness at Four “Levels”: Observation, Description, Explanation, and 
Prediction 
 
Finally, what of the suggestion that, in light of the fact that all of our inquiries 
presuppose, depend on, and convey norms, values, and interests, all of our inquiries may 
therefore be described as “value-guided” and so “value-laden” too?  
Take first the notion of “value-guidedness.” There are, I believe, various senses in which 
we can sensibly say that all of our inquiries are “value-guided.” Here, I won’t attempt to 
delineate all of these. Indeed, I am dubious that it is even possible to do so. Instead, I’ll just offer 
a few examples based on the preceding discussion. As discussed, pragmatists emphasize that 
“inquiry” is as a kind of activity, one that involves doing as well as cognizing. We are not 
passive “knowers.” Hence, a first point to make is that our inquiries, like all of our other 
activities, are “guided by” our values at least in the following sense: we pursue certain activities 
in the first place because we have certain “values.” Our values affect our choices of what to 
investigate in the first place, what we regard as worth studying in the first place. This much is 
commonly noted in the philosophy of the human or social sciences, even by those who have 
defended a “value-free” and/or “value-neutral” conception of the social sciences. Controversy 
arises, however, when one claims or implies that, in one or another sense, our values necessarily 
“guide” the reasoning processes that are involved in our inquiries and/or are necessarily 
conveyed by the language that we use in communicating (“the findings”198 of) our inquiries. But 
the foregoing Peircean-Deweyan considerations suggest plausible reasons for maintaining that 
values do “guide” our inquiries in these two senses as well.       
Consider first the claim that our values necessarily “guide” the reasoning processes that 
are involved in our inquiries. I want to indicate four ways in which this is so, corresponding to 
the four areas or types of inquiry that have traditionally been thought capable of “value-freedom” 
and/or “value-neutrality”: observation, description, explanation, and prediction.199  
Thus, I first indicate why “values” guide our inquiries at the “observational level.” As we 
saw, Peirce criticized the view that we have direct intuitive knowledge, “the type of intuition not 
determined by prior cognitions and one that can serve as an epistemological foundation.”200 
Again, he wanted us to break free from “the Cartesian supposition that we can break out of 	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language or systems of signs and have direct immediate knowledge of non-linguistic objects.”201 
For Peirce, all such knowledge as we can claim involves or presupposes inferential processes; 
and, he maintains, there is no thinking activity (hence inference) without sign activity.202 Just to 
be able to offer an observational report, one has to have mastered what Wittgenstein would later 
call a “language game” and what Sellars would later call a “battery of concepts.” Again, it is 
true, Peirce would recognize, that in looking up at a blue sky, for instance, I cannot help seeing 
that the sky is blue (assuming I have normal eyesight). And in that sense “the percept” is “forced 
on me.” But recall why Peirce introduces the technical term “percipuum”: in short, because 
observation relies not just on “percepts” but “percepts” as they are “immediately interpreted 
in…perceptual judgment[s].” Hence, again, he writes that “the moment we fix our minds upon it 
and think the least thing about the percept, it is the perceptual judgment that tells us what we so 
‘perceive.’ For this and other reasons, I propose to consider the percept as it is immediately 
interpreted in the perceptual judgment, under the name of the ‘percipuum.’”203 Hence, the 
“information” or “knowledge” that is conveyed by our observational reports involves inferences 
and sign activity, and so presupposes and depends on knowledge of certain values. (This is one 
way of making sense of Hilary Putnam’s point that “knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge 
of values,” a claim that we return to below.)204 This is because to interpret a percept as being this 
or that percipuum (say, a “blue sky” or a “grey sky”) is to have mastered a language game or a 
battery of concepts, that is, to understand the role that relevant signs play in a social context of 
rules and norms. And again, anytime we can say that “we understand certain rules or norms,” we 
can also say that “we have knowledge of certain values.” Without this knowledge, we simply 
couldn’t interpret a percept as being this percipuum or that. Hence our knowledge of certain 
values “guides” our inquiries at the observational level. 
Now, once we recognize this, we also recognize that values necessarily “guide” our 
inquiries at “the descriptive level” too. Description obviously involves sign activity, and so 
again, presupposes and depends on knowledge of certain values. The rest follows verbatim. 
Hence our knowledge of certain values guides our inquiries at the descriptive level too.  
What about “the explanatory level”? Here again it is useful to recall Peirce’s notion that 
rational thinking is a form of self-controlled conduct in relation to norms and standards. There 
can be no rational self-control unless there are norms by which we distinguish the true from the 
false, the right from the wrong, the correct from the incorrect, and so on.205 Logic is essentially 
normative, laying down rules or standards that ought to be followed in reasoning; it “is a study of 
the means of attaining the end of thought.”206 Again, these rules or standards are not categorical, 
but hypothetical; they are laid down in light of some goal or purpose, and so “value,” to be 
realized. Hence Peirce’s declaration that logic “not only lays down rules which ought to be, but 
need not be followed; it is the analysis of the conditions of attainment of something of which 
purpose is an essential ingredient.”207 Thus, logic – and so explanation – just is “value-guided.”  
There are various more specific ways of indicating how values “guide” our explanations, 
however. Drawing on Peirce, C. West Churchman, and Roderick Firth, Hilary Putnam, for 	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instance, has argued that “knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of values,”208 and has 
persuasively argued that when we evaluate alternative explanatory hypotheses, we are guided by 
“epistemic values.”209 When we choose among hypotheses, he points out, we are guided by 
considerations of “simplicity,” “coherence,” “preservation of past doctrine,” “reasonableness,” 
and so forth.210 Such values steer us as we try to pursue “right descriptions of the world,” an aim 
which many have equated with “objectivity.”211 Our aims at objectivity are, therefore, guided by 
values. We do not appear to have a way of judging that we have “arrived at the truth” apart from 
our epistemic values. We do not, therefore, appear to have a way of assessing our factual 
knowledge apart from our epistemic values, and so of giving it an “external” justification (a 
justification “external” to our values). That, indeed, is the point of saying that knowledge of facts 
presupposes knowledge of values. As Putnam writes, it is not the case that we can, “so to speak, 
run a test to see how often choosing the more coherent, simpler, and so on, theory turns out to be 
true without presupposing these very standards of justified empirical belief.”212 When scientists 
choose hypotheses they do not reflect on all the stories and myths about the past that are 
available to them; instead, they do so by reflecting on the records and testimonies that they have 
“good reason to trust by these very criteria of ‘good reason.’”213 Thus, if these epistemic values 
permit us accurately to describe the world – or if they permit us to describe it more accurately 
than we would have described it had we been guided by another set of epistemic values – we see 
this “through the lenses of those very values.” 214  And when we render judgments of 
“reasonableness,” “plausibility,” “coherence,” and so forth, we render normative judgments, in 
Peirce’s sense, that is, in the sense of judgments about “what ought to be” in the case of our 
reasoning.215  
Finally, consider the claim that values guide us at “the predictive level.” To begin with, 
prediction relies both on observation and description (which both involve sign activity), and so 
presupposes and depends on knowledge of certain values. For again, observation and description 
entail that we have mastered a language game or a battery of concepts, that is, that we understand 
the role that relevant signs play in a social context of rules and norms. And again, anytime we 
can say that “we understand certain rules or norms,” we can also say that “we have knowledge of 
certain values.” Without this knowledge, we simply couldn’t interpret a percept as being this or 
that percipuum, hence simply couldn’t offer this or that observational-descriptive report. Nor, 
therefore, could we offer this or that prediction based on previous such reports. (Presumably all 
of our “predictions” are based on previous such “reports,” whether our own or others’.) Hence, 
our knowledge of certain values “guides” our inquiries at the predictive level too. 
 
3.4.3 Value-Ladenness at Four “Levels”: Observation, Description, Explanation, and Prediction 
 
We turn now to the question of the inevitable value-ladenness of our inquiries. Just as 
there are various forms of potential value-guidedness, there are also various forms of potential 
value-ladenness. I have no intention of trying to enumerate all of these, however. Indeed, I am 	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once again dubious that it is even possible to do so. But the general claim is easy enough to make 
and generalizes from something that was previously said.  
Earlier we noted that when we reveal that an inquiry is value-guided, we thereby 
recognize that it also “conveys” values. And, we observed, any inquiry that “conveys” values is 
also, therefore, a “value-laden” one. (If this point is not immediately clear, ask yourself: What 
would it even mean to say that we recognize that the content of some inquiry, the reasoning that 
goes into it, is “guided by” this or that cluster of values but that we reject the claim that it 
“conveys” values? I, for one, cannot make sense of this.) Hence, if indeed it is the case that all of 
our inquiries inevitably are “value-guided,” as I have been suggesting it is, it follows that all of 
our inquiries inevitably are “value-laden” too. And this obviously applies at each of the four 
“levels” we have been discussing: if observation, description, explanation, and prediction are 
each “value-guided,” observation, description, explanation, and prediction are each “value-
laden” too.   
*** 
So, beginning from a number of premises associated with pragmatist philosophy, we 
arrive at a defense of the first overarching claim-of-interest: again, that all inquiry presupposes, 
depends on, and conveys norms, values, and interests, hence may be described as “value-guided” 
and “value-laden.” And because of the historic aspiration to create social sciences that are 
“value-free” and/or “value-neutral,” this conclusion, I stress, obviously applies to those specific 
areas or types of inquiry that some social scientists and philosophers of social science have 
claimed, or at least implied, could be “value-free” and/or “value-neutral:” observation, 
description, explanation, and prediction. Hence why I earlier said that the idea that a reflexive 
social practice could allow us to “purge” our social inquiries of all norms, values, and/or 
interests is not only an impossible but also an incoherent aim. 
So much for my statement of the first overarching claim-of-interest. What remains to be 
discussed, then, is the second overarching claim-of-interest: again, the claim that, in light of the 
inevitable value-guidedness and value-ladenness of our inquiries, anything we say (and do not 
say) in any of those inquiries could have “moral or ethical significance and implications.” As 
previously indicated, however, I want to adduce a number of further arguments that have been 
leveled against the idea of “value-freedom” and/or “value-neutrality” in the human or social 
sciences before moving on to that second claim. 
 
3.5 Further Pragmatist (-Type) Considerations Relevant to the Two Claims-of-Interest 
 
A useful point of departure is the discussion provided by the editors of a recent volume, 
Value-Free Science? Ideals and Illusions.  
The editors note that “worries about the fact-value distinction and its implications came 
from multiple sources in the 1950s,” a period in which, they seem to suggest, the “fact-value 
distinction” really came under fire.216 More specifically, the editors suggest that, at least since 
that period, “three types of arguments [have] commonly [been] made for the value-laden nature 
of science: (1) arguments from denying the distinction between fact and value, (2) arguments 
from underdetermination, and (3) arguments from the social processes of science.”217 Here, I 
propose to look briefly at how they summarize each of these types of arguments, and at the 
critical questions they raise in relation to each of them. My suggestion will be that if we make a 	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stronger statement of each of the three types of arguments for the value-ladenness of science or 
inquiry that the editors identify, there is not as much room for dispute as the editors seem to 
suggest. Seeing how this is so will help us subsequently to defend my suggestion that, in light of 
the inevitable value-guidedness and value-ladenness of our inquiries, anything we say (and do 
not say) in any of those inquiries could have “moral or ethical significance and implications.” 
 
3.5.1 More Recent Arguments Against the Fact/Value Dichotomy: Ordinary Language 
Philosophy, Entanglement, and Quine’s Holism 
 
“One natural way to argue against the value-free science ideal,” the editors say, “is to 
attack the distinction between facts and values – to argue that the claim is misguided from the 
beginning.”218 Now, the editors refer to “the distinction between facts and values” and also to 
“the fact-value distinction,”219 but these phrases are misleading. There is no problem with 
distinguishing between “facts” and “values.” “The distinctions we make in a natural language,” 
Vivian Walsh observes, “have some limited range of application”; “there are areas where they do 
not apply, others where their relevance is hazy. We expect no more of them, and use them while 
aware of their limitations.”220 The problem concerns what philosophers sometimes do with 
ordinary distinctions: “they elevate some distinctions into absolute ‘dichotomies’ or 
‘dualisms.’”221 Indeed, as far as I am aware, no one has ever argued that there is literally no good 
reason to distinguish between “facts” and “values.” Hence, it is better to speak of “the fact/value 
dichotomy,” as, for instance, Hilary Putnam does.222 So, moving forward, let us say that the 
claim that is being described as “misguided” here is that there is some dichotomy between facts 
and values to be defended in the first place. With this in mind, consider what the editors say 
about this claim. 
 
There are various ways to support such an attack. Direct counterexamples are one 
strategy: Find cases of scientific investigation where the claims are both evaluative and 
factual.... A more systematic strategy is to offer theoretical reasons that fact and value are 
not independent. Arguments from the holism of meaning…pursue this tack.223 
 
Take first the “direct counterexamples” strategy. In the 1950s and 1960s, ordinary 
language philosophers “noted that a great deal of ordinary language was not neatly divided into 
the straightforwardly factual or evaluative.”224 For instance,  
 
To describe an apple as ‘extra fancy’ is pretty clearly to provide an evaluation of it. But if 
one consults the relevant criteria laid down by the appropriate authorities, they are 
factually quite precise, specifying exact requirements of size, color, and so on. It is also 
helpful to move away from the broad general terms characteristic of so much philosophy 
and consider the much more specific terms in which most everyday evaluation takes 
place. As J.L. Austin memorably suggested, it is helpful to turn one’s attention from the 	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beautiful to the dainty and the dumpy. It is, on the whole, a good thing to be dainty, but 
the factual criteria for this particular aesthetic achievement are fairly precise. Similarly, it 
is an aesthetic flaw to be dumpy, but it is a risk the slender avoid, whatever their other 
strengths and weaknesses.225 
 
However, the editors go on to raise critical questions about the idea that we might not be able to 
divide our language into its “factual” and its “evaluative” “components.” “If there are cases of 
overlap – cases where something seems both factual and evaluative – we might still think there 
are clear cases where the two are distinct.”226 And “if there are [such] clear cases,” they continue, 
“then it may be thought that the distinction is valid and that some device must be found to handle 
the exceptions. So we might try to partition the meaning of ‘courage’ into a factual component 
(e.g., overcoming fear in the face of danger) and a value component, such as behaving in a 
praiseworthy manner in the face of danger.”227 Of course, “critics,” they say, might “then 
challenge whether such partitions work in specific cases or have other unwarranted 
implications.”228 
 In my view, however, there is much less reason to leave open the possibility that “there 
are clear cases” in which “something” is “factual” but not “evaluative” than the editors seem to 
suggest, at least where the “something” in question is “the meaning” of a word. (The editors’ 
choice of example – the meaning of “courage” – seems to suggest that they at least want to leave 
open the possibility that certain words can be “partitioned” into a “factual component” and a 
“value component.” From the context, however, it is not clear what else they might have in mind 
by “something” being or not being “factual” and “evaluative.”) For I am skeptical that words can 
be separated into such “components,” that is, that there are indeed cases where a word (or phrase 
or sentence) can be unproblematically or unambiguously categorized as a “factual” word (or 
phrase or sentence-type) or as an “evaluative” word (or phrase or sentence-type). Here I agree 
with Michael Root when he says that “words cannot [simply] be purged of their evaluative 
content”229 and with Hanna Pitkin when she says that “no word is by nature ‘expressive’ or 
‘evaluative,’ or ‘factual’ or ‘objective.’”230 “What matters,” as Pitkin says, “is not the character 
or meaning of a particular word, but how the word is used in particular utterances, whether to 
express emotion, assert fact, command, recommend, describe, explain, or in other ways.”231 Of 
course, “certain words may be more likely to be used in certain kinds of speech, because their 
meaning is associated with an area of human life where that sort of speech is frequent. But they 
need not be used that way, nor are they essential to that kind of speech.”232 
 Consider Hilary Putnam’s discussion of what he describes as the “entanglement” of fact 
and ethical value at the level of individual predicates, for instance, with respect to the word 
“cruel.” 233  “Cruel” is sometimes used for normative or ethical purposes, sometimes for 
descriptive ones; it cannot simply be classified as a factual term or an evaluative one. As Putnam 
notes, if someone is asked what kind of person his or her child’s teacher is, and responds, “He is 	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very cruel,” the person has both criticized him as a man and as a teacher. If one wishes to be 
understood, one cannot simply say, “He is a very cruel person and a very good teacher.” To be 
understood, one has to separate the manner (or the circumstances) in which he is a very good 
teacher and the manner (or the circumstances) in which he is very cruel. One has to say 
something like, “When he isn’t displaying his cruelty, he is a very good teacher.” Likewise, one 
cannot hope to be understood if one merely says, “He is a very cruel person and a good man.” 
However, in a manner of speaking, “cruel” may also be used “purely descriptively,” as when a 
historian, for example, describes a monarch as being “exceptionally cruel” with the intention of 
simply making his actions and others’ responses to them intelligible.  
Following Iris Mudoch, words like “cruel,” “brave,” and “temperate” have sometimes 
been described as “thick ethical concepts,” and have often been invoked as counterexamples to 
the claim that there is an absolute fact/value dichotomy. (As Putnam observes, “Murdoch was the 
first to emphasize that language has two very different sorts of ethical concepts: abstract ethical 
concepts…such as ‘good’ and ‘right,’ and more descriptive, less abstract concepts…such as, for 
example, cruel, pert, inconsiderate, chaste.” 234 ) Nonetheless, in the face of such 
counterexamples, two main defenses of that dichotomy are still made today. Following Putnam, 
however, both of these defenses seem to me problematic. 
First, some authors have maintained that “thick ethical concepts” are merely factual 
concepts; they are not normative or ethical concepts at all.235 In defense of this view, some have 
claimed that a genuine “adjective of evaluation” (whose semantic content is that something 
possesses intrinsic value or disvalue) is such that anyone who employs it (without hypocrisy or 
insincerity) must be motivated to approve or disapprove of it.236 Yet this requirement appears 
unreasonable. As Elizabeth Anderson has noted:  
 
For something to count as an authentic value judgment or reason, it must be reflectively 
endorsable. But actual motivational states are not always reflectively endorsable. One of 
the functions of value judgments is to note when one’s motivational states are deficient 
because they fail to track what one judges to be good....This prevents the identification of 
value judgments with expressions of actual desires and preferences... 
 
Second, some have argued that thick ethical concepts can be factored into two 
components: a purely “descriptive” one and an “attitudinal” one.237 (Hence why Kincaid et al. 
acknowledge that a proponent of the fact/value dichotomy might respond to the alleged insights 
of ordinary-language philosophy by “try[ing] to partition the meaning of ‘courage’ into a factual 
component…and a value component.”238) The descriptive component is said to state the “matter 
of fact” to which the predicate corresponds; the attitudinal component to express a mere attitude, 
emotion, or volition. But there is at least one problem with this view: the apparent impossibility 
of identifying the “descriptive meaning” of a word like “cruel” without using the word “cruel” or 
some synonym. It is plainly not the case, for instance, that the extension of “cruel” is just “causes 
deep suffering” – and neither is “causes deep suffering” itself free of evaluative force. Likewise, 	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“suffering” is not simply equivalent in meaning to “pain,” and “deep” is not simply equivalent to 
“a lot of.” Indeed, as Putnam rightly notes, the characteristic feature of negative descriptive 
terms like “cruel,” as well as positive ones like “brave” and “temperate,” is that to use them 
discriminatively, it is necessary  
 
to be able to identify imaginatively with an evaluative point of view. That is why 
someone who thought that “brave” simply meant “not afraid to risk life and limb” would 
not be able to understand the all-important distinction that Socrates keeps drawing 
between mere rashness or foolhardiness and genuine bravery. It is also the reason that...it 
is always possible to improve one’s understanding of a concept like “impertinence” or 
“cruelty.”239  
 
Let us look closer at this notion of “imaginatively identifying” with an “evaluative point 
of view.” To do so, first note that “non-cognitivists” typically argue that it is always possible to 
“factor” thick ethical concepts into two components, a purely “descriptive” one and an 
“attitudinal” one. In general, non-cognitivists hold that when a person utters a moral or ethical 
sentence they are not expressing a “state of mind” that, like a belief, is in some sense 
“cognitive.” On this view, moral and ethical statements are unlike utterances of belief because 
they do not entail truth conditions. They are, rather, expressions of “attitudes,” of feelings of 
“approval” or “disapproval.” As John McDowell describes the non-cognitivist view of the 
argument we are considering: 
 
Typically, non-cognitivists hold that when we feel impelled to ascribe value to 
something, what is actually happening can be disentangled into two components. 
Competence with an evaluative concept involves, first, a sensitivity to an aspect of the 
world as it really is (as it is independently of value experience), and, second, a propensity 
to a certain attitude – a non-cognitive state which constitutes the special perspective from 
which items in the world seem to be endowed with the value in question.240  
 
And consider his reaction to this view:  
 
Now it seems reasonable to be skeptical about whether the disentangling manoeuvre here 
envisaged can always be effected: specifically, about whether, corresponding to any 
value concept, one can always isolate a genuine feature of the world – by the appropriate 
standard of genuineness: that is, a feature that is there anyway, independently of anyone’s 
value experience being as it is – to be that to which competent users of the concept are to 
be regarded as responding when they use it; that which is left in the world when one peels 
off the reflection of the appropriate attitude.241 
 
To see precisely why McDowell considers this “disentangling manoeuvre” so implausible, it is 
worth quoting him once more: 
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Consider, for instance, a specific conception of some moral virtue: the conception current 
in a reasonably cohesive moral community. If the disentangling manoeuvre is always 
possible, that implies that the extension of the associated term, as it would be used by 
someone who belonged to the community, could be mastered independently of the special 
concerns which, in the community, would show themselves in admiration or emulation of 
actions seen as falling under the concept. That is: one could know which actions the term 
would be applied to, so that one would be able to predict applications and withholdings of 
it in new cases – not merely without oneself sharing the community’s admiration (there 
need be no difficulty about that), but without even embarking on an attempt to make 
sense of their admiration. That would be an attempt to comprehend their special 
perspective; whereas, according to the position I am considering, the genuine feature to 
which the term is applied should be graspable without benefit of understanding the 
special perspective, since sensitivity to it is singled out as an independent ingredient in a 
purported explanation of why occupants of the perspective see things as they do.242  
 
As Putnam’s reference to Socrates suggests, however, it seems implausible that we might come 
to understand which actions the terms would be applied to, so that (as McDowell says) one could 
“predict applications and withholdings of it in new cases,” “without even embarking on an 
attempt to make sense of [the relevant community’s] admiration.” For, at least with regard to 
thick ethical concepts, Putnam’s plausible suggestion is that to use such concepts competently, 
accurately, discriminatively, we need to be able (continually) to identify, at least in imagination, 
with the relevant evaluative point of view.  
Indeed, it seems that to understand how the members of (such) a community apply the 
relevant term, that which is associated with a specific ethical or moral virtue (or vice), at least 
two related observer-tasks are necessary. As we have just seen, it appears necessary, first, that 
we attempt to make sense of the specific form of admiration that is being expressed by the use of 
that term. (Or when we are considering moral or ethical vices, the specific form of 
disapprobation. Thus, when we speak of “imaginative identification with an evaluative point of 
view” more broadly, we should have in mind “imaginative identification with specific forms of 
admiration or disapprobation,” as the specific term warrants). That is, in order fully to make 
sense of the application (use) of that term, we have to be able to identify, at least imaginatively, 
with the value experience itself. Or to put the point another way, our understanding is dependent 
here on our willingness and ability to understand “the special perspective” that is expressed by 
its specific use in that community, where “use” refers to the specific range of action-situations in 
which the term is (typically) applied (by competent speakers). But then we can also see the 
second observer-task. To develop the ability competently, accurately, discriminatively to employ 
the term in question, as it is (typically) employed by (competent) members of the (reasonably 
cohesive moral) community in question, it is necessary that one “master” the range of action-
situations in which the term is (typically) used (by competent speakers). Doing so entails that 
inquirers have access to adequate information about how, in practice, competent speakers from 
the relevant community typically themselves use the term. It implies, so to speak, that the 
observer, or outsider, “master” the relevant speech practice, either through direct observation of 
– and participation in – that practice, or (what is perhaps more difficult) through dialogue with 
competent, self-reflective community members about that practice, or (what is perhaps most 
difficult) through the study of second-hand accounts of it. 	    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 Ibid.; my emphasis. 
	   218	  
Of course, it is open to the proponent of “value-freedom/neutrality” to suggest that, even 
if these arguments are indeed compelling, we might just avoid “thick ethical concepts” 
altogether. Indeed, one might sincerely ask: Why do we need (to use) thick ethical concepts in 
the first place? To respond, it is well to recognize that, in principle, we could just avoid them – 
but only at a considerable cost. Let me first say a word about why thick ethical concepts typically 
do play a role in our social descriptions, and then say something about why advocates of “value-
free/neutral” social science have often wanted to avoid them, hoping thereby to employ a “value-
free/neutral” language. In this way I’ll briefly indicate what the “considerable cost” is that I’ve 
just referenced.  
So, first consider in more detail what is typically involved in trying to describe, explain, 
and understand human motives and actions and how we typically understand this process. In our 
ordinary, everyday language, when we say that we have come to “understand,” or to “get,” or to 
“comprehend” others’ motives and actions, or our own, we typically employ concepts like 
“charitable,” “brave,” “generous,” “mean-spirited,” “cruel,” “vindictive,” and so forth. In our 
everyday lives, that is, we tend to understand our own understanding of others, and of ourselves, 
as deeply dependent on our ability competently to deploy such descriptive terminology, i.e., on 
our ability to deploy “thick ethical concepts.” When we say that we have arrived at such 
understanding, moreover, we also typically say that we have come to “explain” persons’ motives 
and actions. Consequently, we typically view our ability to “understand” human motives and 
actions as dependent on our ability to “explain” them in terms that make use of precisely this 
kind of descriptive terminology. In our everyday view, that is, we tend to see description, 
explanation, and understanding as, we might say, interwoven. For us, to “understand someone” 
just is to be able competently to describe and explain her motives and actions. Correspondingly, 
there is, it would seem, no way for everyday agents to make sense of the idea of competent 
“description” and “explanation” of humans’ actions and activities, or of meaningful 
“understanding” of themselves and others, without “thick ethical concepts.” Thus, while it may 
be possible to offer descriptions that do not make use of these concepts (think of some of the 
most egregious examples of scientistic jargon and bureaucratese), I, for one, see little reason to 
expect them to be particularly enlightening. And surely our everyday understandings of such 
phrases as “insightful commentary” on, “perspicuous observation” of, “apt descriptions” of, and 
“intelligent explanations” of, human motives and actions support this view. 
Let me put my thinking here in another way. Following Elizabeth Anscombe and Charles 
Taylor, we might describe our ordinary interpretation of our descriptions, explanations, and 
understandings of our fellow humans as involving the application and invocation of the 
“desirability characterizations” which define agents’ lived worlds. 243  When one comes to 
“understand” another, for instance, one comes to understand her emotions, her desires, what she 
appreciates and finds deplorable in others, and so on. One’s ability to formulate this 
understanding consists in one’s ability accurately to apply the desirability characterizations that 
she herself applies in the manner in which she herself applies them. If, for instance, the agent in 
question loathes “pretentious” people, then understanding her demands that one be able to apply 
the concept of “pretentious” in the sense it has for her. However, it is necessary also to observe 
that some aspects of what the agent feels, desires, yearns for, loathes, and so forth, may be 
unformulated for her. Thus, to state more accurately what is involved here we could say the 
following: the explicit formulation of what one understands when one understands another 	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requires that the interpreter grasp the desirability characterizations that the agent in question 
herself “clairvoyantly” uses, or else those which she would use, had she arrived at a more 
reflective formulation of what she feels, desires, yearns for, etc. And parallel remarks could be 
made of what is involved in trying to “understand” one’s own lived world as well. 
Now, with Taylor, note that there are several features of such desirability 
characterizations that create problems for “social science,” or at least for those versions of it that 
have taken the natural sciences as providing a certain kind of model to emulate. For many, the 
idea that the natural sciences provide a model for how social inquiry should be conducted has 
meant that inquiry should aim to produce a verifiable, predictive science. Cursorily summarized, 
the principal objective of social inquiry is, on this view, to predict, or to allow us to derive, the 
pattern of observable social and historical events and the regularities they exhibit – and to do so, 
moreover, in a language that allows for unequivocal verification. And when we look closely at 
what is involved in understanding agents lived worlds, the desirability characterizations they 
invoke in responding to and moving about in it, we can easily appreciate why some have felt a 
strong enticement to view the development of a such a science as dependent on a strict separation 
between “explanation” and “understanding.” Relatedly, we can easily understand why they have 
wanted to bypass agents’ self-understandings and self-descriptions in “explaining” their motives 
and actions. For, as we have seen, “understanding” ourselves, and others, entails that we be able 
accurately to ascribe such terms as “charitable,” “generous,” “vindictive,” and so forth. And with 
regard to ways of life, we might add, it also entails competent usage of terms like “fulfilled,” 
“integrated,” “free from illusion,” or negative descriptions like “false,” “shallow,” “hollow,” and 
so forth. But such terms cannot be intersubjectively validated in an unproblematic way, as a 
verifiable science would hope; for whether or not a life is truly “fulfilled” or actually “shallow” 
is a matter of possibly interminable interpretive wrangling. What is more, we tend to hold that 
there are, or may be, certain pre-conditions of character for the successful discrimination of these 
qualities. Accordingly, if we are to employ such concepts, we cannot at the same time hope for 
replicable findings on the part of any “scientifically competent observer.” Or, against more 
stereotypical depictions of expertise, we might say that “scientific competence” depends here on 
certain developments of character and sensibility that are themselves only identifiable as such 
from the viewpoint of persons who have attained them. Hence the search for an approach to 
“explanation” that simply doesn’t make us of such “folk-psychological” predicates, and so leaves 
aside issues of “(empathetic) understanding.” 
So, yes, it is open to the proponents of “value-freedom/neutrality” to suggest that we 
might just avoid thick ethical concepts altogether. However, the above considerations suggest 
that we could do so only at a considerable cost. For, as indicated, they seem to suggest that there 
is no way for everyday agents to make sense of the idea of competent “description” and 
“explanation” of humans’ motives and actions, or of meaningful “understanding” of themselves 
and others, without “thick ethical concepts.” For us (that is, for everyday agents), description, 
explanation, and understanding are context-dependent, imaginatively sensitive, and dependent 
upon the moral or ethical virtues of the narrator(s) in question. And they just do depend on thick 
ethical concepts. Hence if social scientists and/or philosophers did develop compelling reasons 
for avoiding thick ethical concepts altogether (and this is a possibility that I very much doubt will 
ever eventuate), I, for one, can see no reason for the participants to a democratic process to do so. 
Indeed, it seems to me that they in particular have especially good reasons for not doing. For, 
again, our own normative theory of the democratic process indicates that, ideally speaking, 
participants to the democratic process should try to understand relevant social situations and 
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activities from the perspectives of relevant persons. And if it is the case that relevant persons 
themselves make sense of “relevant situations and activities” largely through the use of thick 
ethical concepts, it would seem that the participants to a democratic process would surely need to 
do so as well. 
Now consider what the editors of Value Free Science? refer to as the “more systematic 
strategy” for arguing that “fact and value are not independent,” namely, “arguments from the 
holism of meaning” offered by W.O. Quine. 244  
 
Quine argued that our beliefs constitute a web where every belief is at least indirectly tied 
to all others by logical and evidential connections. This means, on Quine’s view, that 
there is no sharp way to separate our beliefs into those that are truths of reason and those 
that are truth of fact. In science and elsewhere, belief revision is not dictated by 
algorithmic rules of reason but is a piecemeal process guided in part by pragmatic 
factors…. These Quinean ideas have a number of implications about facts and values. 
First is that it deepens the significance of the hybrid cases just discussed. Terms such as 
dainty and dumpy have semantic links to both evaluative claims (it’s better not to look 
dumpy) and factual claims (to be dumpy, one must be on the plump side). If the meaning 
of terms is at least in part determined by the various connections a sentence has to other 
sentences in the language, then we should expect meaning to be holistic – to depend on 
the term’s use in many different kinds of sentences. So it is quite unsurprising that a 
given term might have connections to both our factual and [our] value judgments, 
precisely what Austin is pointing to…. Quine’s doctrine also motivated much more 
careful looks at the actual practice of science. If revising the scientific web of belief is not 
a mechanical and purely logical process, then how actual scientists reason and pursue 
research becomes relevant for our understanding of how science works. Extralogical 
considerations must mediate scientific inference, thereby opening a wedge to value and 
pragmatic considerations.245 
 
As before, however, the editors go on to raise critical questions about this strategy for critiquing 
the fact/value dichotomy. “Perhaps claims about the holism of meaning are just mistaken,” they 
write. 246 “Or perhaps the holism is less dramatic than depicted, and we can partition meaning as 
suggested for the cases where holism is present.”247  
 Now, for my part, some version of semantic holism seems persuasive. But one need not 
go in for the kind of wholesale holism that the editors are ascribing to Quine here (the kind that 
says that “beliefs constitute a web where every belief is at least indirectly tied to all others by 
logical and evidential connections”) to appreciate that there are good reasons for at least leaving 
open the possibility that any given term “might have connections to both our factual and [our] 
value judgments.” To appreciate why we should leave this possibility open, it seems to me that 
we need only appeal to Quine’s compelling criticism of the logical positivists’ analytic/synthetic 
dichotomy. For what gave the logical positivists and their followers such confidence that they 
could defend the fact/value dichotomy in the first place was apparently the confidence they had 
that they could defend the analytic/synthetic (or fact/convention) dichotomy. “Ever since Quine’s 	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critique of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy in 1951,” however, “this dichotomy has been 
discredited,” Bernstein observes.248 Likewise, Hilary Putnam writes that “Quine demolished the 
(metaphysically inflated) notion of the “analytic” to the satisfaction of most philosophers,”249 
thereby suggesting that “the whole idea of classifying every statement including the statements 
of pure mathematics as ‘factual’ or ‘conventional’ (which the logical positivists equated with 
‘analytic’) was a hopeless muddle.”250 
In various works, Putnam has provided excellent summaries of how the logical positivists 
understood these dichotomies and how the fall of the analytic/synthetic dichotomy brought with 
it the fall of the fact/value dichotomy. In The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other 
Essays, for instance, Putnam writes: 
 
The logical positivists famously introduced a tripartite classification of all of our putative 
judgments into those that are “synthetic” (and hence, according to the logical positivists, 
empirically verifiable or falsifiable), those that are “analytic” (and hence, according to the 
logical positivists,” “true [or false] on the basis of the [logical] rules alone”), and those – 
and this, notoriously, included all our ethical, metaphysical, and aesthetic judgments – 
that are “cognitively meaningless” (although they may have a practical function as 
disguised imperatives, ways of influencing one another’s attitudes, and so on).251 
 
And, he goes on to say,  
 
…the confidence of the logical positivists that they could expel ethics [and aesthetics and 
metaphysics] from the domain of the rationally discussable was in part derived from the 
way in which the analytic-synthetic dualism and the fact/value dualism reinforced one 
another in their hands. According to the positivists, in order to be knowledge, ethical 
“sentences” would have either to be analytic, which they are manifestly not, or else 
would have to be “factual.” And their confidence that they could not be factual …derived 
from their confidence that they knew exactly what a fact was. In the writings of the 
positivists, in the cases of both the dualism of analytic and factual statements and the 
dualism of ethical and factual judgments, it is the conception of the “factual” that does all 
the philosophical work.252 
 
What exactly was their notion of a “fact,” however? The logical positivists’ original notion of a 
fact “was somewhat similar to Hume’s.”253 “The Humean notion of a ‘fact’ is simply something 
of which there can be a sensible ‘impression.’”254 And, “at bottom, the original logical positivist 
view was that a ‘fact’ was something that could be certified by mere observation or even a mere 
report of a sensory experience.”255 Science, however, 
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had changed radically since Hume’s day, and the positivists found themselves pressed 
more and more to abandon their initial notion of a fact… In Hume’s day, it was not 
unreasonable to maintain that there were no scientifically indispensable predicates that 
refer to entities not observable with the human senses…. At the time that the Vienna 
circle was formed, however, the situation was very different. Bacteria, which are not 
“observables” in the logical positivist sense, were know to exist (observed with the aid of 
a microscope), and although the reality of “atoms” was denied by some of the world’s 
best physicists prior to Perrin’s experiments on Brownian motion in 1909, after those 
experiments working physicists…were almost all prepared to regard them as perfectly 
real things…. The logical positivists themselves were deeply impressed by the successes 
of relativity theory, which speaks of “curved space-time,” and quantum mechanics. The 
idea that a “fact” is just a sensible “impression” would hardly seem to be tenable any 
longer.256 
 
The logical positivists, however, “held out against conceding this for more than a decade.”257 
Yet, by 1938, Rudolph Carnap had come to the conclusion that it would be necessary radically to 
revise the “criterion of significance.”258 The liberalized logical positivist view of the criterion 
held that “as long as the system as a whole enables us to predict our experiences more 
successfully than we could without them,” abstract theoretical terms (such as “electron” and 
“charge”) are to be accepted as empirically meaningful.”259 This turned out to raise a host of 
problems, however. 260 For the logical positivists, to predict something means “to deduce 
observation sentences from a theory. And to deduce anything from a set of empirical postulates, 
we need not only those postulates but also the axioms of mathematics and logic.”261 Yet, 
“according to the logical positivists, these axioms…do not state ‘facts’ at all. They are analytic 
and thus ‘empty of factual content.’”262  
 
In short, ‘belonging to the language of science’ is (from the logical positivist point of 
view) a criterion of scientific significance, but not everything scientifically significant is a 
state of fact; within the scientifically significant there are, according to the logical 
positivists, analytic as well as synthetic (that is, factual) statements. Thus the search for a 
satisfactory demarcation of the “factual” became the search for a satisfactory way of 
drawing “the analytic-synthetic distinction.”… In 1950, however, Quine demolished the 
(metaphysically inflated) notion of the “analytic” to the satisfaction of most 
philosophers.263 
 
Once again, Quine’s suggestion, briefly stated, was that “the whole idea of classifying every 
statement including the statements of pure mathematics as ‘factual’ or ‘conventional’ (which the 
logical positivists equated with ‘analytic’) was a hopeless muddle.”264 Quine emphasized that 	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scientific statements meet the test of experience “as a corporate body.”265 If so, Putnam observes, 
“the idea that each scientific statement has its own range of confirming observations and its own 
range of disconfirming observations, independent of what other sentences it is conjoined to, is 
wrong.”266 Yet, “if the whole idea that there is a clear notion of fact collapsed with the 
hopelessly restrictive empiricist picture that gave rise to it,” Putnam asks, “what happens to the 
fact/value dichotomy?” Vivian Walsh, he observes,  
 
made the point that after Carnap’s abandonment…of the picture of ‘factual’ sentences as 
individually capable of confrontation with sense experience…and Quine’s critique of the 
logical positivists’ picture of what they called the language of science as neatly divided 
into a ‘factual’ part and an ‘analytic’ part, the whole argument for the classical fact/value 
dichotomy was in ruins, and that, “as far as logical empiricism could tell,” science might 
presuppose values as well as experiences and conventions. Indeed, once we stop thinking 
of “value” as synonymous with “ethics,” it is quite clear that it does presuppose values – 
it presupposes epistemic values.”267 
 
3.5.2 Two Forms of “Underdetermination” 
 
 Turn now to the second type of argument that the editors of Value Free Science? note has 
commonly be made for the value-laden character of science, namely, “arguments from 
underdetermination.”268 “A second set of arguments points to underdetermination of two sorts: 
underdetermination of theory by data and underdetermination of theory choice by epistemic 
values.”269 The first phrase refers to “the idea that once we have all the data, there may be 
multiple hypotheses compatible with the data.”270 Duhem and Quine, the editors observe, both 
“argued that this must be the case because of the holism of testing: We can always revise 
different parts of the web of belief in the face of new evidence. Intuitive examples of 
underdetermination come from ‘curve fitting’ problems: Given a set of data points, there are 
infinitely many ways to continue whatever trend you identify in the data.” 271 The 
“underdetermination of theory choice by epistemic values – such as scope or accuracy – was one 
of Kuhn’s main claims. If two scientists with different theories agree on what epistemic virtues a 
theory ought to have and on the data, they may nonetheless not agree on which theory is best 
supported, because they may rank epistemic values differently.”272 For instance, “a theory that 
maximizes predictive accuracy might fare less well in terms of scope compared with another that 
did less well in terms of accuracy. Values can be traded off, resulting in a standoff.”273 Thus, 
both of these kinds of underdetermination seem to support the thesis of the value-ladenness of 
science. Each suggests that “the evidence or the evidence plus the epistemic values do not tell us 
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what to believe.”274 And indeed, “because these are supposed to be essential traits of science, we 
have an argument that nonepistemic values are essentially involved in good science.”275 
 Once again, however, the editors raise critical questions about these arguments. The 
underdetermination arguments obviously “go nowhere,” they write,  
 
if the alleged underdetermination is suspect. Questions have indeed been raised whether 
these Quinean and Kuhnian doctrines are compelling. Further issues concern exactly how 
values gain entry if underdetermination does obtain. Why do moral [or, we might add, 
ethical or political or prudential or aesthetic…] rather than scientific values break the 
ties? If two theories are tied on the evidence, why not pick the one that seems to offer the 
greatest promise of fruitful future research, for example? Maybe the best response to 
equally warranted competitors is to withhold judgment.276 
 
It seems to me, however, that the problems that the editors raise can quite easily be addressed, 
and that both types of underdetermination argument that they address do indeed provide 
substantial support for the thesis that science (and inquiry more broadly) is “value-laden,” as 
they say (or, as I would say, “value-guided” and “value-laden”).  
With respect to the underdetermination-of-theory-by-data thesis, I put aside the reference 
to Quinean views about the holism of testing and take what I think is a quicker and less 
controversial route to defending the thesis. Consider this passage from the editors’ own 
Introduction: 
 
In the actual practice of science, it is often not the case that experimental results 
definitively confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis. Instead, evidence piles up gradually in 
favor of some particular claim. Rudner pointed out that therefore the decision to accept a 
scientific result requires a sense of both how much evidence is at hand and how much 
certainty we need. If there are large costs from being wrong, then just having some 
evidence may not be enough. Deciding the relevant costs, however, invokes human 
values. So deciding when to accept a scientific hypothesis essentially involves values.277 
 
Now, I, for one, cannot identify a flaw in this reasoning. The only qualification I have 
strengthens the thesis. The editors write that “it is often not the case that experimental results 
definitively confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis.” But, with pragmatists and other fallibilists, I 
think it preferable to say that “it is never the case that experimental results definitively confirm or 
disconfirm a hypothesis.” In the case of the editors’ way of putting the thesis, the conclusion, it 
seems, is that, where experimental results do not “definitively confirm or disconfirm a 
hypothesis,” we always make (more or less conscious) judgments about how much “certainty” 
(or, perhaps better, “assuredness”) we need or desire moving forward, hence always make (more 
or less conscious) value judgments about how to weigh the anticipated costs and benefits of 
pursuing further investigations against the expected costs and benefits of not doing so. “So 
deciding when to accept a scientific hypothesis essentially involves values [– and not just 
“epistemic values” – in those cases].” In the case of my proposed revision, however, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Ibid. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Ibid. 16. 
277 Ibid.9. 
	   225	  
conclusion is that we always make (more or less conscious) judgments about how much 
“certainty” (or, perhaps better, “assuredness”) we need or desire moving forward, hence always 
make (more or less conscious) value judgments about how to weigh the anticipated costs and 
benefits of pursuing further investigations against the expected costs and benefits of not doing 
so. So deciding when to accept a hypothesis essentially involves values – and not just “epistemic 
values” – in all cases. 
 With respect to the underdetermination-of-theory-choice-by-epistemic-values thesis, 
recall that the main issue that the editors signal is that even when scientists agree on what 
epistemic virtues a theory ought to exhibit and agree on “the data,” they nonetheless may not 
agree on which of various theories is best supported, perhaps because they rank epistemic values 
differently. Again, “values can be traded off, resulting in a standoff.”278 In addition, however, 
recall that they go on to raise the question, “Why do moral [or, we might add, ethical or political 
or prudential or aesthetic…] rather than scientific values break the ties? If [say] two theories are 
tied on the evidence, why not pick the one that seems to offer the greatest promise of fruitful 
future research, for example? Maybe the best response to equally warranted competitors is to 
withhold judgment.”279  
In response, it seems to me that a version of the argument I invoked in relation to the 
underdetermination-of-theory-by-data thesis can be repeated here. Consider what is involved in a 
judgment to “withhold judgment.” When we render such a judgment, do we not (more or less 
consciously) render a judgment about how important it is that we do or do not make the 
judgment in question in the first place? In other words, it seems to me that whenever we do 
decide to “withhold judgment,” we do so in part because we believe that the costs and benefits of 
doing so are favorable in relation to the costs and benefits of not withholding judgment (i.e., of 
not rendering the judgment in question). So, deciding when to withhold judgment essentially 
involves values, and not just “epistemic values.” Now consider the idea that, in the editors’ form 
of speaking, we might simply go with the theory that “offer[s] the greatest promise of future 
fruitful research.” To offer this as a way of avoiding “value judgments,” whether epistemic or 
otherwise, is, it seems to me, simply to kick the can down the road. Research can only be 
regarded as “fruitful” in relation to the pursuit of this or that particular end or set of ends, 
whether it is the production of an “accurate” description of some particular phenomenon, the 
production of a “generalization” of broad scope which allows us to anticipate future happenings 
better than we otherwise might have, or whatever. And even when we reasonably conceive of the 
immediate “ends” of our research as being primarily or perhaps even exclusively “epistemic” in 
nature (the generation of “accurate representations,” let us say, or “generalizations of a broad 
scope,” or what have you), we nevertheless still weigh the costs and benefits of pursuing that 
research against the costs and benefits of not doing so (against the costs and benefits of pursuing 
some other research project or other practical aim). (“I want to be as sure as possible that I’ve 
gotten the facts right about what happened that day. It may take me a few more days of grueling 
interviews, and I could really use the rest, but it’s worth it.” “I could add another case study, but 
that would probably entail six more months of field research. It would be interesting to see 
whether the same pattern might be observed there as well, but I really don’t have the time or 
money to do it.”) In practice, that is, a choice to pursue this or that “epistemic value” is always a 
choice not to pursue some other value. Such choices do not take place in vacuo. It is easy to 
forget this in abstract discussions of what is “involved in research.” However, when we keep our 	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eyes on what is actually involved in doing research – and, likewise, on what is actually involved 
in judging what research would be “fruitful” in the future – we can easily see that our reasoning 
processes are shot through with considerations of a variety of values, again, even when we do 
reasonably regard the immediate “ends” of this or that particular research activity as being 
primarily or perhaps even exclusively “epistemic” in nature. Hence, to choose this or that 
particular theory because it offers “the greatest promise of fruitful future research” is still to 
render value judgments, including judgments of the value of pursuing this or that epistemic value 
in relation to whatever other (kinds of) values we might have. So, deciding which theory to adopt 
essentially involves value judgments, and not only in relation to “epistemic values.” 
 
3.5.3 The Social Construction of Science/Inquiry, Trust, and Judgments of Character 
 
 Finally, we turn to the third type of argument that the editors of Value Free Science? note 
has commonly been made for the value-laden character of science, namely, arguments that see 
“value ladenness in the social process of science.”280 
 
Here, a plethora of post-Kuhnian studies detail how individuals interact to produce 
scientific outcomes and how interests and values are involved in those processes. One 
simple but powerful example comes from the cognitive division of labor in science: 
Many particle physics experiments are so large and complex that no one individual can 
grasp and verify all the details, which makes trust an essential component. That raises the 
prospect, however, that in assessing the evidence, scientists have to make value 
judgments about character.281 
 
However, the editors go on to acknowledge the possibility that the “social constructionist” 
argument that interests and values are necessarily involved in the production of “scientific 
outcomes” may be mistaken. “Social constructionist arguments will fail to show significant 
conclusions if the role of values in any specific instance is just an instance of biased, bad science. 
Then values will have no inevitable connection to science.”282 Of course, “arguments to the 
effect that science is in some sense essentially social,” they acknowledge, “deny that values are 
contingently involved, because social processes inevitably bring interests and decisions about 
how collective decisions are to be made.”283   
 Again, it seems to me that the issues raised by the “social constructionist arguments” that 
the editors are signaling are not as open as they suggest. To begin with, I agree with the 
argument that the editors ascribe to social constructionism, that “science is in some sense social” 
and that, in consequence, we should “deny that values are contingently involved.” However, the 
problem cuts deeper than the editors’ formulation would seem to suggest, for values are 
“involved in” science not just because social processes “inevitably bring interests and decisions 
about how collective decisions are to be made,” as they surely do, but also because scientists and 
other inquirers always have to make “value judgments about character” and because “trust” is 
always “an essential component” of research, not just when experiments or other research 
activities are aptly described as “so large and complex that no one individual can grasp and 	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verify all the details.” We can easily appreciate this, I think, once we recognize that ethical 
values like “trust” are presupposed by scientific as well as other forms of inquiry, all the way 
down to the observational level.  
 To see this, recall that, with Hilary Putnam, we earlier suggested that “knowledge of facts 
presupposes knowledge of values,” and illustrated this by briefly considering the way in which 
when we evaluate alternative explanatory hypotheses, we are guided by “epistemic values.”284 
When we choose among hypotheses, Putnam again points out, we are guided by considerations 
of “simplicity,” “coherence,” “preservation of past doctrine,” “reasonableness,” and so forth. 
When scientists choose hypotheses they do not reflect on all the stories and myths about the past 
that are available to them; instead, they do so by reflecting on the records and testimonies that 
they have “good reason to trust by these very criteria of ‘good reason.’” But now notice that we 
are guided by epistemic values at the observational level as well, that is, by judgments of 
“reasonableness,” “coherence,” and “plausibility,” for instance. As Putnam also notes, 
“judgments of coherence are essential even at the observational level: we have to decide which 
observations to trust, which scientists to trust – sometimes even which of our memories to 
trust.”285 Putnam here speaks of trust being an essential component of judgments of “coherence,” 
but the same could be said of other epistemic values, e.g., of judgments of “reasonableness” and 
“plausibility” too. When we reflect on which factual accounts, eyewitness reports, testimonies, 
documentary records, and so forth to regard as “plausible” or as “reasonable,” we at least tacitly 
rely on judgments of trust, and so character too. And judgments of trustworthiness bring with 
them a range of other ethical values as well. For human (as opposed to, say, mechanical) 
“trustworthiness” is connected to such ethical values as “reliability,” “honesty,” “sincerity,” and 
so on. Hence, when the source of this or that observation is a human, “epistemic values” such as 
“coherence,” “reasonableness,” and “plausibility” are, we might say, entangled with ethical 
values. Thus, epistemic values and ethical values are presupposed by scientific as well as other 
forms of inquiry, even at the observational level. And what is presupposed at “the observational 
level” is also, in consequence, presupposed at the descriptive, explanatory, and predictive 
“levels” too. For neither description, nor explanation, nor prediction can take place without 
observation. 
 
IV. The Moral or Ethical Significance and Implications of What We Say (and Do Not Say)  
       in Our Inquiries 
 
We turn now to the second claim-of-interest: again, the claim that, in light of the value-
guidedness and value-ladenness of all of our inquiries, anything we say (and do not say) in any 
of our inquiries could have “moral or ethical significance and implications.” Much of what 
follows is, I think, fairly obvious, if not quite so. But, as the philosopher-novelist Iris Murdoch is 
said to have said, “philosophy is often a matter of finding occasions on which to say the 
obvious.”286 One reason for this is precisely that, as Richard Bernstein writes, “philosophers [and 
not just philosophers, but many social scientists too!] have a way of forgetting or neglecting the 
obvious.”287   	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4.1 The Necessary Selectivity of Our Inquiries 
 
This is the first point I made in connection with the idea that all of our inquiries are 
value-guided and value-laden, first in Chapter 5 and then again in section 3.1 of the present 
chapter. But let me now restate it, putting the point in a more explicitly pragmatic fashion that 
draws on material from various preceding sections and that helps us to reflect on the issue of 
“moral/ethical significance and implications.” For pragmatists, experience is viewed from a 
biological-anthropological perspective. As such, it is viewed as active, not passive. 
Correspondingly, it is viewed as always involving a transaction with a natural environment, and 
often, at least, as involving a transaction with a social environment. (Insofar as experience 
involves sign activity, we might even say that, from a pragmatic perspective, it always involves 
“a transaction with a social environment”: for signs are themselves social in character. So, we at 
least draw on social resources when we think [hence employ signs] in response to particular 
aspects of our environments.) Like other animals, however, we always respond selectively to our 
environments. And this is as true of our “inquiries” as it is of anything else we do.  
One way in which we can appreciate this is by considering the “necessary selectivity” of 
all descriptions of human affairs. Any description of human affairs has to include implicit or 
explicit information about certain persons’ actions, motives, and intentions. But to be intelligible 
(“coherent,” “plausible,” “reasonable,” “relevant”…), the narrator(s) in question have to be 
selective about all of the (different kinds of) information they include, including the information 
about certain persons’ actions, motives, and intentions that they include. (What would it even 
mean to include “all of the information” about some “event”? Taken literally, that seems to me 
an incoherent aim. We only ever include what we think is “relevant” information.288) Hence, our 
epistemic values dictate that we be “selective” in this (and other) way(s). From this simple 
observation it follows that anything we say (and do not say) in some particular inquiry could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Notice how this observation already invalidates the view that any form of social inquiry could be “value-free” 
and/or “value-neutral.” For in deciding what counts as “relevant” information, there is no way to avoid value 
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invalidates the “traditional view” of moral or ethical reasoning discussed in section 3.2. As we saw in that section, 
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already to have rendered a “value judgment.” Yet, on the traditional view, such judgments are only to occur in the 
second “moment,” again, when we decide how to act in light of our situation. Furthermore, notice that the judgment 
that we do have enough “relevant” information and that we do have an “adequate” description of the situation at 
hand is a judgment that itself has “moral or ethical significance and implications.” To see this, we can offer a variant 
of the argument that was offered in section 3.5.2. In deciding that we do have enough “relevant” information and 
that we do have an “adequate” description of the situation at hand, we always make (more or less conscious) value 
judgments about how to weigh the anticipated costs and benefits of pursuing further investigations in the situation at 
hand against the expected costs and benefits of not doing so. So, deciding when to accept the information we have as 
being “adequate” essentially involves values – and not just “epistemic values” – in all cases. And these judgments 
reveal what (some of our) ethical or even moral values are, and hence what we say in conveying them itself has 
“moral or ethical significance and implications.” 
 
 
	   229	  
have “moral or ethical significance and implications,” indeed, regardless of the intentions of the 
narrator(s) in question. 
Take a hypothetical case in which a narrator’s intention really just is to provide an 
“accurate” description of some policy-related or -relevant event. Therefore, her motives, let us 
say, are simply “epistemic” in character; in the relevant moments, she only speaks for “epistemic 
reasons.” (I am dubious that this is ever literally the case, since I think that intentional activity, 
especially intentional social activity, typically, perhaps even always, involves a variety of 
different values: for instance, those related to “the presentation of self in everyday life.” But the 
point I am after can be made even if there are, indeed, cases where someone does literally speak 
“only for ‘epistemic reasons’” – whatever precisely that might be taken to mean.) Is it not the 
case that in selectively providing information about (what the interlocutor judges to be) certain  
(relevant) persons’ actions, motives, and intentions, something of moral-ethical “relevance” from 
the perspectives of the listeners/readers might be left out? Again, suppose, as we did in section 
2.3, that the event in question is an attack on some rural village by an army unit. This time, 
however, suppose that the observer-narrator in question is as “disinterested” and “objective” a 
reporter as can be found. In observing and describing the event in question, she will nevertheless 
be “selective” in what she sees and in what she says (about certain persons’ actions, motives, and 
intentions) in response to what she sees; there is no meaningful sense in which we can say that 
her reporting will just “mirror” the “reality” or “truth” that is “presented to her.” From this 
simple observation it follows that there is always the possibility that she might leave out 
something of moral-ethical “relevance” to the listeners/readers: for instance, how many children 
were beaten by the attacking soldiers, how many soldiers where struck down by villagers, how 
precisely the attack was initiated, or what have you. Such information is obviously relevant to 
listeners/readers who want to evaluate the morality/ethics of the attack. And from this simple 
observation it follows that there is always the possibility that what the reporter (or anyone else) 
does say (or does not say) (about certain persons’ actions, motives, and intentions) in the inquiry 
in question could have “moral or ethical significance and implications.” 
Now, this, too, is obviously true of examples where the narrator’s motives themselves do 
have moral or ethical relevance and/or the narrator’s motives themselves are moral or ethical in 
character. For instance, if the reporter intentionally downplays how many soldiers are struck 
down by the villagers (say, out of a desire to portray the villagers as “fully innocent of any 
wrongdoing”) or how many young boys are bludgeoned by the soldiers (say, out of a desire to 
“protect the soldiers from being brought to account”), we may then say that the narrator’s 
motives are “moral or ethical in character.” And we may also say that her motives themselves 
have “moral or ethical relevance.” (Among other reasons, this is because any time we reveal 
what a person’s moral or ethical motives are, we reveal something about their moral or ethical 
character. And such revelations have “moral or ethical relevance” in the sense that, for instance, 
they are often the basis for praising or sanctioning particular persons and behaviors.) If so, 
however, we may also say that what the reporter says (and does not say) (about certain persons’ 
actions, motives, and intentions) in the inquiry in question has “moral or ethical significance and 
implications.”  
So, taking these considerations together, I am led to conclude that anything we say (and 
do not say) in some particular inquiry could have “moral or ethical significance and 
implications,” and indeed, regardless of the intentions of the narrator(s) in question. This, 
however, is not to say that the narrators’ intentions are irrelevant to assessing the moral or ethical 
significance and implications of what they say (and does not say). It is only to say that moral or 
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ethical significance and implications can arise, even if is the case (if it ever is the case) that the 
narrator(s) in question “speak(s) only for epistemic reasons.”   
 
4.2 The Performative Character of Our Inquiries (I): How Our Inquiries (Sometimes) Change 
(and Not Only Describe, Explain, and/or Predict) the Social Realities That They Address 
 
As discussed in section 3.3.2, Dewey held that, “in the orthodox view experience is 
regarded primarily as a knowledge affair. But to eyes not looking through ancient spectacles, it 
assuredly appears as an affair of the intercourse of a living being with its physical and social 
environment.”289 Furthermore, Dewey held that “according to tradition experience is (at least 
primarily) a psychical thing, infected throughout by ‘subjectivity.’ What experience suggests 
about itself is a genuinely objective world which enters into the actions and sufferings of men 
and undergoes modifications through their responses.”290 Accordingly, Dewey suggested that the 
esthetic analogy of the craftsperson involved in doing and making is an appropriate one, not only 
for understanding human life in general but also our mental activities and cognitive processes in 
particular. 
One way to appreciate how experience is “an affair of the intercourse of a living being 
with its physical and social environment,” one “which enters into the actions and sufferings of 
[humans] and undergoes modifications through their responses,” is to look closer at the 
relationship between social inquiry and theory, on the one hand, and social practice on the other.  
Take social inquiry first. In section 2.4, I mentioned the Hawthorne Effect, briefly 
discussing how research participation can affect subjects’ activities and behaviors. As evidence 
of this, I cited a review of 19 relevant studies (18 of which were drawn from the health sciences) 
by McCambridge et al., who concluded their study by noting that “consequences of research 
participation for [the] behaviors being investigated” were “found to exist in most studies 
included within [the] review.”291 To recall, the authors summarize one plausible hypothesis for 
this outcome as follows. “Awareness of being observed or having behavior assessed engenders 
beliefs about research expectations. Conformity and social desirability considerations then lead 
behavior to change in line with these expectations.”292  
Now, in the present connection, the first point to emphasize is that the Hawthorne Effect 
is one way of making sense of the Deweyan idea that social inquiry involves not only “doing” 
but also “making,” or, better yet, that it involves not only “doing” but also “re-making.” If some 
social inquiry involves the act of directly observing other humans’ activities and behaviors, and 
the act of doing so itself gives those who are observed sufficient reason to alter their activities 
and behaviors, it is sensible to say that, in a sense, the social inquiry in question itself “re-
makes” the behavior of those who are observed. Hence Dewey’s idea that experience (and, by 
implication, social inquiry) is “an affair of the intercourse of a living being with its physical and 
social environment,” an environment “which enters into the actions and sufferings of [humans] 
and undergoes modifications through their responses.”  
Turn now to social theory, where, as Charles Taylor has emphasized, the relation of 
theory to practice is fundamentally different than in the natural sciences.293 In the natural 	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sciences, theories are about “independent” objects. Here the relationship of knowledge to 
practice is that one applies what one knows about causal powers to specific cases, but the truths 
about the powers that one counts on are believed to remain unaltered. Thus, while we may say 
that natural science theories can transform practice, the practice that is transformed is not what 
the theory is about. By contrast, social theories are not about “independent objects”; rather, they 
can shape the practices to which they are relevant, as we can see by recognizing that they are 
theories about practices, which are partly constituted by particular self-understandings; and in so 
far as our theories transform these self-understandings, they may undercut, bolster, or otherwise 
shape the constitutive features of our practices.294 Seeing this, we should also be able to 
appreciate that there is something potentially misleading about simply say that a theory is “right” 
when it “corresponds to the facts it is about,” because, put simply, our social theories are about 
our practices, and their rise and adoption can alter these practices. This makes it clear that our 
theoretical formulations can serve more than just descriptive, explanatory, and/or predictive 
purposes, as these are typically construed. For we may come to formulate a certain theory (self-
understanding) – to employ certain self-descriptions or self-explanations – precisely so as to 
make it possible to continue a practice, or to reform it, or to rationalize it; and so on.  
As before, this line of reasoning also provides one way of making sense of the Deweyan 
idea that social theory, like social research, involves not only “doing” but also “making,” or, 
better yet, “doing” and “re-making.” Where a theory is about some practice that is partly 
constituted by particular self-understandings, and that theory comes to transform these self-
understandings, it is sensible to say that, in a sense, the social theory in question “re-makes” the 
practice in question. And again, this is one of making sense of Dewey’s idea that experience 
(and, by implication, social theory) is “an affair of the intercourse of a living being with its 
physical and social environment,” an environment “which enters into the actions and sufferings 
of [humans] and undergoes modifications through their responses.” 
Now, once we appreciate how social inquiry can “re-make” the behavior of those who are 
observed by it and how social theory can “re-make” the practices it is about, we can then 
appreciate why it is sensible to say that our inquiries and theories (sometimes) change the reality 
that they address. For we can then recognize that our social inquiries and theories not only 
describe, explain, and predict our social realities (as “value-free/neutral” conceptions of social 
science have sometimes had us think about “properly conducted” inquiry), but also play a crucial 
role in producing or re-producing those realities in this way or that. And this provides another 
way of making sense of my claim that anything we say in some particular inquiry could have 
“moral or ethical significance and implications.”  
Take the case of social theories that “re-make” our social practices. If some social theory 
does change our self-understandings in this way or that, and so does make it easier (say) to 
continue some practice, or to reform some practice, or to rationalize some practice, then, in that 
sense, the theory plays a role analogous to pro-typical “ethical statements” like exhortations, 
prescriptions, praises, and so on. And we do not question whether, in some sense, those (types 
of) statements could have “moral or ethical significance and implications.” If, for instance, our 
coming to formulate a theory makes it easier to rationalize some practice, then that theory makes 
it relatively easier for the practice to continue as it previously had, perhaps to the liking of group 
A but over the objections of group B. In such a case, the theory is playing an analogous role to 	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that played by explicit exhortations, prescriptions, praises, and so on, that is, whenever these 
speech acts also “make it easier for some practice to continue as it previously had” (under 
analogous circumstances: to the liking of group A but over the objections of group B). And, in 
the latter case, we surely would say that those speech acts could have “moral or ethical 
significance and implications.” So, we should also recognize this to be so in the case of the 
speech acts that convey the theory in question, and indeed, regardless of the intentions of the 
inquirer(s)/narrator(s) in question.  
Of course, not all theories will “re-make” the practices that they are about and not all 
social inquiries will re-make the behaviors they observe. But is there any way to tell in advance 
which ones definitely will or will not do so? It seems to me that there clearly isn’t. Hence it also 
seems to me advisable to conclude that anything we say in some particular inquiry could have 
“moral or ethical significance and implications,” and precisely because anything we then say 
could “re-make” one or more of our practices or behaviors. 
 
4.3 The Performative Character of Our Inquiries (II), Or, How “Description” Always Involves 
“Prescription” 
 
Recall from section 3.3.2 that another feature of Dewey’s critique of the “traditional” or 
“orthodox” view of experience relates to its focus on the present and past. Again, it is well to 
recall that, as Bernstein notes, “philosophers have frequently written as if our primary attitude 
toward the world is that of a spectator who passively observes and records what is happening and 
what has happened.”295 “Registration of what has taken place is believed to be the essence of 
experience,” Dewey says.296 Yet, when we view experience from a biological-anthropological 
perspective, we can easily appreciate that within experience, “anticipation is…more primary than 
recollection; projection than summoning of the past; the projective than the retrospective.”297 
Indeed, “experience in its vital form is experimental, an effort to change the given; it is 
characterized by projection, by reaching forward into the unknown; connection with a future its 
salient trait.”298 And as with experience in general, so with language in particular: Dewey’s 
pragmatism, Hildebrand reminds us, “commits us to linking meaning-criteria with present and 
future experience.” Indeed, it might well be fair 
 
to label pragmatism a metaphilosophical attitude or stance as a doctrine (or theory) of 
meaning. (By ‘stance’ I mean that it is more than an academic philosophical position, it is 
vision, a way of approaching philosophy ab extra.) Pragmatism’s status qua stance 
derives from its acute self-consciousness of the fact that a term’s meaning cannot be 
explicated innocently, that is, without implying specific and future consequences. And 
those implications – if one is completely forthright – evince some position about what 
will and should happen. As formulated and asserted, facts imply values; they are 
entangled.... From this stance knowing cannot be spectatorship but is rather a tool (or 
tactic) or dynamic agency.299 
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299 Hildebrand (2013: 58) 
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How might we clarify the idea that we cannot explicate a term’s meaning without 
evincing “some position about what will and should happen”? And if this view is defensible, 
shouldn’t we therefore reject any sharp distinction between “description” and “prescription”? 
Moreover, don’t we then have yet another perspective from which to maintain the implausibility 
of sharply separating “the language” (words, terms, phrase, vocabulary….) that expresses 
(express) our “moral” or “ethical” beliefs and viewpoints from “the language” (words, terms, 
phrase, vocabulary….) that expresses (express) our “scientific,” or “factual,” or “descriptive,” or 
“explanatory,” or “predictive” beliefs and viewpoints? (Recall our earlier discussion, in section 
3.5.1, of the implausibility of factoring our language into its “factual’ and its “evaluative” 
“components.”) And – to add a point that we haven not yet taken up – don’t we therefore have 
yet another perspective from which to defend the idea that anything we say in some particular 
inquiry could have “moral or ethical significance and implications”? 
 To address these questions, we should recall that it has sometimes been thought that there 
is a “language of science” (of observation, description, explanation, and prediction) that is or, in 
principle at least, could be, sharply separated from other languages which are considered to be 
“ethical,” or “moral,” or “aesthetic,” or “evaluative,” or “normative” in nature. J.S. Mill’s 
suggestion that the respective languages of “science” and of “art” are to be sharply distinguished 
provides a representative example. “Science is a collection of truths; art, a body of rules, or 
directions for conduct. The language of art is, Do this; Avoid that. Science takes cognisance of a 
phenomenon, and endeavors to discover its law; art proposes to itself an end, and looks out for 
means to effect it.”300 Here, Mill speaks of “art,” but we could replace that term with, for 
instance, “ethics,” “morality,” and/or “value judgments,” and the position he articulates would 
still be representative of the viewpoint of many of those who have wanted to distinguish “the 
language of science” from other languages which are regarded (in contrast to science) as being 
“intrinsically or inherently ‘normative” and/or ‘evaluative” and/or ‘prescriptive.’” Now, one 
problem with Mill’s characterization of the language of science is that it seems to presuppose 
that there is a vocabulary available to us for describing science’s “collection of truths” that does 
not, at the same time, consists in, or presuppose, or function as “a body or rules” and as 
“directions for conduct.” And it seems to me that this supposition is unwarranted. Based on the 
considerations adduced in previous sections of this chapter, there are a variety of ways to make 
this point. But for brevity, let us just appeal to our earlier idea that there is apparently no way of 
differentiating between the describing use of language and the prescribing (or commending) use 
of language on the basis of vocabulary. (This view was implicit in the discussion of the 
implausibility of factoring our language into its “factual’ and its “evaluative” “components” in 
section 3.5.1). One reason for this, to clarify, is that, as Hilary Putnam has discussed (building on 
Ruth Anna Putnam’s writings),  
 
many descriptive predicates naturally acquire an emotive force. In our culture, ‘slobbers 
his food all over his shirt’ has strong negative emotive force although the phrase is 
literally a description. Any word that stands for something people in a culture value (or 
disvalue) will tend to acquire emotive force.301 
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Putnam’s suggestion is not that we cannot differentiate between (say) the “describing use” of 
language and the “prescribing (or commending) use” of language at all. To be clear, it is only 
that we cannot do so on the basis of vocabulary.  
 
‘Descriptive’ words can be used to praise or blame (‘He slobbers food all over his tie’) 
and ‘evaluative’ words can be used to describe and explain. (Consider the following 
dialogue: ‘John must have been an exceptionally good man to do such a thing.’ ‘No, he 
had never been a moral paragon, if anything the contrary; but he must have had a 
capacity for self-sacrifice we never suspected.’ Here moral language is being used in an 
explanatory function.)302 
 
Now, if these considerations suggest that there is no way sharply to differentiate between 
“description” and “prescription” on the basis of vocabulary, Dewey’s suggestion is still more 
radical: again, that (in Hildebrand’s summary) we cannot explicate a term’s meaning without 
evincing “some position about what will and should happen.” Indeed, Dewey’s suggestion, I 
should now add, is actually that we cannot even use descriptive terms (not just that we cannot 
explicate their meanings) without evincing “some position about what will and should happen.” 
And if this is a defensible position, as I believe it is, our position should not only be that “there is 
no way sharply to differentiate between ‘description’ and ‘prescription’ on the basis of 
vocabulary”; our position should be that “there is no way sharply to distinguish between 
‘description’ and ‘prescription’ at all.” Or, to put the point positively, our position should be that 
“‘description’ (and so ‘explanation’ and ‘prediction’ which depend on description) always 
involve(s) ‘prescription.” To be clear, this is not to say that we should endorse the idea that there 
is no reason to differentiate between the “descriptive use” of language and the “prescriptive” (or 
“commending”) use of language, as if there were no difference between a “descriptive 
statement” like “Inflation has increased this quarter” and a prescriptive statement like “The 
government ought to rein in inflation.” It is only to say that even when we just make 
paradigmatic “descriptive statements” (like “Inflation has increased this quarter”), we are still 
engaged in one or another form of “prescription.”  
 To develop this viewpoint, consider Dewey’s suggestion that “all judgments of fact have 
a reference to a determination of courses of action to be tried and to the discovery of means for 
their realization.”303  To recall terminology that we earlier used in chapter 3, we are so 
accustomed to sharply separating reasoning that we regard as “directed toward belief” 
(“theoretical reasoning”) from reasoning that we regard as “directed toward decision or action” 
that Dewey’s suggestion here may seem quite odd. If, however, we maintain, as we did in 
chapter 3, that the dichotomy between theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning is untenable, 
Dewey’s suggestion is easily understandable. That is, if we recognize that all reasoning is, in 
some sense, “directed toward decision or action” (which is one way of making sense of Dewey’s 
claim that “experience in its vital form is experimental…connection with a future its salient 
trait”), the suggestion that “all judgments of fact have a reference to a determination of courses 
of action to be tried and to the discovery of means for their realization” should not strike us as 
odd. When an agent reasons about how to describe some “fact,” she reasons not just about how 
accurately to “represent” it but about how one thinks one and others should regard its rational 
justifiability. To say that P is true is to assert P. And to assert P is (presumptively) to accept the 	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burden of justifying P. Furthermore, as Peirce would have us notice, to accept the burden of 
“justifying P” is to accept responsibility for meeting certain social-normative-epistemic 
standards for demonstrating P.304 And for some person to say, “I believe that I meet some social-
normative-epistemic standard X,” is for that person to say: “If you perform some action A (e.g., 
if you check some document or speak with some witness), result Y will eventuate for you too 
(e.g., you will see that P is true).” Hence, you too should believe that P is true.” Hence why 
Hildebrand says that, according to Dewey’s pragmatism, “a term’s meaning [or, we may add, a 
descriptive statement’s meaning or factual claim’s meaning] cannot be explicated innocently, 
without implying specific and future consequences. And those implications – if one is 
completely forthright – evince some position about what will and should happen.” For in 
asserting that P is true, one evinces some position about what “will and should happen”: if you 
carry out, for instance, some action A, one will come to believe that P is true; and so one should 
believe that P is true. Hence also why Dewey himself says that “all judgments of fact have a 
reference to a determination of courses of action to be tried and to the discovery of means for 
their realization.” Hence also why I am suggesting even that “description always involves 
prescription.” 
 Now, if description always involves prescription, this implies that the decision to describe 
some particular fact or state of affairs some particular way just is a decision to “prescribe” some 
course of action to oneself and to others. Hence when we linguistically convey our decision to 
describe some particular fact or state of affairs some particular way we also linguistically convey 
our decision to prescribe some course of action to oneself and to others. And whenever we 
“prescribe some course of action to oneself and others,” aren’t we at least engaged in “ethical” 
discourse, even sometimes in “moral” discourse? If so, we are led once again to the conclusion 
that that anything we say in some particular descriptive (and therefore explanatory and 
predictive) inquiry could have “moral or ethical significance and implications.” 
 
4.4 Value-Guidedness and Value-Ladenness as Involving Epistemic and Ethical Values at the 
Four “Levels” 
 
Recall that, in section 3.4, I explained how all of our inquiries are “value-guided” and 
“value-laden” at the observational, descriptive, explanatory, and predictive levels, and that this is 
true not just in the original sense in which we defended that thesis in section 3.4 (in the sense that 
our inquiries at each of those “levels” are guided by, and so laden with, epistemic values) but 
also in the sense in which we later defended that thesis in section 3.5.3, that is, in the sense that 
our inquiries at each of those “levels” are guided by, and so laden with, ethical values too. In 
short, this is because various “epistemic values” can be “entangled with” “ethical values.” To 
recall, by this I mean to say that, at minimum, it is clear that certain “epistemic values” are at 
least sometimes “entangled with” certain “ethical values.” For instance, judgments with respect 
to epistemic values like “plausibility,” “coherence,” and “reasonableness” at least sometimes 
presuppose and depend on judgments with respect to the ethical value of “trust,” which brings 
with it a range of other ethical values like “honesty,” “sincerity,” and “reliability.” Character 
judgments of this kind are, therefore, presupposed and depended on at the observational level, 
hence also at the descriptive, explanatory, and predictive levels too.  	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Now, this recognition provides yet another perspective from which to argue that anything 
we say in any of our inquiries could have “moral or ethical significance and implications.” For 
any time I judge someone (including myself) as being, at least for relevant purposes, “honest,” 
“sincere,” or “reliable,” I am rendering an ethical or even (depending on how one interprets this 
phrase) a moral judgment. And my doing so can surely have “moral or ethical significance and 
implications.” For one thing, in a culture in which “honesty” is generally a character trait that 
people value (and what culture doesn’t, as a general matter, “value honesty” as an “ethical 
value”?), do I not praise someone (someone’s character) when I say (or imply) that this or that 
report is “reliable” because “the source” is “honest”? Accordingly, wouldn’t we say that my 
statement that the source is “reliable” could have “moral or ethical significance”? Surely we 
would.  
For another thing, wouldn’t we presume that, other things being equal, in such a culture, 
my praising him (or his character in this respect) is likely to be understood as encouraging 
“honesty”? Accordingly, wouldn’t we say that my statement that this or that report is “reliable” 
because “the source” is “honest” could have “moral or ethical implications”? Surely we would. 
Once again, these considerations suggest that anything we say in any of our inquiries could have 
“moral or ethical significance and implications.” For isn’t it safest to assume that, in advance of 
investigating whether or not something that someone says in some particular inquiry does or 
does not presuppose and depend on an epistemic value that is “entangled” with some (cluster of) 
ethical value(s), what they then say could presuppose and depend on some ethical value like 
“trustworthiness,” “honesty,” “sincerity,” or “reliability”? And isn’t it then safest to assume that 
what they then say could have “moral or ethical significance and implications”? 
 
Conclusion 
 
 At the outset, I stated that the guiding aim of this chapter would be to develop the claim 
that the democratic process is best conceived of as a form of collective social inquiry, conducted 
as a “reflexive social practice”: as a practice in which participants recognize the potential need to 
inquire, and, as appropriate, actually do inquire, into the (potential or actual) moral or ethical 
significance and implications of whatever is said (and not said) in whatever inquiries are fed into, 
or invoked in the context of, the democratic process. This I referred to as “the main claim.” To 
conclude this chapter, I want to reiterate the principal arguments that were made in each of the 
chapter’s four main sections, and to indicate how I believe those arguments come together in 
support of the main claim. 
 In section I, we first considered the claim that the democratic process ought to be 
conceived of as a form of collective social inquiry. There, we recalled that this claim had 
previously been developed in chapter 4, Normative Democratic Theory as a Tool for Practical 
Reasoning. More specifically, we recalled that the specific claim that had been developed in 
chapter 4 was that informed reflection on paradigmatic moments of “free and equal treatment” in 
joint or collective decision-making reveals that, in those moments, participants recognize the 
need to inquire, and, as appropriate, actually do inquire, into the procedures, virtues, and cultural 
practices that, in the particular context in which they do (have to) act, are most apt to promote the 
effective granting of certain opportunities and the effective assumption of certain responsibilities. 
That is why, in chapter 4, I said that, ideally speaking, democracy’s participants should (think 
they should) conduct empirical inquiries that illuminate how, in some particular context, they 
might best uphold the norms and realize the values that the normative democratic theory 
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developed in chapter 5 helps them to articulate. And that, I also added, is one reason why I 
suggested that, ideally speaking, the democratic process ought to be conducted as a form of 
collective social inquiry. For brevity, we summarized this first argument for conducting the 
democratic process as a form of collective social inquiry as The Presumed Need to Inquire into 
Procedures, Virtues, and Cultural Practices. 
 We then turned to a second argument for conducting the democratic process as a form of 
collective social inquiry. Here we noted that the normative democratic theory from chapter 5, 
Toward a Normative Theory of the Democratic Process, itself suggests that there is reason to 
maintain that the democratic process ought to be conducted as a form of collective social inquiry. 
Here we referred to the fact that the Criterion of Effective Participation and the Criterion of 
Enlightened Understanding both say that participants should assume responsibility for seeking 
out mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons for their expressed policy preferences 
(and so for trying to understand relevant social situations and activities from each other’s 
perspectives), and that their doing so entails that they engage in various forms of inquiry: 
perhaps, for instance, questioning and even transforming their own self-understandings or self-
perceptions; sympathetically projecting themselves into other relevant persons’ ‘heart and 
minds’; revisiting the history of their own policy positions and the way in which they have 
interpreted certain relevant social/economic/political ideals; developing a more sensitive and 
nuanced understanding of the emotional burdens suffered by those who are critically impacted 
by relevant policies; and so on. This second argument for conducting the democratic process as a 
form of collective social inquiry we summarized as The Presumed Need to Inquire into What 
Could Count as Mutually Acceptable and Generally Accessible Reasons. 
 Finally, we turned to a third argument for conducting the democratic process as a form of 
collective social inquiry. To develop this argument, I noted that in chapter 5, Toward a 
Normative Theory of the Democratic Process, I developed the idea that, ideally speaking, the 
participants to a democratic process ought to give equal consideration to, and show equal 
concern and respect for, the good or interests of relevant persons. This was summarized in The 
Principle of Equal Consideration of, and Concern and Respect for, the Good or Interests of 
Relevant Persons. In chapter 5, we then recalled, I also discussed and endorsed what Dahl calls 
the Presumption of Personal Autonomy. I then observed that our joint endorsement of The 
Principle of Equal Consideration of, and Concern and Respect for, the Good or Interests of 
Relevant Persons and (our extended version of) the Presumption of Personal Autonomy implies 
that the democratic process ought to be an occasion to inquire into how all relevant persons 
interpret the actual or potential consequences of past, present, and/or proposed actions of 
“relevant” agents and/or agencies and an occasion to inquire into how all relevant persons 
interpret how (if at all) those actions bore, bear, and/or might bear on their own good or their 
own respective interests. This third argument we summarized as The Presumed Need to Inquire 
into Relevant Persons’ Own Interpretations of Policy Consequences.  
 So, these were the three arguments that I suggested stand in support of the idea, 
expressed in the main claim, that the democratic process is best conceived of as a form of 
collective social inquiry. What, though, of the idea of a “reflexive social practice” that is 
contained in the main claim? The rest of the chapter was dedicated to explicating what I mean by 
a reflexive social practice and why I think that the democratic process ought to be conducted as 
one.  
 In section II, I developed a “generic conception of reflexivity,” which, I suggested, might 
benefit any interpretation of “informed,” “intelligent,” “reasonable,” or “rational” decision-
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making, not just our own conception of deliberative-democratic decision-making explicated in 
chapter 5. Beginning from “reflexivity” as it is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary, I 
suggested that, in the context of any conception of collective decision-making, a “reflexive social 
practice” might reasonably be construed as follows. A reflexive social practice is a practice in 
which participants are capable of, inclined to, and characterized by serious, reflective thought; 
turn or direct their mental processes back upon their own minds when they conduct their 
inquiries, always engaging in the kind of searching self-examination that would allow them to 
exhibit an intelligent self-awareness; take account of the effect of their personalities and their 
own presence on whatever is being investigated; and craft inquiries that consciously call 
attention to the process that went into producing those inquiries. Any normative democratic 
theory will presumably recognize the need for the democratic process to function as a form of 
collective social inquiry, at least in the minimal sense that it ought to be an occasion to pool 
participants’ knowledge, information, and/or judgments about the actual or potential 
consequences of past, present, and/or proposed actions of “relevant” agents and/or agencies. 
And, I suggested, a reflexive social practice (in the above sense), could help participants to pool 
“informed,” “intelligent,” “reasonable,” or “rational” knowledge, information, and/or judgments 
about these actions and agencies. One way to make sense of this claim, I suggested, is to notice 
that the abilities and dispositions that I associated with reflexivity in Section II can be useful to 
participants precisely insofar as they: first, help participants to reveal the various roles that 
norms, values, and interests do play in whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context 
of, the democratic process; and second, to help participants to the democratic process to mitigate 
or compensate for the various roles that some norms, values, and interests do play in those 
inquiries.    
 Now, as discussed, the idea that a reflexive social practice (in the above sense) can help 
the participants to a democratic process to reveal the various roles that norms, values, and 
interests do play in whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, the democratic 
process might give rise to the idea that it can help participants to purge their inquiries of the 
norms, values, and interests that it does help them to identify. However, it is a non sequitur, I 
immediately suggested, to conclude that our reflexive abilities and dispositions could allow us to 
purge our social inquiries of all norms, values, and/or interests. For, on my view, this is an 
impossible, indeed incoherent, aim in the first place. Very briefly, this, I suggested, is because all 
of our social inquiries presuppose, depend on, and convey norms, values, and interests, hence can 
reasonably be described as “value-guided” and “value-laden.” Hence, norms, values, and 
interests cannot be “purged” from our inquiries.  
 So, in Section III, I set out to defend the all-inquiry-is-value-guided-and-value-laden 
thesis. As background to that discussion, I began with two preliminary items.  
First, I briefly set out the traditional view of moral or ethical reasoning that I am 
concerned to argue against, one which is bolstered by the idea that, properly conducted, social (-
scientific) inquiry either is or could be “value-free” and/or “value-neutral.” Indeed, the reason 
that I am concerned to defend the all-inquiry-is-value-guided-and-value-laden thesis in the first 
place is precisely because the idea of “value-free” and/or “value-neutral” social (-scientific) 
inquiry) has served to bolster the traditional view of moral or ethical reasoning that I am 
concerned to criticize here. Hence, we briefly reviewed the traditional view in question and its 
relationship to the idea of “value-free” and/or “value-neutral” social (-scientific) inquiry. As we 
saw, “rational” decision-making, on the view in question, consists in two clearly distinct and 
separable “moments”: a “value-free” and/or “value-neutral” one, where we first figure out what 
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our situation is; and (as we might put) a “value-guided” and “value-laden” one, where we then 
decide how we would should (like to) act in light of that situation. So, the view has been that, 
insofar as the process is “rational,” participants to collective decision-making: first “gather the 
facts” about relevant circumstances, where this process is viewed as one of collecting and/or 
producing observational, descriptive, explanatory, and predictive information, data, and/or 
knowledge about the facts of those circumstances and where this process is viewed as not 
involving “value judgments”; and only subsequently decide together – through some form of 
collective decision-making – what (individual or collective) “ends” or “values” they would like 
to realize, and how they would like to do so, given those circumstances. What is more, this 
division of intellectual labor has been defended by reference to the possibility of creating (or due 
to the reality of our already having created) “value-free” and/or “value-neutral” sciences. 
Furthermore, it has been supported by a (tacit) dichotomy between “theoretical reasoning” 
(reasoning that is “directed toward belief”) and “practical reasoning” (reasoning that is “directed 
toward decision or action”), where the former has been regarded as “reasoning about the facts” 
and the latter has been regarded as “reasoning about values.” 
 The second preliminary task was to review what had previously been said in defense of 
the all-inquiry-is-value-guided-and-value-laden-thesis. Here we recalled that, in Chapter 5, 
Toward a Normative Theory of the Democratic Process, I had suggested that the Criterion of 
Enlightened Understanding gives us reason to prefer some philosophies of social inquiry to other 
such philosophies and illustrated this through a brief comparison between two philosophies of 
social inquiry: between a philosophy that begins from the supposition that all inquiry is “value-
guided” and “value-laden” with one that explicitly rejects that claim, holding that “value-free” 
and “value-neutral” social inquiry is possible. In this context, we discussed the “necessary 
selectivity” of all of our inquiries, a feature that we related to our “epistemic values.” Here I 
discussed how, in virtue of the “necessary selectivity” of our inquiries, what we say (and do not 
say) in any particular inquiry could have “moral or ethical significance and implications.” This is 
a theme that we picked up again in section 4.1 above and that we’ll briefly return to below. So, I 
will not say anything more about it here.  
 We then looked to see what resources for critiquing the idea of “value-
freedom/neutrality” (and so for critiquing the traditional view of moral/ethical reasoning outlined 
above) might be found in the pragmatist tradition, focusing particularly on the ways in which 
Peirce and Dewey sought to reconstruct experience and inquiry.  
Very briefly, we saw that Peirce emphasized the following tightly related theses: 
experience is active, not passive, and is permeated by our conceptual capacities and funded with 
inference; thinking is itself a kind of action, activity, or conduct; thinking always proceeds 
against the background of (tacit) prejudgments (we cannot start from a position of having no 
prejudgments that we might later find reason to reject or modify – there is apparently no 
infallible starting point for reasoning about anything); and thinking always involves sign activity 
and so is essentially normative and social in character.  
We then turned to John Dewey’s reconstruction of experience and inquiry, at which point 
I noted that Dewey, as I read him, would agree with each of the above Peircean theses. However, 
I did not endeavor to defend that claim directly; for our concern here is only to find resources for 
critiquing the idea of “value-freedom/neutrality,” and for that purpose the veracity of the above 
claim is irrelevant. (However, section 3.3.2 does contain material indicating the substantial 
degree of overlap between the aforementioned Peircean theses and Dewey’s reconstruction of 
experience and inquiry.) The discussion centered on five contrasts between the “traditional” or 
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“orthodox” view of experience and Dewey’s own view, with attention being paid to the 
implications of Dewey’s alternative view for how to conceive of “inquiry.” First, whereas in the 
orthodox view experience is “regarded primarily as a knowledge affair,” for Dewey “it assuredly 
appears as an affair of the intercourse of a living being with its physical and social 
environment.”305 Second, whereas in the orthodox experience “is (at least primarily) a psychical 
thing, infected throughout by ‘subjectivity,’ ‘what experience suggests about itself is a genuinely 
objective world which enters into the actions and sufferings of men and undergoes modifications 
through their responses.”306 Third, whereas in the orthodox view “registration of what has taken 
place…is believed to be the essence of experience,” “experience in its vital form is experimental, 
an effort to change the given; it is characterized by projection…connection with a future its 
salient trait.” 307  Fourth, whereas “the [orthodox] empirical tradition is committed to 
particularism” and views “connections and continuities” as “foreign to experience,” as “by 
products of dubious validity,” “experience that is an undergoing and a striving for control in new 
directions,” which is to say experience as we experience it, “is pregnant with connections”;308 
“connections and relations are as much a part of experience as the particulars that we isolate 
within experience.”309 Finally, whereas in the orthodox view “experience and thought are anti-
thetical terms,” in Dewey’s view “there is, apparently, no conscious experience without 
inference; reflection is native and constant.”310 
In section 3.4, I then offered a brief statement of how the Peircean and Deweyan 
reflections on experience and inquiry reviewed in section 3.3 provide us with a perspective from 
which to argue that all of our inquiries presuppose, depend on, and convey norms, values, and 
interests, hence may be described as “value-guided” and “value-laden.”  
We first considered the claim about norms, values, and interests in that argument (Section 
3.4.1). To summarize very quickly, the key thought was that insofar as it is plausible to claim (as 
Peirce does) that thought inevitably involves sign activity (including linguistic signs) and that 
signs get their very meaning from the role that they play in a social context of rules and norms, it 
is plausible to claim that thought presupposes and depends on “norms,” hence values and 
interests too. And this suggests that insofar as our inquiries presuppose and depend on language 
and thought (as they obviously do), they also presuppose and depend on norms, values, and 
interests too. Furthermore, reflection on ordinary language suggests that any practice or activity 
that can be identified as “presupposing” and “depending on” norms, values, and interests may be 
described as “conveying” norms, values, and interests too. Hence, all of our inquiries not only 
“presuppose” and “depend on” norms, values, and interests but “convey” them too.  
We then concluded that all of our inquiries are “value-guided” and “value-laden,” indeed, 
found this to be a feature of our inquiries at four different “levels”: the observational level, the 
descriptive level, the explanatory level, and the predictive level (Section 3.4.2). (This was a 
crucial finding, I stress, because these are precisely the forms of inquiry that some have thought 
capable of “value-freedom” and/or “value-neutrality.”) Here again we referred back to the 
Peircean claim that there is no thinking activity (hence inference) without sign activity. To 
interpret a percept as being this or that “percipuum” (in Peirce’s neologism) is to understand the 	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role that relevant signs play in a social context of rules and norms. And anytime we can say that 
“we understand certain rules or norms,” we can also say that “we have knowledge of certain 
values.” Without this knowledge, we simply couldn’t, for instance, interpret a percept as being 
this percipuum or that. Hence our knowledge of certain values “guides” our inquiries at the 
observational level. Furthermore, description obviously involves sign activity, and so again, 
presupposes and depends on knowledge of certain values. Hence, we concluded that our 
knowledge of certain values “guides” our inquiries at the descriptive level too. Now, this 
argument could obviously be repeated at the explanatory level as well. Instead of simply doing 
that, however, the argument that I made in section 3.4.2 relied on the fact that our “epistemic 
values” (like “coherence,” “plausibility,” and “reasonableness”) “guide us” as we evaluate 
alternative explanatory hypotheses. When scientists and others choose hypotheses, they do not 
reflect on all the stories and myths about the past that are available to them; instead, they do so 
by reflecting on the records and testimonies that they have “good reason to trust by these very 
criteria of ‘good reason.’” Hence, these values “guide us” at the explanatory level. With respect 
to the predictive level, the argument here was a straightforward implication of the respective 
arguments about the observational level and the descriptive level. Prediction relies on 
observation and description (which both involve sign activity), and so presupposes and depends 
on knowledge of certain values, just as observation and description do too. Hence, our 
knowledge of certain values “guides” our inquiries at the predictive level too. Finally, we again 
noted that any practice or activity that is “guided by” values also “conveys” values. Hence the 
content of what is produced by it is “value-laden” too.  
So, beginning from a number of premises associated with pragmatist philosophy, we 
arrived at the conclusion that all of our inquiries presuppose, depend on, and convey norms, 
values, and interests, hence may be described as “value-guided” and “value-laden,” including, of 
course, all of our observations, descriptions, explanations, and predictions. Finally, I noted that 
this is why I had earlier said that the idea that a reflexive social practice could allow us to 
“purge” our social inquiries of all values, norms, and/or interests is not only an impossible aim 
but also an incoherent one.  
At this point we could have paused to offer a statement of the profound problems 
plaguing the above-considered traditional view of moral/ethical reasoning, which, I think it 
should be clear by now, stands or falls with the plausibility or implausibility of the idea of 
“value-free/neutral” social (-scientific) inquiry. However, in the contemporary literature that 
discusses the various conceptions, defenses, and criticisms of such inquiry, various controversies 
are still said to remain open, and my own judgment was that by taking a position on some of 
these controversies we could subsequently offer a still stronger critique of the traditional view in 
question. So, in section 3.5, we went on to consider some of these controversies, and to offer a 
number of further pragmatist (-type) considerations that would help us to offer that critique. 
The editors of Value-Free Science? highlight three types of arguments that have 
commonly been made “for the value-laden nature of science” since at least the 1950s.311 As we 
saw, however, in each case the authors raise critical questions about the cogency of these 
arguments. The first type is “arguments from denying the distinction between fact and value.”312 
Ordinary language philosophers have noted that much ordinary language is not neatly divided 
into “the straightforwardly factual or evaluative.”313 However, the authors raise the possibility 	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that we indeed might be able to divide our language into its “factual” and its “evaluative” 
“components.” We then reviewed a number of criticisms of the idea that this is possible. Here I 
suggested that, in light of these criticisms, there are good reasons for denying there are indeed 
cases where a word (or phrase or sentence) can be unproblematically or unambiguously 
categorized as a “factual” word (or phrase or sentence-type) or as an “evaluative” word (or 
phrase or sentence-type). The considerations we reviewed seem to support Hanna Pitkin’s 
(Wittgensteinian) suggestion that “what matters [in figuring how to “categorize” speech] is not 
the character or meaning of a particular word [or phrase or sentence], but how the word [or 
phrase or sentence] is used in particular utterances, whether to express emotion, assert fact, 
command, recommend, describe, explain, or in other ways.” Hence it seems untenable to suggest 
that there is a way of unproblematically or unambiguously categorizing words, phrases, and/or 
sentences as “factual” (or “descriptive”) words, phrases, or sentence-types in advance of an 
investigation into how the word, phrase, or sentence in question was actually used in some 
particular socio-linguistic context.  
After discussing ordinary language philosophy, the editors move on to a second major 
way to challenge the fact/value dichotomy, namely, by appealing to the holism of meaning. If, as 
Quine suggested, the meaning of a term or phrase is at least partly determined by the various 
connections a sentence has to other sentences in the language, then meaning is holistic: it 
depends on the word or phrase’s use in various different kinds of sentences. From this 
perspective, the editors write, “it is quite unsurprising that a given term might have connections 
to both our factual and [our] value judgments.”314 However, as we saw, the editors then say: 
“Perhaps claims about the holism of meaning are just mistaken” or “perhaps the holism is less 
dramatic than depicted, and we can partition meaning as suggested for the cases where holism is 
present.”315 In response, I noted that we need not go in for the kind of holism that says (in the 
editors’ summary) that beliefs constitute a web where every belief is at least indirectly tied to all 
others by logical and evidential connections” to appreciate that there are good reasons for at least 
leaving open the possibility that any given term “might have connections to both our factual and 
[our] value judgments.” We need only appeal to Quine’s compelling criticism of the logical 
positivists’ analytic/synthetic dichotomy and to see how, as that dichotomy falls, so does the 
classical fact/value dichotomy that the logical positivists defended by reference to it. So, we 
briefly considered Putnam’s excellent summary of the demise of these two dichotomies in 
tandem, the details of which I won’t repeat. (See section 3.5.1.) 
We then moved on to consider the editors’ discussion of “arguments from 
underdetermination,” of which there were two varieties.   
First, there is underdetermination of theory by data. The main idea here was that “once 
we have all the data, there may [still] be multiple hypotheses compatible with the data”;316 
regardless of how much data we have, our “results” are never, I said, absolutely “definitive.” 
Therefore, as Rudner pointed out, deciding which hypothesis to accept is at least partly about 
deciding how much evidence is at hand and how much “certainty” we need, a process which 
invokes human values that go beyond our “epistemic” ones. Indeed, my own suggestion was that 
we always make (more or less conscious) judgments about how much “certainty” (or, better, 
“assuredness”) we need or desire moving forward, hence always make (more or less conscious) 
value judgments about how to weigh the anticipated costs and benefits of pursuing further 	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investigations against the expected costs and benefits of not doing so. So, I said, deciding when 
to accept a hypothesis (like deciding when to “accept” anything else, I might add) essentially 
involves values in all cases – and not just “epistemic” values. For the process of weighing the 
costs and benefits of moving forward or not moving forward with an investigation in this way or 
that will always implicitly invoke other types of value judgment too. 
Second, there is underdetermination of theory choice by epistemic values. The main idea 
here was that “even if two scientists with different theories agree on what epistemic virtues a 
theory ought to have and on the data, they may nonetheless not agree on which theory is best 
supported, because they may rank epistemic values differently.”317 So, to break the tie, the 
editors note, we might have to invoke values other than epistemic ones. Yet, the authors also 
consider the possibility that we might just appeal to judgments about what is most likely to lead 
to “future fruitful research” to break such ties; in that way, it is, perhaps, possible to avoid 
appealing to values other than epistemic ones. Or, they say, we might just withhold judgment 
altogether. In response, I noted that whenever we do decide to “withhold judgment,” we do so in 
part because we believe that the costs and benefits of doing so are favorable in relation to the 
costs and benefits of not withholding judgment (i.e., of not rendering the judgment in question), 
where these judgments necessarily go beyond judgments of “the epistemic value” of withholding 
or not withholding judgment. So, deciding when to withhold judgment essentially involves non-
epistemic values. As for the issue of breaking ties, I likewise noted that there is no way to judge 
what is to be regarded as “fruitful research” simply by making appeals to values that are 
exclusively “epistemic” in nature. A choice to pursue this or that (cluster of) “epistemic value(s)” 
is always a choice not to pursue some other value. And whatever we may come to think would 
constitute “fruitful future research” will partly emerge out of how we weigh our “epistemic 
values” against our other values. 
Finally, the editors considered arguments that see “value ladenness in the social process 
of science.”318 Some authors, they noted, suggest that values are involved in science because the 
social processes involved in producing scientific outcomes (e.g., large lab experiments) raise 
“the prospect” that, “in assessing the evidence, scientists have to make value judgments about 
character.”319 Yet, as we saw, the editors go on to say that the argument that values are 
necessarily “involved in” the production of “scientific outcomes” may be mistaken. In response, 
I suggested that observation itself presupposes and depends on “epistemic values,” which in turn 
are “entangled” with “ethical values” like trust (and “reliability,” “honesty,” “sincerity,” and so 
on as well). And, I noted, what is presupposed at “the observational level” is also, in 
consequence, presupposed at the “descriptive,” “explanatory,” and “predictive” “levels” too. 
Hence, epistemic values and ethical values are presupposed by scientific as well as other forms 
of inquiry – at the observational level, the descriptive level, the explanatory level, and the 
predictive level as well. 
With these arguments in place, we then turned, in the final section (Section IV), to the 
claim that anything we say (and do not say) in any of our inquiries could have “moral or ethical 
significance and implications.” To develop this perspective, we drew on various arguments that 
had first been developed in sections II and III.  
The first argument concerned the necessary selectivity of our inquiries. Pragmatists view 
experience from a biological-anthropological perspective. Thus, they interpret experience, and so 	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inquiry, as active, not passive, and as always involving a transaction with a natural and perhaps 
also social environment. However, these transactions are always selective, and one way we can 
see this is by looking at the “necessary selectivity” of our descriptions of human affairs. Among 
other things, our epistemic values dictate that we be selective in, for instance, the information we 
provide about certain persons’ actions, motives, and intentions. But, as we saw, from this simple 
observation it follows that there is always the possibility that an inquirer might leave out 
something of moral-ethical “relevance” to the listeners/readers of the inquiry in question. Hence 
we concluded that anything we say (and do not say) in some particular inquiry could have “moral 
or ethical significance and implications,” and indeed, regardless of the intentions of the 
narrator(s) in question. 
We then turned to two kinds of performativity in our inquiries. First, we considered how 
our inquiries sometimes change the social realities that they address; they do not just observe, 
describe, explain, and predict them. Against the orthodox view of experience, Dewey 
emphasized that experience is “an affair of the intercourse of a living being with its physical and 
social environment,” one “which enters into the actions and sufferings of [humans] and 
undergoes modifications through their responses.” One way to see this, we said, was to look 
closer at how our social theories, for instance, sometimes “re-make” the social practices that 
they are about. Where a theory is about some practice that is partly constituted by particular self-
understandings, and the theory comes to transform these self-understandings, it is sensible to say 
that, in a sense, the social theory in question “re-makes” the practice in question. And this 
provides another way of making sense of my claim that anything we say in some particular 
inquiry could have “moral or ethical significance and implications.” If some social theory does 
change our self-understandings in this way or that, and so does make it easier (say) to continue 
some practice, or to reform some practice, or to rationalize some practice, then, in that sense, the 
theory plays a role analogous to pro-typical “ethical statements” like exhortations, prescriptions, 
praises, and so on. And we do not question whether, in some sense, those (types of) statements 
could have “moral or ethical significance and implications.” 
The second sense of performativity that we considered relates to my claim that 
“description” always involves “prescription.” Philosophers, we have seen, have often written as 
though our primary attitude toward the world is that of a spectator, passively observing and 
recording what is now happening and what has happened. Pragmatists, however, counsel that we 
view ourselves as engaged, dynamic agents, whose experience of the world is characterized by 
projection. From this perspective, language is viewed as a tool (or tactic) of dynamic agency, and 
when we use it we are seen as always implying views about future experience. One way to make 
sense of this claim, we saw, was to consider the claim that we cannot explicate a factual claim’s 
meaning without evincing some position about what will and should happen. For in asserting that 
P is true, one evinces some position about what “will and should happen”: if you carry out (for 
instance) some action A, one will come to believe that P is true; and so one should believe that P 
is true. Hence also why I am suggesting that “description always involves prescription.” We then 
noticed that whenever we prescribe some course of action to ourselves or to others, we seem to 
be engaged in “ethical” discourse, sometimes even in “moral discourse.” Hence we concluded 
that if description always involves prescription, anything we say when we describe something 
could have “moral or ethical significance and implications,” and precisely because we then are 
engaged in “prescription” too.  
Finally, we discussed how our inquiries are value-guided, and so value-laden, at the 
observational, descriptive, explanatory, and predictive levels, and saw that this value-ladenness 
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not only involves “epistemic values” but “ethical values” too. For instance, judgments with 
respect to epistemic values like “plausibility,” “coherence,” and “reasonableness” at least 
sometimes presuppose and depend on judgments with respect to the ethical value of “trust,” 
which brings with it a range of other ethical values like “honesty,” “sincerity,” and “reliability.” 
Hence, because our inquiries are “guided by” epistemic values, and so “laden with” epistemic 
values at all four of the aforementioned levels, and because epistemic values are at least 
sometimes “entangled with” ethical values, ethical values are at least sometimes presupposed 
and depended upon at all four of those levels too. And this recognition provides yet another 
perspective from which to argue that anything we say in any of our inquiries could have “moral 
or ethical significance and implications.” 
 Now, taken together, these considerations provide us with a clear perspective from which 
to argue against the traditional view of moral/ethical reasoning previously discussed in section 
3.2 and briefly reviewed toward the beginning of this conclusion. Briefly stated, the argument is 
that “rational” decision-making simply cannot consist in two clearly distinct and separable 
“moments”: a “value-free” and/or “value-neutral” one, where we first figure out what our 
situation is; and (as we might put it) a “value-guided” and “value-laden” one, where we then 
decide how we would should (like to) act in light of that situation. For the above considerations 
give us good reason to doubt, I think, whether there is much sense in saying that there ever is a 
“moment” in our conscious reasoning processes that is “value-free” and/or “value-neutral.” 
Correspondingly, they give us good reason for doubting the view of collective decision-making 
that holds that, insofar as the process is “rational,” participants: first “gather the facts” about 
relevant circumstances, where this process is viewed as one of collecting and/or producing 
observational, descriptive, explanatory, and predictive information, data, and/or knowledge about 
the facts of those circumstances and where this process is viewed as not involving “value 
judgments”; and only subsequently decide together – through some form of collective decision-
making – what (individual or collective) “ends” or “values” they would like to realize, and how 
they would like to do so, given those circumstances. For the above considerations suggest that 
there can be no “gathering of the facts” – indeed, that there can be no “facts” at all – apart from a 
process in which we make a least some value judgments, including ethical ones. (In light of the 
foregoing, can we even conceive of a social inquiry that doesn’t presuppose, depend on, and so 
convey epistemic values and ethical ones?)  
Finally, we turn to the main claim of this chapter: that the democratic process is best 
conceived of as a form of collective social inquiry, conducted as a “reflexive social practice”: as 
a practice in which participants recognize the potential need to inquire, and, as appropriate, 
actually do inquire, into the (potential or actual) moral or ethical significance and implications of 
whatever is said (and not said) in whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, the 
democratic process. Let me now provide a fuller description of what I mean by a reflexive social 
practice and indicate how we might think of this characterization of it as an extension of the 
“generic conception of reflexivity” that was developed in section II.   
Again, a reflexive social practice, I there said, is a practice in which participants are 
capable of, inclined to, and characterized by serious, reflective thought; turn or direct their 
mental processes back upon their own minds when they conduct their inquiries, always engaging 
in the kind of searching self-examination that would allow them to exhibit an intelligent self-
awareness; take account of the effect of their personalities and their own presence on whatever 
they investigate; and craft inquiries that consciously call attention to the process that went into 
producing those inquiries. Construed in this way, I suggested, there are reasons to think that such 
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a practice could benefit any conception of “informed,” “intelligent,” “reasonable,” or “rational” 
collective decision-making. In light of what was subsequently said in Sections III and IV, 
however, we can now state more directly what purposes a reflexive social practice could serve 
for our own specific conception of deliberative-democratic decision-making (as described in 
chapter 5), with its stress on moral-ethical dialogue and deliberation. 
 The first purpose is to reveal the various roles that norms, values, and interests inevitably 
just do play in whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked of the context of, the democratic 
process, recalling now that, as discussed in Section I, the “inquiries” I refer to include, but are 
not limited to: participants’ inquiries into the procedures, virtues, and cultural practices that, in 
the particular context in which they do (have to) act, are most apt to promote the effective 
granting of the ideal opportunities, and the effective assumption of the ideal responsibilities, that 
our normative democratic theory helps them to specify (recall The Presumed Need to Inquire 
into Procedures, Virtues, and Cultural Practices discussed in Section I and again mentioned at 
the beginning of this Conclusion); participants’ inquiries into what could count as mutually 
acceptable and generally accessible reasons for their expressed policy preferences (recall The 
Presumed Need to Inquire into What Could Count as Mutually Acceptable and Generally 
Accessible Reasons); participants’ inquiries into how all relevant persons interpret the actual or 
potential consequences of past, present, and/or proposed actions on the part of “relevant” agents 
and/or agencies and into how all relevant persons interpret how (if at all) those actions bore, 
bear, and/or might bear on their own good or their own respective interests (recall The Presumed 
Need to Inquire into Relevant Persons’ Own Interpretations of Policy Consequences). As we 
have seen, our inquiries are guided by, and so laden with, not just our epistemic values but our 
ethical values too – and, indeed, at the four levels previously discussed. Hence, a reflexive social 
practice can help participants to reveal whatever epistemic and ethical values are at play in all of 
the above types of inquiries and at all of the four levels we have considered (observation, 
description, explanation, and prediction) – and can help them to do so with respect to any other 
inquiries that might also feature in some democratic process.  
The second, closely related purpose of a reflexive social practice is to help participants to 
the democratic process to mitigate, or to compensate for, the various roles that some norms, 
values, and interests do play in whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, the 
democratic process. My analysis has suggested that it is impossible to “purge” values from our 
inquiries (indeed, that it would be self-defeating and counter-productive even to try to do so), but 
nothing I have said should be taken to suggest that there are not good reasons for sometimes 
trying to “purge” some of the “values” (and norms and interests) that are at play in our inquiries, 
either in the sense of helping us to look back at some inquiry and to “pull out” the values that we 
retrospectively think shouldn’t have been there in the first place or in the sense of helping us to 
mitigate, or to compensate for, the values that were at play there by indicating how we might 
better conduct future inquiries. Indeed, our discussion of the generic conception of reflexivity 
was partly intended to indicate why doing so can be useful for any conception of  “informed,” 
“intelligent,” “reasonable,” or “rational” decision-making, including our own conception of 
deliberative-democratic decision-making as presented in chapter 5. To recall, in Section 2.5, for 
instance, we discussed how the general “reflexive disposition and ability” to “turn our mental 
processes back on our own minds” can help participants to identify, and so prospectively 
compensate for, systematic biases in news coverage that can undermine their own ability to 
pursue their own interpretations of their own best interests as a political community. Hence the 
disposition and ability in question can help them to engage in “informed,” “intelligent,” 
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“reasonable,” or “rational” collective decision-making. In Section 2.5, I also briefly indicated 
how participants’ reflexive abilities and dispositions can help them to take account of inquirers’ 
personalities on whatever is being investigated, and so can help participants to reveal what 
norms, values, and/or interests are at play in some particular inquiry. For instance, we considered 
a hypothetical – but not implausible – scenario in which two observers, from different social 
backgrounds (hence with different norms, values, and interests), are literally positioned to, and 
capable of, seeing “all of the same aspects of the same event,” but in fact see “different aspects 
of the same event” (the attack of an army unit on a village). What I would just stress here is that 
participants’ reflexive abilities and dispositions to identify how the observers’ personalities or 
characters (hence norms, values, and/or interests) can not only potentially help them to identify 
the outcome in question but also perhaps to find ways of compensating for it: for example, by 
searching out other witnesses who have different norms, values, and interests, and so for that 
reason perhaps perceived the event in question in a more comprehensive, and so accurate, 
fashion. This could potentially not only help them better to “assign responsibility” for what 
happened; it might help them to get a more accurate sense of (say) how village communities and 
army units interact with one another, and so provide them with information that is relevant to 
future policy-making. If, in this way, participants’ reflexive abilities and dispositions could allow 
them to reveal cultural patterns with respect to how different groups observe and so report (say) 
village-army interactions, the implications for policy-making might be even more noteworthy.  
 The third, closely related purpose of a reflexive social practice is to help participants to 
reveal the (potential or actual) “moral or ethical significance and implications” of whatever 
inquirers say (and do not say) in whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, the 
democratic process. As discussed in Section IV, we seem to have a variety of angles from which 
to argue that anything we say (and do not say) in any of our inquiries could have “moral or 
ethical significance and implications.” A few of these – but, I stress, only a few of these – were 
discussed in that section. Surely there are other angles from which to argue this as well, but four 
were there discussed for illustrative purposes. To clarify this third purpose of a reflexive social 
practice, let me just comment on two of them. 
To repeat, one of these referred to the “necessary selectivity” of our inquiries, a feature 
that is tied to (among other things) our epistemic values. (See section 4.1.) From the simple 
observation that all of our descriptions are necessarily selective about, for instance, what 
information they provide about certain persons’ actions, motives, and intentions, it follows that 
we always could offer a description that “leaves something out” that is of “moral or ethical 
significance” to the audience. Moreover, the fact of the inquirer(s) in question having left some 
such thing out could itself have “moral or ethical implications”: it might mean, for instance, that 
some crime perpetrated by an army official goes unrecognized, contributing, as some “audience 
member” might put it, to “the perpetuation of a legacy of unaccountable state repression of the 
indigenous population.” As we saw, this is so regardless of the intentions of the inquirer(s) in 
question: one might genuinely try to “speak only for epistemic reasons,” as I earlier put it, but 
still leave something out that is of “moral or ethical significance” to the audience, and so say 
something that has “moral or ethical implications” too. Notice, moreover, that the potential 
importance of inquiring into the selective character of any given inquiry becomes still clearer 
when we take note of the obvious fact that inquirers may speak “selectively” (in whatever way 
they do) for a vast range of reasons: perhaps to “save face,” or to “avoid trouble at work,” or “to 
obscure their own responsibility for what happened,” or “to make it easier to rationalize their 
own government’s participation in the crimes in question”; or perhaps because “they aren’t 
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sufficiently sensitive to recognize ‘cruelty’ when they see it,” or because “there’s no direct 
analogue to that kind of behavior in the inquirers’ own culture.” And clearly when we do speak 
for such reasons, what we say (and do not say) could have “moral or ethical significance and 
implications”: perhaps because it “reproduces a history of repression (where, say, the inquirer 
speaks as he does “to make it easier to rationalize his own government’s participation in the 
crimes in question”) or because “it fails to convey how truly ‘cruel’ the action was” (where, say, 
the inquirer speaks as he does because he “isn’t sufficiently sensitive to recognize ‘cruelty’ when 
he sees it”).  
Second, recall that one of the other angles from which I argued that anything we say (and 
do not say) in any of our inquiries could have “moral or ethical significance and implications” 
concerned the claim that “description” always involves “prescription.” To recall, the claim was 
that we cannot explicate a factual claim’s meaning without evincing some position about what 
will and should happen. For, again, in asserting that P is true, one evinces some position about 
what “will and should happen”: if you carry out, for instance, some action A, one will come to 
believe that P is true; and so one should believe that P is true.” Hence, at a minimum, we should 
recognize that in offering the description in question, we are also prescribing some action (or 
cluster of actions) – in the sense that we are at least prescribing that one should believe that P is 
true. I say that this is to “prescribe some action or actions” because, as Peirce says, beliefs are 
habits, and thinking is itself a kind of action, activity, or conduct; hence, to prescribe a belief just 
is to prescribe that one “act in a particular way.” So, to prescribe a believe just is to render an 
“ethical judgment,” where this is understood as a judgment about “how one ought to act.”  
Now, this may seem innocent enough. For even if one accepts that thinking is a kind of 
conduct and even that to assert that “P is true” therefore is to prescribe a certain kind of conduct, 
one still might think that, “from a political perspective,” this kind of “ethical judgment” is an 
innocent one. For beyond asking you to think (and so, in that limited sense, to “act”) in a 
particular way, it does not ask you to act on that belief (in any given way).  
However, this, I think, is too facile a response. For it seems to me to miss the moral or 
ethical import of the argument; it seems to me to miss the whole point of saying that beliefs are 
habits, and the whole point of saying that thinking is a kind of action, activity, or conduct. For, 
on the Peircean view (as I understand it), one doesn’t actually “believe something” unless one is 
prepared to act in this way or that (and not just in the narrow sense in which we might construe 
“thinking” in this way or that). Hence, a suggestion that you ought “to think in a particular way” 
really is a suggestion that you ought “to act in a particular way.” (This is one reason that 
pragmatists reject the dichotomy between “doing” and “cognizing.”) For instance, consider the 
claim: “The government is powerful enough to suppress the rebellion.” Surely this should count 
as a descriptive/factual statement. But just as surely, it should also be understood as prescribing 
that one act in particular ways – that is, insofar as it is not conjoined with other statements that 
override those “prescriptive implications.” To begin with, the statement in question may be said 
to have “prescriptive implications” at least in the minimal sense already indicated: to assert its 
truth is to evince a view about what will happen and what should happen: if you perform some 
action A (say, consult the empirical analysis that I have just read), you will come to believe that 
“the government is powerful enough to suppress the rebellion”; and so you should believe that 
“the government is powerful enough to suppress the rebellion.” However, notice that in ordinary 
language, the statement “the government is powerful enough to suppress the rebellion” will 
typically carry with it certain implications about how one should act in relation to the 
government. For instance, depending on what else precisely is said, it might well carry such 
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prescriptive implications as “Don’t join the rebellion unless you want to die!” or “Don’t join the 
rebellion unless you want to be a martyr!” or “Wait a bit more to see if the government starts to 
weaken!” Furthermore, we typically wouldn’t know what to make of someone who said, “I 
believe that the government is strong enough to repress the rebellion” but saw no need to offer a 
justification when he follows that statement with one like: “I am going to join the rebellion 
anyway.” And one reason for this is that we just do understand statements like the first of these 
two statements as implying further beliefs about how one should act if one does believe what that 
statement claims. In ordinary language, to believe the statement in question just is to have certain 
beliefs about how one should act, given the kinds of language games in which that statement is 
typically employed.  
Of course, such implications can be over-ridden by other considerations: one like, “I 
don’t care if I die in the rebellion; I have a duty to defend my people” or “Be that as it may, I 
want to get revenge on the soldiers who ransacked my town.” In any case, however, the point I 
wish to emphasize with this example is that descriptive statements always have prescriptive 
implications in the first sense explicated; but they typically have prescriptive implications in 
further senses as well. As such, the default assumption should be that anything we say in some 
particular inquiry could have “moral or ethical significance and implications,” since, in one or 
another sense, even our paradigmatic descriptive statements will always have prescriptive 
implications. Accordingly, one way to characterize the third purpose of a reflexive social 
practice is to say that it can help us to reveal that “significance” and to reveal those 
“implications.” Doing so, we should notice, is especially important for our own normative 
democratic theory, which stresses the importance of participants entering into a moral dialogue 
and deliberation with one another. As we have seen, the responsibility they have for doing so 
implies that, ideally speaking, they seek out mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons 
for their expressed policy preferences, which in turn entails that they sincerely try to understand 
relevant social situations and activities from relevant persons’ perspectives. And, ceteris paribus, 
surely they will be better able to assume this responsibility if they try to understand the moral or 
ethical significance of what relevant persons say (and do not say) about those situations and 
activities. Hence my defense of the main claim of this chapter: that the democratic process is best 
conceived of as a form of collective social inquiry, conducted as a “reflexive social practice”: as 
a practice in which participants recognize the potential need to inquire, and, as appropriate, 
actually do inquire, into the (potential or actual) moral or ethical significance and implications of 
whatever is said (and not said) in whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, the 
democratic process. 
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Conclusion: Deliberative Democracy as Reflexive Social Inquiry 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this conclusion, we pursue two main tasks. The first is to provide a brief overview of 
the main arguments that were presented in each of the preceding chapters. Taking these 
arguments together, a certain conception of the democratic process emerges, which I refer to as 
“Deliberative Democracy as Reflexive Social Inquiry.” The second task is then to illustrate what 
the logic of that conception might look like in action, that is, how – in whatever unique, 
problematic context in which they do (have to) act – engaged, situated actors might actually 
reason about how to craft a democratic practice that resembles that conception. Accordingly, the 
chapter is divided in two main parts, corresponding to the two tasks just indicated. 
 
I. Retracing the Main Steps in the Argument 
 
The first chapter was entitled “Problems in/with Normative Democratic Theory.” Here, I 
suggested that one problematic aspect of the literature on normative democratic theory is that 
there is sometimes a tendency to focus either on (ideal) procedures/procedural criteria, or on 
civic virtues, or on cultural practices that would arguably facilitate a more inclusive democratic 
process. And, I noted, this tendency is sometimes apparent in the literature on deliberative 
democracy in particular: indeed, deliberative theorists have sometimes focused either on (ideal) 
deliberative procedures/procedural criteria, or on deliberative/civic virtues, or on cultural 
practices that would arguably facilitate more inclusive deliberative-democratic processes. Thus, 
in a variety of ways, I suggested, discussions of procedures, virtues, and cultural practices have 
proceeded in relative isolation from one another. And yet, reflection on lived experience seems 
to reveal that to think intelligently about how actually to craft a democratic process, it is useful to 
reason about procedures, virtues, and cultural practices “in conjunction.” (This idea was only 
briefly discussed in that chapter; it was developed at greater length in chapter 4 and recurrently 
discussed in subsequent chapters.) So, in chapter 1, I critically discussed one variant of the 
tendency in question at length: the tendency to focus on (ideal) procedures/procedural criteria 
without at the same time explicitly discussing deliberative/civic virtues and cultural practices. As 
we saw, the various kinds of “proceduralism” that often characterize liberal theories can lead to 
precisely this tendency, as we found to be the case with the normative democratic theories of 
Dahl, Habermas, and Cohen, each of whom has described his own theory as offering a 
“deliberative” conception of democracy. A main conclusion that emerged from the discussion 
was that when an author develops and presents his normative democratic theory, it is sometimes 
unclear what, if any, links that author sees between his theory, on the one hand, and empirical 
inquiry on the other. In consequence, the “proper” function of normative democratic theory in 
democratic practice is either unclear or is presented in a way that is less desirable than it 
otherwise might be. (Or both.) Accordingly, I suggested that, in developing a normative 
democratic theory, it is useful to clarify what, if any, links we think our theory has to empirical 
inquiry, and in two broad senses. First, it is valuable to indicate how, if at all, we think that the 
theory emerged out of empirical inquiry. Among other things, this should help to clarify what, if 
any, relationship there is between, on the one hand, the norms and values that the theory 
articulates and, on the other hand, the norms and values that may or may not already exist in this 
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or that particular community. Second, it is valuable to indicate how, if at all, the theory might 
relate to future empirical inquiries. This should help to clarify what, if any, role the theory might 
play in guiding actual democratic practices.  
So, in the next chapter, we began to take up these tasks. Chapter 2 was entitled “Re-
engaging Normative and Empirical Democratic Theory, or, Why ‘Normative’ Democratic 
Theory is ‘Empirical’ All the Way Down.” As we saw in chapter 1, normative democratic 
theory, like other forms of moral or ethical theory, is sometimes conducted without making clear 
references to empirical inquiry. One consequence is that it is not clear how the participants to 
some democratic process might use the theory to improve that process. In part, this is because 
where an author doesn’t make clear references to empirical inquiry, what relation, if any, the 
theory has to lived experience is unclear, and consequently it is unclear how, if at all, 
democracy’s participants might relate the theory to their own existing democratic norms, values, 
and practices. Therefore, in chapter 2 I began to offer a strategy for “re-engaging” so-called 
“normative democratic theory” and so-called “empirical democratic theory,” initiating – though, 
I stress, only “initiating” – the tasks of clarifying where our democratic norms and values come 
from and of indicating how normative democratic theory might actually be used to improve 
democratic practice. I say that I only “initiated” these tasks in chapter 2 because, as indicated 
below, I continued to return to the challenge of addressing them throughout subsequent chapters.  
Briefly, the strategy for re-engagement in chapter 2 looked like this. As the classical 
pragmatists sought to teach us, all reasoning is, in some sense, “practical,” which obviously 
implies that whatever reasoning is involved in “normative democratic theory” is so too. 
Correspondingly, I argued that normative democratic theory is a form of “practical reasoning,” 
and so, like any form of practical reasoning, inevitably just does “involve” empirical inquiry (in 
an extended sense of “involvement” that I specified.1) Indeed, because normative democratic 
theory just is a form of practical reasoning and because practical reasoning inevitably does 
involve empirical inquiry, it follows that normative democratic theory just is an “empirical 
enterprise.” Hence, when we reason about what we think a democratic process should look like – 
that is, when we engage in “normative democratic theory” – we should avoid any sharp 
distinction between “normative” and “empirical” forms of reasoning, just as we should avoid any 
such distinction between “theoretical” and “practical” forms of reasoning.  
The call for a re-engagement of normative and empirical democratic theory consisted, 
then, in two main injunctions – one, so to speak, about how we should “look backward,” the 
other about how we should “look forward.” Looking backward, the injunction was to be aware of 
how our existing democratic norms and values – hence normative democratic theories – have 
been “empirically generated.” By following this first injunction, I suggested, we may enhance 
our ability to articulate, and so interrogate, our existing democratic norms, values, and theories. 
Looking forward, the injunction was to be aware of how our future democratic norms and values 
– hence normative democratic theories – just will be “empirically generated.” By following this 
second injunction, I suggested, we are encouraged to engage in normative democratic theory – to 
                                                            
1 To recall, a person’s reasoning can be said to “involve” empirical inquiry, I said, if it is the case that her ability to 
reason about something is tied to, in some way depends on, her own or others’ empirical inquiries. In chapter 2, I 
also used the term “influenced” in an extended sense: I said that a person’s reasoning is “influenced” by empirical 
inquiries if it is the case that her ability to reason about something is tied to, in some way depends on, her own or 
others’ empirical inquiries. Hence, when I talk of “normative democratic theory” being a form of “practical 
reasoning,” one which inevitably “involves” empirical inquiry or which inevitably is “influenced” by it, I mean that 
our ability to reason about our democratic norms, values, and practices is tied to, in some way depends on, our own 
or others’ empirical inquiries. 
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formulate and re-formulate our future democratic norms and values – in a more self-consciously 
and deliberately “empirical” manner. 
Now, if chapter 2 indicated why it is the case that normative democratic theory just is an 
empirical enterprise, chapter 3 sought to give greater clarify the character of that empirical 
enterprise. The central claim from chapter 2, briefly stated, was that when we actually carry out 
certain tasks that are indispensable to any “reasonable” conception of normative democratic 
theory, we are then engaged in a form of “practical reasoning,” one that inevitably “involves” 
empirical inquiry. So, more specifically, chapter 3, “Practical Reasoning is About a Unique 
Context,” then aimed to give further clarity to the nature of the practical reasoning that is 
involved in that empirical enterprise. In doing so, we arrived at an extended version of “the 
central claim” from chapter 2, just mentioned, which looked like this: When we actually carry 
out certain tasks that are indispensible to any “reasonable” conception of normative democratic 
theory, we are then engaged in a situated form of practical reasoning, one that inevitably 
“involves” empirical inquiry; and this reasoning is always about a unique context, one in which 
our norms and values may come into conflict and in which those norms and values always need 
“contextual interpretation ‘in their application.’” 
Having clarified the nature of the practical reasoning that is inevitably involved in any 
“reasonable” conception of normative democratic theory, we then, in chapter 4 (“Normative 
Democratic Theory as a Tool for Practical Reasoning”), went on to clarify the “proper” status 
and function of normative democratic theory in this “practical reasoning.” As suggested by the 
title, chapter 3 therefore described how normative democratic theory might function as a “tool” 
for practical reasoning, one that can assist democracy’s participants in carrying out two principal 
tasks. First, it can help them to clarify what their own democratic norms and values are. And 
second, it can help them to conduct empirical inquiries that clarify how they might best uphold 
those norms and realize those values.  
To develop these ideas, Section I of chapter 4 discussed John Dewey’s “empirical-
instrumentalist” approach to moral theory, juxtaposing it with two more familiar approaches: the 
“generalist” approach and the “particularist” approach. To recall, the “generalist” approach is to 
articulate moral principles that are purportedly universal in scope and that purportedly “tell us” 
how we are to act in cases of a particular kind. The “particularist” approach, by contrast, rejects 
the idea of moral principles altogether or, at a minimum, holds that, in moral reasoning, there 
need be no attempt to bring such principles to bear on particular situations. Sound moral 
judgment is non-codifiable, and can only be found as one decides particular cases. The chapter 
then suggested that normative democratic theory is a kind of moral theory, and that a Dewey-
inspired approach to it is more appropriate than either a generalist or a particularist one. As we 
saw, Dewey’s empirical-instrumentalist approach recognizes the need for moral principles that 
are broad in scope. It also recognizes, however, that sound moral judgment responds to the 
exigencies of particular situations and is, therefore, non-codifiable. Hence, a Dewey-inspired 
approach to normative democratic theory is sensitive to the need for such theory to balance a 
kind of generalism with a kind of particularism. Section II then illustrated the logic of how 
normative democratic theory, construed in this way, can assist democracy’s participants in 
carrying out the two principal tasks mentioned above: first, clarifying what their own democratic 
norms and values are; and second, helping them to conduct empirical inquiries that illuminate 
how they might best uphold those norms and realize those values.  
Here, let us recall a bit more about the Dewey-inspired approach to normative democratic 
theory that I developed in chapter 4. In addition, let us recall a bit more about why I said that 
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such an approach to normative democratic theory can assist democracy’s participants in carrying 
out the two aforementioned tasks. As we saw in chapter 4, Dewey’s empirical-instrumentalist 
approach to moral theory gives rise to two main injunctions that are relevant for our purposes. 
Very briefly, the first injunction is to develop moral theory out of anthropological-interpretive 
inquiry into moral experience itself. The second injunction is to view such theory as a “tool” for 
practical reasoning about how best to act in unique, problematic situations.  
Following these two injunctions, I characterized my Dewey-inspired approach to 
normative democratic theory (qua one kind of “moral theory”) like this. The first question to ask 
is: What kind of “moral experience” is (or what “aspects of moral experience” are) relevant 
here? Following Dahl, I began by observing that the twin values that arguably justify the 
adoption of a democratic process in the first place are the values of treating persons as “moral 
equals” and as “autonomous.”2 Thus, when I referred to a particular kind of “moral experience,” 
or to particular aspects of “moral experience,” as laying the basis for my theory, these two values 
are what I had in mind: I had in mind those moments in which we are most likely to think and to 
feel that we are being treated as “moral equals” and as “autonomous” in joint or collective 
decision-making. Accordingly, the normative democratic theory I later developed in chapter 5 
(see below) was said to emerge out of anthropological-interpretive inquiry into those moments 
that are paradigmatic of when we are most likely to think and to feel that we are being treated as 
moral equals and as autonomous in joint or collective decision-making, or, in the standard 
terminology, as “free and equal” in such decision-making. In short, the theory was characterized 
as emerging out of inquiry into certain paradigmatic moments of “free and equal treatment” in 
joint or collective decision-making, e.g. in certain such decisions among genuine friends. 
What was my suggestion about what close interpretation of such moments in moral 
experience reveals? First off, I suggested that, at a very general level, our everyday view seems 
to be that people who are (or who we think ought to be regarded as) “free and equal” ought to be 
treated with “equal consideration, concern, and respect.” More specifically, the suggestion was 
that, in the context of a collective decision that is reasonably presumed to affect the good or 
interests of the persons in question, “the process” for making that decision ought to give equal 
consideration to, and ought to show equal concern and respect for, the good or interests of each 
of them. I then suggested that we seem to think that, in those moments in which we are most 
likely to think and to feel that the process is doing this, it is because the participants to that 
process grant certain (equal and adequate) opportunities to one another and because they assume 
certain (corollary negative and positive responsibilities) in relation to one another. 
Correspondingly, I suggested that once we have articulated what these opportunities and 
responsibilities are, we have arrived at a “normative theory of the democratic process.” In this 
way we build up our normative democratic theory out of moral experience itself. And this is the 
sense in which, as I earlier said, my Dewey-inspired approach to normative democratic theory 
“can help participants to clarify what their own democratic norms and values are.” 
Following Dewey (and Nelson Goodman and Hilary Putnam), however, I pointed out that 
any such theory, like any theory at all, ought to be viewed as articulating standards that emerge 
out of our inquiries into how our practices have fared under various circumstances, which we in 
turn use to judge the rightness or wrongness, or adequacy or inadequacy, of the practices out of 
which the standards themselves emerge. Adapting this idea, I suggested that we think of our 
                                                            
2 Dahl (1989: chapters 6 and 7). Also, recall the discussion in chapter 5. As we saw, Dahl (1989) speaks of the Idea 
of Intrinsic in Equality, a phrase I also employed in chapter 5. Throughout this dissertation, however, I also employ 
the term “moral equals” in referring to persons who are regarded as somehow being “intrinsically equal.”  
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normative theory of the democratic process as articulating “ideal procedural criteria,” that is, as 
articulating descriptions of the ideal, defining features of a process for binding, collective 
decision-making process that treats persons as equal and autonomous – or, that treats them in a 
way that is consistent with the twin values that arguably justify the adoption of a “democratic 
process” in the first place: again, the values of treating persons as “moral equals” and as 
“autonomous.” And I suggested that these ideal procedural criteria should “guide” democracy’s 
participants as they move forward into new, problematic situations: that the criteria can and 
should help them to conduct empirical inquiries that illuminate how they might best realize the 
values and uphold the norms that the ideal procedural criteria themselves articulate. 
This brings us to Dewey’s second injunction: that we should view such theory as a “tool” 
for practical reasoning about how best to act in unique, problematic situations – about how best 
to realize the moral (or ethical) goods that are diffused in moral (or ethical) experience. I just 
noted that in chapter 4 my suggestion was that the participants to a democratic process should 
view normative democratic theory in precisely this way. But we should now recall my 
suggestion about why they should do so. Relatedly, we should now recall what reasons I think 
they have for conducting empirical inquiries that illuminate how they might best realize the 
values and uphold the norms that a normative democratic theory itself helps them to articulate. 
As before, my reasoning here appeals to moral experience itself. Close interpretation of 
paradigmatic moments of “free and equal treatment” in joint or collective decision-making 
reveals, I maintained, that participants not only recognize the need to grant certain (equal and 
adequate) opportunities to one another and to assume certain (corollary negative and positive) 
responsibilities in relation to one another; it also reveals that they recognize the need to inquire, 
and that, as appropriate, they actually do inquire, into the procedures, virtues, and cultural 
practices that, in the particular context in which they do (have to) act, are most to promote the 
effective granting of those opportunities and the effective assumption of those responsibilities. 
Furthermore, it reveals that they do not regard their norms and values as “telling them” precisely 
what to do in advance of an assessment of (what they regard as the relevant features of) the 
context in which they do (have to) act. Rather, they regard their own understandings of the 
opportunities and responsibilities in question as simply giving them relatively stable expectations 
about the conditions under which they might be able to give equal consideration to, and to show 
equal concern and respect for, the good or interests of each of them. So, by analogy, my 
suggestion was that democracy’s participants should use normative democratic theory as “tool” 
for practical reasoning, one that helps them to think through what (they reflectively think) their 
democratic norms and values should mean in the particular context in which they do (have to) 
act. And, by analogy, my suggestion was that they should recognize that this entails that there is 
a need to inquire and that, as appropriate, they actually do inquire into the procedures, virtues, 
and cultural practices that, in the particular context in which they do (have to) act, are most apt to 
promote the effective granting of the opportunities that are specified by the ideal procedural 
criteria and that are most apt to promote the effective assumption of the responsibilities that are 
specified (or entailed) by those  criteria. 
Now, having developed this Dewey-inspired approach to normative democratic theory, I 
then, in chapter 5 (“Toward a Normative Theory of the Democratic Process”), developed my 
own normative democratic theory, or as I preferred to call it, my own “normative theory of the 
democratic process.” I did so by critically engaging with Robert Dahl’s theory, as presented in 
Democracy and Its Critics. Let me now reiterate the main points of similarity between our 
respective approaches, which highlight why I chose to engage with his theory in the first place. 
 255 
Along the way, I’ll also highlight how my theory differs from Dahl’s theory, and so how it can 
be read as an improvement on it. (Often, the best way to make progress in theory is to 
differentiate one’s own theory from whatever theory is, in relevant respects at least, the theory 
that is “closest” to one’s own theory. This helps to make it clear how one’s own theory offers an 
improvement on what, in relevant respects at least, is “the best theory” currently on offer.) 
To begin with, Dahl’s theory is based on two major premises (which refer us back to 
what I described above as “the twin values that arguably justify the adoption of a democratic 
process in the first place,” namely, the values of treating persons as “moral equals” and as 
“autonomous”). First, if we regard persons as somehow being “intrinsically equal” (or, as I also 
say, as “moral equals”), it follows that the process by which a political association governs itself 
ought to give “equal consideration” to the good or interests of each of its members. Second, if we 
presume that the adult members of an association are “autonomous” – that they are the best 
judges, promoters, and defenders of their own good or interests – we should assume that they are 
adequately qualified to participate in that process. Based on these premises, Dahl offers four 
“criteria for a democratic process.”3 These are meant as descriptions of the ideal, defining 
features of a process for “binding,” collective decision-making that treats persons as intrinsically 
equal and autonomous. Dahl’s criteria specify the equal and adequate opportunities for 
participation that citizens should ideally have in such a process. The criteria are “standards – 
ideal standards, if you like – against which procedures proposed ought to be evaluated in any 
association to which the assumptions [“justifying a democratic political order” may be said to] 
apply.4 More specifically, the criteria, he says, ought to be used for assessing how well 
alternative procedures furnish citizens with the equal and adequate opportunities that the criteria 
articulate. 
Now, in chapter 5, I suggested that, in qualified form, we should endorse Dahl’s two 
premises, but reconsider the implications of our doing so. First off, I agreed with Dahl that a 
process for “binding,” collective decision-making should treat persons as equal and autonomous. 
However, I proposed an amendment to Dahl’s first premise. Again, Dahl says that if we regard 
persons as somehow being “intrinsically equal,” it follows that the process by which a political 
association governs itself ought to give “equal consideration” to the good or interests of each of 
its members. By contrast, I offered reasons for preferring to say that if we regard persons as 
somehow being “intrinsically equal,” it follows that the process by which a political association 
governs itself ought to give “equal consideration to, and show equal concern and respect for, the 
good or interests of all relevant persons.” The second premise I did not amend: if we presume 
that the adult members of an association are “autonomous” – that they are the best judges, 
                                                            
3 In chapter 8 of Democracy and Its Critics, “A Theory of the Democratic Process,” Dahl does indeed offer four 
“criteria for a democratic process.” Recall, however, that, in the broader presentation of his theory in that book, Dahl 
actually offers five such criteria. (The fifth criterion is offered in chapter 9, “The Problem of Inclusion.”) But the 
fifth criterion concerns the constitution of the demos itself, a matter which I did not take up here, mainly because I 
intend my normative democratic theory as a tool for practical reasoning about how to create a “democratic process” 
in a variety of associations, not just in “the state.” And different such institutions will and should be constituted 
according to different criteria. So, for this reason (and for reasons on scope), I just considered Dahl’s four criteria, 
and set aside the issue of what specific criterion we should invoke regarding “inclusion” in state decision-making in 
particular. 
4 Ibid. 108-9. Again, these assumptions refer to, or are derived from, what Dahl calls the “Idea of Intrinsic Equality” 
and the “Presumption of Personal Autonomy.” See pp. 107-108. Also, on the former notion, see Dahl (1989: chapter 
6); on the latter notion, Dahl (1989: chapter 7). See also my discussion of these assumptions in chapter 5. 
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promoters, and defenders of their own good or interests – we should, indeed, assume that they 
are adequately qualified to participate in that process.5 
Now, moving on to the criteria themselves, I agreed with Dahl that we should think of the 
criteria for a democratic process as “ideal standards” (though I chose to use the terminology 
“ideal procedural criteria” instead.) However, I disagreed with Dahl on two major substantive 
issues with respect to the criteria.  
First, I disagreed on how to characterize the ideal procedural criteria themselves and I 
disagreed on how to characterize their function (that is to say, the function of normative 
democratic theory) in democratic practice. On the first issue, I argued, the ideal procedural 
criteria should specify not only the (equal and adequate) opportunities that the process (and that 
participants) should ideally grant each other; they should also specify the responsibilities that 
participants should ideally assume in relation to one another (and, indeed, those they [ought to] 
represent). Anthropological-interpretive inquiry into paradigmatic moments of “free and equal 
treatment” reveals, I suggested, that persons who view each other as intrinsically equal and 
autonomous recognize that they owe each other justifications for their expressed policy 
preferences. Therefore, the ideal procedural criteria should not just articulate certain (equal and 
adequate) opportunities but also a number of responsibilities related to such justification. In this 
way, we are led from Dahl’s own premises to a deliberative conception of the democratic 
process.  
On the second issue, I argued, the function of normative democratic theory in democratic 
practice should not be what Dahl suggests it should be. Again, Dahl suggests that normative 
democratic theory ought to be used for assessing how well alternative procedures furnish 
citizens or the members of an association with the equal and adequate opportunities that the 
criteria articulate; he mentions no other role for it. By contrast, my view (as already suggested in 
chapter 4) is that the participants to a democratic process ought to use the ideal procedural 
criteria as a tool for inquiring into the procedures, virtues, and cultural practices that, in the 
particular context in which they do (have to) act, are most apt to promote the effective granting 
of the (equal and adequate) opportunities that are specified by those criteria and are most apt to 
promote the effective assumption of the (corollary negative and positive) responsibilities that are 
specified (or entailed) by them. 
Next, in chapter 6 (“Why the Democratic Process Ought to Be Conducted as a Reflexive 
Social Practice”), I returned to, and further elaborated on, the claim that the democratic process 
ought to be conceived of as a form of “collective social inquiry.” As reviewed above, chapter 4 
had already briefly discussed how a normative theory of the democratic process could help to 
guide such inquiry, and it had already discussed how the participants to a democratic process 
have reason to think that they should engage in such inquiry. And, as we just saw, chapter 5 then 
developed the specific normative democratic theory that I think should guide that inquiry. In 
chapter 6, I then returned to the idea that the “democratic process” ought to be conceived of as a 
form of “collective social inquiry,” but now added a qualification to that claim. The revised and 
extended claim was that the democratic process is best conceived of as a form of “collective 
social inquiry,” but one that, more specifically, is conducted as a “reflexive social practice”: as a 
practice in which participants recognize the potential need to inquire, and, as appropriate, 
                                                            
5 I did, however, add the comment that this presumption – The Presumption of Personal Autonomy – should be 
interpreted so as to include the implication that “autonomous persons” should be presumed to be the best judges of 
how the actions of “relevant” agents and agencies bear on their respective goods or interests, a point that we 
returned to in chapter 6. 
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actually do inquire, into the (potential or actual) moral or ethical significance and implications of 
whatever is said (and not said) in whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, 
that process.  
To summarize very quickly, the main motivation for this argument was as follows. There 
is a traditional view of “rational” moral or ethical reasoning that views it as a process that 
consists in two clearly distinct and separable “moments”: a “value-free” and/or “value-neutral” 
one, where we first figure out what our situation is; and (as we might put it) a “value-guided” 
and “value-laden” one, where we then decide how we would should (like to) act in light of that 
situation. The problem with this view, as I described in chapter 6, is that all inquiry is “value-
guided” and “value-laden,” and so there apparently is no form of inquiry that is “value-free” 
and/or “value-neutral.” From this it follows, I argued, that anything we say (and do not say) in 
any of our inquiries could have “moral or ethical significance and implications.” Hence, insofar 
as it is “rational,” the democratic process will not be divided into two stages (as the traditional 
view would have it), one in which participants: first “gather the facts” about relevant 
circumstances, where this process is viewed as one of collecting and/or producing observational, 
descriptive, explanatory, and predictive information, data, and/or knowledge about the facts of 
those circumstances and where this process is viewed as not involving “value judgments”; and 
one in which they subsequently decide together – through some form of collective decision-
making – what (individual or collective) “ends” or “values” they would like to realize, and how 
they would like to do so, given those circumstances. Rather, insofar as it is “rational,” I 
suggested it is sensible to say, the democratic process will be conducted as a “reflexive social 
practice”: again, as a practice in which participants recognize the potential need to inquire, and, 
as appropriate, actually do inquire, into the (potential or actual) moral or ethical significance and 
implications of whatever is said (and not said) in whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in 
the context of, that process. This is not only because the aforementioned “traditional view of 
moral or ethical reasoning” fails on its own terms; it is also because the normative democratic 
theory developed in chapter 5 suggests its own view of “rationality” that is relevant here. 
According to that theory, participants to the democratic process ought ideally to seek out 
mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons for their expressed policy preferences. And 
this entails that they try to understand relevant social situations and activities from relevant 
persons’ perspectives, which in turn entails that they try to understand the moral or ethical 
significance of what is said (and is not said) in relation to those situations and activities in 
whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, the democratic process. (This, I 
suggested, is an aim that the idea of “value-free/neutral” social [-scientific] inquiry can 
undermine.) Hence, a reflexive social practice can help the participants to the democratic process 
to assume certain of the “ideal responsibilities” specified (or entailed) by the normative 
democratic theory developed in chapter 5.  
Now, as I stated at the outset, a certain conception of the democratic process emerges 
from the preceding arguments. To state that conception as succinctly as possible, we might say 
the following. When we take the arguments developed across the preceding chapters together, 
we can then see the reasonableness of a conception of democracy which regards it as a process in 
which, ideally speaking, the free and equal citizens or members of the pertinent association: 
enter into a moral dialogue and deliberation with one another; view that dialogue and 
deliberation as a process of inclusive, collective social inquiry; and conduct that inquiry as what 
I call a “reflexive social practice.” Hence the title of this dissertation: Deliberative Democracy as 
Reflexive Social Inquiry.  
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Let me now provide a more detailed summary statement of that conception, focusing on 
the positive or reconstructive aspects of the preceding arguments. As indicated, I’ll then, in the 
rest of Section II, provide a sketch of how our normative theory of the democratic process might 
play a productive role in that process, assisting engaged, situated actors to reason about how they 
might craft a democratic process that resembles the above conception. 
 
II. Deliberative Democracy as Reflexive Social Inquiry 
 
 As indicated, reasoning about how to craft a democratic process (hereafter “democratic 
practical reasoning”) has the following main features.  
 
2.1 Democratic Practical Reasoning for a Deliberative Democracy 
 
First, democratic practical reasoning begins with the recognition that the task of crafting 
each democratic process is a form of practical reasoning, one that inevitably “involves” empirical 
inquiry and that is always about a unique context, where relevant persons’ norms and values may 
come into conflict and in which those norms and values always need “contextual interpretation 
‘in their application.’”  
Second, democratic practical reasoning appeals to our normative democratic theory as 
kind of “map” that indicates, at least in broad strokes, a good deal of what (we think) would 
ideally occur were the process-to-be-crafted to instantiate the basic values that arguably justify 
the adoption of a democratic process in the first place: the values of treating persons as moral 
equals and as autonomous. More specifically, it appeals to normative democratic theory as a kind 
of “map” that indicates, at least in broad strokes, the (equal and adequate) opportunities that the 
democratic process in question ought ideally to grant the members of the pertinent association 
(and that participants ought ideally to grant one another) and the (corollary) responsibilities that 
participants ought ideally to assume in order for “the process” to give equal consideration to, and 
show equal concern and respect for, the good or interests of relevant persons.  
Third, democratic practical reasoning recognizes that the “ideal procedural criteria” 
articulated by our normative democratic theory need “contextual interpretation ‘in their 
application”; it recognizes that we always need to ask the questions: What might it mean, in this 
particular context, for the process-to-be-crafted to grant the members of the pertinent association 
(and for the participants themselves to grant one another) the equal and adequate opportunities 
specified by our theory (map)? And what, in that context, might it mean for them to assume the 
(corollary negative and positive) responsibilities specified (or entailed) by it?  
Fourth, democratic practical reasoning recognizes that these questions cannot be 
answered through abstract reasoning alone – that addressing these questions requires context-
sensitive (anthropological-interpretive) empirical inquiry. Such inquiry, it recognizes, is both 
backward looking and forward looking. Broadly speaking, the backward-looking inquiry focuses 
on two main issues: first, the origins and histories of our democratic norms, values, practices, 
and so theories themselves; and second, how, if at all, various groups have (allegedly) attempted 
to uphold those norms and to realize those values in practice and how well, if at all, those 
attempts have arguably succeeded. As previously indicated, the main purpose of this backward-
looking inquiry is to articulate, and so interrogate, our existing democratic norms, values, 
practices, and theories, which can help participants to craft a process that more closely 
approximates our ideal procedural criteria in the future. Broadly speaking, the forward-looking 
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inquiry involves inquiry into the unique context in which participants to the democratic-process-
to-be-crafted will (have to) act. This reasoning focuses on three main issues. First, it investigates 
the specific procedural requirements (e.g., formal agenda-setting procedures, voting systems, 
rules for governing policy implementation) might, in the unique context in question, help the 
participants to the democratic process to grant one another the (equal and adequate) opportunities 
specified by our ideal procedural criteria and/or help them to assume the (corollary negative and 
positive) responsibilities that are specified (or entailed) by them. Second, it investigates the 
specific virtues that, in that context, would assist participants in assuming (or that would dispose 
them to assume) those responsibilities, and that participants would necessarily exhibit were they 
to do so. Third, it investigates the cultural practices that, in the unique context in question, can 
arguably promote a social environment that is conducive to the effective granting of such 
opportunities and to the effective assumption of the (positive and negative) responsibilities that 
they should ideally assume. (Each of these types of investigations can obviously benefit from the 
backward-looking inquiries discussed above). As previously indicated, the main purpose of this 
backward-looking inquiry is to encourage participants to formulate and to reformulate their 
present and future democratic norms, values, practices, and theories in a more self-consciously 
and deliberately “empirical manner,” which should help them to act with (what John Dewey 
sometimes called) greater “moral intelligence” in whatever unique, problematic contexts they do 
(have to) act. 
 Finally, democratic practical reasoning recognizes the need to craft a democratic process 
that allows and encourages participants to inquire into the (potential or actual) “moral or ethical 
significance and implications” of whatever is said (and not said) in whatever inquiries are fed 
into, or invoked in the context of, the democratic-process-to-be-crafted.  
 
2.2 Democratic Practical Reasoning in Action: Two Examples to Illustrate the Logic 
 
To illustrate what this construal of democratic practical reasoning might look like in 
practice, we now consider two illustrative examples. Among other things, the examples will 
indicate that when institutional crafters engage in democratic practical reasoning, they will not, 
and need not, necessarily do so in such a way that all of the main features of “democratic 
practical reasoning” outlined above are actually on display. For instance, there may be 
circumstances in which, for instance, there is little need to engage in backward-looking inquiry 
into how various groups have (allegedly) attempted to uphold some norm or to realize some 
value, perhaps because there aren’t cases in which (or there isn’t easily obtainable information 
about cases in which) groups have attempted to uphold some relevant norm or realize some 
relevant value in a comparable or relevant way. Suppose, say, that there are individuals who 
work for some international organization who are interested in crafting, and are empowered (to 
try) to craft, a decision-making process in their organization that provides members with “equal 
and adequate opportunities to place questions on the agenda” when the organization initiates a 
process of rendering a binding decision (as the Criterion of Effective Participation suggests that 
they ideally should have equal and adequate opportunities to do). We can easily imagine that, 
without expending a considerable amount of energy looking for relevant cases to investigate, the 
individuals may not be able to find cases from which to learn lessons. Hence it might make sense 
to give little or no attention to (at least this kind of) backward-looking inquiry here. Instead, they 
might just “spin ideas out of their heads,” as it were. Or (as I generally think would be more 
advisable) they might invest some amount of energy in reviewing and drawing lessons from 
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robust agenda-setting procedures in smaller-scale organizations (cases that would surely be 
easier to encounter), and then “spin ideas out of their heads,” generating ideas about how best to 
scale up and adapt practices that are already employed at smaller scales. In any case, the point is 
that the above list of the main features of “democratic practical reasoning” is meant to be an 
ideal scheme: it is meant to indicate the main features of how institutional crafters would reason 
about how to craft a democratic process that approximates the ideal procedural criteria as closely 
as possible, independent of considerations related to time and other resource constraints. It is 
obviously the case, however, that institutional crafters can’t so reason. But, like other ideal 
schemes and criteria, this one too can generate useful guidelines. 
 
2.2.1 Participatory Public-Opinion Formation and Agenda-Setting (Cum Decision-making) in 
the EU 
 
Now, as our first example, let us suppose that we are European policymakers, interested 
in coming up with a novel way of addressing urgent environmental problems in the European 
Union (EU). We are committed, let us say, to crafting a process for addressing these problems 
that is as “democratic” as possible. We begin with the thought that there is much public 
awareness of a variety of urgent environmental problems (say, carbon emissions; air, water, and 
soil pollution; destruction of biodiversity; and resource-use inefficiency on a large scale), but 
little public agreement on how best to address such problems. Indeed, we begin, let us say, by 
recognizing that the EU-public is deeply divided over how to address these issues. In point of 
fact, let us suppose that available empirical studies of a variety of kinds (public opinion studies, 
focus groups, ethnographic accounts of particular conflicts over the aforementioned urgent 
environmental problems in diverse EU-member-state contexts, and so on) overwhelmingly give 
this impression. This, loosely speaking, is the unique context in which we are to reason about the 
democratic-process-to-be-crafted.  
Suppose we now turn to our ideal procedural criteria for broad guidance about how to 
address these urgent environmental problems in the EU in a democratic fashion, bearing in mind 
the context just briefly outlined. How might we productively invoke the criteria? To begin with, 
suppose we think as follows. The Criterion of Voting Equality at the Decisive Stage indicates 
that  
 
At the decisive stage of collective decisions, each citizen or member must be ensured an 
equal opportunity to express a choice that will be counted as equal in weight to the choice 
expressed by any other citizen or member. In determining outcomes at the decisive stage, 
these choices, and only these choices, must be taken into account. 
 
Furthermore, the Criterion of Final Control of the Agenda says: 
 
The demos must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how matters are to be placed 
on the agenda of matters to be decided by means of the democratic process. 
 
Additionally, the Criterion of Effective Participation says: 
 
Throughout the process of making binding decisions, citizens or members ought to have 
an adequate opportunity, and an equal opportunity: to place questions on the agenda; to 
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express reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another; and to express their 
preferences as to the final outcome. In expressing the reasons for which they endorse one 
outcome rather than another, participants should assume responsibility for seeking out 
mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons for their expressed preferences. 
Hence, before expressing their final choices, each participant should also have an equal 
and adequate opportunity to listen and respond to the reasons offered by each of the other 
participants. In doing so, they should try to understand relevant social situations and 
activities from relevant persons’ perspectives. 
 
Accordingly, we begin, let us suppose, with the idea that a series of referenda might be our best 
option for trying to craft a process that is as “democratic” as possible and that will address the 
type of urgent environmental problems that we mentioned. More specifically, the Criterion of 
Effective Participation and the Criterion of Final Control of the Agenda both suggest, we think, 
that the citizens of EU member states ought to have the opportunity directly to “set the agenda” 
in terms of what environmental problems get addressed through EU-level action (or though EU-
level action in coordination with individual-member-state action) in the first place. (The former 
criterion says, notice, that citizens or members ought to have an “adequate opportunity” and an 
“equal opportunity” “to place questions on the agenda,” while the latter criterion says that the 
demos must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how matters are to be placed on the 
agenda for matters to be decided by means of the democratic process.”) Moreover, the Criterion 
of Effective Participation and the Criterion of Voting Equality both suggest, we also think, that 
the citizens of EU member states ought to have the opportunity directly to vote on specific 
legislation to address the issues that make it onto the agenda. (The former says that citizens or 
members ought to have an “adequate opportunity” and an “equal opportunity” to “express their 
preferences as to the final outcome,” while the latter says that that, “at the decisive stage, each 
citizen or member must be ensured an equal opportunity to express a choice that will be counted 
as equal in weight to the choice expressed by any other citizen or member.”) Hence, a series of 
referenda might indeed be our best option for trying to craft a process that is as “democratic” as 
possible and that will address the type of urgent environmental problems that we mentioned. 
Yet, well before we enter into the details of how we might go about conceptualizing these 
referenda and the details of their actual implementation, we come to think that, in the unique 
context in which we are to enact the democratic process in question, this line of reasoning is 
perhaps too literal and instrumental than is advisable. For instance, it seems to interpret the idea 
of “equal and adequate opportunities to place questions on the agenda” more literally than is 
perhaps advisable for a geographic setting as expansive as the EU. Relatedly, it seems to 
interpret the envisioned referenda (perhaps rightly) as the most direct instruments for granting 
citizens those opportunities, but perhaps at the expense of a adopting a more nuanced strategy 
that would arguably bring us closer to the effective granting of various “ideal procedural 
opportunities” and that would arguably allow the process better to promote the assumption of 
various “ideal procedural responsibilities.”6 For instance, the Criterion of Effective Participation 
not only says that citizens or members ought to have an “adequate opportunity” and an “equal 
opportunity” to “place questions on the agenda”; it also says (inter alia) that they ought to have 
an “adequate opportunity” and an “equal opportunity” “to express reasons for endorsing one 
outcome rather than another.” And, based on the existing research on the use of referenda in 
                                                            
6 These terms refer, respectively, to the equal and adequate opportunities that our ideal procedural criteria specify 
and to the responsibilities that they specify. 
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various settings, there is some reason to be skeptical that the referenda we have begun to 
envision would bring us closer to the ideal of giving EU citizens equal and adequate 
opportunities “to express reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.” Furthermore, 
the Criterion of Effective Participation also says that “participants should assume responsibility 
for seeking out mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons for their expressed 
preferences” and that, in seeking out such reasons, they should “try to understand relevant social 
situations and activities from relevant person’s perspectives.” And again, based on the existing 
research, there is some reason to be skeptical that the referenda that we have begun to envision 
would bring us closer to a situation in which participants (can even try to) assume these 
responsibilities. So, it’s back to the drawing board, we conclude. 
Now, at this point, we realize that we should think more about the context in which we 
are going to craft the democratic process in question and that we should think more about what 
existing empirical inquiries might tell us about how best to respond to that context. Here we step 
back and ask: What, if any, existing or previously existing practices might conceivably allow us 
better to approximate the granting of the aforementioned equal and adequate opportunities and 
might conceivably allow us to craft a process that encourages participants to assume the 
aforementioned responsibilities better than they otherwise would have done had they (say) not 
participated at all or had we (say) just implemented the aforementioned referenda and had they 
(say) just voted in them?  
First off, we come across academic research on what have been called “mini-publics,” 
fora that convene a segment of the population in self-consciously organized public 
deliberations. 7 These include 21st Century Town Meetings, consensus conferences, and 
deliberative polls.8 Here, we notice, the scale of participation ranges from a dozen citizens to 
several thousand, and we begin to think that there might be a way of employing mini-publics in 
our democratic-process-to-be-crafted – that doing so might both allow us better to approximate 
the granting of the aforementioned equal and adequate opportunities and allow us to craft a 
process that encourages participants to assume the aforementioned responsibilities better than 
they otherwise would have, had they (say) not participated at all or had we (say) just 
implemented the aforementioned referenda and had they (say) just voted in them. Before 
thinking through this possibility in greater detail, however, we should probably think more about 
how the context for our democratic-process-to-be-crafted might pose certain challenges to the 
participants being able or disposed to assume the responsibilities in question. If mini-publics 
might be used, for instance, to gather thousands of individuals in public dialogues and 
deliberations throughout the EU, thereby giving many more citizens the opportunity to “place 
questions on the agenda” and “to express reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than 
another,” how might they allow us better to craft a process that encourages participants to 
assume responsibility for “seeking out mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons for 
their expressed preferences” and for “trying to understand relevant social situations and activities 
from relevant other’s perspectives”? 
Well, we began with the assessment that the EU public is deeply divided over how to 
address such urgent environmental problems as, say: carbon emissions; air, water, and soil 
pollution; the destruction of biodiversity; and resource-use inefficiency on a large scale. And so 
we now puzzle over the question: Why is the public so divided? Very likely, there are, we 
recognize, multiple explanations for this state of affairs. But, whatever these are, we think it is 
                                                            
7 See Fung (2003).  
8 Bevir and Bowman (2011). 
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clear that we are dealing here with, inter alia, deep religious, spiritual, and philosophical 
differences – differences, let us simply say, in “deep-seated ideologies.” These different 
ideologies provide varying, sometimes even contradictory, perspectives from which to view our 
place in the universe, how we should relate to other animals and other living beings, what duties, 
if any, we humans have to “care” for our natural surroundings, and so on. Suppose, however, that 
we come to believe that while some of the disagreement is connected to these deep-seated 
ideological differences, the bulk of the disagreement about how to address urgent environmental 
problems that are expressed in relevant public arenas proceeds within certain “narrow” 
parameters and so against the background of certain (typically tacit) premises, which only a 
minority of environmentalist and ecologists challenge. What might these features of our unique 
context imply about the assumption of the ideal responsibilities in question, we now ask? 
Let us look closer at what is involved here. After closely reviewing relevant scholarship, 
we come to believe that we are dealing here with a case of a “hegemonic discourse,” which we 
follow Iris Marion Young in understanding in this way.  
 
By a “discourse,” I mean a system of stories and expert knowledge diffused through the 
society, which convey the widely accepted generalizations about how the society operates 
that are theorized in these terms, as well as the social norms and cultural values to which 
most of the people appeal when discussing their social and political problems and 
proposed solutions. In a society with longstanding and multiple structural inequalities, 
some such discourses are, in the terms derived from Gramsci, “hegemonic”: most of the 
people in the society think about their social relations in these terms, whatever their 
location in the structural inequalities…. When such hegemonic discourse operates, parties 
to deliberation may agree on premises, they may accept a theory of their situation and 
give reasons for proposals that the others accept, but yet the premises and terms of the 
account mask the reproduction of power and injustice.9 
 
Furthermore, we follow Young in observing that hegemonic discourses sometimes operate in 
debates on the future of environmental policy in particular: 
 
International debates about greenhouse gas emissions [for instance]…contain fierce 
disagreement about whether and how such emissions should be reduced, and how the 
burdens or reductions should be distributed across the globe. Should richer, more 
advanced industrial states be required to reduce emissions in greater proportion to less 
developed countries? Are markets in pollution rights useful policy tools? Should 
governments subsidize “green” technologies for industrial production and private 
transportation? These debates take place within terms of discussion that only 
marginalized environmentalists question. The discussions assume that the economies of 
any developed society must rely on the burning of fossil fuels, and that a high standard of 
living involves airconditioned buildings and lots of consumer goods, including a private 
automobile for every household. The social imaginaries of both “developed” and “less 
developed” countries have few ideas for alternative forms of living that would not 
produce large carbon emissions.10 
  
                                                            
9 Young (2001: 685). 
10 Young (2001: 687). 
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In short, our democratic-process-to-be-crafted, we conclude, is going to take place in 
something very much like the ideological context that Young describes here. Thus, invoking the 
Criterion of Effective Participation, we notice that participants therefore have the responsibility 
to try to understand (among other things) the marginalized environmentalists’ perspectives, 
including why many of them think that the usual debates over the future of environmental policy 
in the EU are (let us say) “limited,” “ideologically restricted,” even “irrational,” since the bulk of 
the proposed solutions are cast in terms that reproduce the “hegemonic discourse.” More 
specifically, we notice that many of the marginalized environmentalists think that the assumption 
that “development,” if it is to be successful, must rely on the burning of fossil fuels is a 
“limited,” “ideologically restricted” notion of “development,” one that, for instance, sets up as a 
model for all groups and nations to follow the historically specific experience of early 
industrializers. It ignores, or, as the case may be, tacitly denigrates, other conceptions of 
“development,” “productive resource use,” “rational resource allocations,” and so on. 
Correspondingly, we come to realize that many of them think (with Ernst Schumacher, for 
instance) that the way in which a “high standard of living” is conceived is mistaken, even 
“irrational,” and that they prefer to think in the alternative concepts of “Buddhist economics.” 
They are not “mainly interested in goods,” but rather in “liberation.”11 Hence, many of them 
agree with Schumacher’s observation that “the modern economist”  
 
is used to measuring the ‘standard of living’ by the amount of annual consumption, 
assuming all the time that a man [sic] who consumes more is ‘better off’ than a man who 
consumes less. A Buddhist economist would consider this approach excessively 
irrational: since consumption is merely a means to human well-being, the aim should be 
to obtain the maximum of well-being with the minimum of consumption. Thus, if the 
purpose of clothing is a certain amount of temperature comfort and an attractive 
appearance, the task is to obtain this purpose with the smallest possible effort, that is, 
with the smallest annual destruction of cloth and with the help of designs that involve the 
smallest possible input of toil…. The ownership and the consumption of goods is a means 
to an end, and Buddhist economics is the systematic study of how to attain ends with the 
minimum means.12 
 
Furthermore, many of them agree, we notice, with the Buddhist economist that another source of 
“irrationality” conveyed by many of the (implicit or explicit) subscribers to the “hegemonic 
discourse” in question is that they follow “modern economics” in not distinguishing between 
“renewable and non-renewable materials.” Its very method, many of our marginalized 
environmentalists observe, 
 
is to equalise and quantify everything by means of a money price. Thus, taking various 
alternative fuels, like coal, oil, wood, or water-power: the only difference between them 
recognised by modern economics is relative cost per equivalent unit. The cheapest is 
automatically the one to be preferred, and to do otherwise would be irrational and 
‘uneconomic’. From a Buddhist point of view, of course this will not do; the essential 
difference between non-renewable fuels like coal and oil on the one hand and renewable 
fuels like wood and water-power on the other cannot be simply overlooked. Non-
                                                            
11 Schumacher (2005: 335). 
12 Ibid. 335-36. 
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renewable goods must be used only if they are indispensable, and then only with the 
greatest care and the most meticulous concern for conservation. To use them heedlessly 
or extravagantly is an act of violence, and while complete non-violence may not be 
attainable on this earth, there is nonetheless an ineluctable duty on man [sic] to aim at 
the ideal of non-violence in all he does.13 
 
Hence, we notice that to assume the responsibilities in question – to seek out mutually 
acceptable and generally accessible reasons for their expressed policy preferences and to make a 
sincere effort to understand relevant social situations and activities from relevant persons’ 
perspectives – part of the task would be for those who (explicitly or implicitly) subscribe to the 
basic tenants of the “hegemonic discourse” in question to try to understand why the very terms of 
the debate strike our marginalized environmentalists as “limited,” “ideologically restricted,” even 
“irrational.”  
Now, at this point we notice that, in thinking about what is involved in the assumption of 
these ideal procedural responsibilities, it is useful to think about what “virtues” would arguably 
assist the participants in assuming (or that would arguably dispose them to assume) them, and 
that they would necessarily assume were they to assume them. Thinking through – and naming 
these – virtues can help us to give content to the claim that participants ought to assume this or 
that “more specific responsibility” in this or that context. This, in turn, can help us to reason 
through what, if any, cultural practices might arguably assist the participants in assuming (or 
dispose them to assume) the responsibilities in question. 
We now think, for instance, about what it would mean for a member of the group that 
(implicitly or explicitly) subscribes to the basic tenants of the “hegemonic discourse” in question 
to try to understand why the very terms of the debate strike our marginalized environmentalists 
as “limited, “ideologically restricted,” even “irrational.” And we notice that this effort might well 
involve a great deal of searching self-scrutiny: “Why do I (tacitly) accept the notion that a 
society with a higher GDP is, ipso facto, a more ‘developed’ society? Why do I presume that a 
higher GDP is positively associated with greater well-being and that greater consumption is so 
too? Would my life indeed be more ‘fulfilling’ if I were ‘less attached to material goods,’ and if I 
were, as my Buddhist (-inspired) interlocutor is trying to impress upon me, more concerned with 
‘liberation’? Is it, indeed, ‘irrational’ to equalize and quantify everything by means of a money 
price, regardless of whether the resource in question is renewable or non-renewable? And is it, 
indeed, ‘an act of violence’ to use a non-renewable resource in a ‘heedless’ or ‘extravagant’ 
fashion?”  
To genuinely take up the task of asking oneself such questions is, we therefore notice, 
surely to exhibit a variety of virtues. For instance, assuming one’s starting point is an explicit or 
implicit subscription to the basic tenants of the “hegemonic discourse” in question, one is surely 
to exhibit some degree of patience and open-mindedness in opening oneself up to the possibility 
of radically revising one’s views in light of the perspectives offered by our marginalized 
environmentalists here. For persons in the former group genuinely to consider the possibility, for 
instance, that their very conception of “rational” resource use is in fact “irrational,” or that some 
of their routine activities (like “filling up” at the local gas station) are in fact “acts of violence,” 
or that their very notions of “development” and “well-being” are deeply misguided is surely for 
those persons to exhibit a considerable amount of open-mindedness, at least while they do so. 
Likewise, particularly in light of the amount and kind of factual evidence that would be needed 
                                                            
13 Ibid. 337. 
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to alter one’s opinions in these matters, such persons are surely likely to exhibit a good deal of 
patience as well. Furthermore, to open oneself up to the possibility of radically revising one’s 
views in light of perspectives that are not only radically different from but also, to a considerable 
degree, hostile to one’s own views and actual life practices is to exhibit a good deal of 
charitableness as well. Finally, to come to recognize, for instance, that one’s way of comparing 
the relative “costs” of alternative resources (e.g. renewable versus non-renewable ones) 
presupposes a set of value judgments beyond those that one had previously recognized is, at least 
in that instance, to come to exhibit a greater degree of self-awareness in certain respects.  
 Thinking through these virtues, we then consider what, if any, cultural practices would 
arguably assist the participants in assuming the responsibilities in question and in cultivating the 
virtues in question, were they somehow incorporated into the democratic-process-to-be-crafted. 
We begin with the observation that no procedural requirement (or cluster of procedural 
requirements) can ensure that participants assume those responsibilities, hence ensure that 
participants do exhibit such virtues as they necessarily would exhibit were they to assume them. 
And neither can any procedural requirement (or cluster of such requirements) ensure the 
cultivation of such virtues as would arguably assist participants in assuming (or dispose them to 
assume) them in the first place. This is precisely why is it useful to consider what, if any, cultural 
practices would arguably assist the participants in assuming the responsibility or responsibilities 
in question and in cultivating the virtues in question, were those practices somehow incorporated 
into the democratic-process-to-be-crafted.   
 So, aware of the usefulness of reasoning through procedures, virtues, and cultural 
practices in conjunction, we then reason about the democratic-process-to-be-crafted itself. 
We want to craft a deliberative, dialogical process for how to address urgent 
environmental problems, where this is understood to imply that participants assume 
responsibility for, inter alia, searching out mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons 
for their expressed policy preferences, hence for trying to understand relevant social situations 
and activities from relevant persons’ perspectives. (Here we recall that the Criterion of Effective 
Participation and the Criterion of Enlightened Understanding both specify these “ideal 
procedural responsibilities.”) Hence, for the reasons previously indicated, the “ideal 
expectation,” so to speak, is that participants exhibit certain corollary virtues, for instance the 
virtue of “open-mindedness,” and we have reason to want the democratic process itself to 
cultivate those virtues. But, we recognize, no procedural requirement (e.g. that each participant 
to whatever specific deliberations occur in this process is permitted to place an item on the 
agenda for discussion) can guarantee that deliberation will be “reasoned,” and, taken by 
themselves, some procedural requirements arguably won’t even make it plausible that this is so. 
Perhaps, however, there are practices that can be found in many (or all of) the diverse cultures 
from which participants will come – that can be found in the EU member states – that would 
arguably assist the participants in assuming (or dispose them to assume) the responsibility in 
question (and perhaps other responsibilities), and so to exhibit certain corollary virtues (e.g. 
open-mindedness, patience, charitableness, and self-awareness).  
One thing that comes to mind is the practice of storytelling. Indeed, there is evidence 
from a range of country contexts that beginning a discussion with storytelling can be an apt way 
to promote openness to subsequent deliberation involving explicit reason-giving and proposal-
making; it can provide one plausible way for perspectives and proposals that would otherwise 
not get a (sympathetic) hearing to get one.14 So, to make the process as “reasoned” as possible 
                                                            
14 Steiner (2012) and Polletta and Lee (2006).  
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and to deal with certain problems that might impede it from being so (for instance, “hegemonic 
discourses” in the area of environmental-ecological problems and proposals), let us try to build a 
“chain of stories” into the process. The overarching purpose is to generate proposals for action to 
address urgent environmental-ecological problems, proposals which will be submitted to policy-
makers in each of the respective states as well as at the EU-level. The idea is to formulate 
proposals for action at the EU-level that include descriptions of how these policies will bear on, 
and can be supported by, environmental governance policies in each of the member states. The 
process, in short, will be an extended exercise in participatory public-opinion formation and 
agenda-setting.  
In crafting the process, it doesn’t make much sense to start from scratch, we observe. 
Why don’t we take inspiration from existing practices that have broadly similar aims and that 
have had some success in pursuing them? Take, again, what we earlier referred to as “mini-
publics,” forums that convene a small segment of the population (between about a dozen 
individuals and several thousand) in self-consciously organized public dialogues and 
deliberations.15 Again, three examples are 21st Century Town Meetings, consensus conferences, 
and deliberative polls.16 Borrowing specific practices from each of these types of mini-public, we 
can envision a process that would arguably move us closer to the goal of providing equal and 
adequate opportunities for citizens to “place questions on the agenda” and for citizens to 
“express reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.” 
In each region or province of each EU member state, we’ll convene an initial forum for 
residents of that region or province. As with 21st Century Town Meetings (THMs), each of these 
might involve the participation of approximately 3,000 individuals. To select participants, we 
might follow the method sometimes used in deliberative polling. First, a warm-up letter will be 
sent to a random sample of phone listings and then a follow-up call will be made. Using this 
method, we are likely to generate a participant pool that is demographically representative of the 
larger target population. At the event itself, each participant will spend the day at a table 
composed of 10 to 12 demographically diverse individuals. A trained facilitator will help the 
table to deliberate the relevant issue. The facilitators will be trained to remain neutral, not to 
impart information, to support broad participation, and to refrain from promoting consensus 
among the participants. There will be no restriction on what participants can say or on the kind of 
speech they can use. Participants will not be instructed to refrain from storytelling or to rely 
exclusively on arguments. They will also not be asked to restrict their speech to appeals to the 
common good.  
Before the event, participants will be sent background materials that will provide an array 
of information and perspectives on the issues in question. At the event itself, the participants will 
begin with a broad dialogue about visions and values in order to clarify what is important to 
them about the relevant issue. Here, they will be encouraged to tell whatever stories and personal 
anecdotes they think might convey information and experiences relevant to the issue of 
environmental governance (broadly conceived) and to their own personal visions and values in 
this area. The participants will then spend four to five hours discussing whatever key issues and 
initial policy options emerge out of the initial free-floating discussion about visions and values.  
At each table, a volunteer will record the main points of the discussion on a laptop 
computer. The computers will be networked together. A “theme team” will thus be able to read 
                                                            
15 Fung (2003). 
16 On 21st Century Town Meetings, see Lukensmeyer et al. (2005) and Fung (2003). On consensus conferences, see 
Hendriks (2005). On deliberative polling, see Fishkin and Farrar (2005) and Fishkin (2009).  
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participants’ comments from every table in real time and to distill these comments into key 
messages or themes. The key messages and themes will then be presented back to the whole 
room. The facilitators will solicit rapid reactions, collect demographic surveys, and conduct 
straw polls throughout the meeting. Each participant will have a polling keypad with which to 
respond to the facilitators. Issue experts will also be available to answer specific questions that 
might arise at the tables. The organizers will attempt to provide balance in selecting the experts, 
just as they will do so in training the facilitators and preparing the initial briefing materials. A 
vote will be held at the end of the day to determine (say) the two most popular proposals for 
action at the EU level.  
These proposals will be fed into a national Town Meeting in each of the 28 member 
states, run using the same format as the initial regional/provincial forums. Instead of meeting just 
once, however, participants will meet over three weekends. Over those weekends, participants at 
each of these events (perhaps between 50 and 75 participants at each, yielding a total of between 
1,400 and 2,100 people) will work to generate (say) 2 proposals for action at the EU level, 
starting from the proposals drawn from the earlier regional/ provincial events.  
Then, in each EU member-state, a smaller mini-public, modeled on the Danish 
Consensus Conference, will be held to wither down the number of proposals generated by each 
country’s respective regional or provincial forums, combining similar proposals that were 
generated at that level and perhaps discarding some proposals that no longer seem actionable or 
desirable. Here, the forum will run roughly as follows. 10 to 12 citizens will come together for 
eight days of deliberation over a period of roughly two months. The participants will attempt to 
translate the regional/provincial proposals into (say) two actionable policy recommendations. 
The organizers will use stratified random sampling to match the participants to the desired 
characteristics of the larger population. The meetings will involve two stages.  
The first stage will consist of two preparatory weekends in which the participants 
convene to learn about one another, the subject, and the process. Based on the 
regional/provincial proposals, the participants will here develop a series of questions that the 
conference will discuss. As before, participants will begin with a broad dialogue about visions 
and values in order to clarify what is important to them about the relevant issue. Subsequently, 
they will choose people to make presentations to the conference from a list of potential interest 
group representatives and experts. The second stage will be a four-day conference. The first two 
days will consist in a plenary session at which the presenters respond to the questions set for the 
conference. Throughout these days, the citizens’ panel will occasionally retreat into closed 
sessions to articulate further questions for the presenters and to clarify points of contention or 
misunderstanding. In the final two days, the participants will collaborate on writing a report that 
outlines their (say) two main policy recommendations, elaborating on how to make them as 
actionable as possible. They will then present the report to the experts and interest-group 
representatives who had earlier presented, alongside national policymakers, the media, and 
interested members of the public who will have assembled to receive the report. The expert and 
interest-group presenters will then be given the opportunity to reply, and the citizens’ panel will 
then be free to revise their report.  
The organizers will include professionally trained facilitators throughout the process, but 
these facilitators, like the citizen-participants, will not be experts on the relevant topic. An 
external advisory body will oversee the whole process. This body will maintain the integrity of 
the procedure, compile the list of presenters, develop the briefing materials, manage contact with 
the media and the public, and select the facilitators and participants. As with the 
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regional/provincial and national THMs, the organizers will attempt to provide balance 
throughout, including when they compile the list of potential expert and interest-group 
presenters. The external advisory body will generally include academics, practitioners of public 
participation, and a diverse group of experts on environmental-ecologic issues and problems. 
The next stage will be a transnational THM, which will employ the same format as the 
regional/provincial and national THMs.17 Here the aim will be to generate (say) 15 proposals for 
action at the EU level, based on the (say) two detailed, actionable proposals that each of the 28 
national consensus conferences generated. The transnational THM will involve (say) 350-400 
participants drawn from all 28 member states, and will have simultaneous translations in some 
22 languages. Again, they will combine proposals that are similar to one another, and from there 
generate (say) 15 proposals for action at the EU level.  
The participants in the previously held national THMs in the each of the member states 
will then have the opportunity to vote on the 15 policy proposals: they will have the opportunity 
to rank the proposals in order of priority and also to register an overall approval or disapproval of 
each proposal. A randomly selected group of the participants from the transnational THM (say, 
100) will then travel to Brussels to submit the recommendations and the vote tallies to EU-level 
policymakers and to discuss them.  
 Now, as presented, the above process has been conceived of as way of creating what we 
might call “participatory public-opinion formation” and “participatory agenda-setting.” It is not 
hard to envisage, however, various ways in which something very much like the above process 
might morph into a form of “participatory decision-making.” Suppose, for instance, that after 
running this process a first time – conducting it as a pilot project, if you like – we then decide 
that we would like to make greater progress toward granting a third equal and adequate 
opportunity specified by the Criterion of Effective Participation: the equal and adequate 
opportunity to express one’s preferences as to the final outcome. The process, we have judged, 
did help the EU move toward a state of affairs in which EU citizens have equal and adequate 
opportunities “to place questions on the agenda” and “to express reasons for endorsing one 
outcome rather than another”; and it also helped the EU move toward a state of affairs in which 
the participants to “the democratic process” in the EU assume responsibility for “seeking out 
mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons for their expressed policy preferences” and 
for “trying to understand relevant social situations and activities from relevant persons’ 
perspectives.” We are far from fully achieving these outcomes (Is that even possible? How could 
we know?); but given the research we have conducted on the process as it was implemented and 
as citizens engaged in it, we think that, relative to the status quo ex ante, we have made 
improvements on these dimensions of the Criterion of Effective Participation. But we want to 
make progress on granting EU citizens equal and adequate opportunities to “express their 
preferences as to the final outcome,” as the Criterion of Effective Participation also asks us to do. 
Likewise, we want to make progress on better approximating the goal set out by the Criterion of 
Voting Equality at the Decisive Stage, which again says: 
 
At the decisive stage of collective decisions, each citizen or member must be ensured an 
equal opportunity to express a choice that will be counted as equal in weight to the choice 
                                                            
17 The inspiration here comes from two sources: the first international deliberative poll as described by Fishkin 
(2009) and the European Citizens’ Consultations as presented here: See http://www.european-citizens-
consultations.eu/ (last accessed on April 14, 2010). 
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expressed by any other citizen or member. In determining outcomes at the decisive stage, 
these choices, and only these choices, must be taken into account. 
 
Furthermore, we want to make greater progress on meeting the Criterion of Final Control of the 
Agenda by the Demos, which again says: 
 
The demos must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how matters are to be placed 
on the agenda of matters to be decided by means of the democratic process. 
  
So, instead of sending a randomly selected group of the participants from the 
transnational THM to Brussels just to discuss the 15 proposals for action at the EU-level with EU 
policymakers, suppose we instead did the following. As indicated, the last time we ran this 
process the participants to the national THMs in each of the member states had the opportunity to 
vote on the final 15 policy proposals generated by the international THM: they had the 
opportunity to rank the 15 proposals in order of priority and to register an overall approval or 
disapproval of each proposal. This time, instead of just having a randomly selected group of the 
participants from the transnational THM bring these 15 proposals and these two vote tallies to 
Brussels to discuss them, we’ll instead submit 5 of these 15 proposals to a public referendum.  
Very quickly, here’s how we’ll choose the 5. Any proposal for which a simple majority 
of participants from the national THMs voted “No” will not be included in the referendum. Let 
us say that 8 of the original 15 proposals receive a simple majority of “Yes” votes. We’ll then 
use the rank-order priority votes to weigh the remaining 8 proposals, generating a list that 
indicates which is the most popular proposal, the second most popular proposal, the third most 
popular proposal, and so on, all the way down to the eighth most popular proposal. The five most 
popular proposals will then be included in the public referendum, which will allow the general 
public to approve or disapprove of each of the five proposals. 
Arguably, this process would allow us to make greater progress on meeting the Criterion 
of Effective Participation and the Criterion of Final Control of the Agenda by the Demos.  
 
2.2.1 Participatory Public-Opinion Formation and Agenda-Setting in U.S. Foreign Policy 
Debates 
  
 For our second illustrative example, suppose we are a small group of legislators (say 
there are 10 of us) in the United States Congress. Above all, what brings us together is a 
commitment to creating a more “democratic process” for formulating US foreign policy. More 
specifically, we would like to contribute to the emergence of a more open, deliberative, and 
dialogical way of formulating US foreign policy than we think currently exists in Congress. We 
are particularly interested in the question of US interventionism abroad. Broadly speaking, we 
think that, too often, Congress “debates” foreign policy in such a way that those with highly 
critical perspectives on US foreign interventions do not get a fair hearing – indeed, quite often, 
are not heard at all. We also think that, on the whole, the way in which foreign policy is 
“debated” in the American media is inadequate, that it leaves the public woefully uninformed 
about the motives, character, and consequences of US interventionism. Ideally, we would like to 
see Congress itself change, so that Congresspersons are more capable of, and interested in, 
engaging in an open, deliberative, and dialogical way of formulating US foreign policy, one 
which takes account of how US foreign policy significantly affects various constituencies 
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throughout the world. Relatedly, we share the longer-term hope of making it so that Congress is 
much less likely to support US military interventions abroad. But, recognizing the truly 
ambitious nature of these aims, we start with the thought that we might simply help to create 
venues for discussing and debating US foreign policy-making that run parallel to formal 
Congressional proceedings.  
Again, broadly speaking, our thinking is that given that we are a very small group of 
legislators; that our resources are limited; that there are deeply entrenched interests in Congress 
that would move to block a more open and transparent dialogue about the motives for, and the 
character and consequences of, US interventions abroad; and that formal-legal changes to how 
Congress itself operates are not only very unlikely to occur in the short-term but also unlikely to 
address the main sources of US interventionism abroad, we therefore believe that our energies 
are initially best spent in helping to facilitate the creation of venues for open, deliberative, and 
dialogical engagements on US interventionism in the informal public sphere outside the state. 
Broadly speaking, our hope in the short run is that these engagements might simply make US 
public opinion regarding US military interventions abroad more informed. In the long run, our 
hope is to bring informed opinion to bear on the actual exercise of public power in this area – to 
bring the public into decision-making about (potential or proposed) US interventions abroad in a 
more meaningful and democratic way. And we think that one way to make a step toward that 
latter aim is to craft a process for participatory public-opinion formation “outside the state,” 
which might subsequently be “brought into the state.” (Even then, we recognize, such a process 
might also continue to exist “outside of the state” and run parallel to a participatory public-
opinion formation process that is somehow “conducted through the state.” We might, then, think 
of the parallel process as a kind of “shadow” public-opinion formation process.)  
 Very broadly speaking, this is our own understanding of our project and of the unique 
context in which we hope to pursue it. (We’ll fill in more details as we proceed.) So, we now 
start to think about the democratic-process-to-be-crafted. What guidance might our ideal 
procedural criteria provide us here? Well, first off, we notice that the Criterion of Enlightened 
Understanding is relevant for assessing our initial project of making US public opinion regarding 
(potential or proposed) military interventions “more informed.” The criterion says, we recall, that 
 
Each citizen or member ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for discovering 
and validating (within the time permitted by the need for a decision) the choice on the 
matter to be decided that would best serve the citizen’s or member’s good or interests. In 
considering that choice, each participant should have an equal and adequate opportunity 
to offer his or her reasons for preferring one outcome to another, and to listen and 
respond to the reasons offered by each of the other participants. In doing so, participants 
should assume responsibility for seeking out mutually acceptable and generally 
accessible reasons for their expressed preferences, hence for trying to understand relevant 
social situations and activities from relevant persons’ perspectives. 
 
We then note that while not all aspects of this criterion are entirely familiar from common, 
everyday “American” understandings of “democracy” at the national level, the idea that “each 
citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for discovering and validating (within the 
time permitted by the need for a decision) the choice on the matter to be decided that would best 
serve the citizen’s good or interests” can easily be related to a viewpoint that is familiar: the 
viewpoint that, in Dahl’s words, democracy should be “conceived as a system in which ‘rule by 
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the people’ makes it more likely that the ‘people’ will get what it wants, or what it believes is 
best, than alternative systems like guardianship in which an elite determines what is best.”18 And 
“to know what it wants, or what is best, the people must be enlightened [or, for our immediate 
purposes, we might just say “informed,” about the past, present, and proposed actions of 
“relevant” agents and agencies], at least to some degree.”19  
So, let us take this familiar understanding as a point of departure for trying to persuade 
others of the reasonableness of our overall project. But to find additional resources for that 
purpose, let us look closer at how people in our culture often think citizens can become 
“enlightened,” or, to some degree at least, “informed,” about the past, present, and proposed 
actions of “relevant” agents and agencies in the area of (say) US foreign policymaking. We’ll 
then look to see if there are any major shortcomings in how people in our culture often do think 
that citizens can become so enlightened or informed. For this will provide us with an opening for 
arguing for the merits of our own proposed participatory approach to public-opinion formation in 
this area. 
First off, we observe that there is a long-standing tradition of interpreting the press’s role 
as being that of informing the public of the American government’s policies and actions. So, we 
begin by looking closely at how the role of the press has often been characterized in American 
constitutional interpretation and political commentary more generally. “Under the First 
Amendment,” we observe media scholar Jonathan Mermin writing, “the press is free to report 
criticism of the government, and it is often taken for granted that the United States therefore has 
a press that is independent of the government.”20 We then notice that this conception of a “free 
press” (which, so it is thought, serves to promote “the public interest” by investigating and, 
where it believes necessary, openly criticizing government policy) has been articulated by, 
among others, a number of Supreme Court Justices. As Justice Potter Stewart has remarked, for 
instance, the First Amendment creates “a fourth institution outside the government as an 
additional check on the three official branches.”21 Similarly, Justice Hugo Black has remarked 
that, with the First Amendment, “the Government’s power to censor the press was abolished so 
that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government.” 22  “Although this 
interpretation of the First Amendment goes well beyond what the founders appear to have 
intended,” Mermin comments, “the principles Stewart and Black expound are essentially 
                                                            
18 Dahl (1989: 111-112). 
19 Ibid. 111-112. 
20 Mermin (1999). 
21 Quoted in Bollinger (1991: 177, n. 44). 
22 Quoted in Hentoff (1980: 206). As we say below, the important point, in the present connection, is not that these 
“principles” are actualized – not, that is, that the press or the media more generally “is independent from the 
government” (in the relevant senses). In quoting the passages we do in this paragraph, we do not mean to suggest 
that. Rather, the point is that these principles are “essentially uncontested” as “principles,” or desirable aims, at least 
when given a sufficiently broad and defensible interpretation (and at least, as we say below, in the dominant political 
culture of the United States). On our view, such an interpretation would include the claim that some form of media 
should operate as an “independent observer of political power, having the right and the responsibility to maintain its 
independence of government”; but it would leave open what more precisely defines “independence,” apart from the 
minimal criterion of “not controlled (or managed or censured…) by the government.” And, likewise, it would again 
leave open the extent to which these principles are realized. That being so, however, it would also have to leave 
open, as w mention below, the (we think reasonable) acceptability of some government “oversight,” in order, for 
instance, to protect individuals from libel. 
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uncontested in the modern era. The press is seen as an independent observer of political power, 
having the right and the responsibility to maintain its independence of government.”23  
Similar comments may be found in the press itself, we notice. Consider, for instance, 
Anthony Lewis of the New York Times, who writes: “The press is protected [by the First 
Amendment] not for its own sake but to enable a free political system to operate. In the end, the 
concern is not for the reporter or the editor but for the citizen-critic of government.”24 Freedom 
of the press is something worth struggling to protect, for it is “the freedom to perform a function 
on behalf of the polity.”25 In describing that function, Lewis cites Justice Powell, who observes 
that, “no individual can obtain for himself the information needed for the intelligent discharge of 
his political responsibilities…. By enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the 
political process, the press performs a crucial function in effecting the societal purpose of the 
First Amendment.”26 Indeed, as Judge Gurfein has said, “a cantankerous press, an obstinate 
press, a ubiquitous press must be suffered by those in authority in order to preserve the even 
greater values of freedom of expression and the right of the people to know.”27  
 Many Americans, of course, may not accept the view that a “free press” ought to be 
defended, or defended primarily, on instrumental grounds: on the grounds that it ought to be 
protected “in order to preserve [say] the even greater values of freedom of expression and the 
right of the people to know,” or “to enable a free political system to operate.” Instead, they might 
defend it, as in fact we would, as also being a value in its own right. Likewise, some might 
dispute, as again we would, the extent to which the press, in practice, actually serves their 
putative role as “independent observers of political power.” And, of course, the question of what 
itself constitutes a “free” or “independent” press is deeply contested, just as the question of what 
constitutes a “free political system” is too.  
These issues aside, however, the above comments nevertheless serve to express a view 
that is, we emphasize, both familiar and widely held in American political culture: the press, or, 
better yet, (elements of) the media more broadly, ought to seek out “the information needed for 
the intelligent discharge of [the citizen’s] political responsibilities,” thereby “enabling the public 
to assert meaningful control over the political process.” To the extent that the media act as an 
“independent observer of political power,” and are free to “censure” the government as they see 
fit, the media (may) perform a crucial function on behalf of the polity: they (may) allow the 
citizen more effectively to act as an informed “citizen-critic,” or at least enhance her ability so to 
act. Presumably, the media thereby allow the public as a whole to play a more meaningful role in 
the political process; political participation, of whatever kind, can lose (much of) its meaning if 
those participating do not have adequate opportunities to inform themselves about the past, 
present, and/or proposed actions of “relevant” agents or agencies, including, of course, “public” 
ones. Insofar as the media play this role – or insofar as they allow citizens so to act – they 
therefore serve an important societal or political function, acting, in effect, as an institution 
outside the government that serves as an additional “check” on those inside it. Consequently, it is 
imperative that the press, and (elements of) the media more generally, remain critical and 
“independent” observers of political power.28 Accordingly, it is imperative that the media have 
                                                            
23 Ibid; my emphasis. 
24 Lewis (1987: 13-15); my emphasis. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Cited in Abrams (2014: 213); my emphasis. 
28 Of course, not all elements of the media need be so independent or serve such a function, we would observe. Even 
on the viewpoint that we are sketching, state-supported media (such as television programming) might have a 
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the right (within some limits, of course29) to publish their inquiries freely, without sanction or 
fear of reprisal on the part of public authorities. Indeed, at least on some variants of the view we 
are sketching, the press and (elements of) the media more broadly have the responsibility to 
remain so “independent”; not to do so would be to abdicate one of the basic functions they 
allegedly exist to perform, and to abandon one of the reasons for which many citizens, in one 
form or another, support them. And these principles, it would seem, are “essentially uncontested 
in the modern era” – at least, we would clarify, in the dominant culture of the United States.   
Now, this overview serves to indicate why we think that, indeed, it is widely thought in 
the dominant political culture of the United States that the press’s role is to inform the public of 
the policies of the United States government, including, we may add, its foreign policies. And 
the same may be said of certain other forms of media. To make sure we are all on the same page, 
let us re-state the logic that leads so many of us to this conclusion, listing the major presumptions 
that are at work in that logic.  
We begin with the presumption that in a democratic political system, citizens need 
“relevant” information in order intelligently to discharge their political responsibilities and/or to 
realize the aim of meaningfully participating in the democratic process (to the extent that they 
may wish to do so). More specifically, we assume that, to do so, citizens need an “adequate 
level” of information about the past, present, and/or proposed actions of “relevant” agents or 
agencies, including “public” ones. Without it, participation, of whatever kind, may become 
(largely) meaningless. Let us call this The Presumed Requirement of Relevant Information for 
Meaningful Participation. (This presumption follows, in turn, from the viewpoint that one of the 
reasons we believe that a “democratic system” is preferable to the other [feasible] systems that 
we might adopt [or that we might be made to endure!] is that such a system is the most likely to 
make it so that, as we earlier put it, the respective demos, in some sense, “gets what it wants [or 
thinks best].” And, evidently, the ability of the demos to “gets what it wants [or thinks best]” is 
dependent on, among other things, the possession of information about the past, present, and/or 
proposed actions of “relevant” agents or agencies, including “public” ones.)  
We then presume that in order to obtain such information, no citizen can act alone; no 
one may conceivably obtain such information alone.30 Let us call this The Presumption of 
Dependence on Public Information.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
legitimate role to play in the broader media environment. And, of course, elements of the media need not play the 
role of “observing” political power at all.  
29 Few, we think, would reflectively endorse the notion that the press, or the media more broadly, should have an 
“absolute right” to publish just anything, or at least anything under the name, say, of “news” or “reporting.” 
Controversies, of course, will no doubt continue to rage over how to conceptualize “freedom of expression.” Here, 
however, the important points are: first, that some view of “freedom of expression” is widely defended, in part 
because it is viewed as instrumental or integral to the democratic process itself; and second, that any such view 
should include the right of the media (admittedly, within in some limits) to investigate and openly criticize 
governmental actions. 
30 Indeed, it is not even clear what it would mean, at least in a literal sense, for a citizen to obtain such information 
by “acting alone.” For one thing, any such inquiry will involve (depend on) language (even if only in thought), 
which is clearly a social resource. Furthermore, any such inquiry is likely to, perhaps inevitably will, use other 
historically evolved (social and intellectual) artifacts, such as computers, calculators, binoculars, navigational tools, 
and so forth, not to speak of such “artifacts” as culturally-transmitted “narrative frames.” Accordingly, all 
practically conceivable forms of inquiry would seem to involve, or depend on, social resources.  
Still, some might want to say that there are senses in which an inquiry might be (best described as being) 
conducted “individually”: for instance, if an individual goes out by herself to establish the “relevant facts” regarding 
some event. Notice, however, that if the event in question has already passed, she will have to rely on the testimony 
of others. So, even if we agree to say that she conducts an inquiry “by herself,” or “individually,” this will only be 
 275 
Furthermore, we presume that in order to obtain such information, citizens cannot, and 
should not, rely solely on information provided by the public authorities themselves. For we 
presume that, in doing so, they will not obtain the (kind or quality of) information that is needed 
intelligently to discharge their political responsibilities, or to realize the aim of meaningfully 
participating in the democratic process, or the aim of making it so that the demos “gets what it 
wants (or thinks best).” Or, short of that, we presume that even if they do sometimes obtain it, 
they are generally much less likely to obtain it. So, we believe that citizens should have access to 
“independent” sources of (relevant) information. Let us call this train of thought The Presumed 
Requirement of Independence from Government Information.  
Taking these thoughts together, we then presume that we have good reason to believe that 
information should be generated and dispersed socially, or publically, but in a sense other than 
“by the government,” and that the press and (elements of) the media more broadly are to play 
this role. We’ll call this The Presumed Requirement of Independent and Critical Public 
Information.  
Next, we notice that the latter part of our last presumption (“and that [elements of] the 
media more broadly are to play this role”) follows from the view that the media, by definition, 
constitute a mechanism for the “social” or “public” generation and dispersal of information of 
various kinds. That, in part, is what the media are, we tend to think; for the media not to do so 
would be to render their function as “media” obsolete – or at least seriously bring into question 
their status as “media.” Hence, some form of “media,” we presume, should seek to generate, and 
then disperse, the kinds of information that are specifically relevant to political participation – 
for example, factual information about current affairs, including governmental actions, as well as 
critical, independent commentary and analyses thereof. Where they do not provide such 
information, commentary, and analysis, the thinking goes, the respective demos is unlikely to 
obtain it. And to the extent that they play this role, the media potentially may be said to 
constitute “independent observers” of political power, and so to serve a crucial function on 
behalf of the respective democratic process or system. For, in so acting, they presumably afford 
(prospective) citizen-critics with access to the kinds of knowledge and information that they 
(might) need, or that might bring them to want, to “censure” government actors and actions or to 
otherwise evaluate those actors’ actions, thereby allowing the public as a whole to play a more 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
partly accurate; for equally, we might say that while she perhaps instigated or directed it, she did not conduct it, or, 
what is perhaps clearer, carry it out, “entirely on her own.” It also involved, for instance, the effort of others who 
tried to remember, to sort out their memories about, what happened. Hence, if the inquiry is an historical one, in the 
broad sense of being about something that already happened (however recently), it will, for that very reason, also be 
a social one. What, though, of a case in which an individual plans to inquire about something yet-to-come, and then 
herself directly observes it when it does come about? Here, we believe, is the type of case in which the idea of 
inquiry-by-oneself, or individual inquiry, is most plausible, the type of case in which either of those phrases might 
be apt. In this case, it is conceivable at least that our inquirer would not need to rely on the testimony of others – that 
she might only need to rely on her own “observations” (but only, as we’re about to indicate, on her own 
“observations” in a very particular sense of that word). Notice, however, that this could conceivably be the case in 
only a very limited range of cases. Most “observational studies” involve interaction with others: for instance, 
ethnography, participant observation, and survey research. In that sense, they are social forms of inquiry. 
Nevertheless, one might, reasonably enough, still choose to say that, all things considered, it is best to describe the 
inquiry as conducted “by a single person,” or “individually.” The important point, then, is that if one refers to (and 
so thinks of) such an inquiry in this way, one does not lose track of the social resources that inevitably will enter into 
it – of that fact that, at a minimum, language, as a social resource, will necessarily enter into it. (We say 
“necessarily” here because, to our minds, the idea of an “inquiry” that does not at least involve thought in language 
is inconceivable.) 
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meaningful role in the political process. Let us call this The Presumed Contribution of 
Independent and Critical Media to Meaningful Participation.                                                                                                                                                                                    
This contribution to meaningful participation, some would therefore say, is necessary to 
the realization of (at least certain of) the fundamental aims of the democratic process itself; for 
instance, allowing the respective demos, in some sense, “to get what it wants (or thinks best).” 
Or, short of that, it surely should be regarded as an important contributing factor to our ability to 
realize those aims, including the one just mentioned. (Hence, if we were to invoke our own ideal 
procedural criteria and not just appeal to ideas that are already familiar in our public political 
culture, it could also be regarded as a contributing factor to our ability more closely to 
approximate the Criterion of Enlightened Understanding. But, for now, we’re sticking with an 
interpretation of ideas already widely available in the public political culture.) So, we presume 
that, “from a democratic perspective,” it is necessary to defend freedom of expression, and, more 
particularly, the freedom of the media to investigate and openly criticize governmental actions. 
This we’ll call The Presumed Need to Protect Independent and Critical Media.  
So, to summarize in a more succinct fashion: We first presume that, in the context of a 
democratic process, citizens need some (adequate) level of relevant information to make political 
participation (at least reasonably) meaningful (The Presumed Requirement of Relevant 
Information for Meaningful Participation). Second, we presume that in order to obtain such 
information, no single individual may conceivably act alone (The Presumption of Dependence on 
Public Information). Third, we presume that in order to obtain such information, citizens cannot, 
and should not, rely solely on information provided by the public authorities themselves, but 
rather should have access to “independent” and “critical” sources of such information. What is 
more, we presume that such information is best generated, and then dispersed, socially or 
publically, but not in the sense of “by the government,” and that the press and (elements of) the 
media are to play this role (The Presumed Requirement of Independent and Critical Public 
Information). To the extent that they do so, the press and (elements of) the media, we believe, 
therefore serve a crucial function on behalf of the respective democratic system or process, 
presumably allowing the relevant demos to play a more meaningful role in it (The Presumed 
Contribution of Independent Media to Meaningful Participation). Accordingly, an independent 
press/media is viewed as a necessary element of our capacity to realize (at least certain of) the 
basic aims of the democratic process (or is at least seen as an important contributing factor to it), 
and we therefore presume that, “from a democratic point of view,” we have good reason to want 
to protect the right and to guard or enhance the ability of the press/the media to be so critical and 
independent (The Presumed Need to Protect Independent and Critical Media).31 (Again, if we 
were to invoke our own ideal procedural criterion and not just appeal to ideas that are already 
familiar in our public political culture, we could say that, from the point of view provided by 
                                                            
31 We say here “the right and ability of the media to be so critical and independent” on the supposition that, here as 
elsewhere, we are never merely concerned with an abstract “right.” Rather, we defend “rights” to protect 
individuals’ (and sometimes groups’) abilities to do things. This, we believe, is even the case when we speak of 
“negative liberties”: a liberty which entails being protected from some form of harm or coercion is still a liberty to 
act (say, to move about or speak) in particular ways, without being, say, tortured or arbitrarily thrown in jail. Hence 
why we suggest here that our concern is not just with “the right” of the media “to be so critical and independent,” 
but also with their “ability” to be so. Of course, one can aim to protect that right without thereby committing oneself 
to trying to enhance all of the conditions that (some might think) are indispensable to their ability to be so critical 
and independent. That said, in light of what we’ve just said, a commitment to the “right” in question would seem to 
entail a commitment to guarding or enhancing some of the conditions that are necessary or indispensable to be the 
press’s (and the media’s) being so critical and independent. 
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those criteria, we have good reason to want to protect the right and to guard or enhance the 
ability of the media to be so critical and independent.) 
 At this point, however, it is important that we assess if there are any major shortcomings 
in how people apply this line of reasoning in interpreting how the press or other elements of the 
media actually function in our society. For, again, this will provide us with an opening for 
arguing for the merits of our own participatory approach to public-opinion formation in this area. 
 Our reflections on this issue have brought our attention to four closely related claims that 
are worth signaling here. We’ll momentarily see the importance of these claims when we look 
more closely at how the actual role of “the free press” is often interpreted in American society. 
 Broadly speaking, the first claim is that there is apparently no “procedural” way of 
guaranteeing that the press or the media operate in the way that the above line of reasoning 
suggests they should. That is, to generate an “adequate” level of “independent” and “critical” 
public information, and, in particular, to do so about the past, present, and/or proposed actions of 
“relevant” agents or agencies, including “public” ones, no “procedure,” however complex or 
sophisticated, may simply be followed in order to do so.32 Indeed, no form of “inquiry” can 
successfully be executed simply by “applying” a “procedure”; doing so never provides a 
guarantee of producing the “intended results,” such as they are, and no “procedure” can specify 
what tasks will even be needed to “complete” any given inquiry. All inquiry involves the 
exercise of contextual judgment, and competence in making such judgments is something that is 
acquired and developed though practice with the relevant activities. Within the Western 
philosophical tradition, the point has been recognized at least since Aristotle, and was often made 
by the classical pragmatists. Here, we do not attempt to argue for it, but merely refer to it, and 
just observe that the practitioners of any trade or craft invariably seem to recognize its veracity.  
The second, closely related claim is that no formal-legal “guarantee” can secure the 
production of an “adequate” level of “independent” and “critical” public information (in the 
above sense) either. Instead, those tasked with the responsibility of producing, and then 
distributing, such information obviously have to have the requisite abilities and dispositions to do 
so, as well as the requisite willingness to do so. 
Taken together (and this is the third claim), the first and second claims seem to imply that 
in order to generate an “adequate” level of “independent” and “critical” public information (in 
the above sense), we must rely, in some significant measure, on the virtues of those who are 
tasked with the responsibility of producing, and then distributing, that information, and on their 
willingness to do so.  
Fourth, this implies (inter alia) that in order to guard or enhance the ability of the media 
to be critical and independent in the way that we have suggested they should be, struggling to 
protect their right to be so (by implementing certain formal-legal protections, following certain 
procedures, or otherwise) is not sufficient. If the relevant agents do not themselves develop and 
evince the appropriate dispositions for producing the kinds of information in question, and do not 
have the requisite willingness to do so, no procedure or formal-legal protections will make it so 
that citizens have and “adequate” level of “independent” and “critical” public information. 
An example will be useful in indicating the import of these claims for our present 
purposes. There are a number of reasons why we cannot simply follow a procedure in order to 
produce the information in question, and a number of reasons why we cannot simply rely on 
                                                            
32 This is not to say that no “procedure” can assist us in doing so. There are, of course, procedures that can assist us 
in this way. The point, rather, is that, on our view, no procedure, however complex or sophisticated, has much, if 
any, chance of doing so “by itself.” 
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formal-legal protections for those who are tasked with the responsibility of doing so. One of 
those reasons is that the referents for the terms that that I am placing in quotes in the phrase 
“‘adequate’ level of ‘independent’ and ‘critical’ public information” are not only vague and 
contested, but also, in part because they are so, more or less continuously shifting. Therefore, 
each requires contextual interpretation and justification. Consequently, we need to assess: first, 
how, in practice and in some particular context, these terms are actually applied, what their 
actual referents are; and second, whether, in light of those reflections, the term is therefore 
actually warranted. 
Take the notion of “independent” information or news production as it is sometimes 
interpreted by defenders of (something at least very much like) the line of reasoning we outlined 
above regarding the proper role of “the free press” in a “democratic society.” For simplicity, we 
have so far spoken as if this term were unproblematic, even though it is actually not. We did this 
because, as we earlier said, in the dominant political culture of the United States at least, there is 
widespread agreement on the claim that, at a minimum, the press as well as (elements of) the 
media more broadly ought to be “independent” observers of political power. They ought to be 
free to investigate and openly criticize governmental actions, without sanction or fear of reprisal 
on the part of public authorities.33 If so, “freedom of the press” in that sense is, indeed, 
essentially uncontroversial, and we are warranted in speaking of widespread agreement on the 
importance of protecting the media from infringements on their right and ability to act 
“independently” to produce such information and inquiries. Nevertheless, when we move away 
from this sense of, or criterion for the application of, “freedom” or “independence” to other 
senses of, or criteria for the application of, these words, we do not meet with such agreement. 
And for the purposes of explaining how we would like to craft our participatory approach to 
public opinion-formation and agenda-setting in the area of foreign policy-making, it is important 
that we see how this is so. 
Consider, in this connection, Jonathan Mermin’s work on U.S. foreign-policy coverage 
and debate in the American media, presented in Debating War and Peace.34 Mermin writes: “It 
is clear that the media are players in the construction of foreign-policy debate in the United 
States.”35 “But,” he asks, “what part do they play? Do journalists function as independent, 
critical observers of U.S. foreign policy?”36 Mermin is not concerned to challenge the “First 
Amendment ideal of a press independent of government”; rather, he is concerned to evaluate the 
relationship of “American journalistic practice to that ideal.”37 “It is often just assumed,” he 
writes, “that the First Amendment ideal is fulfilled in the United States. In formal legal terms, the 
American media are independent of government, free to report the news without official 
interference.”38 “Under one model of an independent press,” basically the one which we 
considered above, “the press is independent of government if journalists are free to report 
criticism of public officials and their policies. American journalists have this freedom. But what 
has been done with it in practice? In assessing the independence of the American media, this is 
the fundamental question that must be addressed.”39 
                                                            
33 To be clear, I again stress the qualification that, in adopting this view, we may still endorse some government 
“oversight,” in order, for instance, to protect individuals from libel.  
34 Mermin (1999). 
35 Ibid. 4. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 5-6; my emphasis. 
38 Ibid. 7. 
39 Ibid. 143; my emphasis. 
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When we address it, what does empirical investigation show? If, as some critics have 
suggested, “the evidence shows that journalists are letting actors inside the government set the 
terms and boundaries of foreign-policy debate in the news, then the free press is voluntarily 
surrendering to the government an essential element of its power under the First Amendment.”40 
“The towering example of Vietnam,” he continues, “might seem to indicate that presidents are 
unable to set the terms and boundaries of foreign-policy debate in the news.”41 Indeed, “some 
observers concluded that the media had emerged as independent critics of U.S. foreign policy in 
the 1960s, reporting the Vietnam War in terms that contradicted the official declarations of the 
Johnson and Nixon administrations.”42 Journalists, in fact, “were said to have generated public 
opposition to the war with stories that encouraged Americans to question the wisdom and the 
credibility of their government.”43 Yet this interpretation has been challenged by empirical 
research. In the 1980s, Daniel C. Hallin, for instance, found that (in Mermin’s summary): 
 
newspaper and television coverage of U.S. intervention in Vietnam had been very 
supportive in the early and mid-1960s, when a consensus in Washington supported U.S. 
policy. Not until 1967–68, when high officials in Washington had spoken out against the 
war, does the news turn critical. Hallin offered a simple explanation for the emergence of 
critical coverage of the Vietnam War: mounting opposition to American policy inside the 
U.S. government. Until critical perspectives on the war had been expressed in 
Washington, no alternative to the White House position on the nature of the conflict in 
Vietnam and the need for U.S. intervention could be found (except at the margins) in the 
news.44 
 
And in 1990,  
 
W. Lance Bennett offered a general formulation of what Hallin described in the Vietnam 
case. The mainstream media, Bennett argues, “‘index’ the range of voices and viewpoints 
in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream 
government debate about a given topic.” The spectrum of debate in the news, the indexing 
hypothesis asserts, is a function of the spectrum of debate in official Washington. If there 
is debate inside the American government over U.S. policy, critical perspectives appear 
in the news. If government policy has bipartisan support in Washington, however, critical 
perspectives expressed outside the government are not well reported. Bennett found that 
coverage of U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan Contras in the 1980s fit this pattern, with critical 
coverage of American policy rising and falling in the news as Democratic opposition to 
Contra aid waxed and waned.45  
 
These are important findings, Mermin notes, and they illuminate the two cases in question. But 
the findings reported with respect to these two cases “do not [suffice to] demonstrate a general 
pattern”; two cases do not a “general pattern” make. To see whether the pattern is more general, 
a broader investigation is needed, which Mermin carries out.  
                                                            
40 Ibid. 7; my emphasis. 
41 Ibid. 4. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid. See Hallin (1986). 
45 Ibid. 4-5. See Bennett (1990).  
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 To offer more “systematic evidence of the impact of foreign-policy debate in Washington 
on the spectrum of foreign-policy debate in the news,” Mermin examines “coverage of eight 
military interventions in the post-Vietnam era — the invasions of Grenada and Panama, the 
bombing of Libya, the buildup to the Gulf War (divided into its August and November phases), 
the Gulf War itself, and U.S. intervention in Somalia and Haiti.”46 In doing so, Mermin follows 
Bennett “in using the term indexing to describe journalism that lets the spectrum of debate in 
Washington determine the spectrum of debate in the news.”47 However, Mermin observes that   
 
it would be no great surprise to find that the spectrum of debate in the news was to some 
degree indexed to the spectrum of debate inside the government. Conflict inside the 
government is newsworthy, and one would expect it to be reported. The words of 
government officials, moreover, often constitute diplomatic events that demand coverage. 
Evidence that there is a correlation between debate in Washington and the spectrum of 
viewpoints reported in the news is not, therefore, of such great interest. What would be of 
great interest is evidence showing that critical perspectives do not just increase from a 
reasonable baseline in the news when there is debate in Washington, but instead are 
ignored or marginalized in the news if not first expressed in Washington.48 
 
Accordingly, Mermin’s inquiry seeks to test “the marginalization version of the indexing 
hypothesis, not just the correlation version.”49 Bennett claims that, “evidence supporting the 
indexing hypothesis would suggest that the news industry has ceded to government the tasks of 
policing itself and striking the democratic balance.”50 But, Mermin says, “this conclusion 
[instead] requires [that we find] evidence to support the marginalization version of the indexing 
hypothesis, not just the correlation version.”51 (Or, as we ourselves would rather say, this 
conclusion would at least be more warranted if the evidence were to support “the 
marginalization version of the indexing hypothesis.”)  
 As Mermin elaborates the difference between these two versions of the indexing 
hypothesis: 
 
If critical perspectives on policies that win bipartisan support in Washington are simply 
outweighed or overshadowed in the news by the official perspective – what might be 
called the correlation version of the indexing hypothesis – then indexing is not a matter 
of much significance. [Recall what was said above: “Conflict inside the government is 
newsworthy, and one would expect it to be reported. The words of government officials, 
moreover, often constitute diplomatic events that demand coverage. Evidence that there 
is a correlation between debate in Washington and the spectrum of viewpoints reported in 
the news is not, therefore, of such great interest.”52] But if critical viewpoints not 
articulated in Washington are ignored or relegated to the margins of the news—the 
marginalization version of the indexing hypothesis—then this tells us something quite 
striking about the relationship of American journalistic practice to the First Amendment 
                                                            
46 Mermin (1999: 5).  
47 Ibid. 5.  
48 Ibid. 5. 
49 Ibid. 14. 
50 Quoted in Mermin (1999: 14). 
51 Ibid. 14. 
52 Ibid. 5. 
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ideal of a press independent of government.53 
 
What, however, is meant here by the phrase “the government”? “In the context of foreign 
policy,” Mermin observes, “it must include—at a minimum—the president and Congress, the 
executive and legislative branches. This, one might imagine, is what the press is expected to be 
independent of.”54 Yet “if the indexing hypothesis is correct,” or (as we ourselves would prefer 
to say) if it may be significantly substantiated, “one must conclude [one would seem to have 
reason to conclude] that American journalists report the news, in practice, as if the president 
were the government, and critics of U.S. policy inside the government—in Congress or within 
the administration itself—constituted an independent vantage point. When spelled out in these 
terms the premise sounds absurd. But this is how journalists in effect operate under the indexing 
rule.”55  
Hence, “what makes the indexing of debate in the news to the spectrum of debate in the 
Washington an interesting phenomenon, [particularly] if the evidence supports the 
marginalization version of the indexing hypothesis, is that it would appear to contradict the 
[purpose behind the] First Amendment ideal of a press independent of government.”56 For 
“under the indexing rule, the press is independent [that is, acts independently] of the president, 
but not the government, as it does not offer critical analysis of White House policy decisions 
unless actors inside the government (most often in Congress) have done so first.”57 This is a 
politically important observation. Indeed, it “means [that] the media act, for the most part, as a 
vehicle for government officials to criticize each other, reporting criticism of U.S. policy that has 
been expressed inside the government, but declining to report critical perspectives expressed 
outside of Washington.”58 
 Here, it is not necessary fully to describe how Mermin goes about testing this hypothesis, 
nor all the details of his results. But we do want to say enough, for purposes of illustration, to 
make clear the general approach, to indicate his broad findings, and to understand what he 
recommends in response to them. 
To test the marginalization version of the indexing hypothesis, Mermin needs to compare 
cases in which there is (significant) conflict within the government over policy with cases in 
which there is not. For recall that the marginalization version of this hypothesis says that “critical 
perspectives do not just increase from a reasonable baseline in the news when there is debate 
[i.e., conflict over policy] in Washington [i.e., within the government itself], but instead are 
ignored or marginalized in the news if not first expressed in Washington [i.e., within the 
government itself].”59 Accordingly, Mermin examines news coverage of the eight previously 
mentioned cases of U.S. military intervention in the post-Vietnam era.  
 
In four of the cases U.S. intervention won bipartisan support; in the other four cases U.S. 
intervention generated conflict in Washington. The four Washington consensus cases are 
the bombing of Libya in April 1986; the invasion of Panama in December 1989; the 
deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia in August 1990; and the Gulf War in January 
                                                            
53 Ibid. 5-6. 
54 Ibid. 6.  
55 Ibid. 6; my emphasis. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 7. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 5. 
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1991. The four Washington conflict cases are the invasion of Grenada in 1983; the 
doubling of the American deployment in Saudi Arabia in November 1990; the raid on a 
faction hostile to U.S. forces in Somalia in October 1993 that constituted the decisive 
turning point in the U.S. intervention in Somalia; and U.S. intervention in Haiti in 
September 1994.60  
 
The news media Mermin examines are “the New York Times (news and opinion sections), 
the most influential newspaper in the United States; ABC’s World News Tonight, a leading 
evening newscast; and the MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour, the program generally thought to offer the 
most in-depth coverage and the greatest diversity of viewpoints on television.”61 Mermin 
examines “the coverage in two mutually reinforcing ways. One form of evidence is quantitative, 
the results of a simple content analysis,” “designed to measure critical perspectives on U.S. 
policy in the news.”62 And “a second form of evidence is based on a close reading of the 
coverage, designed to offer a tangible sense of the volume and character of critical reporting.”63 
 What does he find? Summarizing his results, Mermin writes: 
 
In their coverage of U.S. intervention in the post-Vietnam era, the New York Times, 
World News Tonight, and the MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour have made no independent 
contribution (except at the margins) to foreign-policy debate in the United States. The 
spectrum of debate in Washington, instead, has determined the spectrum of debate in the 
news. The evidence supports not just the correlation version of the indexing hypothesis, 
but the marginalization version.64  
 
And commenting on the implications of these findings:  
 
Journalism that indexes debate in the news to debate in Washington violates not just the 
watchdog ideal, but also the mirror ideal. For under the indexing rule the journalistic 
mirror is help up not to reality, but to official interpretations of reality. Not just the 
watchdog idea[l], but the mirror ideal too is unfulfilled if the news is reported from the 
vantage point of the government – even a government of two parties and three branches – 
for this grants to government the power to determine not just the spectrum of debate on 
its policies in Washington, but also the basic information made available to the public in 
the news. Issues and alternatives that are on the Washington agenda are clearly visible in 
the mirror that indexing constructs, as are the clusters of facts connected to them. Issues 
and alternatives and related facts under discussion outside of Washington, however, go 
unreflected or are relegated to the mirror’s edge. If the media are acting neither as a 
watchdog over government, nor as a mirror independent of government, then it is hard to 
argue that the First Amendment ideal is being fulfilled.65 
 
Hence, “independence [of the press] exists in principle,” he concludes, “but does not manifest 
                                                            
60 Ibid. 12. 
61 Ibid. 12. 
62 Ibid. 14. 
63 Ibid. 14. 
64 Ibid. 143; my emphasis. 
65 Ibid. 145; my emphasis. 
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itself in practice.”66  
Now, recall that our immediate point in reviewing these empirical findings has been to 
bring attention to how the notion of “independence” is obviously contested and contestable, and 
then to make a number of further points that follow on that basic observation. If Mermin is 
broadly correct in saying that “independence [of the press] exists in principle, but does not 
manifest itself in practice,” it seems to follow that in order to make it so that those tasked with 
producing the information in question actually do so, we cannot simply rely on formal-legal 
protections. For if the press essentially is “free” (in our formal-legal sense) to act independently, 
but nevertheless doesn’t do so (to the extent that, or in the manner in which, our earlier review of 
the First Amendment ideal suggests it should), the conclusion follows: we cannot rely on formal-
legal protections to secure the effective exercise of “independence” in the sense in which the First 
Amendment ideal suggests that we should care about. The point is obvious, but bears mention: 
for again, “it is often just assumed that the First Amendment ideal is fulfilled in the United 
States.”67 Consequently, much commentary suffers from the defect of taking for granted what 
should rather be demonstrated, if the application of the predicate “independent” is adequately to 
be justified. It is not enough to observe that the press has certain formal-legal protections, and 
then simply call it – or assume that we are warranted in calling it – “independent.” The use of 
that term should be continually justified, through appropriate forms of empirical investigation 
into the relevant journalistic practices themselves. 
What now of the related claim that neither can we simply follow a “procedure” to 
generate the kinds of information in question? In the present connection, the point is crucial 
because in assuming – as opposed to investigating and demonstrating – that the First Amendment 
ideal is meaningfully “fulfilled” in the United States, those who do so appear not to recognize 
that by the standards internal to the journalism profession itself, journalists, at the collective 
level, appear to be failing (to a considerable extent) to make the competent contextual judgments 
that would allow this ideal to be (more approximately) “fulfilled.” (By “contextual judgments” 
we include a whole range of value judgments that arise in the activities that are actually involved 
in journalistic practice: for instance, judgments about whose opinions to consult in reporting the 
news, about when to include criticisms of government policies, and about how to include such 
criticisms.) This conclusion would seem to follow from Mermin’s findings, which, for purposes 
of illustration, we take to be broadly compelling. 
To see this more clearly, three further observations should be made. First, journalists 
tasked with covering foreign policy ought to, by the standards of their own profession (and the 
First Amendment ideal), report in such a way that they show “independence” from the 
government by, among other things, not “letting the government set the news agenda and the 
spectrum of debate in the news,” thereby letting “issues and alternatives and related facts under 
discussion outside of Washington” go “unreflected” in the “mirror” that they are supposed to 
hold up to those in power.68  
Second, to the extent that those journalists are sincerely trying to maintain such 
“independence,” there is a failure, at least at the collective level, in how they are conducting the 
pertinent journalistic activities in their efforts to do so. This conclusion would seem plausible 
from the results of Mermin’s investigation (assuming the pattern he identifies has not changed 
since he carried out his investigation); it is not clear, in this regard, what other conclusion we 
                                                            
66 Ibid. 144. 
67 Ibid. 7. 
68 Ibid. 145. 
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might be drawn from it. If so, changes are needed in how those activities are conducted, and in 
how pertinent contextual judgments/value judgments are therefore rendered. Indeed, this is why 
Mermin himself offers various “rules of thumb” for how to avoid this collective outcome, that is, 
for how to achieve a more meaningful form of “independent journalism” regarding US foreign 
policy.69 One of his recommendations is that journalists should report the reactions of “engaged 
citizens.” “To get the perspective of the engaged citizen into the news,” he says, “journalists 
could consult representatives of national public-interest organizations that speak out on U.S. 
foreign policy…”70 This recommendation is meant as a way to encourage journalists to expand 
the range of (critical) perspectives that are reported in the news. In that sense, it is meant, as are 
his other recommendations, to help journalists more effectively to realize the First Amendment 
ideal discussed above (as well as journalism’s own professional standard of independence from 
government). To follow it, however, notice that journalists obviously have to make contextual 
judgments/value judgments about, for instance, what counts as an “engaged citizen” or as a 
“representative” of a “public-interest organization” that “speaks out on U.S. foreign policy.” 
(Journalistic inquiry, like other forms of inquiry, is “value-guided” and so “value-laden” too.) 
None of these terms is completely self-evident; none of them can always be applied 
unproblematically. It is a matter of “characterization” (indeed, of “characterization” for moral-
ethical purposes), not merely of “naming.” Hence, not only does the application, and so 
justification, of the term “independence” require contextual interpretation; so too do a variety of 
terms that one might employ in justifying one’s choices in carrying out the activities that are 
required for, or that might promote, such “independence.” So, no (mere) procedure may be 
followed here.  
This brings us to the third observation: If the above is basically compelling, it would 
appear to be the case that certain (kinds of) inadequate contextual judgments/value judgments are 
helping to produce a broader news pattern that falls well short of the First Amendment ideal, and 
that, consequently, better such judgments would help to realize that ideal. 
Taken together, these observations lead us back to our earlier point about the importance 
of the virtues evinced by social inquirers. Following out the above line of reasoning, it does not 
appear possible to generate an “adequate” level of “independent” and “critical” public 
information through a “procedure,” and no formal-legal “guarantee” can secure its production 
either. If so, we instead must rely, in some significant measure, on the virtues of those who are 
tasked with the responsibility of producing, and then distributing, that information, and on their 
willingness to do so.71 This conclusion appears to hold quite generally, as well as in the specific 
case that interests us: information about the past, present, and/or proposed actions of “relevant” 
agents or agencies, including “public” ones. The discussion of Mermin’s findings clearly 
suggests this conclusion. What it implies (inter alia) is that in order “to guard or enhance the 
ability” of the media to be “critical” and “independent” of government interference, struggling to 
protect their right to be so is obviously not sufficient. While important, implementing and 
protecting the requisite formal-legal protections (as with the First Amendment) is not enough: if 
the relevant agents don’t themselves develop and evince the virtues needed for producing the 
kinds of information in question, as in the case of the American media investigated by Mermin, 
                                                            
69 See Mermin (1999: chapter 7) for his five “prescriptions for independent journalism.” 
70 Ibid. 147. 
71 Their “willingness to do so” is relevant here because, as with any skilled activity, the possession of the requisite 
“skills” is not alone sufficient for the successful execution of that activity. One needs not only certain abilities but 
also the willingness to employ them in relevant ways. 
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no procedure or formal-legal protections will make it so that they do so. Instead, we need to 
cultivate the virtues that would encourage and allow them to do so. That, we might say, is 
necessary to the realization of the First Amendment ideal, which is meant to serve the basic 
democratic aim of making it so that the people “gets what it wants (or thinks best).” Let’s call 
this The Presumed Need to Cultivate the Virtues Needed for the Production of Critical and 
Independent Public Information. 
How, though, might we do so? One way, surely, is to shift “the culture of the media” in 
this way or that. To promote, for instance, the practice of reporting the opinions of engaged 
citizens outside of the government is to promote a practice that is constitutive of the virtue of 
“independence.” Hence, to promote that virtue, it would appear useful, perhaps even necessary, 
socially to encourage this practice, or this reflective habit, whether by altering the curricula 
taught at journalism schools, emphasizing the importance of engaging in this practice at relevant 
professional conferences, changing editorial guidelines, or what have you. Indeed, one can easily 
imagine doing much more than this. For instance, a professional association might, perhaps in 
collaboration with a group of journalism schools, commission or conduct a study of how well 
and widely this practice is employed, publishing and distributing the findings to its members. 
And, of course, the same could be done for other practices that are constitutive of the virtue of 
“independence.” In any case, the important point is that such cultural practices would appear to 
be useful – indeed, perhaps they are effectively necessary – for the broad promotion of the 
practices that are constitutive of the virtue of “independence.” If effective, the relevant groups, 
in that sense, would be adopting cultural practices that in turn promote certain virtues, thereby 
promoting certain basic aims of the profession itself as well as “the First Amendment ideal.” In 
that sense, too, they would be promoting cultural practices that serve the basic democratic aim of 
making it more likely that the people will “get what it wants (or thinks best).” If such cultural 
practices are necessary for the promotion of the virtues that make the “the First Amendment 
ideal” a meaningful one, then they might be thought of as necessary also for the promotion of 
that basic democratic aim. Let’s call this final presumption, The Presumed Need to Cultivate the 
Cultural Practices Needed for the Production of Critical and Independent Public Information.  
Now, in light of these observations, we need to revise our earlier summary of the 
“proper” role of the press/media in a democratic society. We need to include the two 
“presumptions” outlined in the last paragraph. Doing so, this is the view that we arrive at. 
We first presume that, in the context of a democratic process, citizens need some 
“adequate” level of “relevant” information to make political participation (at least reasonably) 
meaningful. More specifically, the democratic ideal tells us that, in that context, we should think 
of social inquiry – including the inquiries carried out by the press and (elements of) the media 
more broadly – as (in part at least) a means for allowing citizens to obtain an “adequate” level of 
information about the past, present, and/or proposed actions of “relevant” agents or agencies, 
including “public” ones (The Presumed Requirement of Relevant Information for Meaningful 
Participation). Second, we presume that in order to obtain such information, no single individual 
may conceivably act alone (The Presumption of Dependence on Public Information). Third, we 
presume that in order to obtain such information, citizens cannot, and should not, rely solely on 
information provided by the public authorities themselves, but rather should have access to 
“independent” and “critical” sources of such information. What is more, we presume that such 
information is best generated, and then dispersed, socially or publically, but not in the sense of 
“by the government,” and that the press and (elements of) the media are to play this role (The 
Presumed Requirement of Independent and Critical Public Information). To the extent that they 
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do so, the press/media therefore serve a crucial function, we believe, on behalf of the respective 
democratic system or process, presumably allowing the relevant demos to play a more 
meaningful role in it (The Presumed Contribution of Independent Media to Meaningful 
Participation). Accordingly, an independent press/media is viewed as a necessary element of our 
capacity to realize (at least certain of) the basic aims of the democratic process, or is at least seen 
as an important contributing factor to it, and we therefore presume that, “from a democratic point 
of view,” we have good reason to want to protect the right and to guard or enhance the ability of 
the press/media to be so critical and independent (The Presumed Need to Protect Independent 
and Critical Media). However, it does not appear possible to generate an “adequate” level of 
“independent” and “critical” public information merely through a “procedure,” and no formal or 
legal “guarantee” can secure its production either. To do so, we instead must rely, in some 
significant measure, on the virtues of those who are tasked with the responsibility of producing 
and distributing that information, and on their willingness to do so (The Presumed Need to 
Cultivate the Virtues Needed for the Production of Critical and Independent Public Information). 
These virtues, we presume, are best promoted by the encouragement of certain cultural 
practices. Such cultural practices would appear useful – indeed, perhaps they are effectively 
necessary – for the realization of (certain of) our basic democratic aims, including the aim of 
allowing the people to “get what it wants (or thinks best)” (The Presumed Need to Cultivate the 
Cultural Practices Needed for the Production of Critical and Independent Public Information).  
Now, although this line of reasoning explicitly addresses the “proper” role of the 
press/media in a democratic society, it can also, we think, help us to reason about some 
democratic-process-to-be-crafted, including (what is our more specific interest here) a 
participatory process for public-opinion formation and agenda-setting in the area of US military 
interventions abroad that could arguably bring us closer to realizing to the Criterion of 
Enlightened Understanding. (Hereafter, we refer to this simply as “the process.”) To recall, the 
criterion reads as follows. 
 
Each citizen or member ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for discovering 
and validating (within the time permitted by the need for a decision) the choice on the 
matter to be decided that would best serve the citizen’s or member’s good or interests. In 
considering that choice, each participant should have an equal and adequate opportunity 
to offer his or her reasons for preferring one outcome to another, and to listen and 
respond to the reasons offered by each of the other participants. In doing so, participants 
should assume responsibility for seeking out mutually acceptable and generally 
accessible reasons for their expressed preferences, hence for trying to understand relevant 
social situations and activities from relevant persons’ perspectives. 
 
So, we now provide a very rough outline of the process and stress that the idea is to 
create a source for information and knowledge production that truly is “independent of the 
government” (in the way that Mermin’s analysis gives us reason to think that, in crucial respects 
at least, the American mainstream media has often not been72), one that will lay the basis for 
more informed public opinion in the policy area in question, and so arguably bring us closer to 
realizing the Criterion of Enlightened Understanding. The proposal primarily takes inspiration 
                                                            
72 Recall Mermin’s (1999: 7) conclusion that “the media [he analyzed] act, for the most part, as a vehicle for 
government officials to criticize each other, reporting criticism of U.S. policy that has been expressed inside the 
government, but declining to report critical perspectives expressed outside of Washington.” 
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from three existing practices: Consensus Conferences, Deliberative Polling, and 21st Century 
Town Hall Meetings. As we present it, the proposal draws freely from various aspects of these 
practices, combining them in whatever way suits our purposes. 
Broadly, we would like the process to create a network of conversations about the past, 
present, and proposed/potential actions and activities of “relevant” agents and agencies in the 
area of US interventionism abroad, with a focus on interventionism from the end of WWII until 
the present. Our view is that in order to reflect intelligently on the motives for, and on the 
character and implications of, ongoing US military actions abroad, it is imperative that one gains 
an understanding of the dominant role that the US has played in world affairs since the end of 
WWII. Likewise, we think this is imperative for any intelligent reflection on the potential 
motives for, and the potential character and implications of, any proposed/possible US military 
actions abroad. One has to understand the influential role the US has played during this period in 
those countries where it intervened in the past (e.g. Guatemala), is intervening now (e.g. Iraq), or 
possibly might intervene in the near future (e.g. Iran). So, we would like to see the creation of 
venues for open, deliberative, and dialogical engagements regarding the past, present, and 
proposed/potential actions and activities of “relevant” agents and agencies in the area of US 
interventionism abroad, with a focus on interventionism from the end of WWII until the present. 
Now, we do not want to mandate which countries should be addressed in this process, for two 
main reasons: first, the ability of the process to garner broad public interest and participation will 
partly depend on the process’s addressing issues of widespread concern; and second, the 
countries that the US is militarily involved in, or might soon be involved in, at the time of the 
creation of the process and during its operation is obviously something that we cannot precisely 
foretell. Yet, we believe that, very broadly speaking, the process should focus on the period 
specified and for the reasons specified.  
Now, there are many ways to organize such a process, so the details that we now offer 
should be taken as tentative suggestions, open to revision as the process is conceptualized in 
greater detail and actually implemented by interested parties. To be successful, the process will 
need the support of a broad coalition of actors: for instance, organizations interested and 
involved in facilitating dialogues and deliberations on a diverse range of public issues (say, the 
National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation); organizations that conduct research on, or 
conduct advocacy work in the area of, US foreign policy (say, the Institute for Policy Studies); 
academic and research outfits that specialize in the analysis and/or practical implementation of 
diverse practices for citizen engagement in policy-related public dialogues and deliberations 
(say, Stanford University’s Center for Deliberative Democracy); and a diverse array of 
academics and other researchers with interest in issues related to civic engagement, pubic 
deliberation and dialogue, and social movement organization. Perhaps we’ll name our coalition 
“We Decide Our Foreign Policy” (WDOFP). As the process begins to unfold, we hope that 
WDOFP will be involved in further conceptualizing and implementing the process.  
Here, then, is the initial conception of the process itself, which will occur at three 
geographic levels: the local (municipal) level, the state level, and the national level. The local 
venues will take place in any municipality in which the WDOFP has sufficient capacity to 
organize the venues. In municipalities in which there is a lot of capacity on the ground, we 
envision three types of venues recurrently taking place: dialogues and deliberations about past 
US interventions, dialogues and deliberations about on-going US interventions, and dialogues 
and deliberations about possible future or proposed US interventions. In municipalities in which 
the capacity is considerably less, the coalition might just focus on on-going interventions or even 
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just convene dialogues and deliberations on an as-needed basis when interventions are proposed 
or seem reasonably likely in the near future.  
Here is how the meetings at this first level might work. Broadly speaking, the meetings 
will look like the 21st Century “Town Hall Meetings” (THMs) organized by AmericaSpeaks, but 
with some modifications.73 For the purposes of illustration, consider what a meeting that 
addresses an on-going US intervention might look like. THMs of this kind can convene 
thousands of citizens in large-scale public deliberations. Each participant spends most of the day 
at a table composed of 10 to 12 geographically diverse individuals. A trained facilitator – who is 
not an expert in relevant areas – helps the table to deliberate the broad issues set for the day’s 
discussion. At each of the tables, the participants begin with introductions and with a broad 
dialogue about their views on the issues set for the discussion. At this point, they might discuss 
issues like what brought each of them to the discussion in the first place (perhaps one of them 
lost a daughter in a recent military conflict, while another has been an anti-war activist for the 
last two decades); their general thoughts on US interventionism (perhaps one participant thinks 
that most interventions are self-interested struggles for resources and so has opposed every 
intervention during his adult life, while another participant has supported some US interventions, 
deeming them “legitimate humanitarian interventions”); and their hopes for what might get 
accomplished during the course of the day.  
After this brief opening discussion, the participants listen to a panel of experts give 
presentations on the intervention in question. The experts might be chosen as follows. Well prior 
to the event, the organizers will publicize news of the event, soliciting expert testimony for a 
panel on the proposed intervention. The organizers will then sift through the responses, choosing 
a diverse group of presenters who seem to have relevant expertise: for instance, experts on 
mainstream media coverage of US interventionism (think of scholars like Jonathan Mermin, 
whose work we considered at length above); experts on the humanitarian consequences of recent 
or (potentially) comparable US interventions (say, experts on how recent or comparable 
interventions created refugee populations); experts on ethical question as they arise in 
international affairs and on military strategy (here the organizers might intentionally choose, say, 
3 panelists: one strongly opposed to the on-going intervention, one strongly in favor of it, and 
one who is ambivalent but who can clearly explain her reasons for being so); and so on. 
(Depending on the organizers’ resources and the time constraints they face, the organizers might 
even come up with a more “democratic” way of choosing the panelists, say, by allowing the 
members of the local chapter of WDOFP to vote on the issue.) Aware of the fact that all inquiry 
is “value-guided” and “value-laden,” the intention here would be to strive for pluralism: just as 
the participants are meant to represent the demographic diversity of the local population (more 
on this below), so the presenters ought to represent a very broad range of perspectives on the 
topic(s) at hand. Even when we just discuss “the facts” about relevant social situations and 
activities, there is no way to get around the fact that whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in 
the context of, the venue in question will be “value-guided” and “value-laden.” So, there will be 
no attempt to draw on or to produce “value-free” and/or “value-neutral” inquiry or expertise in 
this process – though appeals to “simple facts,” “observations,” “unbiased accounts,” “balanced 
perspectives,” and so on will, of course, have an appropriate role to play. But so will testimony 
                                                            
73 Fung 2003; Lukensmeyer et al. 2005. It would be cumbersome to signal which aspects of the proposal are directly 
inspired by the 21st Century THM model and which aspects of it are modifications of it. So, we simply refer the 
reader to the above sources for comparison. 
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of the Mermin-variety, which shows how relevant inquiries are (in our own terminology) “value-
guided” and “value-laden,” and which indicates why it is important that we recognize it. 
After the panel presentation (which will be followed by a brief Q and A), the participants 
will then spend four to five hours discussing the key issues and policy options. At each table, a 
volunteer will record the main points of the discussion on a laptop computer. The computers will 
be networked together. A “theme team” will thus be able to read participants’ comments from 
every table in real time and to distill these comments into key messages or themes. The key 
messages and themes will then be presented back to the whole room. The facilitators will solicit 
rapid reactions, collect demographic surveys, and conduct straw polls throughout the meeting. 
Each participant will have a polling keypad with which to respond to the facilitators. A diverse 
group of issue experts (including the panelists) will be available to answer specific questions that 
arise at the tables.  
One of the main issues surrounding the THMs will be how to ensure the involvement of 
an appropriate group of citizens. The organizers will want a group that represents the 
demographic diversity of the larger community. To assemble such a group, the organizers will 
often have to tailor their outreach and recruitment strategies to fit the specific project. As 
participants register, organizers will compare the registration numbers to the demographic targets 
and adjust the recruitment strategy accordingly.  
The event organizers will create summaries of the day’s outcomes, providing these not 
only to the participants but also to public officials and the media. These summaries will also be 
fed into the state-level meetings, the proposed format for which we now discuss. 
Broadly speaking, the state-level events will be organized on the model of the Danish 
Consensus Conference, but again with some modifications.74 Whereas the local meetings will be 
geared mainly toward facilitating an informed discussion about the intervention in question, the 
state-level meetings will be geared mainly toward generating actionable proposals in relation to 
it (partly on the basis of the earlier “informed discussions” at the local level). As before, we’ll 
discuss an example of a dialogue and deliberation about an on-going US intervention abroad. 
The meetings will be run roughly as follows. 10 to 12 citizens will come together for 
eight days of deliberation over a period of roughly two months (less if circumstances are urgent). 
The organizers will use stratified random sampling to match the participants to the desired 
characteristics of the larger population. The meetings will involve two stages.  
The first stage will consist of two preparatory weekends in which the participants 
convene to learn about one another, the subject, and the process. Based in part on the event-
summaries from the local-level events, the participants will here develop a series of questions for 
the conference to address. Participants will begin with a broad dialogue about visions and values 
in order to clarify what is important to them about the intervention in question. Subsequently, 
they will choose people to make presentations to the conference from a list of potential interest 
group representatives and experts.  
The second stage will be a five-day conference. The first two days will involve two 
plenary sessions: during the first one, the presenters chosen by the participants themselves will 
respond to the questions they had set for the conference; during the second one, a diverse group 
of panelists chosen by the organizers will present on whatever issues the panelists themselves 
deem relevant to the intervention in question. This second group of presenters will be chosen 
                                                            
74 See Hendriks (2005) and Goodin and Dryzek (2006). Again, it would be cumbersome to signal which aspects of 
the proposal are directly inspired by the Danish Consensus Conference model and which aspects of it are 
modifications of it. So, we simply refer the reader to the above sources for comparison. 
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with the intention of exposing the participants to as broad a range of perspectives on the 
intervention in question as possible (including, as before, individuals strongly in favor of the 
intervention, individuals strongly opposed to it, and individuals who are ambivalent about it but 
who have clear reasons for being so, which they can clearly explicate). Where possible, this 
second group will also involve the participation of individuals from the society in which the 
intervention is on-going – individuals who are drawn from interest groups (e.g. human rights 
organizations) that can speak to the impact of the intervention on the society in question. 
Throughout these two days, the citizens’ panel will occasionally retreat into closed sessions to 
articulate further questions for the presenters from both expert/interest group panels and to 
clarify points of contention or misunderstanding.  
Note that the organizers might (with good reason, our normative theory of the democratic 
process tells us) encourage this second group of individuals (or at least some number of them) to 
offer presentations that encourage participants to develop the specific intellectual, moral, and 
ethical virtues that, in the specific context in question, they think would arguably assist 
participants in assuming (or dispose them to assume) the responsibilities that are specified (or 
entailed) by our ideal procedural criteria. (These we’ll refer to as “corollary virtues.”) In doing 
so, they might encourage this second group (with good reason, our normative theory of the 
democratic process again tells us) to draw on certain cultural practices that can promote a social 
environment that is conducive to the effective assumption of those responsibilities and to the 
effective cultivation of those corollary virtues.  
For instance, the Criterion of Enlightened Understanding indicates, we have repeatedly 
seen, that, ideally speaking, the “participants should assume responsibility for seeking out 
mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons for their expressed preferences.” So, in 
thinking through what it means to assume these responsibilities in the context in question, a 
panelist might identify certain “corollary virtues” that she thinks her presentation might be used 
to cultivate. For instance, she might maintain (with good reason, in our view) that a person who 
seeks sincerely to justify her expressed policy preferences by an appeal to reasons that could be 
regarded as mutually acceptable and generally accessible by her interlocutors is someone who 
exhibits a certain kind of “civic integrity” in how she presents her own position and how she 
(presumptively) regards her interlocutors’ positions. More specifically, she might maintain 
(again, with good reason, in our view) that when persons do exhibit this virtue (while seeking out 
mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons for the expressed preferences), it is 
typically because their behavior demonstrates this in one or more of the following three ways.75  
The first our hypothetical panelist calls “consistency in speech.” She unpacks this by 
saying that “we expect citizens and officials to espouse their moral positions independently of 
the circumstances in which they speak.” This, she says, is “a sign of political sincerity: it 
indicates that a person holds the position for moral reasons of morality, not (only) for reasons of 
political advantage [or narrow self-interest].” “There is,” she recognizes, “no completely reliable 
way to tell if such a principle is satisfied.” Yet, “we can find some reliable criteria for 
recognizing, or at least providing good grounds for suspecting, insincerity. Politicians who 
continually shift their positions according to political fashions give us good grounds for doubting 
that they honestly accept the positions they espouse on moral grounds.” With respect to the topic 
                                                            
75 In the quotes contained in the next three paragraphs, I am putting Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson’s (1996: 
81-2) manner of speaking about the virtue of “civic integrity” in the mouth of our imagined panelist. Outside of the 
quotes, however, I am offering my own account of how the imagined panelist might describe her own suggestions 
about how she might go about cultivating that virtue. 
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in question, US interventionism, there are various familiar ways of testing the sincerity of the 
“moral arguments” that, for instance, politicians offer for their own policy positions. And some 
of these are widespread in our culture. For instance, where the relevant materials are available, 
critics often test the sincerity of what politicians say about why they support or supported some 
US intervention “in public” against what they say about why they supported it “in private.” For 
instance, they sometimes compare what politicians say at campaign rallies, in speeches on the 
floor of Congress, in press releases, and so on against what they say in leaked cables or internal 
memos or perhaps in documents that are later declassified. These practices are akin to 
widespread cultural practices in the broader society, where, for instance, friend A tries to test the 
sincerity of friend B’s explanation for B’s actions in relation to A by asking friend C what, if 
any, explanation friend B also gave to friend C about said actions.  
The second way that people exhibit the virtue of integrity in such contexts is through 
“consistency between speech and action,” our hypothetical panelist continues. “It is,” she 
explains, “sometimes possible to point to differences [between how a person verbally presents 
his beliefs and their implications for action and the way in which he seems to act or not act on 
those beliefs] that would legitimately distinguish the speech and action [in question].” “But 
apparent inconsistencies call for careful and candid explanations.” Furthermore, “public 
officials,” she adds, “have even greater responsibilities in this respect because their words may 
be reasonably taken as a commitment to carry out certain policies. Furthermore, their culpability 
for failures to act is probably greater.” Notice that in our culture we do not admire politicians 
who during a campaign repeatedly stress their concern over the humanitarian situation in some 
US-occupied country, but, once elected, fail (whether from laziness, lack of leadership, or lack of 
genuine concern) “to work for the policies implied by the position they advocated.” This would 
include, for instance, a politician who during a campaign repeatedly stresses his concern for the 
treatment of “enemy combatants” in the US-occupied country in question, but, once elected, fails 
even to try to support policies that would address the forms of treatment that he himself had 
previously labeled “torture.” In the broader culture, there are various more and less specific 
cultural practices available for identifying and critiquing such behavior. Person A, for instance, 
might inquire into the integrity of her partner’s character by asking person C if (in relevant 
respects) B’s behavior is as B says it is when B’s with C and A’s not around. Analogously, we 
sometimes inquire into the integrity of a politician’s position on some issue by comparing how 
he publically presents his own beliefs and what those beliefs imply about how he should act in 
this or that respect with what “the documentary record” tells us about how he does in fact act 
when there isn’t as much pressure to present his beliefs in “the moral way” he does while 
explicating those beliefs in the limelight. (Here, “the documentary record” might include 
interviews with former staff persons, relevant bills that he has either quietly supported or not 
supported during his tenure as a legislator, leaked documents, and so on.) 
 The third way that people exhibit the virtue of integrity in seeking out justifications for 
their expressed policy preferences is, our hypothetical presenter continues, by exhibiting what 
she calls “integrity of principle.” “This consists in the acceptance of the broader implications of 
the principles presupposed by one’s moral positions,” she explains. Of course, “there may be 
good reasons for denying the apparent implications of one’s principles (if, for example, other 
more weighty principles block the inference that would otherwise be warranted.) But even when 
there are such reasons, the burden should fall on those who deny the implications.” In the 
broader culture, it is conventional to test someone’s integrity by assessing to what extent he 
“lives by his (moral or ethical) principles.” To do so, we commonly assess to what extent he: 
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first, recognizes the broader implications of the moral or ethical principles that he explicitly 
defends or that are presupposed by his moral or ethical positions; and second, accepts those 
implications, both in word and in deed. If, for instance, person A says, “I think the invasion of 
Iraq was legitimate, because we thought they had weapons of mass destruction,” person B, 
skeptical of A’s claim, might first ask person A: “Do you realize what that statement implies? 
Think not about the US and Iraq in particular but about any two given countries. If the leadership 
of country X simply says that country Y ‘has weapons of mass destruction,’ do we just believe 
them and therefore accept an invasion as legitimate?” “No,” A might say, “I would only accept 
an invasion as legitimate if the evidence were compelling that country Y did have said weapons.” 
“Ok,” B might respond, “but do you know what that implies?” Among other things, it implies 
that any country that can provide ‘compelling evidence’ that, for instance, the United States has 
weapons of mass destruction could ‘legitimately’ invade the United States. Therefore, any 
country could ‘legitimately’ invade the US, because it is widely known and easily demonstrable 
that the US does have said weapons, e.g., nuclear weapons.” At this point, if A (without adding 
further qualifications) continued to maintain that the US invasion of Iraq was “legitimate” simply 
because “the evidence was compelling that Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction” but 
rejected the claim that “any country could ‘legitimately’ invade the US” as argued above, B 
would have prima facie grounds for accusing A of not showing “integrity of principle.” Hence, B 
could plausibly accuse A of not evincing “civic integrity” in our imagined panelist’s sense. In 
any case, however, the main point is that such engagements are familiar from everyday political-
moral-ethical argumentation; Q-and-As of this kind are so widespread that we might even call 
them “cultural practices for assessing how well one lives by one’s principles.” And to the extent 
that, for instance, panelists can invoke such cultural practices in service of promoting “integrity 
of principle” (hence the virtue of “civic integrity”), they arguably might help participants to 
assume the responsibility for seeking out mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons 
for their expressed preferences – hence help the process better to approximate the Criterion of 
Enlightened Understanding. Likewise, to the extent that, for instance, panelists can invoke 
cultural practices (like the ones mentioned above) in the service of promoting “consistency in 
speech” and “consistency between speech and action” (hence the virtue of “civic integrity”), they 
arguably might help participants to assume the responsibility for seeking out mutually acceptable 
and generally accessible reasons for their expressed policy preferences – hence help the process 
better to approximate the Criterion of Enlightened Understanding. 
Turning to the final three days of the conference, note that the participants will here 
collaborate on writing a report that outlines their (say) two main policy recommendations, 
elaborating on how to make them as actionable as possible. They will then present the report to 
the experts and interest-group representatives who had earlier presented, alongside national 
policymakers, the media, selected participants from the local-level meetings and other interested 
members of the public who will have assembled to receive the report. The expert and interest-
group presenters from both groups will then be given the opportunity to reply, and the citizens’ 
panel will then be free to revise their report. Ideally, the media will broadcast this final set of 
interactions between the citizens’ panel, the experts, and the interest-group representatives in 
unedited and unabbreviated from. 
The organizers will include professionally trained facilitators throughout the process, but 
these facilitators, like the citizen-participants, will not be experts on the relevant topic. An 
external advisory body will oversee the whole process. This body will maintain the integrity of 
the procedure, compile the list of presenters, develop the briefing materials, manage contact with 
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the media and the public, and select the participants and facilitators. As indicated, the organizers 
will attempt to provide balance throughout (or, what is to say the same thing differently, will try 
to expose the participants to as broad a spectrum of relevant and reasonable opinions as 
possible), including when they compile the list of potential expert/interest-group presenters. The 
external advisory body will generally include academics, practitioners of public participation, 
and a diverse group of experts on US foreign policy. 
Now, if each state-level meeting generates 2 proposals for action, we obviously end up 
with 100 proposals – a great many indeed. So, we propose the following way of whittling down 
the proposals before convening the national-level meeting. Let us aim for having 10 proposals in 
the end. To arrive at the ten, the organizers from WDOFP will compile the 100 proposals and 
then make them public in one document. A panel of experts from WDOFP will then combine 
proposals that are essentially the same; presumably there will be a fair number of these. (Since 
the proposals will all be publically available in one document, the panel will have strong 
incentives to combine proposals in a reasonable way, faithful to the intent of the original 
proposals. Were they to manipulate the content of the proposals in this process, they would 
clearly lose credibility in the public’s eye.) From there, let us suppose that the panel may arrive 
at a list of about 25 proposals, each of which will be presented with a brief 
description/explanation. The participants from the local-level meetings and the participants from 
the state-level meetings will then vote on the remaining proposals. The ballot will ask voters both 
to rank order the proposals and to give each of them a “Yes” or “No” vote. Any proposal that 
receives a simply majority of “No” votes will not move forward to the next level. Let us say that 
15 of the original 25 proposals receive a simple majority of “Yes” votes. We’ll then use the rank-
order priority votes to weight the remaining 15 proposals, generating a list that indicates which is 
the most popular proposal, the second most popular proposal, the third most popular proposal, 
and so on, all the way down to the fifteenth most popular proposal. The 10 most popular 
proposals will then be sent to the third level, the national deliberation and dialogue on the 
intervention in question.  
Again, the meeting at this level will concern the same on-going intervention. The national 
dialogue and deliberation will primarily be modeled on the practice of deliberative polling. 
Unlike conventional polls, “a deliberative poll attempts to model what the public would think, 
had it a better opportunity to consider the questions at issue.”76 It does so by modeling citizen 
deliberation under ideal conditions. To date, scores of deliberative polls have been conducted 
throughout the world at local, regional, and national levels, some of which have already 
addressed foreign policy issues. (The first international deliberative poll took place in the EU in 
October 2007.) The events sometimes include over 400 individuals and have sometimes been 
broadcast on national TV. For instance, during the 1996 U.S. presidential primary, some 10 
million television-viewers watched a deliberative poll of 460 participants.77 We think that a 
similarly sized deliberative poll at the national level would be appropriate for our purposes. 
WDOFP will work hard to obtain extensive media coverage and analysis of the event, and will 
provide its own analyses of the same. More broadly, we also think that, ideally speaking, 
                                                            
76 Fishkin (1995: 162). This summary is based primarily on Fishkin and Farrar (2005). As before, it would be 
cumbersome to signal which aspects of the proposal are directly inspired by the deliberative polling model and 
which aspects of it are modifications of deliberative polling as it is typically practiced. So, we simply refer the 
reader to the above sources for comparison. 
77 Levine (2002, 78). 
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recurrent deliberative polls at the national-level should be broadcast on national TV, made 
available for streaming online, and radio broadcast.  
 The selection of participants will occur by random phone dialing. A warm-up letter will 
be sent to a random sample of phone listings and a follow-up call will then made. People who 
choose to participate will be compensated for their time. In past deliberative polls, participants 
have approximated the initial sample and the larger target population in both their surveyed 
attitude and their demographic characteristics, and we expect the same result here. Usually, the 
participants to a deliberative poll are sent background materials that provide an array of 
information and perspectives on the issues in question. Here, too, this will happen, but the 
background materials will be complied in a specific manner, loosely as follows. Recall that the 
local-level organizers from the WDOFP will have previously created and published summaries 
of all of the local-level meetings. In addition, recall that the original 100 proposals from the 50 
state-level meetings will already be published and available to the public. Furthermore, recall 
that a panel of experts will already have combined proposals that are essentially the same, 
reducing the total to about, say, 25 total proposals, and will have generated a brief 
description/explanation of each of these. Finally, recall that a list of the top 10 proposals will 
have been generated through the voting process previously described. Now, the background 
materials will provide information about where to find all of this information online, namely, on 
the WDOFP’s website, where it will all be clearly organized and downloadable. More 
importantly, however, the background materials will list the top 10 proposals alongside the 
accompanying descriptions/explanations that were generated by WDOFP’s expert panel. In 
addition, it will also include brief expert commentary on each of the proposals. As before, the 
organizers will try to choose experts who will offer commentaries that convey as diverse a range 
of opinions as possible. 
 Now we consider the event itself. The event will include both small-group discussions 
and a plenary session during which participants will be able to ask questions of an expert panel. 
Experienced moderators will facilitate the small group discussions. The moderators will be 
trained to: remain neutral, not to impart information, to support broad participation, and to 
refrain from promoting consensus among the participants. There will be no restriction on what 
participants can say or on the kind of speech they can use. Participants will not be instructed to 
refrain from storytelling or to rely exclusively on arguments. They will also not be asked to 
restrict their speech to appeals to the common good. The organizers will attempt to provide 
balance in training the moderators, in selecting the experts, and, as indicated, in preparing the 
briefing materials. As with the state-level meetings, the organizers might again encourage the 
panelists (or at least some subsection of them) to offer presentations that encourage the 
participants to develop the specific intellectual, moral, and ethical virtues that, in this specific 
context, they think would arguably assist participants in assuming (dispose them to assume) the 
responsibilities that are specified (or entailed) by our ideal procedural criteria. And, in doing so, 
they might encourage the panelists to draw on certain cultural practices that can promote a social 
environment that is conducive to the effective assumption of those responsibilities and to the 
effective cultivation of the corollary virtues they have identified. Pre- and post-deliberation 
surveys will permit the organizers to assess shifts in participants’ knowledge of relevant factual 
questions and in their considered judgments about the 10 proposals under consideration (again, 
those generated from the earlier state-level meetings).  Having sketched our proposal, we conclude by briefly indicating how we might relate 
this proposal to our earlier description of the proper role of the press/media in a democratic 
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society. In brief, our suggestion here is that we can substitute references to “the press/media” in 
that summary for references to “the participatory process for public-opinion and agenda-setting 
in some policy area.” Doing so, we believe, is one compelling way to argue for the creation of 
such a process – to reason analogically from (a somewhat modified and extended version of) a 
familiar argument in American political cultural to an argument about the “democratic 
usefulness,” so to speak, of crafting a participatory process of public-opinion formation and 
agenda-setting in some policy area. In a succinct formulation, this is what the argument roughly 
looks like. 
We first presume that, in the context of a democratic process, citizens need some 
“adequate” level of “relevant” information to make political participation (at least reasonably) 
meaningful in the policy area in question. (Or, if we were to invoke our own normative theory of 
the democratic process here, which is built up out of reflection on everyday experience with 
“treatment as free and equal” in joint or collective decision-making, we could say: In the context 
of a democratic process in some policy area, “each citizen or member ought to have adequate 
and equal opportunities for discovering and validating [within the time permitted by the need for 
a decision] the choice on the matter to be decided that would best serve the citizen’s or member’s 
good or interests.” These opportunities allow political participation to be [at least reasonably] 
meaningful in that policy area.) Correspondingly, the democratic ideal tells us that, in that 
context, we should think of social inquiry – including the inquiries carried out in and through 
“the participatory process for public-opinion formation and agenda-setting” in question – as (in 
part at least) a means for allowing citizens to obtain an “adequate” level of information about the 
past, present, and/or proposed actions of “relevant” agents or agencies, including “public” ones 
(The Presumed Requirement of Relevant Information for Meaningful Participation). Second, we 
presume that in order to obtain such information no single individual may conceivably act alone 
(The Presumption of Dependence on Public Information). Third, we presume that in order to 
obtain such information, citizens cannot, and should not, rely solely on information provided by 
the public authorities themselves, but rather should have access to “independent” and “critical” 
sources of such information. What is more, we presume that such information is best generated, 
and then dispersed, socially or publically, but not in the sense of “by the government,” and that 
the participatory process for public-opinion formation and agenda-setting in question is to play 
this role (The Presumed Requirement of Independent and Critical Public Information). To the 
extent that it does so, the process in question, we have reason to believe, would therefore serve a 
crucial function on behalf of the respective democratic system or the broader democratic process 
of which it is a part, presumably allowing the relevant demos to play a more meaningful role in it 
(The Presumed Contribution of an Independent Public-Opinion Formation and Agenda-Setting 
Process to Meaningful Participation). Accordingly, an independent public-opinion formation 
and agenda-setting process is viewed as a necessary element of our capacity to realize (at least 
certain of) the basic aims of the democratic process, or is at least seen as an important 
contributing factor to it, and we therefore presume that, “from a democratic point of view,” we 
have good reason to want to protect the right and guard or enhance the ability of the process in 
question to be so critical and independent (The Presumed Need to Protect an Independent and 
Critical Public-Opinion Formation and Agenda-Setting Process). However, it does not appear 
possible to generate an “adequate” level of “independent” and “critical” public information 
merely through a “procedure,” and no formal or legal guarantee would seem to be able to secure 
its production either. To do so, we instead must rely, in some significant measure, on the 
intellectual, ethical, and moral virtues of those who are involved in producing and distributing 
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that information (all those persons who are involved in the process in question), and on their 
willingness to do so (The Presumed Need to Cultivate the Virtues Needed for the Production of 
Critical and Independent Public Information). These virtues, we presume, are best promoted by 
the encouragement of certain cultural practices. Such cultural practices would appear useful – 
indeed, perhaps they are effectively necessary – for the realization of (certain of) our basic 
democratic aims, including the aim of allowing the people to “get what it wants (or thinks best)” 
(The Presumed Need to Cultivate the Cultural Practices Needed for the Production of Critical 
and Independent Public Information). (Or, if we were again to invoke our own normative theory 
of the democratic process, we could say: Such cultural practices would appear useful for – 
perhaps, indeed, they are necessary elements of – our attempt to grant each citizen “equal and 
adequate opportunities for discovering and validating [within the time permitted by the need for 
a decision] the choice on the matter to be decided that would best serve the citizen’s good or 
interests,” as the Criterion of Enlightened Understanding asks us to do.) 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, I have developed a normative theory of the democratic process and 
have tried to illustrate how engaged, situated agents might invoke that theory in their diverse 
efforts to craft processes for collective decision-making that treat the citizens of the respective 
demos or the members of the respective association as “free and equal,” or, as “autonomous 
moral equals.” Two overarching questions have motivated the entire discussion: How might the 
participants to a (nominally) democratic process themselves craft decision-making processes that 
are “inclusive,” or, that best approximate the ideal of treating them and those (if any) they (ought 
to) represent as “free and equal”? And what role, if any, might “normative democratic theory” 
play in their efforts to do so? 
To address these questions, I have developed a normative theory of the democratic 
process, which articulates ideal procedural criteria for such a process. Broadly speaking, I have 
suggested that this theory ought to be viewed like pragmatists typically think that all theories 
should be viewed: as articulating standards that emerge out of our inquiries into how well our 
practices have fared in various circumstances, which we in turn use to judge the rightness or 
wrongness, or adequacy or inadequacy, of the practices out of which the standards themselves 
emerge. For the purposes of crafting a democratic process, I have suggested, the practices in 
question are those that we employ in paradigmatic moments of “free and equal treatment” in 
joint or collective decision-making, for it is through an appeal to “the values” of treating persons 
as free and as equal (or as equal and as autonomous) that we may arguably justify the democratic 
process in the first place. Furthermore, I have suggested that we think of these criteria as 
descriptions of the ideal, defining features of a process for “binding,” collective decision-making 
that treats persons as free and equal. And I have described how and why I think that these ideal 
procedural criteria should “guide” democracy’s participants as they move forward into new, 
problematic situations. More specifically, I have defended the idea that these criteria can and 
should help democracy’s participants to conduct empirical inquiries that illuminate how they 
might best realize the values and uphold the norms that the ideal procedural criteria themselves 
articulate. Still more specifically, I have indicated how and why democracy’s participants can 
and should use these ideal procedural criteria as a “tool” for practical reasoning, one that can 
assist them in conducting empirical inquiries into the procedures, virtues, and cultural practices 
that, in whatever particular context they do (have to) act, are most apt to promote the effective 
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granting of the opportunities that are specified by the ideal procedural criteria and are most apt to 
promote participants’ effective assumption of the responsibilities that are specified (or entailed) 
by those criteria. 
As this formulation suggests, my conception of the democratic process places a great deal 
of stress on “inquiry”: for instance, into procedures, virtues, and cultural practices. But, to recall, 
it also stresses inquiry into much else besides: for instance, into what could count as mutually 
acceptable and generally accessible reasons for participants’ expressed policy preferences; and 
second, into how all relevant persons interpret the actual or potential consequences of the past, 
present, and/or proposed actions of “relevant” agents and/or agencies and how all such persons 
interpret how (if at all) those actions bore, bear, and/or might bear on the good of each of them or 
on their own respective interests. 
Furthermore, I have indicated why I believe that the democratic process itself ought to be 
conducted as a “reflexive social practice”: as a practice in which participants recognize the 
potential need to inquire, and, as appropriate, actually do inquire, into the (potential or actual) 
moral or ethical significance and implications of whatever is said (and not said) in whatever 
inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, the democratic process. As just noted, my 
conception of inquiry stresses at least three major forms of inquiry: inquiry the procedures, 
virtues, and cultural practices that, in whatever particular context participants do (have to) act, 
are most apt to promote the effective granting of the opportunities that are specified by the ideal 
procedural criteria and are most apt to promote participants’ effective assumption of the 
responsibilities that are specified (or entailed) by those criteria; inquiry into what could count as 
mutually acceptable and generally accessible reasons for participants’ expressed policy 
preferences; and inquiry into how all relevant persons interpret the actual or potential 
consequences of the past, present, and/or proposed actions of “relevant” agents and/or agencies 
and how all such persons interpret how (if at all) those actions bore, bear, and/or might bear on 
the good of each of them or on their own respective interests. So, in speaking of the (potential or 
actual) moral or ethical significance and implications of whatever is said (and not said) in 
whatever inquiries are fed into, or invoked in the context of, the democratic process, these are the 
“inquiries” that I primarily have had in mind. To recall, I offered this line of argumentation 
mainly because there is a traditional view of moral or ethical reasoning that I find deeply 
mistaken. According to this view, “rational” moral or ethical decision-making has two clearly 
distinct and separable “moments”: a “value-free” and/or “value-neutral” one, where we first 
figure out what our situation is; and (as we might put it) a “value-guided” and “value-laden” one, 
where we then decide how we would should (like to) act in light of that situation. As we saw, the 
problem with this view is that all inquiry is apparently “value-guided” and “value-laden,” and so 
there apparently is no form of inquiry that is “value-free” and/or “value-neutral.” And from this 
it follows, I suggested, that anything we say (and do not say) in any of our inquiries could have 
“moral or ethical significance and implications.” Hence, I suggested that we instead endorse (and 
that our normative theory of the democratic process gives us good reason to endorse) a view of 
“rational” moral or ethical decision-making that views it as being best conducted as a reflexive 
social practice, in the above sense. 
 The conception of the democratic process that emerges from these reflections is, as I 
earlier noted, aptly described as “Deliberative Democracy as Reflexive Social Inquiry.” In brief, 
it is a “deliberative” conception because, like other such conceptions, it stresses that, ideally 
speaking, democracy’s participants ought to try to justify their expressed policy preferences to 
one another. (Recall that, on the normative theory developed in chapter 5, the ideal requirement 
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is actually that participants try to justify their expressed policy preferences to all “relevant 
persons” – not that they simply try to justify their expressed policy preferences to the other 
participants and/or to the citizens or members of the demos or association in question.) Yet, the 
conception of the democratic process developed here is distinctive in the degree to which it 
places emphasis on inquiry, and, more particularly, on inquiry of the various kinds described in 
the last paragraph. This distinguishes it from depictions of democratic deliberation that define 
such deliberation as primarily consisting in “debate.” (In Deliberative Democracy: A Critical 
Introduction, Zsuzsanna Chappell, for instance, defines “democratic deliberation as un-coerced, 
other-regarding, reasoned, inclusive and equal debate.”78 As suggested, debate does play an 
important role in my conception of democratic deliberation; but, given the stress that my 
conception also places on inquiry and dialogue, I would not, in the way that Chappell does, 
define “democratic deliberation” as consisting, or as primarily consisting, in “debate.”) Yet, it is 
also distinctive for another reason, for it emphasizes that we should conduct the democratic 
process in a very particular way – that, in the democratic forum, we should always recognize the 
potential need to inquire, and that, as appropriate, we actually should inquire, into the (potential 
or actual) “moral or ethical significance and implications” of whatever is said (and not said) in 
whatever inquires are fed into, or invoked in the context, of that process, including all of the 
various types of inquiry just mentioned. In the main, theorists of deliberative democracy have not 
paid much attention to the question of what, if anything, their respective theories might imply for 
how participants to the democratic process ought ideally to regard whatever “knowledge,” 
“information,” and “data” is fed into, or invoked in the context of, the democratic process. By 
contrast, I have argued that a deliberative conception of democracy demands precisely that 
participants do regard such knowledge, information, and data in a particular way, namely, as 
involving linguistic expressions any one of which could have “moral or ethical significance and 
implications.” In this way, I have put the politics of knowledge production at the center of a 
deliberative conception of democracy. And in this way, I have suggested that, properly 
conducted, democratic practice ought to be “Socratic” as well as “Deweyan” in its commitments: 
“Socratic” in its resolute commitment to the maxim, “Know thyself,” to the idea that we should 
constantly ask ourselves who we are and what our deepest commitments are, putting these 
commitments and self-understandings to the test of searching self-scrutiny; and “Deweyan” in its 
equal commitment to the idea that one of the principal tasks of democracy is to elucidate the 
modes of thought and action that prevail in our respective cultures, engaging us in a kind of 
collective scrutiny of those cultures, in order that we might improve our ability to think, and to 
inquire, and to act more intelligently, so that, among other things, we might better formulate and 
realize our own individual and collective (democratic) aims.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
78 Chappell (2012: 7). 
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